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University of California

Santa Barbara

**The Democratization of South Korea and Taiwan:
Elections, Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform**

**A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy**

in Political Science

by

Natasha Frantz

Committee in charge:

Professor Alan P. Liu, Chair

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March 2002

Part I.

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
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
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March 2002

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Elections, Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform**

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Abstract

Democratization of South Korea and Taiwan: Elections, Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform

By

Natasha M. Frantz

Political scientists have searched for the motivating factors behind democratization in developing countries, including South Korea and Taiwan. So far, though—mainly because of their economic achievements, the bulk of the English language studies on South Korea and Taiwan have focused on the role of economic growth in the democratization process. By contrast this study focuses on the political factors, most specifically the role of electoral systems, elections, and how electoral reform came to fruition. To do so, it qualitatively examines both South Korean and Taiwanese history and their political contexts from 1895 to current. It also looks at elections, electoral rules and conferences, where key changes were made to the system. Besides highlighting the importance of electoral systems and elections in democratic transitions, the thesis argues that the democratization process differed in South Korea and Taiwan.

In addition, the dissertation explores the issue of representation in South Korea and Taiwan and compares it to studies done on representation in Western democratic countries.

It finds that representation occurs much differently in South Korea and Taiwan, than in Western democratic countries, indicating the importance of history, culture and institutions on how democracies operate.

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Introduction

Purpose

For a long time, the majority of scholarship on South Korea and Taiwan was concerned mainly with their impressive economic developments. Recently, however, more studies have focused on their equally impressive political transformations from authoritarian regimes to electoral democracies. The purpose of my thesis is to examine and compare the role that the electoral system has played in the democratization of Taiwan and South Korea in the late 1980's. In addition, the thesis also intends to explain why South Korea's democratization process differed from that of Taiwan's. Since the bulk of English language studies in these two countries have stressed the role of economic growth on democratization, my study deliberately plays up the political causal forces. I have kept the references to economic factors to the minimum. Finally, the thesis explores how representation occurs in Taiwan and South Korea and explains why it differs from Western democratic countries.

Contributions

Political scientists have published an extensive amount of work on democratization. These works have focused on numerous political and economic factors that explain transitions to democracy. Scholars such as

Lipset (1960) have focused on the economic variables that are important to transitions. Lipset argued that stable democracies are most likely to occur in the most developed and affluent societies, indicating the importance of economic growth to democratic development. Huntington (1968) focused on the importance of strong and stable institutions, in addition to a strong military to provide political order. Moore (1966) hypothesized that the road to democracy was paved by bourgeois revolutions. He argued, in explaining the conditions for democratic development, that the importance in democratic transitions lied in the relations between the bourgeoisie and the rural classes of peasants and landed aristocracy. Thus, the relations between different classes were examined in depth. Putnam (1993) stressed the role of culture in democratic development by examining both northern and southern Italy. He emphasized the cultural traditions of both countries as the key elements in explaining the success of democracies. Higley and Burton (1989) focused on how domestic elite interrelations affect regime stability. They claimed that a unified national elite produced a stable regime that may evolve into a modern democracy, if economic and other facilitative conditions allowed for this. Finally Rueschemyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) claimed that the balance of class power fundamentally shapes the chances for democracy. They argued that it is the struggle between the dominant and subordinate classes over the right to rule that decides the prospects for democracy. In addition, they argued that capitalist development also affects the chances of

democracy because it transforms class structure and changes the balance of power between classes.

Thus, the literature on democratization has focused on the role of economic variables, culture, class relations, the military and institutions, the balance of class power and the cohesiveness of the elite. Nevertheless, despite the abundance of this literature, the role of the electoral system in the democratization process has not been examined extensively. In this thesis I not only examine the democratic transitions that occurred in South Korea and Taiwan, but more specifically my work focuses on the role of electoral systems, elections, and electoral reform.

As it happens, the literature on electoral systems is itself extensive. Scholars such as Duverger (1954) argued that different electoral systems determined the number of parties in a particular political system. He theorized that using single member district/plurality (SMD) would lead to a two-party system and using proportional representation (PR) would lead to a multi-party system. This argument was met with much praise, but also criticism. Other scholars soon responded to what became known as the *Duverger's Law* and *Duverger's Hypothesis*, respectively, by arguing that Duverger had reversed the causal direction. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) claimed that the number of cleavages already present at the time of state building would determine the type of electoral system that a country would implement. Others such as Riker (1986), Rae (1971) and Cox (1997) also

responded to these claims (to be examined in depth in Part IV). Though the findings set forth by the aforementioned scholars have made significant contributions to better understanding party systems in Western democracies, little work has been done on countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, and they have largely ignored the issue of whether their results are applicable in non-Western contexts.

In addition, scholars such as Converse (1964), Miller and Stokes (1963), Downs (1957) and Dalton (1988) have made contributions to voting and representation literature. These scholars have made various hypotheses regarding how representation occurs, by what pathway and to what extent. Converse argued that voters know very little about politics and have little interest in it, indicating that representation almost does not matter. Downs (1957) argued that legislators are mainly concerned with winning and care very little about issues, and simply move to the middle of the left to right ideological spectrum in order to win the most votes, indicating that there is little representation, if any. Miller and Stokes (1963) argued that representation occurs by two different pathways, either through a *delegate model*, where the legislator closely follows the views of his or her constituents or through a *trustee model*, where the legislator knows best and therefore, does not try to match the views of his or her constituency. Finally, Dalton (1988) argued that Miller and Stokes had not identified how representation occurs in European democracies and claimed that representation occurs

through parties. He hypothesized that representation occurs through the *responsible party model*, where parties set forth clear platforms that they stick to, and voters are well aware of this. Thus, voters vote for the party whose platform most closely corresponds with their views.

These studies, however, have a major drawback. They neglect to explain how representation operates in non-Western countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan. Correcting this drawback is the aim of the thesis. None of the aforementioned models apply to South Korea and Taiwan and therefore, this study sets forth another model of how representation can occur (to be discussed further in part IV).

Why are elections important?

Why study the role of elections in democratic transitions? Why are elections important? Elections can play an important role even when they occur in non-democratic countries. They are not only a primary means of consolidating control, but also of gaining feedback on the ruling party's performance. They provide a channel for increased political participation.

Elections have been the avenue for political reform and have empowered people. Eventually the exposure to elections, no matter how undemocratic they were when they were initially implemented, have granted individuals the experience of how to compete and voice opposing views over different political issues. Holding elections does not make a country

democratic, but experience with participating in elections, do acclimate both the elite and the masses to what democratic practices.

Case Selection

There are several reasons for examining the evolution and impact of electoral systems---subject always to contextual political cultural influences---in South Korea and Taiwan. Both countries rapidly industrialized at the height of the Cold War era, have strong Confucian influences, and have received substantial military and economic aid from the United States. By assuming that they are exactly the same, one misses some of the key contrasting elements of their transitions to democracy. By better understanding some of these key elements, one can provide lessons to other countries in the midst of making institutional choices.

Because South Korea and Taiwan match up similarly on many independent variables, this makes it much easier to isolate the key differences in their democratic transitions. In examining both countries, a more thorough investigation can be done regarding how electoral institutions work in other settings. This is particularly important in the case of South Korea and Taiwan, because they are at a critical stage of their political development.

The leadership (post World War II) from both countries exhibited similar goals and interests. They had a need to earn legitimacy. They have

sought to gain legitimacy in several ways: through economic development, personalistic leadership, and by maintaining the minimum level of democracy (holding elections). This enabled both countries to maintain support from the international community and from the populace. Both countries also had the need for control over society and security, and were not allowing any level of uncertainty regarding the electoral process. This need manifested itself in the implementation of martial law and authoritarian measures to control society and the opposition. Moreover, both countries had a strong executive, a weak legislature, and censorship over public information and media, persecution of the political opposition, and unfair campaign laws. In both countries, vote buying and other election frauds were widespread.

Taiwanese and South Korean authorities justified their need to control society on the basis of near-by communist threats. They also claimed that their leadership was the most qualified to achieve development. Also, in Taiwan, economic development and security and tight organization were justified because of the lofty goal of driving the Communists out of China and unifying the country.

Underneath these political similarities between Taiwan and South Korea are shared cultural and historical experiences. Both countries are small in size and bordered by aggressive neighbors. Traditionally, they were deeply influenced by the Confucian values. Their political heritage has been authoritarian. In modern times, Taiwan and South Korea had been Japanese

colonies until the end of the World War II. During the Cold War era, both economic aid and political influences from the U.S. have had major impacts in Taiwan and South Korea.

Thus, both countries appear very similar based on all of these cultural and historical contextual factors, but in comparing them, their differences are also clearly delineated, thus throwing into relief the intricate relations between variables of democratization.

Variables to be examined

My analysis consists of two sections. Parts II through III focuses on the electoral system, its evolution and operation. Part IV deals with the background factors that have possibly affected the electoral system.

In Parts II through III, I will focus on the changes that both countries made to their respective electoral systems. Some of these changes are efforts of democratic reform. This includes any amendment or rule enacted by the government that impinges on how representatives at any level are elected. Specifically, they encompass: changes made to the campaign laws, nominating procedures, election of local politicians, voting procedures, district size, translation of votes into seats, election of the president, the frequency of elections, monitoring corruption, size of legislature, vote counting and thresholds for forming new parties.

Then, in Part IV, I shall describe how these institutions function. The manner in which the electoral institutions perform will be compared to other democracies and will be examined in chapters 17-19. More specifically, the study examines the factors that affect how democratic the representative institutions are and how these institutions compare to other democracies. These factors include: the number of viable parties, the saliency of political issues, the strength of party loyalty, the strength of ideology, and the relationship between voters and legislators.

In Parts II through III, and IV respectively, I shall describe two groups of background factors, the first being political and the second, cultural. The political factors are: (1) the effect of U.S. pressure and involvement, (2) the effect of the political culture of the elite, (3) the goals and interests of the elite, (4) the strength and cohesiveness of the opposition, (5) the effect of the disapproval or approval of the electorate, and (6) the leaders' perceptions of how secure or threatening they were by either Communist China or North Korea

The historical and cultural background factors described in Part VI are: (1) the historical heritage of Taiwan and Korea, (2) regionalism, (3) personalism, (4) the prevalence of factionalism and patron-client relationships and (5) the level of vote buying and corruption.

A brief review of the different sections of my thesis is now in order.

Part I: Historical Context-(Before 1945)

The argument begins by analyzing the cultural and historical context of both countries. This includes brief references to the political culture and a more in depth look into the effects of Japanese colonialism. The history and effects of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and South Korea differed and this shaped the way each country looked at elections and their functions.

Japanese rule has had important effects on the political cultures of both countries, which explains partly the initial stages of pseudo-democratization in both states. All of these influences will be compared and contrasted. From looking at the historical context, one can also better understand the elites' values, their reasons for making certain critical decisions and the public's reactions to policy.

The heritage and historical legacies of Taiwan and South Korea (from 1895- to current) help explain how and which institutions were established and what their ultimate effects were. It also explains why some institutions were stable and others were not. I will also show how Japanese rule impacted the degree of political socialization of both the elite and the public in South Korea and Taiwan.

The Paths to Democracy: Taiwan and South Korea

The Politics of Electoral Engineering: Institutional Choice and Effects

Chapters 2 and 8 in Parts II and III, respectively examine the immediate political contexts- the post-war situations in Taiwan and South Korea. The thesis will compare and contrast the differences between Taiwan and South Korea and how these differences affected the way their political systems operate and the strength of their political institutions. I will look at the role of the United States as well.

After describing the historical and the post-war political contexts, the thesis will analyze and explore the origin of the electoral laws in Taiwan and South Korea in chapters 3-6 and 8-9, respectively. It will show that each change to the laws results from elites' response to the political environment and their goals and interests at the time. I will argue that the elites' decisions were shaped by several factors: the opposition's response to the rules of the game, the actions and diplomatic messages from the United States, the political support from the electorate, and their perception of how secure or threatened they were by either Communist China or North Korea. The Taiwanese and South Korean elites took into consideration these factors in their drives to achieve legitimacy. When the elites' interests of maintaining order and control over society were more urgent, exceeding the need to achieve legitimacy, they manipulated laws to serve these interests.

Finally, it should be noted that though chapters 3-6 describe the origin and manipulation of the electoral laws in Taiwan, the process of democratic reform is also discussed. Because Taiwan's path to democracy was a much more linear, smooth, and gradual process, this evolution is traced to its entirety in Part II. In South Korea, there were severe bumps to the process, so I trace the Korean experience differently in three sections in Part III.

The Path to Democracy:

Examining the Factors that Delayed Democratic Reform in South Korea

Though Taiwan had already begun democratizing by 1972, South Korea, at that time, was implementing one of its most authoritarian constitutions to date. While the role of leaders such as Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, will be examined in chapter 9, the role of other factors such as the effects of security concerns of the United States and the lack of a unified opposition will be examined in chapters 10-12. I discuss the role of the United States in terms of three periods- 1950-1960, 1961-1979 and 1980-1985- coinciding with the Presidential terms, of Rhee, Park, and Chun, respectively. But I will categorize my description of the opposition into the periods of 1960-1979 and 1980-1988.

The Paths to Democracy

The Politics of Electoral Reform-

Analyzing the Factors that Influenced Democratic Reform

Political leaders in Taiwan and South Korea at first designed electoral systems for insuring control and legitimacy. But as the overall political environment gradually moved in the direction of reform, the electoral system also changed. Chapter 3-7 and 13-15 respectively, describe the reform processes in the two countries.

Reforms that were intended to democratize each country's regimes occurred at different stages for South Korea and Taiwan, at a different pace, and due to different motivating factors. Taiwan's path to democratization was much more gradual and was a "trickle-down" process. Steps in the shape of electoral reform as well as other constitutional amendments were implemented in Taiwan at a snail's pace. Nevertheless, despite the unhurried pace of reform, Taiwan rarely enacted policy that was intended to halt the process of democratization and revert back to authoritarianism. Taiwan was under strong control from a well-organized party headed by powerful leaders who were able to have a large influence in dictating the pace of democratization. Thus, the periods of reform to be examined mirror the length of tenure of the three primary leaders with the exception of the recently elected Chen Shui-bien.

Chapter 3 will first examine why Chiang Kai-shek, the first leader of the Republic of China on Taiwan (here after, the R.O.C.), made steps towards liberalization, particularly with respect to the electoral laws. This period begins in 1950 and ends with Chiang's death in 1975. In chapter 4, I suggest the reasons that influenced Chiang Ching-kuo (hereafter, CCK), son of Chiang Kai-shek, to make changes and implement reforms. This period begins in 1972 and ends with CCK's death in 1988. It also discusses how the opposition affected CCK's decisions and electoral reform. Chapter 5 examines the effects of the electoral laws more comprehensively in order to explain how the laws benefited the KMT. It also looks at the effects of more recent reform efforts. Chapter 6 will look at Lee Teng Hui's tenure and why democratic measures were passed during 1988 –2000. Finally, chapter 7 examines post –democratization politics in Taiwan and specifically looks at its most recent elections. Essentially, each period witnessed more progress towards democratization although the progress, at times, was very slow to say the least.

As mentioned above, there have been severe jolts in the South Korean process of democratization. The role of leadership in South Korea is also important, possibly exceeding the influence of leadership in Taiwan. Personalism affects both countries' political systems and political behavior but this factor is much more damaging in South Korea than Taiwan. In the South

Korean case, personalism has affected the success or failure of the opposition and has stunted the institutionalization of political parties.

The South Korean history of reform was much shorter (to be discussed in chapters 13-16). Democratic measures were not enacted until after 1987, and unlike Taiwan, came from the bottom up, in a "bubble-up" process. Prior to this date, half-hearted measures were made during the beginning of the regime as well, such as a disastrous first attempt at a cabinet style of government. No significant or permanent reforms were passed that were intended to make steps towards democratization or democratic consolidation until after 1987 when the leadership at the time was given no choice. The explosive and unstable nature of the South Korean case was illustrated by two coups, one assassination, one overthrow of the president and over six major changes to the Constitution. The electoral laws underwent seven major changes during this period. The first six changes represented the leadership's attempts to manipulate the rules of democracy to guarantee outcomes that served their interests. It wasn't until Roh Tae Woo came to power in 1988 and was given almost no choice (due to the forces from below) but to democratize, that democratic reforms were finally implemented, making the electoral system more democratic. I will examine the numerous forces bargaining and affecting Roh's decision to democratize and liberalize in this section.

Finally, some of the more recent and important elections will also be analyzed.

Part IV: Examining Representation Literature:

What are the Implications for South Korea and Taiwan?

In this section I examine the origin of electoral institutions and the role of political factors, such as electoral laws, in democratic transitions. In addition, I will review the literature on electoral systems, representation and the saliency of political issues and representation. Moreover, I will examine empirical work on electoral systems in other countries. Finally, I will test Western theories of electoral systems on Taiwan and South Korea, including theories on the pathways of representation, and on the saliency of political issues and ideology.

After describing the electoral systems and political reforms in South Korea and Taiwan, the thesis then compares and contrasts the functions of elections in non- Western democracies. The implementation of elections does not guarantee that representation will occur according to the same models and pathways proposed by scholars who have concentrated on Western democracies. I illustrate the difficulties of making these comparisons at the present time, despite scholarly consensus that both Taiwan and South Korea have become democratic nations.

The political systems of Taiwan and South Korea function much differently from Western democracies. For example, there is an absence of party loyalty in South Korea. In both South Korea and Taiwan parties can't be easily distinguished based on different political issues. There are not clear cleavages that can explain partisan support. Vote buying is still a common occurrence. Regionalism and personalism are still important elements in South Korean politics. There are more political parties than one would theoretically expect in South Korea. These are just a few of the differences that explain why South Korean and Taiwanese institutions cannot be expected to function in the same way as those in the West.

Currently, there are still several factors that disrupt the democratization process. Both countries have not witnessed complete elite commitment to democracy. In Taiwan, the campaign method and reliance on patron-client relationships are still problematic. In South Korea, the leadership continues to regress to old habits of handling political interactions in an authoritarian manner and resorting to the habits of past regimes. This makes it difficult for South Korea to truly operate as a democracy since the elites are still using their personal characteristics, appeal and access to patronage to make them above the law and exempt from following rules and regulations. Nevertheless, because elections continue to be held in both countries, the future of democratic consolidation looks promising.

I conclude by discussing the general lessons of these two Asian cases of democracy. I offer my thoughts on the state of democracy in South Korea and Taiwan and what the future holds regarding their democratic stability. I finally suggest research directions for studying representation in non-Western countries.

Part I.

Historical Context: South Korea and Taiwan

Chapter 1

Effects of Japanese Colonialism: Taiwan and South Korea

Taiwanese and South Koreans have vastly different opinions of their colonial experiences despite both being colonized by Japan for roughly the same amount of time, (50 years for Taiwan and 35 years for South Korea). These differences had lasting effects on each country's political culture and political development. This chapter explains these differences and analyzes what impact Japanese colonialism had on their respective development. Overall, the severity of Japanese colonialism had a more stifling effect on Korean political development than Taiwanese political development. An exploration of Japanese colonialism helps illuminate why Korea's path to democratization was neither smooth nor harmonious.

Though both Korea and Taiwan were colonized by the same country, Taiwanese relations with the Japanese during colonial rule were much more tension-free and harmonious than relations between the Koreans and the Japanese. The Taiwanese were also more ambivalent towards the Japanese. On some levels they resented the Japanese, but to some extent they admired them and

felt that they could learn from some of their practices, sharing similar attitudes. This had to do with many factors, starting with the popular view that the Japanese respected Chinese culture much more than Korean culture (Lai, Myers, Wou 1991: 46). Japanese rule in Taiwan was not totally unpopular especially since the Japanese were very well organized while China at the time, was divided by the fighting between warlords.

The Korean image of the Japanese is that of a cruel tyrant. During colonial rule they held much more contempt for the Japanese and many of these sentiments still remain today. Why is this the case? While the Japanese may have reshaped Taiwan (both economically and politically), they destroyed Korea. They eradicated the Yi dynasty and Korean sovereignty in order to colonize Korea. Koreans were pained by this elimination of their history. The Japanese also attempted to erase all traces of Korean culture and re-socialize and acculturate the Koreans to Japanese customs and language, even changing their surnames. Koreans had much more at stake and much more to lose with the Japanese invasion. They were also treated much more harshly than the Taiwanese. This created a volatile and damaging action and reaction cycle where the Koreans stood up valiantly to their conquerors and the Japanese responded even more harshly.

Taiwan was ceded to the Japanese at the treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 (Lai, Myers, Wou 1991). When the Japanese took over, the Taiwanese attempted to offer military resistance but the Japanese forces rebuked them. Despite the initial hostile welcome, Taiwan was the only colony of Japan that could be considered any type of economic success. Japan brought law and order to the island, which had been absent in the past. The Japanese were much more successful in Taiwan in building their social and economic conditions by building infrastructure, an island-wide road system and establishing a somewhat effective education system. In addition, though the Taiwanese were mainly allowed to study medicine and technical studies at home, there were opportunities to study other subjects in Japan.

Due to Japanese colonialism, the Taiwanese were not westernized and were also guarded from Confucian tradition. They were also isolated from the wars and revolutions that plagued the rest of China. The Taiwanese national identity was not as fully formed as the Koreans' national identity. There was a loose feeling of being either Ming Chinese or part of the Manchu rule. They were also culturally backward, with half of the island under aboriginal control (Chen, I. 1968). When the Japanese arrived, many Taiwanese were economically underdeveloped.

The Koreans, on the other hand, had experienced 2000 years of cultural heritage (Chen, I. 1968). This surpassed even Japanese culture. There were many intellectuals working hard to modernize the nation, before the Japanese colonial period. Thus, the Koreans had already been nationalistic since 1910 and this was only furthered by Japanese rule, which "transformed xenophobia into a modern form of nationalism," (Chen, I. 1968: 326).

The military force used in Taiwan to control the local population was comparatively lenient. Instead of using mostly military government generals as the case in Korea, in Taiwan the Japanese relied on civilian governor-generals. This arrangement continued because the Taiwanese accepted Japanese sovereignty much more quickly than the Koreans. In Korea, the military was used to maintain order and prevent revolts. This did little to deter the Koreans from fighting back, however. Amidst a backdrop of political, economic and social repression, the March Movement in 1919 mobilized the masses into action, in what was the first major mass demonstration against the Japanese. Though the protests were peaceful in nature, the Japanese police responded with force and subsequently reacted more and more severely with each challenge to their authority.

While much less ruthless with the Taiwanese, the Japanese attempted to control them as well. Political and economic controls were utilized in both colonies. The Japanese were very prejudicial and opposed any native suffrage movements. Local autonomy was fixed in favor of the Japanese. None of these measures of control had positive effects for the Japanese, and in both countries merely solidified native feelings and enthusiasm to establish political movements against their oppressors.

The elite groups did what they could to hold onto their cultural heritage and retain ties with other provinces. They tried to persevere and derive whatever advantage they could from their new ruler's policies. Luckily for the Taiwanese, the Japanese did not have the same distaste for Chinese culture as they did for Korean culture. They treated the Taiwanese less harshly than they treated the Koreans. At times the Japanese colonizers even tried to co-opt the Taiwanese into the government (Chen, I. 1968).

This co-optation took many forms. Some of the more prominent Taiwanese were offered rewards or recruited to lead new organizations or police whose responsibilities included supervising household activities. They served as officials in the new prefectures (ken) and department administrative units (cho) below the central bureaucracy of the colony and as officials of the bureaucracy itself.

The Japanese tried to eradicate traditional Chinese consciousness in Taiwan and were better able to create a separate sense of identity there than in Korea. In the Taiwanese case, the uprisings and political movements developed some connections with nationalist movements on the Chinese Mainland. Nevertheless, there were no viable political organizations created that advocated the return of the island to China. After all, China, at the time had enough problems of its own. Korea, on the other hand, had lost much more than association to a sister nation. It had completely lost its sovereignty, and had much more to fight for.

The economic control of the colonies influenced the development of nationalism as well, but the effects were much more powerful in Korea. There were many negative effects of economic exploitation and racial discrimination. Economic exploitation made nationalism a grassroots phenomenon (Chen, 1968: 320). Anger mounted over the fact that economic integration and the agricultural industry were geared towards the overall Japanese economy. To make matters worse, the food consumption of the local population was reduced to the bare minimum, increasing exports of foodstuffs to Japan. (This contributed to the number of farmers who were without land). The Japanese also introduced heavy industry through zaibatsu investment and expected the colonies to produce war

materials in great quantities. In addition, due to severe Japanese economic exploitation, Korean living conditions quickly deteriorated. All of these factors intensified Korean animosity and aggression, further contributing to the development of a strong sense of nationalism (Chen, I 1968: 330).

In Taiwan, though the island was clearly exploited, there was not as much suffering. There might have been advantages due to climate that help explain this. The native farmers, due to the milder climate and environment were able to produce enough rice for both export and subsistence. In addition, the land was placed in the hands of medium-sized landowners. Thus, the land was controlled by farmers rather than in the hands of the Japanese. In Taiwan, in fact, the economic conditions actually improved rather than worsened. A middle class emerged and students were better educated. There were even changes in the ways in which the native population thought about traditional notions of family. The Taiwanese began to look beyond the limits imposed on them by families and clans. They began to search for their own form of nationalism.

In Korea, the education policies were more discriminative than they were in Taiwan. As mentioned before, the Japanese tried to completely erase the Korean cultural heritage. This was

especially difficult for Koreans, who took such great pride in their history (Chen, I. 1968: 332). They demanded that schools still teach the Korean language and history, but the Japanese were unyielding in their policy. While 57% of the Taiwanese were able to comprehend and speak Japanese, only 17.6% of Koreans were able to do the same in 1941 (Chen, I. 1968: 333).

In Taiwan because there was an absence of these crucial attachments to culture, heritage and nationalism, the process of cultural elimination was not as painful as it was for the Japanese. The harshness fueled the desire to become more aware and well educated in Korea. As students were educated in Japan in the 1920' and 1930's, they were exposed to the liberal environment. They participated in anti-Japanese movements, providing the nationalistic movements with leadership and a more cohesive ideology. Koreans desired to regain their sovereignty and this helped sustain their feelings of nationalism.

Christian churches and Confucianism aided these feelings of nationalism. Both were instrumental in triggering independence movements. Both also tried to play a key role in mobilizing people for education, citizens' rights, social development and national independence. This cultural and social role played by the church could also explain the continued strength of the Christian churches

in South Korea. Another important figure in this nationalist movement was the third supreme leader of Ch'on dogyo, son pyong-hu. His believers participated in nationwide demonstrations. His words mobilized people to resist Japanese power, (Chen, I 1968: 341).

Despite all of these efforts, the Japanese used more force as time wore on, continually suppressing the Koreans. Many of those participating in the demonstrations were arrested. There were also cultural rules (such as the social pressure to conform) that imposed censorship and that made it very difficult for the Koreans to have a voice.

Many tried to resist Japanese colonization but were left feeling powerless. It was considered one of the more unspeakable experiences in Korea's history, producing a profound sense of humiliation and outrage. It also contributed to tendencies that became embedded in Korean culture. The legacy of Japanese colonialism had a lasting impact that was a stumbling block to Korea's democratization in many ways. Because of the Koreans disdain for the Japanese period, they regressed and cherished all aspects of the traditions that were practiced before the colonial era and held on to these traditions dearly.

Thus, the colonial period had many adverse effects (Helgesen 1998: 21). First, it impacted the institutional development because the Koreans rejected rules and regulations developed by the Japanese. The Yi dynasty had an absence of institutions and the Koreans grasped onto the traditional ways. Though Japanese rule led to the development of bureaucratic units, the relationships that formed between the bureaucracy and the people were filled with mutual mistrust and contempt, and were exacerbated by the arrogance of the Japanese officials.

Second, it affected how Koreans view laws and legal institutions. Japanese laws were copied from German laws and harshly enforced by the Japanese (Helgesen 1998: 21). Thus, the adoption of Western law came to be identified with national humiliation.

Third, it affected their concept of the opposition in democratic politics. Japanese colonial rule didn't contribute to the psyche of political attitudes that were conducive to viable, competitive politics in the post-colonial period. The opposition was accustomed to voicing its disagreements in ways that were uncompromising and destabilizing to the system. The opposition was not familiar with discussing their views in a peaceful manner and settling disputes and disagreements through calm means of dialogue and debate.

The Japanese never allowed political competition to flourish under their rule and orientation toward the system of democratic political competition was never established.

Fourth, Japanese colonialism helped form a negative view of political parties. Political parties were viewed as nothing more than factions. Factions, in turn, were widely considered to be a divisive element, responsible for the downfall of the Yi dynasty that made it susceptible to takeover by the Japanese. The bitter memories of Japanese rule created a cultural disdain for anything that could be considered responsible for that period. Political parties were viewed as divisive and not conducive to stability.

Fifth, because the Koreans were so adamantly hostile to the institutions during the Japanese period, instead of developing loyalty to institutions, particularly institutions of the state, the loyalty to family and connections with friends and so forth increased. The state was considered to be harmful, discriminatory and oppressive. The state was involved in their lives, took away their freedoms and gave people no means to express themselves.

The Japanese also had the right to interfere at all levels of Korean politics. They limited Korean involvement in politics much more and only used them in a police force to suppress nationalist activity. The effects were lasting and detrimental to political

development and created feelings of such intense hostility that any aspect that reminded Koreans of that period was rejected for the traditional processes and beliefs of before.

In conclusion, for South Korea, Helgesen wrote that the Japanese colonial authorities monopolized the political field and froze ancient Korean political patterns. These patterns then reappeared after their liberation. These traits in post-colonial politics, such as regionalism, paternalism and familism (to be described later) "can be explained by this hibernation," (1998: 33).

In contrast to Korea Japan influenced Taiwan in more positive ways. Though the Japanese were arrogant and tyrannical at times, they ruled the island efficiently and were rarely corrupt, (Moody 1992: 40). The Japanese encouraged the Taiwanese to go into business and experience some limited levels of wealth. Thus, the Taiwanese early on, were cultivating a strong, prominent and well-skilled business class and many Taiwanese were reaping the benefits of this in the form of economic gains and improved standards of living. In addition, the Japanese allowed some limited forms of political autonomy, which socialized the Taiwanese to expect elections of some sort as a normative process.

Elections were first, allowed on a small scale in 1935.

Though the elections weren't fair, (the Japanese outnumbered the

Taiwanese in the provincial and district assemblies), there were Taiwanese majorities at the village levels and in one municipal assembly, (Ballentine from Rigger 1999: 32). Elected assemblies were established in prefectures, counties and towns. However, the democratic process was very limited. Only half of the assembly delegates were elected, while the other half were nominated by the Japanese colonial administrators. Thus, of the 172 assembly representatives, 109 were Japanese and 63 were Taiwanese (Rigger 1999: 34). Anyone who was over 25 years of age, was self sufficient in livelihood, had attended local organizations for more than six months, and had paid local taxes was eligible to vote or run for office. Elections were arranged and overseen by the Japanese police.

This indirect system of elections served to consolidate the political hierarchy of the local factions, as factional membership was needed to choose amongst themselves and the candidates for the upper level posts. It is interesting that factions were formed for the purpose of selecting individuals to fill positions that had no supervisory or budgetary power.

Despite these disadvantages, elections gave the Taiwanese their first exposure to the democratic process, unlike other colonists. Many members of the Taiwanese local elite were able to use

elections to attain political power. The elite became accustomed to representational politics during this time. This would later have an impact on the decisions made by Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, since most assembly members demanded continuing autonomy or local self-rule after their experience with self-government.

The Taiwanese became more and more aware that they were not given the same rights as the Japanese and that democracy would come to mean greater freedom and more political rights. The Taiwanese population also became more aware of the development of modern institutions. "Thus, there was some progress made during the Japanese period to establish political reforms that were in a rudimentary sense, democratic," (Copper 1984: 11). In addition, all of the political exposure did not eradicate opposition forces in Taiwan. Many still felt deeply attached to Chinese culture. Though a large number of Taiwanese learned to speak Japanese and adopted Japanese surnames, many didn't absorb Japanese culture.

In 1918, a movement for greater local autonomy began to gain momentum among students living in Japan. They founded the Taiwan Culture Society and advocated a Taiwanese parliament to reduce the power of the Japanese colonial administration. This movement persisted until 1927 when a split occurred in the Taiwan Culture Society. This led to different demands as the agenda of

fighting for a Taiwanese parliament was changed to fighting for local autonomy. Fortunately, these demands went hand in hand with some of Japan's own goals.

Local autonomy was established in the form of assemblies in each of Taiwan's prefectures. Rigger wrote that in 1921, the colony's governor –general appointed nine Taiwanese to his consultative council, which was considered the highest office that the Taiwanese could obtain under colonization (1999: 37). Local elections were established in 1935, and voters were allowed to elect half of the members of local assemblies, while the Japanese appointed the other half. The manner of electing officials copied the Japanese system, utilizing multi-member districts, which (as will be discussed later) did not exactly serve the native Taiwanese interests.

According to Rigger, these early elections had numerous important consequences. They neutralized the earlier movement in favor of home rule, and divided the local elites because they encouraged ambitious Taiwanese to develop individual political bases instead of joining organized movements. From a positive stance, Rigger claimed that they introduced Taiwanese into the political process and acclimated them to, "regular, peaceful political participation," (1999: 38). Kerr added that the Taiwanese were becoming more and more familiar with political campaigns and

electioneering during this period. These served as elements of training and experience that would provide a frame of reference for the future and would raise demands and expectations of the Republic of China (R.O.C.), the regime that would eventually take over (1965: 59).

Thus, both Taiwan and Korea experienced many years of Japanese colonial rule. This set up their respective political foundations and shaped the paths of their political development. The Taiwanese gained some valuable experience with democratic practices and experienced some economic growth. The Koreans, on the other hand, viewed the colonial years as a period of humiliation. The Japanese treated the Koreans much more harshly and even made attempts to eradicate Korea's culture. In the process of doing so, Koreans reverted back to traditional cultural patterns that would have lasting effects on Korea's political development. Though the legacy did not cement the fate of their political development, it had an effect in molding their response towards institutions, the public's interaction with political leaders and their overall political cultures.

Part II.

Political Context: Taiwan's Path to Democracy

Chapter 2

Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT- initial auspicious beginnings

Chiang Kai-shek had no intentions of ruling Taiwan, when he was first granted the opportunity. Nevertheless, he inherited Taiwan as a result of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations in 1943, during the turmoil of World War II. One of the main problems with these declarations was the ambiguity regarding the sovereignty of Taiwan. (This ambiguity still impacts Taiwanese domestic and foreign policy). The Allied Powers had decided that Chiang Kai-shek and the R.O.C. would be governing over Taiwan. Another problem was that Chiang Kai-shek and the R.O.C. had been unsuccessfully attempting to gain control of China from warlords and therefore, had many distractions. Nevertheless, after years of Japanese rule, the Taiwanese eagerly awaited this transfer of power. Though they waited in Taipei to greet the new soldiers, the Taiwanese would soon be disappointed.

Between 1945 and 1949, the R.O.C. had more to deal with than fighting off warlords. It was at war with the Communists and problems regarding Taiwan were of low priority. Little was done to tend to corruption. Political affairs were poorly managed and

because there was such a huge political void left with the evacuation of the Japanese, this lack of organization was readily apparent. The R.O.C. was doing its best to fight off the Communists, but to no avail and its poor performance was not winning it any support or admiration from the United States (U.S.), from whom it badly needed assistance.

For Chiang, Taiwan was nothing more than a temporary home where he could store supplies. This initial attitude was reflected in the way he ruled Taiwan. He considered Taiwan to be a place to stay while he waited for the right time to recover the Mainland and re-establish his rule over all of China (Rigger 1999: 6). He had low regards for the local inhabitants over which he ruled. He viewed them, to some extent, as collaborators with the Japanese because they had done little to resist Japanese control. He was indifferent, at best, regarding the development of Taiwan and did little, if anything, to promote democracy.

To compound this problem, the regime suffered from grave legitimacy troubles stemming from its unstable and uncertain future. It was a transitional regime in the midst of a devastating civil war, which required full support and cooperation of the Taiwanese. The R.O.C. expected the Taiwanese to volunteer their services in the war against the Communists. To accomplish this, the regime responded

with authoritarian measures to maintain as much control over the Taiwanese as possible in the name of security.

Nevertheless, the Taiwanese were well aware that the R.O.C. regime would not be meeting their expectations. During this period, the R.O.C. and Chiang's political party, the Kuomintang (KMT), destroyed and dismantled their factories, causing numerous economic problems (Rigger 1999: 57). According to Copper (1984: 41), the political administrative duties and economic control were also handled poorly. There were rising levels of unemployment and inflation and many instances of corruption. In addition, further worsening the native Taiwanese' first impression of the R.O.C./KMT, the governorship was given to an incompetent, cruel and selfish individual who had little concern for the Taiwanese people or democracy. The local Taiwanese quickly realized that the newcomers were immoral, corrupt and materialistic. They took over all of the official positions from the Japanese, excluded the Taiwanese, and expropriated the state-owned businesses. The overall mentality of the Taiwanese was deteriorating, day by day in this situation (Min Pao, from Rigger 1999: 57).

At the time, Taiwan had a free press, and these instances of corruption were well documented by the newspapers. This only served to reinforce and magnify the bad impression the people

already had. The Mainlanders, themselves, like Chiang were also suspicious of the Taiwanese. They treated the Taiwanese as second-class citizens. This was particularly true in the case of Ch'en I, who was in charge of the R.O.C. soldiers on Taiwan. His troops badly mistreated the local population. This situation was exaggerated by the fact that Ch'en I's troops were from a rival region. Tensions were clearly mounting and Chiang was doing little to improve his image in Taiwan.

At the time, Chiang felt that he had far more important things to take care of. He was losing to the Communists in a civil war that was raging out of control. Inflation was rising and students and intellectuals were extremely critical, withdrawing their support for the KMT. The KMT clearly felt vulnerable and responded to this vulnerability in a reactionary manner. Everyday events were treated more and more oppressively.

Thus, this set the stage for the infamous February 28th Incident. It was one of the most tragic and enduring events that shaped Taiwanese distrust and disdain of the émigré regime. It occurred in a context where the native Taiwanese were growing increasingly more frustrated and dissatisfied with the R.O.C. government. This growing dissatisfaction exploded when an older woman was beaten badly for selling cigarettes in front of Taipei City

Hall. At the time, it was illegal to sell cigarettes without a license from the government. This sheer act of brutality provoked riots that eventually grew to a rebellion of 50-60 thousand people. This violence spread over the capital in Taipei. The Nationalist troops, clearly alarmed by their loss of control over the Taiwanese, responded with brutal uses of force. They imprisoned countless Taiwanese and killed over ten thousand, spreading terror among those in leadership positions and among students, intellectuals, community leaders and the social elite. This created a legacy of hatred of the KMT by the local population and left a permanent scar, reinforcing its disdain for the government. In fact, the repercussions of this incident are still present today (Lai, Myers, Wou 1991).

The government was without a doubt, illegitimate in the eyes of the Taiwanese, but for the time being, Chiang and the R.O.C./KMT would do little to alter this impression. Chiang was far more concerned with the events going on in China. By the end of 1949, the Communists defeated Chiang who withdrew to Taiwan, taking with him millions of troops and civil servants. The U.S. had no hope for the R.O.C's survival and had given up on it. Despite, this dire situation, Chiang did not give up on his goals of one day, regaining the mainland. He set up a group of party members to look at how the KMT might be rebuilt. Chiang was forced to complete his

tasks without much U.S. help, since the U.S. figured that the Communists would soon invade Taiwan and defeat his troops easily (Lai, Myers, Wou 1991).

This all changed in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War. The U.S. was forced to reevaluate its policies towards Taiwan, as it became more and more important to the U.S. to protect the region from the spread of Communism. The U.S. military, (not completely aware of Mao's goals or intentions), thought that it must increase its involvement in Taiwan and give millions of dollars in aid to help Chiang build up his troops. Though President Truman was not a big fan of Chiang he was determined to keep Taiwan out of Communist control. He imposed the 7th fleet in the Taiwan Straits to prevent a Communist invasion of Taiwan. The Chinese Communists did not take the U.S.'s involvement in Taiwan lightly and this initiated bitterness between China and the U.S. Nevertheless, despite the problems brewing between the U.S. and China, the KMT was now given a new breath of life. With the help of the U.S., the KMT was finally given a chance to reinvent itself. It had a long way to go, however.

As it entered the new decade, it was widely unpopular, considered illegitimate, corrupt and oppressive. Chiang, thus, had much to accomplish. Not only did he want to rebuild the party and

reorganize its structure but he also wanted to show the world that it was morally superior to the Communist Party in China and practiced democratic principles. He wanted Taiwan to become a bastion for the future recovery of the Mainland, should the Communist regime lose popular support and collapse. He wanted to do away with the dictatorship on the Mainland and return the power to the people of China. Nevertheless, this goal was so lofty and truly outrageous that it impeded the chances for democratization.

The irony of this situation was that Chiang emphasized that the democratization of Taiwan was a step in the right direction towards recovering the Mainland. He believed that the KMT had to display "exemplary moral and innovative leadership," (Chao, Myers 1998: 219). At the same time he insisted that the KMT become a political party that would never lose an election. In order to accomplish this, he had to reorganize the party and the government. This required cooperation from the Taiwanese and did not rule out suppressing any activities that might weaken their authority and control. This meant that democratization and democratic legitimacy was of secondary priority for the time being. In truth, if democracy were ever put into practice, it would not have meshed well with Chiang's style of rule. He was more concerned with attaining his own definition of legitimacy rather than implementing a Western-

style democracy. Though democratization was perceived as a means to achieving legitimacy, it was still too risky. Democracy, at the moment, implied too much uncertainty and as Chiang saw it, legitimacy could be achieved in other ways.

How Chiang Kai-shek builds power

During the period from 1950 to 1952 Chiang's power and the strength of the KMT were rebuilt (Dickson 1993: 52). The party was given a new breath of life after the United States deemed that it was necessary to aid the party and protect the KMT regime from Communist attack. He was thus, given the chance to prove that the KMT could be an effective organization that could help him achieve some of his larger goals. A key difference between Chiang's leadership and that of South Korea's leaders was that Chiang believed that the party was an integral part to achieving his goals. He sought to make the party a well-organized and enduring institution.

He wanted to reorganize the party around six guiding principles (Dickson 1993: 59). First, he wanted the party to be a revolutionary democratic party and he wanted the party to regain its missionary zeal. Second, he wanted to expand the membership of the KMT. He knew that it needed to gain a wider social base

including farmers, workers, youth and intellectuals. Each of these groups previously had been alienated from the Mainland and he witnessed how they had provided key support for the Communists. Third, he wanted the KMT party structure to retain its democratic centralist structure. This was a reaffirmation of the party's Leninist origins but also served to control policy and have networks of cadres carry out the policy. He would allow some scope of debate, but essentially party members must be bound by policy. In addition, as he saw it, democratic centralism would permit the co-optation of local elite without giving them too much power that would be threatening to KMT leadership. Fourth, like the Leninist structure, the KMT party cells would serve as basic organization units. Fifth, the KMT would provide political leadership in all spheres. Key decisions and policies should be decided through the party's organizational procedures. Sixth, and finally, the KMT members would have to subscribe to the Three Principles of the People, as proposed by Sun Yat Sen which advocated democracy, educating the masses and unity. Nevertheless, this was interpreted liberally to say the least. Balancing the goals of living by the Three Principles of the People and wanting to regain China caused a major dilemma for Chiang and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK), and both father and son would find it difficult to achieve both goals simultaneously.

Thus, Chiang knew that he needed to reinvent the party. He wisely acknowledged his mistakes and did what he could to learn from them. Benefiting from economic and military aid from the U.S., he was able to better develop the KMT as a viable, stable and indestructible institution. Chiang intended to have party members actively participate in this campaign to reorganize.

The party was loosely organized around a Leninist structure, where the higher-ranking party officials held more power than many department heads. However, it differed from Leninist parties in that it didn't ascribe to the principles of a proletarian dictatorship. It also was not against employing a capitalist economy and would allow private ownership and a free market economy.

Nevertheless, power was heavily concentrated in the Central Reconstruction Committee and later in the Central Standing Committee of the ruling KMT. At the top of the power structure was the KMT party chair. The party chair was responsible for leading the party and exerting influence over government decision-making. Chiang wanted to consolidate his leadership in both society and in the party and to accomplish both of these objectives he needed to construct an organization that could extend down to every level, while still remaining highly centralized with most of the authority and decisions made by himself, alone.

The organization of the party was restructured around cells (Hood 1998). KMT members were required to join a party cell and attend its meetings. Previously the district branch had been the basic unit and the cell was only used for training. Now, the cells were both the basic training unit and the organizational unit. The cells now had numerous responsibilities. First, they carried out party policies and higher-level orders. They also played a role in conducting propaganda. They also prevented any type of communist infiltration and counter revolutionary activities. They investigated the work and background of their members and recruited new members for office.

Because these cells now had many more tasks to accomplish, the meetings were especially important and the KMT kept records of who had attended the meetings. The frequency of the meetings was seen as a burden to many, but it helped ascertain the worthiness and loyalty of each member. Loyalties and discipline to the party were also tested with the creation of the Discipline Commission that investigated the specific violation of party rules. Punishments ranged from expulsion to warnings and loss of party privileges.

The cells also supervised the workings of government and the legislative organization at all levels. Chiang also rebuilt the civil

service and the army into more efficient and effective machines of the state. He learned from his problems with inflation from the past and pursued a more conservative monetary policy on Taiwan. He also embarked on an ambitious land reform program that helped him gain support from the countryside and avoided unpopular alliances with the landed elite.

Despite the fact that Taiwan was much smaller than Mainland China, he still retained the cumbersome constitutional structure. This was in part due to the fact that Chiang never thought that his stay on Taiwan would be permanent. In addition, emergency legislation was added to give the state power over individual and political rights. This authoritarian structure was justified by the KMT as a necessary response to the state of conflict that existed between the KMT and the Communists.

The authoritarian structure was also deemed necessary because Chiang knew he needed to strengthen party organization. He wanted the party to penetrate all of the organization in order to prevent political competition and to secure resources for the regime. He knew that if he wanted to achieve all of his political goals, the opposition parties would have to be marginalized, though parties friendly to the KMT were permitted. He had to socialize all of the party cadres as revolutionary vanguards. Most importantly, he

wanted Taiwan to become more economically developed and modernized. He knew he couldn't achieve any of these goals without the help and approval of the local Taiwanese.

First Stage of KMT rule: Chiang Kai-shek Builds Power

Chiang built power by traditional methods of Chinese leaders. He built networks of client relationships based on loyalty to him while encouraging rivalries between his subordinates. This enabled him to preserve power when no major external challenges to the regime were present. This also allowed for the development of the type of efficient administrative machinery, which was necessary for the development of the modern democratic state. According to Keith Maguire, "Chiang controlled his regime through the manipulation of cliques within the party, the military, the civil service and the business community," (1998: 19).

This provides excellent insight regarding some of the institutional choices he would make. He clearly did not want to foster any type of political competition that might be threatening to his regime, but that didn't mean that he didn't want to encourage political competition. Competition could serve to strengthen his power. Much of his decisions were, therefore, based on cultivating factions and groups that would cancel each other out, but in many

cases still are dependent on him. He would serve as the glue that kept all of these interests together. His divide and conquer strategy that he inherited from the Chinese would help him sustain his power and his control over society (Bosco 1992).

Though local elections would later be permitted, he still wanted to make sure that he had tight control over any opposition groups. The best strategy, as Chiang saw it, was to allow a political opposition that was individually based, fragmented and locally oriented rather than collective. To ensure that the opposition remained fragmented, Chiang employed many tactics and institutional mechanisms that will be later explored in depth. The main objective, of all of this was to maintain political control to ensure that he could rule effectively. This was considered paramount to pursuing some of his loftier goals of achieving legitimacy and economic development. But most importantly, all of these sub-goals were directly related to regaining back the Mainland, a dream that he was unable to let die.

When the R.O.C. immigrated to Taiwan, the 1947 Constitution had called for elections by 1953, but these elections were suspended. Chiang saw no possibility of holding elections in a country that only served as a temporary base for him to consolidate power. He was concerned with recovering the Mainland first and

foremost, and wouldn't let anything get in the way of this goal. In order to build up his power, he could not rule completely like a tyrant. Local elections were held to make Taiwan appear as a democracy. The KMT attempted to wed one-party rule with a limited system of local elections.

To provide a stable environment, it was ruled on January 29, 1954 by Justice Wang Ts'ung hui of the Council of Grand Justices that the first-term elected central government officials and those elected to the National Assembly could serve in their offices beyond the 1953 election date (Hood 1997). Thus, elections ceased to have meaning at the national level with this decision. There were also several other repressive maneuvers that were used to ensure stability and control over society. The regime arrested any individual that threatened national security, which could be justified in a number of ways. The regime also arrested any groups or individuals that attempted to form a political party. Finally the regime kept a close eye on the print media to ensure that nothing was written that challenged the KMT's legitimacy.

To establish its control over society and deter opposition activity, the regime amended the Constitution to suit its needs at the time. In 1947 it added to the Constitution temporary provisions that gave the president special powers during the period of Communist

rebellion. In 1949, the regime implemented martial law, and thereby gave the power to arrest and try by military court anyone who threatened the goals of the KMT. To prove how intent it was on sustaining control over society, it launched a "white terror" where thousands were imprisoned without a trial (Chao, Myers 1994: 215).

Though these acts were clearly coercive and corrosive to democracy, Chiang believed that legitimacy could be earned in other ways. He believed that economic achievements were more important than full-scale liberalization and believed that this could only happen under his control. Nevertheless, he did acknowledge that the Taiwanese were talented people capable of achieving economic growth. Thus, regarding the economy, he gave more control and autonomy to the Taiwanese. In addition, one of the more successful policies was the implementation of land reform. This accomplished many important goals. According to Rigger, land reform improved overall agricultural production, equalized the distribution of wealth and finally, won the support of many farmers and helped integrate them into the economy (1999: 89).

Chiang's government aimed to industrialize the country and followed a strategy of import substitution. It concentrated on steel, cement and petroleum to increase production of these products in Taiwan instead of relying on imports. The government was heavily

geared towards economic development and gave the bureaucracy the means to implement policies that would be most conducive towards national development. Later on, the government would follow a more export-oriented approach with special concentration on industrial goods. In the meantime, Chiang's government empowered households with more private property rights. He also improved education of children between the ages of six and twelve. This was of particular importance because it improved overall levels of human capital and enhanced an already gifted and capable society.

On the political front, he only allowed citizens over the age of 21 to vote in village, city, county and provincial elections. Thus, the level of participation suited Chiang's needs perfectly. It enabled him to co-opt the local elite and gain legitimacy. It also afforded him total control over the society and government. Finally, it subdued groups who demanded participation and diverted their attention from the lack of democracy at the national level. As Chiang saw it, he needed to be realistic and pragmatic regarding his defeat on the Mainland and how he could go about recovering it. He realized "that the proper foundations had to be created before democratization could be expanded beyond local elections," (Chao, Myers 1994: 215.) and these foundations included establishing stability, control

over society and economic development before his promises of full democratization could be fulfilled.

Chapter 3

Reform in Taiwan (1950-1971)

The KMT was different than the political leadership in South Korea in that it implemented local autonomy early on (Rigger 1999). From the beginning, Chiang allowed local elections because it helped him satisfy several goals. First, holding elections made his regime appear to be somewhat legitimate and legitimacy was an important concept borrowed from his skewed interpretation of Sun Yat Sen's ideology. The appearance of legitimacy was also important because he needed to show the international community, and particularly the United States, that Taiwan deserved both recognition and support. Second, he needed to appeal to groups that had already been used to participating in politics in order to preempt any chances of chaos and instability. Third, holding elections helped him co-opt the local elite into the party so that he could attain a firmer grip on society.

The threat from Communist China was still uncertain at the time and Chiang adamantly hung onto the dream of one day unifying China. This goal was much more out of his reach than he realized and thus his inflexibility impeded the democratic process. He refused to allow the democratization process to run its course because he believed that in order to one day unify with Mainland

China he would need to develop the economy substantially and have a well-organized and ordered regime. This could not be accomplished by allowing free elections at the national level and unlimited amounts of political participation and freedom.

The need for order over society took precedence over enacting democratic reforms. This was accomplished by implementing martial law, by banning the formation of political parties and through stringent controls over free speech and the press. More importantly, though elections were permitted at the local level, national elections, which had more of an impact on policy, were suspended indefinitely. This suspension was justified on the basis that the Taiwanese public was not prepared for too much participation at the national level. However, as years passed by, this justification no longer held true. The public was becoming more educated as a result of the economic growth spurt, and economic growth was accompanied by social change that placed pressure for greater levels of political participation. Individual opposition politicians were making themselves heard more often. They believed that it was illogical to continue to appoint Mainland Chinese to positions in the national legislative bodies.

This sets up the context for the first major reform that occurred in Taiwan concerning elections (Copper 1988). The R.O.C.,

at the time, was weak and extremely vulnerable, rendering it highly dependent on the U.S. Its foreign policy was contingent upon the support of the U.S. Though the U.S. was not pleased with Chiang (because it disapproved with his non-democratic ways), the U.S. had to use Taiwan as a regional strategic base.

The Soviets, at the time, were growing more and more powerful and it was believed that they were determined to spread their influence. The U.S. wanted to contain Communism, and though it wouldn't normally have come to the aid of the R.O.C., given the circumstances, it deemed it necessary to protect the R.O.C. from Communist invasion. In addition, the U.S. was desperate for an East Asian ally. Thus, at the time, Taiwan was important to the U.S. and because the R.O.C. was the U.S.'s only Eastern ally, its strategic position during and briefly after the Korean War allowed Chiang to pursue policies that were more conducive to consolidating his power than establishing a democracy. The U.S. only tried to exert minimal influence that led to Chiang's attempts to appear democratic. In practice, however, very little was done at the national level to encourage democratization.

As almost twenty years had passed since the R.O.C. took over Taiwan, the U.S. government became somewhat concerned about the low levels of democratic progress. The U.S. stopped

noticing the levels of democracy at the local levels and started noticing the absence of democracy at the national level. In the 1960's the U.S. had trouble distinguishing "free" China (e.g. Taiwan) from "un-free" China (e.g. Mainland China). Concern regarding voting and civil rights increased. When the time came to vote in the U.S. Congress regarding the appropriation of foreign aid to Taiwan, U.S. liberals, especially, pointed to the lack of party competition and the slow progress of democratization. The U.S. also started to rationalize support for Taiwanese independence as many started to think of Taiwan as an independent nation that had the right to self-determination.

The U.S. also began to debate its policy towards China in the late 1960's. As the Vietnam War dragged on, foreign policy became more divided at home. In 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on U.S. policy towards China and strong recommendations were made that the containment policy be ended, (U.S. Policy Toward China: 117). A popular idea circulated in the administration that the U.S. should embark on official relations with China.

Nixon preferred a "two-China" policy, but Chiang adamantly opposed this. However, international events would later compel Nixon to go with his preferences. In 1969, military clashes along the

Sino-Soviet border clarified that there was indeed a split between these two powers that could be taken advantage of. Nixon wanted to forge relations with China and signaled friendly gestures. He indicated that trade and travel restrictions could be eased and that he desired a constructive relationship with the P.R.C. This augured shifts in foreign policy that would occur later on. This also demonstrated to Taiwanese and opposition politicians that the legitimacy of the R.O.C. might be in question.

Meanwhile, in 1965 there was a U.N. resolution to expel the Republic of China (Taiwan) delegation. It resulted in a 47-47 tie. This severely threatened the R.O.C. status as the government representing China. This also signified to the growing opposition present that the R.O.C. was not legitimate in the eyes of the international community. Demands for internal political reform intensified and possibly Chiang realized that he needed to curb his oppressive measures.

The government responded in 1966 by amending the Temporary Provisions Act, thus empowering Chiang, or the President of the R.O.C., to add legislative members from Taiwan by popular election. This was a milestone in Taiwanese politics. For the first time Taiwanese were able to vote in a national election to fill seats in legislative bodies that had been vacated by death. (At the

time, the number of national representatives had dwindled almost in half due to old age.) Eleven new members were elected in 1969 to serve indefinite terms in the Legislative Yuan. At the same time 15 seats were added to the National Assembly and two to the Control Yuan. Though these newly elected delegates only comprised about 3%, 1% and 3% respectively of the legislative bodies, the new law was significant because it indicated that the Taiwanese would finally have the chance to participate at the national level (Copper 1988). It also indicated that the leadership was aware that it needed to provide some democratic concessions. The government was forced to respond to an opposition that was beginning to stand up and be noticed.

Chapter 4

Examining Reasons Behind Political Reform (1972-1988)

Role of the United States (1972-1980)

In order to understand the processes of democratic transition in Taiwan one has to examine not only the institutions, but also other factors such as relations with the United States. Here, I focus on the relationship with the U.S. and the effects that this had on reform because the U.S. (as stated in the previous chapter) was extremely important to Taiwan both economically, and from a security standpoint as well. Therefore, tracing this relationship helps to better explain how and why reforms were implemented. The years to be examined, 1972 to 1980, were particularly pivotal years in Taiwanese- U.S relations.

In 1972, there were many changes to the political landscape. A changing of the guard occurred, from father to son. Though Chiang Kai-shek did not die until 1975, his son Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) was placed in charge of Taiwan by 1972. There were many aspects of KMT rule that did not change with Chiang the elder's passing. The conservative leaders that had supported Chiang Kai-shek emphasized the importance of order and maintaining strict control over society. The KMT had control over newspapers, radio and television releases. The cells of the KMT also watched over

government offices, businesses and even neighborhoods. CCK wanted to establish that he wouldn't be more tolerant of dissidents and that he intended to maintain control during the period of transition after his father's death (Moody 1992).

Nevertheless, this period was an important time of change and CCK made an impact on democratic reform that will be analyzed in detail later on in this section. Before CCK had a chance to get used to his new title, the government was forced to take steps towards democratic reform due to a serious diplomatic emergency. In 1971, the R.O.C. had been unseated from the U.N. and was now aware that there was both a diplomatic and legitimacy crisis that it needed to attend to. As a result of this, the R.O.C. responded with a number of conciliatory democratic reforms to satisfy opposition groups who, seizing on the KMT's vulnerability, pushed for democratization. The number of seats in the Legislative and Control Yuans and the National Assembly was increased further in 1972, allotting 51 more seats for the National Assembly and 15 more seats for the Control Yuan. Among new seats for the Legislative Yuan, 15 more seats were filled by appointment from overseas Chinese communities. In addition, these elections were now held every three years (Copper 1984).

Also of note, the KMT, at this time started to recruit more and more Taiwanese to important positions within the party. During the 1950's and 1960's, prominent Taiwanese had been recruited at the local level to help consolidate KMT power and legitimacy. As Huang wrote, the KMT wanted to dominate Taiwanese society and started a reconstruction movement in 1950 that "aimed at purging faction leaders and rebuilding Chiang Kai-shek's hegemony within the party," (1995: 94). The reconstruction movement was aimed at establishing grassroots organizations and recruiting more and more Taiwanese into the party and government at the local levels.

In 1951, the KMT leadership established county jurisdiction with each district in the cities under provincial jurisdiction. By 1952, more than half of the membership of the county- and city- level reconstruction committees was comprised of Taiwanese. Though initially it was the politically active and social elite that had been recruited, this time ordinary Taiwanese citizens were also recruited.

Now there were more Taiwanese recruited into decision-making bodies of the central government and party. The 1970's, in fact, saw one of the larger recruitment drives for Taiwanese into the party apparatus. More Taiwanese were recruited to serve as party cadres. This deliberate move by the KMT increased the proportion of Taiwanese who were working full time for local service stations

and part time as members of country or city committees (Huang 1995: 94). Another consequence of this was that progressive and younger leaders were appointed to higher positions in the party. By 1979, nine Taiwanese party members were placed in the Central Standing Committee. This brought more diversity to the top levels of the party. As CCK saw it, incorporating more Taiwanese and younger individuals with more progressive visions into the system was important to party development and legitimacy, views that he held onto firmly.

There were other changes that were made within the party organization that signaled that CCK was aware that adjustments needed to be made. At the 11th National Congress of the KMT held in 1976, he retired the use of the title supreme leader and claimed that the new party leader should be referred to as "chairman". He also administered the retirement of almost 70 party leaders in the central advisory committee. This was significant in that it opened the door for younger and possibly more progressive voices to enter the KMT. This would allow CCK to pursue steps towards democratization. He allowed individuals within the party to express themselves more freely and promised to be more responsive to the concerns of the people as well (Hood 1997: 63).

Though clear changes were being made to adjust to the altered political landscape within the KMT, the opposition (essentially, a group of Taiwanese individuals opposed to the KMT) was not satisfied with the pace of reforms to the system as a whole. The decision to continue to hold local elections enabled the opposition to improve its political practices and strategy. The opposition tried to de-legitimize the KMT by showing the public how corrupt the KMT really was. This was illustrated in 1977 at Chungli, a town just south of Taipei. The KMT was caught stuffing the ballots in an election and a riot ensued. It was clear to CCK that the KMT had erred in both the strategy and the campaign. He didn't want to resort to ballot stuffing to win elections. He believed that the KMT could still manage to win elections with better planning and strategies, but this would be difficult if his party continued to be de-legitimized by the opposition, who were becoming more and more impatient.

Meanwhile, Nixon continued to pursue relations with China. On Feb. 28, 1972, the Shanghai Communique ambiguously established Sino- U.S. relations for years to come that would form the "bedrock of both government's position on the Taiwan issue," (Kinderman 1980: 459). This made it clear that China was very important to the U.S. strategically and that the Nixon administration

wanted improved relations with China to be the hallmark of its foreign policy. It would also foreshadow the more significant events that would take place in the late 1970's.

The U.S. unintentionally impacted the slow pace of CCK's democratization when the Carter administration's strategic considerations caused what appeared to be a significant reversal of foreign policy. In 1978, the R.O.C. was delivered a crucial blow when the U.S. decided to no longer recognize it, favoring diplomatic relations with China. This termination of formal diplomatic relations sent shock waves throughout Taiwan and led to the R.O.C.'s biggest legitimacy crisis yet. The R.O.C. had relied on support from the U.S. and had not been in any danger of losing this support, due to the U.S.'s beliefs that Taiwan occupied a key strategic position in the Korean War and needed to be well assisted to protect it from any Communist threat. This support helped consolidate KMT authority early on when its prognosis looked bleak, after its loss to the Communists. Nevertheless, due to a reordering of the U.S.'s strategic priorities in the late 1960's, the U.S. believed that it needed to change its policies.

Though some individuals in Congress and the Carter administration questioned the legitimacy of the KMT and started to probe deeply into its domestic and democratic progress, the reasons

for the shift were more strategic. The U.S. under the Carter administration decided to change its policy towards Taiwan in an effort to improve relations with China, which was considered to be much more strategically important. There were many factors involved in this decision. First, Vietnam had been a disaster for the U.S. and the U.S. believed that there was no way that it could simultaneously confront both the U.S.S.R. and China. Second, it was believed that the U.S.S.R. was growing more powerful in military strength. Third, the U.S. needed a strong ally to combat this power and Western Europe and Japan's defense capabilities were not strong enough. Fourth, it was believed that the U.S. could improve its own global power position by aiming for détente and rapprochement with China, the weaker of its two Communist opponents. It was also believed that this could be achieved without worsening U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R. Fifth, the U.S. also believed that China would never give up Taiwan and that it was a hopeless cause. The U.S. did not want to enter a war with China to protect the R.O.C. Richard Solomon stated that the "failure to make further progress in U.S.-PRC relations will dissipate an important element of flexibility in America's effort to adjust to a changing strategic environment, " (1971: 463). Finally, China appeared to respond positively to Nixon's conciliatory gestures. The P.R.C., at

the time had many opponents, including both the U.S.S.R. and India. Thus, the timing was right to make a change in foreign policy.

Another blow was that the R.O.C., despite making it its goal to distinguish itself from China as the true legitimate “free” China, was unseated in the U.N. in favor of China. In addition, other nations followed suit, including Japan, resulting in a major legitimacy crisis that was not going to be rectified by simply recruiting more Taiwanese into the party.

This shock came at a crucial time in Taiwan's political development. Taiwan was just about to hold its most democratic elections at the end of 1979. It decided to regroup and reconsider the implications of this “dis-recognition”. The result was a new Public Officials Election and Recall Law that was intended to appear more democratic, despite some of the undemocratic consequences that were described in the previous section (Copper 1984: 60).

To address this problem, a supplementary election was held in 1980. In the new elections, the number of new legislators was increased to 97 (27 were appointed from overseas Chinese communities). There were also 70 new seats added to the popular election in the National Assembly and 32 seats in the Control Yuan. The law contained 113 articles. Besides attempting to make the rights and restrictions of campaigning clearer and more specific, it

took the supervision of elections away from the government and placed it in the hands of the independent Central Election Commission. The procedures of elections were tightened and proper conduct was defined more clearly in order to decrease the chances of election irregularities and cheating. Copper wrote that another positive consequence of this law was that there was more tacit approval from the KMT to allow independent politicians more freedom of expression as long as they agreed to not support Communism or Taiwanese Independence (Copper 1984: 63).

This law was promulgated after a long gestation period. There was consent among scholars in Taiwan that reforms needed to be enacted regarding the lack of political participation and democracy at the national level. There was a consensus that the laws needed to become more democratic and must satisfy the concerns that had justified martial law. The laws also needed to uphold the Constitution, prevent subversion of the R.O.C. and maintain order and peace, goals that did not sway from the interests of the Chiang Kai-shek run KMT.

Despite many of the undemocratic overtures of the law, it was still a milestone in Taiwan's election process, according to Copper (1984: 64). It set when the elections were to begin and end, ending the KMT's ability to surprise the opposition by holding elections

whenever it pleased. It also made all candidates register and campaign under the same rules. It standardized voting procedures such as how votes were counted and reported to make the process fairer and less prone to corruption. It stipulated that the government had to pay candidates for a designated number of days of political rallies, specifically seven out of fifteen days. (Under the old laws, candidates had to pay for all days of political rallies). Government rallies were not to be held before party rallies. Finally, it expanded the length of speeches, the number of rallies per day and the number of cars that could be used. This all gave the less well know independent politicians a better chance to promote their messages to the voters.

Though the U.S.'s decision to end its formal recognition of Taiwan in favor of China was not intended to unleash a series of domestic reforms, this event had far-reaching consequences. (The U.S. did not want to abandon Taiwan and attempted to reassure it with the Taiwan Relations Act that Taiwan's security was ensured). One of the most important consequences was not the initial effect that it had on the KMT, but the initial effect that it had on the opposition in Taiwan. This signaled to the opposition the vulnerability of the KMT. It also indicated to the opposition that the legitimacy of the KMT was waning internationally and possibly,

domestically, as well. This encouraged and stimulated opposition groups both in Taiwan and abroad to challenge the KMT in the midst of its diplomatic crisis. It also indicated that the KMT could not hold onto its power forever.

Role of the United States (1979-1983)

The 1970's were one of the most unsuccessful periods for Taiwan regarding its diplomatic ties and recognition with the international community. Taiwan experienced a series of diplomatic setbacks that affected the governance of policy. The opposition was clearly encouraged to push the KMT to reform. On a much lesser scale, there were other factors that created a change in the atmosphere. The U.S. Congressmen, particularly those on the liberal continuum were displeased with the oppressiveness of the R.O.C. and began to support ideas of self-determination. The U.S. support of Taiwanese independence grew unofficially as a result. Through a series of events, including the escape of Taiwanese leaders and formal contacts with movement leaders, the U.S. indicated that it was flirting somewhat with the independence movement. Many Taiwanese living abroad made their voices heard regarding the lack of democratic progress in Taiwan and the U.S. Congress served as a sympathetic ear.

The possibility of a transformation of U.S.-Taiwan relations was problematic for the R.O.C. for several reasons. First, economic aid from the U.S. was very important. It contributed to the furthering of the R.O.C.'s economic development. The government was obsessed with continuing to achieve economic growth and this was contingent upon the U.S.'s consent to eat up Taiwan's exports and provide beneficial trade incentives. The U.S. also provided loans and investment to Taiwan.

Second, the U.S. played an important role in ensuring security of the region. The R.O.C. was still vulnerable to threats from China and was uncertain how China would respond to many of its maneuvers. It was a delicate process for the R.O.C. to maintain some form of sovereignty while it waited for the right time to reunite. It also could not appear to be too independent, which might incite an aggressive response from China. The situation was made more complicated by the role of the burgeoning opposition that was more vocal about the self-determination movement.

Third, the shift of the U.S.'s position signaled to the opposition groups that the R.O.C. was becoming more and more vulnerable and ineffective. It helped the opposition mobilize and gave hope that this chink in the KMT's armor could lead to an opening in the system.

Taiwan responded to the pressure from the opposition by adding more seats to be contested in national elections. Additional supplemental elections were held in 1972, where 53 seats were added to the National Assembly and in 1975 where 52 seats were added to the Legislative Yuan (Copper 1984). Nevertheless, this did little to sway the United States that Taiwan was taking any serious steps to democratize.

This had a monumental impact on Taiwan's governing elite and on the society as a whole. The immediate impact was that CCK decided to postpone the December 1978 national elections that were supposed to be the most expansive to date. He believed that he needed time to regroup from this terrible diplomatic blow and regain composure of the party.

This naturally impacted the KMT tremendously. The many years of economic growth were not enough to stand on. The legitimacy of the KMT was seriously in question. A large segment of the population began to ask for meaningful elections at the time. When the scheduled elections were canceled, this only increased demands for political freedom and civil rights.

It also spurred on the opposition movement, seizing on the vulnerability of the KMT. It encouraged the young intellectuals in particular, to "acquire new conceptions of the role of politics in the

lives and new goals in which they may strive," (Cheng, T. 1989: 484). Simply put, it breathed new life into the opposition movement.

It can hardly be considered a coincidence that a new election law was passed in 1980 and elections were expanded more at the national level. In addition, the legislature increased to 70 new Legislative Yuan seats, 76 seats were available in the National Assembly and 32 openings were made in the Control Yuan. Though nothing drastic had occurred, CCK "was well aware that democracy was the way of the future and that to accommodate this trend, elections were crucial," (Copper 1993: 14).

The reforms that were made in the years to come were in part in response to the changing environment in Taiwan, as a result of the diplomatic shifts. It is possible that there were some concerns regarding its legitimacy with the international community and the prospects for sustaining economic growth and security. CCK knew that he could not continue to suppress the democratization process and must make concessions to show good faith. If he continued to ignore these pressures, the results could be far more disastrous.

Role of Chiang Ching-kuo (1972-1986)

The major moves towards reforms occurred in the late 1980's and 1990's. There are various factors that explain why so much of the reform occurred during this time, specifically for Taiwan. At this point it was clear to the KMT that the opposition movement was gaining momentum. They were no longer afforded the luxury of imposing an authoritarian regime under the guise of an electoral democracy. The quasi-democratic regime could only manufacture legitimacy for so long and as it became less and less important to the U.S. from a strategic standpoint, this signaled the KMT's vulnerability to the opposition. One of the key reasons why the regime was able to adapt was to due a change in leadership. This section examines the goals, interests and constraints imposed upon the new leader and how this influenced the democratization process. I argue that CCK was guided by different goals and constrained by a different environment than his father. This had a significant impact on the reforms that were enacted during his tenure. In addition, CCK slowly pursued democratic reforms at his own pace, instead of waiting until frustrations from below became too disruptive and violent (Chao, Myers 1998; Nathan, Ho 1990).

Though CCK shared many of the goals of his father, his vision was skewed more towards the goal of democratization than his

father's was. Thus, to CCK, the goal of one day, unifying China was simply unrealistic. Like his father, CCK ascribed to the teachings of Sun Yat Sen and believed that he must strive to improve the level of democracy on Taiwan, which was one of the Three Principles of the People. Nevertheless, CCK was more concerned with the KMT's survival and legitimacy than taking over Mainland China.

Chao and Myers quoted CCK in September 23, 1975 "To save our country and our people, we must propagate the spirit of sharing a single boat. We truly believe in Chang Kai-shek's great hope to restore our Chinese culture, carry out the Three Principles of the People, vigorously practice democracy, and recover the Chinese Mainland. All of these tasks still remain to be accomplished," (1998: 112). Thus, he aimed to establish democracy and a rule of law but was encumbered by the goal of recovering the Mainland in the process. To recover the Mainland, CCK believed that Taiwan needed to evolve and become more virtuous and moral. It was only after the citizens and elite became more virtuous and moral, serving as examples for citizens living in China, that the R.O.C. could recover the Mainland. The problem, however, was that no timetable was given to determine when these goals would be pursued, and in particular when democratization would be initiated.

Like his father, in the beginning of CCK's reign, he didn't believe that democracy could fully materialize until the Mainland had been recovered. The most important transformation of CCK's priorities occurred once he became aware that the goal of democratization would have to come before the goal of reuniting the Mainland. Though this was not easy to accept, it became clearer to CCK that the recovery of the Mainland might not happen in his lifetime.

The shifting of his priorities by no means meant that CCK would pursue democratization at a rapid pace. Stability, order and control over society were still important goals that guided his behavior. He justified the gradual pace of the process due to the Communist threat. Nevertheless, there were many indications from his speeches and quotes that he was much more committed to the goal of democratization than his father was. When he recognized that Taiwan's political development depended not on a "single dominant political system but on political pluralism," (Chao, Myers 1998: 114) he realized that improving Taiwan's democracy could help unify China. These sentiments of strong support for democracy were expressed on October 10, 1980. He thought that Taiwan could transfer its democratic experience to the Mainland in a peaceful manner. He claimed that "because we are dedicated to recovering

our country, we hold these high ideals: the Three Principles of the People, democratic-constitutional politics and freedom, peace and happiness. We want to transmit this kind of lifestyle to Mainland China and share this with all of the people” (Chao, Myers 1998: 114).

Thus, he was not averse to the idea of one day, becoming more democratic. The problem was that he still felt constrained and threatened by Communist China to allow the level of participation to expand to the level of a true democracy. Allowing such high levels of freedom and democratization could result in chaos and thus, destroy his goal of unifying China. There was a contingency of Taiwanese who voiced their desire for independence. Allowing politicians and individuals to espouse these types of thoughts would directly impede on his goals. CCK was in no way ready to allow this type of free-for-all that could revert the process that he and his father had worked so hard to achieve.

Thus, he believed that democratization must be a gradual process. He claimed that to have a democratic government, it required that both the leaders and the public be moral and virtuous, and that they obey the rules. He believed that the KMT must be prepared to participate in elections and demonstrate its high moral virtues to the voters by behaving without selfishness. He drew

heavily from Confucian values and the principles of Sun Yat Sen. However, as he saw it, the voters and the opposition politicians were not prepared for the process yet. There still needed to be some control over society to ensure that the government was as effective and well organized as possible in order to deal with the threats posed by Communist China. Even up until 1986, he was not optimistic that political party competition would be good for R.O.C. governance. Until the threat of China went away, he wasn't prepared to allow Taiwan to become inefficient and vulnerable to attack.

Nevertheless, he did realize the importance of recruiting more Taiwanese into the party and the importance of getting rid of one-man rule. He argued that with proper training and commitment to the rule of law, the government could continue to progress while maintaining its effectiveness. He claimed, "that only by staying in the era of the rule of law can we establish a common standard of concepts and behavior to build a new R.O.C.," (Chao, Myers 1998: 112). In order to train more individuals about following and establishing the rule of law he recruited Taiwanese into the party.

In the late 1970's he began to seek out more of Taiwan's best and brightest. This process, which was later coined by President Lee Teng Hui as "taiwanization" led to the infiltration of many young

politicians who were more capable of adapting to the changing nature of the domestic and international environment. (Cheng, T. 1989: 484) In 1973, the KMT recruited highly educated Taiwanese to government positions for the supplemental election that were instituted to replace the aging national representatives. These young party members were intellectuals who turned to social surveys (to gauge public opinion) and ways in which the structure of the regime could be improved. They also acquired "new conceptions of the role of politics in their lives and new goals for which they strive," (Cheng, T. 1989: 484). This was significant because it contributed to internal party development and forced the KMT to change its outlook not only regarding its policy but also regarding the issue of democratic reform.

In the 1972 election, 87% of the newly elected delegates were Taiwanese. This infusion of new blood recharged the party. Also in 1972, CCK's Party Central Committee elected Taiwanese to occupy three of the sixteen party positions. In 1976, this membership expanded to 70%, with five Taiwanese serving as members of the party's highest decision-making body, the Central Standing Committee. By the mid-1980's 45% of the Central Standing Committee members and 75% of the KMT cadres were native

Taiwanese. The "taiwanization" of the party also enabled CCK to have more control over the pace of reform (Nathan, Ho 1990).

The large number of Taiwanese party members holding significant positions in the mid-1980's undermined the opposition's argument that the KMT had not been responsive to the needs of the native Taiwanese. One of the most important indications that Taiwanese were becoming more powerful in politics was when it came time for CCK to choose his vice president in 1984. Instead of choosing a mainlander, he chose Lee Teng Hui, (to be discussed later) a Taiwanese born man, the first to hold such a high position in the government. This was a controversial move and was met with some criticism from KMT hard-liners, but indicated to the Taiwanese that they could work their way up within the KMT to attain positions of power. The process of recruiting Taiwanese to higher positions in the party enabled CCK to maintain some element of social control while quelling dissent from the opposition.

In 1976 CCK informed the Legislative Yuan that he planned on expanding the quota of national representatives to be elected in the supplemental elections. He was well aware of the political mood in his country and the sentiments of the leadership abroad. He claimed "if people ask me if it is now suitable to have supplemental elections for national representatives, my view is the following. Our

people are unanimous in wanting to have a democratic constitutional political system. This goal is also our unswerving national mission. Whatever we must do on behalf of our constitution and the Temporary Provisions, we must definitely carry out in practice," (From Chao, Myers 1998: 112). Thus, he was aware of what was going on in his country but wanted to always act prudently given the more important security goals and the need to ensure stability.

CCK dismissed many of the older KMT leaders that would provide roadblocks to reform and changed and recruited in the new. The addition of the Taiwanese to the party provided additional legitimacy, preempted possible frustrated forces within the Taiwanese community and provided the capacity to take the party in a new direction and adapt to the ever-changing environment. In order to incorporate more Taiwanese into the party he expanded the seats available for national election. He wanted to normalize the political process and bring more legitimacy to the party. At the time, these goals were integral to the process of recovering the Mainland.

In the early 1980's CCK was feeling the pressure mounting from the opposition. It was dissatisfied with the pace of democratization and the progress that had been made. Though some concessions were granted after the diplomatic defeats in the late 1970's and the growing strength of the opposition movement,

CCK was still worried about how opposition politicians would behave in a democratic government. Though he had become more realistic about the goal of recovering the Mainland, he knew that stability was still important. In addition, opposition members' espousal of independence could not be tolerated. He was worried about the uncertain response from the opposition members, given they were granted the opportunity in a democratic opening. He could only tolerate the opposition as long as it behaved by the rules and did not try to organize a political party.

Nevertheless, CCK was convinced that democratization was still inevitable and that he needed to allow it to happen, but on his terms. In order to pass democratic reforms at his pace, he needed the cooperation of the party, which would be difficult with the aging and conservative remnants from his father's regime. For the next couple of years, he replaced leaders that had been close to his father. Most of these leaders were too resistant to change or had grown too old. He brought in both progressive leaders and those who were more acceptable to hard-liners. He needed new blood to meet the demands of the increased political activity on Taiwan and hoped to build on its record to be successful in the future.

CCK also started meeting more often with leaders to propose and discuss policy changes. He was no longer waiting for party

congresses to convene to assess policy goals. The more frequent meetings allowed younger progressive leaders to voice their views and to reinforce CCK's views that democratic changes needed to be made.

According to Chao and Myers (1998: 123) he was also still influenced by Tao Pai-chuan, a former Control Yuan member, who had been the National Policy Advisor to the President since 1977. In 1982 Tao argued that the R.O.C. needed more elements of Western liberal democratic systems. He argued that the "polity had reached an impasse," and that the only way out of this was through free and fair political elections. This would enable the country to select the best and highest quality representatives to the people. In this way, political party competition could check and balance the various administrative bodies of the state. He advocated that the KMT promote the real political party politics and that it needed the tang-wai, the Taiwanese opposition, to compete in elections in order for the system to be most effective.

CCK knew that democratization needed to happen and he was aware of the reasons why, but he was adamant that it would happen at his own pace and not before he deemed the country ready. He could still remain in control of the situation by offering carrots to the opposition here and there without jeopardizing his

authority too much. Nevertheless, his bargaining leverage was substantially weakened after a series of events that occurred in the mid-1980's that discredited the KMT's legitimacy again.

On October 15 1984, the journalist Jiang Nan, otherwise known as Henry Liu was murdered in Daly City, California at his own home (Chao, Myers 1998). He had written an irreverent biography on CCK and his writings were considered very damaging to the KMT. The leaders of the Bamboo Gang, associated with the KMT were arrested and considered responsible for this attack. This did very little to enhance the U.S. government's opinion of the KMT and it provoked the opposition movement into a frenzy.

On February 9, 1985, it was exposed that the Shixin 10th Credit cooperative association was bankrupt. This revealed how closely the party was tied to big business. This was demoralizing since it reinforced one of the most enduring stereotypes about the KMT, in its last days on the Mainland and its trouble with corruption. The opposition leaders had been calling for a full disclosure of the finances since 1960 and this scandal made their requests more urgent. The scandal resulted in the indictment of several prominent officials with the KMT (Chao, Myers 1998: 129).

Given the set of embarrassments incurred by the regime, CCK wasn't able to respond to the instigating measures set forth by

an important Taiwanese opposition leader named Hsu Hsin-liang. Hsu tried to see what he could get away with by forming the Taiwan Democratic Party that was clearly against the law. Instead of responding forcefully, CCK surprised many by letting Hsu get away with it. All of these setbacks contributed to CCK's decision to set in motion reforms before it was too late.

Role of Chiang Ching Kuo (1985-1988)

The process of democratic reform had been moving slowly. By 1986, no giant leaps were made towards establishing democratization. CCK knew that once he allowed too much liberalization to occur there was no going back. Dahl supported this idea. He argued that "once a repressive regime moves away from the premise of total control and begins to allow some opposition, there is no natural stopping point until it reaches full-scale political competition or else re-imposes total control," (1982: 42). In the South Korean case, a re-imposition of total control was gradually implemented by President Park Chung Hee, after a brief period of democracy. CCK did not have this option. To revert back to authoritarianism at such a critical juncture might have resulted in total chaos and disruption. The opposition was becoming more and more well organized and influential (to be discussed in more detail

later). If Taiwan reverted back to authoritarianism it could incite the opposition to react violently and would greatly offend the U.S. government and public opinion.

Given this situation, CCK knew that he needed to be prudent and not make any quick decisions to propel democracy until the last possible moment. He knew that the gradual transition of reform was better than an overnight transformation. Huntington (1968) argued that the level of institutionalization must exceed the demands for political participation for a country to achieve political stability. In the case of Taiwan, the level of institutionalization meant the level of communication and constraint on the opposition and its ability to obey the rules of law without putting the country in jeopardy.

CCK still viewed the country's situation as a critical one where the party needed control over policy and the agenda. He could maintain control and perpetuate an image of some level of legitimacy by increasing the scope of supplemental elections while disallowing the formation of all opposition parties and public debate on political liberalization in the name of national security. By setting a purely electoral agenda, this enabled CCK and the KMT to "minimize the opposition's gain in the extended process of democratic transition. Moreover, a tight election law constrained campaign activity and pre-election crackdowns crippled critical publications," (Cheng, T. 1989:

491). He was only able to maintain this manufactured legitimacy for so long, however. He was aware that in order for Taiwan to survive and continue to achieve economic development and international recognition of its legitimacy, it had to prove that it had the support of the population. Copper wrote that only a democratic Taiwan would survive (1984: 22). In the current international environment, if Taiwan continued to be governed by undemocratic procedures, it wouldn't be long before it was entirely isolated in the world community.

During this time, CCK established the party's mission to democratize in a March 29, 1986 speech at the Third Plenum. "The Three Principles of the People definitely can be practiced and carried out in all of China. Taiwan serves as a base to use these principles as the blueprint for building a lasting peace for China and establishing the foundations for nationalism, people's rights and people's livelihood. Our party advocates practicing the spirit of making our present world a perfect moral order and to carry our R.O.C. Constitution to the Mainland to initiate democratic constitutional government. We aim to do away with dictatorships and class warfare, to really implement a way for our people to determine their destiny and return political power to the people and

make them entirely equal before the law," (From Chao, Myers 1998: 126).

To demonstrate his commitment, he called on the secretary General Mah Soo-lay and instructed him to establish a twelve-person committee to form six sub-committees for studying how the party should initiate political reforms. By April 9, 1986 a twelve-person committee had been named. The twelve-person blue ribbon committee was established within the party to examine how to restructure the National Congress, local autonomy, martial law, civic organizations, social reform as well as internal reform within the KMT. On October 15 1986, at a conference of the KMT Standing Committee, he explained further why he was taking such a course. "The times are changing, the environment is changing and the tides are also changing. To meet these changes the ruling party must adopt new concepts and new methods. On the basis of the democratic and constitutional political order, we must push forward measures of reform and renewal. Only this way can we link up with the tides of the times. Only this way can we remain forever at one with the people," (From Nathan, Ho 1990: 46).

Pzerworski (1986) argued that democratization occurs when an authoritarian regime is faced with problems that it can't resolve. These unresolved problems constrained the alternatives available to

CCK. When these problems or pressures became more acute, CCK knew that he needed to do something. The pressures before had been more chronic than acute in nature. He knew now that he had to be on good behavior and was no longer in a position where he could postpone elections as he did in 1978.

This decision to democratize also could have been influenced by the collapse of the Marcos Regime in the Philippines. It created an atmosphere that was favorable to democracy and signaled to him what could happen if a regime didn't pre-empt the forces pushing for democratization soon enough. Student protests in South Korea, (most notably in 1987), also signaled to CCK that if the regime was too inflexible, the alternative would be a forced democratization.

Though there is no way to know exactly what was going through CCK's head, there are several assumptions that can be made about his view of the overall situation in the mid-1980s. He knew that Taiwan needed to democratize. He knew that democratization would also have to come first, before the goal of recovering the Mainland was accomplished. He knew that democratic legitimacy was important to Taiwan's survival. He knew that without the legitimate consent of the public, Taiwan would be relegated to the permanent status of a diplomatic pariah. Finally, he also knew that the opposition was getting stronger and more vocal

and could respond at any time in a destabilizing manner. Given all of this information that CCK was informed about, his decision is not surprising. In the mid-1980s, CCK made some of the most significant moves towards democratization in Taiwan.

By 1986, CCK's health had been deteriorating and he needed to select a successor. He had earlier shut down a magazine that denigrated him, titled "Who is Chiang Ching-kuo's successor?" Time was running out at this point and something more drastic needed to be done. In an interview with Katherine Graham, the editor-in-chief of the Washington Post in late 1986 he announced that he planned to end martial law. He claimed, "the times are changing, the environment is changing, the tide is changing. The government must adopt new measures in accord with the changing times," (Chao, Myers 1998: 220).

CCK was facing the biggest challenge to the KMT. He wanted to somehow preserve the constitution and maintain stability while also reforming it to adapt to the "new realities that democratization required, namely, new but regular national elections of leaders and representatives by R.O.C. citizens," (Chao, Myers 1994: 225). Before this could be achieved this required the carrying out of another necessary step.

In April of 1986, he instructed members of the KMT Central Standing Committee to make up a special task force to examine the possibility of removing martial law and the ban on political parties. He had announced a month before at a KMT Central Committee plenum meeting that the party should aim for constitutional democracy. During the fall and summer of 1986, the KMT reform committees studied how the government would remove these barriers and how the process of reform would occur. One of the primary issues was to implement large-scale supplemental elections. In order to do so, the retirement of the senior parliamentarians was paramount. This idea was not well received by many members of the party.

Many officials working for CCK also expressed concern about removing martial law. They feared that they would no longer have the power to arrest traitors and try traitors to the regime. "They feared an overloading of civil courts and public demoralization caused by an increase in communist subversion and more overt Taiwanese nationalist activities," (Chao, Myers 1994: 221). The beliefs of some of CCK's top aides were cautious and averse to taking many of the steps needed to democratize. Chiang, however, didn't believe that there was an alternative, at this point. He wanted to reform on his terms.

CCK was well aware that there were leaders of the tang-wai intent of forming a new political party. Instead of suppressing these activists, he chose to meet with them. He sent the KMT Deputy Secretary-General Liang Su-jung and other mediators to meet with the key tang-wai leaders to discourage them from forming a new political party. The opposition was not budging and Chiang had few options on his table. He knew that the opposition was going to coalesce formally whether he liked it or not. If he responded harshly, this would create domestic instability and incite criticism from abroad. Though he was not happy about the prospects of democracy, he knew that it was now inevitable and he wanted it to be a peaceful process.

Chao and Myers (1998) proved this by pointing to numerous instances where he could have responded in a much more violent manner. The most telling example occurred on September 28, 1986, when tang-wai members illegally formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Though CCK was aware of this new development, he decided to respond with tolerance. This is particularly significant given the advice offered to him by his top-level security advisors, who wanted to declare the DPP illegal. He rejected their suggestions and instructed the powerful Garrison Command, a security apparatus, to take no action. Moreover, when

political dissident Hsu Hsing-liang tried to return to Taiwan on November 30, of that year, he ordered his personnel to respond with prudence and moderation. A new security law was implemented in June of 1987 enabling CCK to announce in July that martial law had been lifted.

In addition, towards the end of 1987, the government removed many press restrictions and started to open up proposals for the total re-election of the legislative bodies. He wanted to finally promote the "sprit of the constitution and the forms of constitutional government," (Moody 1992: 91)

Nevertheless, this did not mean that all of the issues were resolved. There were so many contentious issues still left undecided. The DPP rallied around the issue of the retirement of the senior parliamentarians, an injustice that it believed had run its course. The presence of these senior members froze the democratization process. The DPP charged that the bodies of government were undemocratic. In response to this situation, the KMT devised a plan to give the three bodies of government a total membership of 579. There would be 375 seats in the National Assembly. Another 150 seats would be allotted for the Legislative Yuan and another 54 seats to the Control Yuan. The new National Assembly would be set up after the 1989 election and the new

Legislative Yuan would be set up after the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections (Copper 1993).

CCK's ailing health forced him to quickly choose a successor. There were many Mainlanders in the party that he could have chosen, but he decided against appointing them. The times were changing and he knew that for the party to continue to endure amidst these changes, it needed the support of a largely Taiwanese public that was becoming more assertive. He chose Lee Teng Hui, a popular well-respected Taiwanese man who was not well backed within the party as other members. It was a controversial choice to KMT members. This choice came to a surprise to many because it was widely regarded that Lee Huan would be named the successor. He was a technocrat and generally popular within the party. CCK, however, did not believe that Lee Huan could move the KMT into the future.

Why did CCK choose Lee? He was regarded highly by CCK for his values and work ethic. He was not knee deep in scandal and not connected auspiciously to the wrong groups. He showed a stronger commitment to pursuing CCK's goals of democratizing the country in a fashion that connected with the vision set forth by Sun Yat Sen. In addition, CCK did not want to create another dynasty. The country needed to change. There were pressures to do so

coming left and right and inside and out. He believed that Lee was the best choice and the man with the most ability and integrity to do so.

Towards the end of his reign, CCK initiated many significant changes to the Taiwanese political system. He ended martial law. He planted the seeds for the democratization of the legislative bodies. He recruited more Taiwanese into the party. He allowed a new political party to form. He removed the more severe press restrictions. Finally, he named a Taiwanese born man to serve as his successor. He had many accomplishments to be proud of at the time of his death, on January 13, 1988. His death established a new era in Taiwanese politics, but the foundation had already been planted.

Role of the Opposition (origin- 1986)

The opposition in Taiwan also played a role in the transition to democracy, although somewhat differently than its South Korean counterpart. The Taiwanese were given the chance to compete in elections at the local level and had more opportunity to participate via local elections. This impacted how the opposition responded to its environment. Though it pushed for reforms, its demands were not as disruptive to the system. Thus, the leadership in Taiwan was

able to respond more calmly to these demands as they arose.

Nevertheless, the process of reform did not happen overnight. It was a result of many years of trial and error.

The opposition in Taiwan was not very well organized early on. As explained before, this was due to the oppressive laws that restricted its freedoms and created divisions. During Chiang Kai-shek's rule, the Taiwanese elites were especially dependent on Chiang to provide resources and avenues to maintain any type of power being doled out. All of the different groups were co-opted into Chiang's power structure or left out to fend for themselves in a competitive environment. There were few rewards or incentives for remaining on the side against the government. The groups that did remain were extremely fragmented and disorganized and didn't provide much of a threat to the ruling KMT.

The opposition was often split up and divided by the lack of a unified and shared ideology. It was not interested at the time, in uniting to further anti-KMT goals or for increasing the size of the anti-KMT coalition. The opposition members were more out for themselves and more interested in gaining their own power and prestige, and not for fighting for democracy. Thus, Lerman wrote that ideology was "overridden by ambitions to attain many non-

ideological rewards offered by successful players of the local politics game," (1978: 76-77).

The government ensured that this was how politics would function. It played local factions off against one another to satisfy the needs of electoral politicians and their followings. It did this by distributing local patronage and also through coercion. This convinced many of the opposition politicians as well as the potential voters to concentrate on private goals instead of going against the KMT machine.

Though most politicians gave up and joined the KMT, the government did allow two minor parties to exist. Both of these minor opposition parties had formed when the government of the R.O.C. ruled all of China. These parties were known as the Young China Party (YCP) and the China Democratic Socialist party (DSP). These parties moved to Taiwan in 1949 and at various times were able to gain some membership and support. For the most part, however, they were nothing more than token opposition parties that posed no threat to the KMT (Copper Winter 1993: 97).

The YCP was founded by Cheng Chi, an intellectual who supported youth activism in 1923. He was opposed to Communism in China and advocated social revolutions based on the philosophy of the French radical right, nationalism and actions against foreign

imperialism. Party members, however, were unable to make the transition from intellectuals to party builders and this hurt their ability to compete. In 1947, the YCP joined a campaign coalition with the KMT and helped it to win 237 seats in the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan. This enabled the YCP to have some influence over legislative decisions, but it wasn't able to do anything to oppose the KMT on any serious matters (Copper Winter 1993: 96).

In addition, the YCP was not much more than an adjunct to the KMT. It generally adhered to what the KMT wanted and differed only slightly on the issues. Thus, it didn't offer much of an alternative to the KMT. Because of this, it wasn't been able to attract much support on its own from the electorate.

The DSP formed in Shanghai in 1946 from a merger between the Democratic Constitutionalist Party and National Socialist party. It's similar in ideology to European socialism. Thus, it did offer an alternative to the more conservative KMT ideology. However, like the YCP, it failed to gain much status after it moved to Taiwan. The only representation that it received was through appointment rather than through electoral wins. After the 1989 election it had no representation in any of the major elected organs and even lost the only seat that it had in the provincial assembly (Copper Winter 1993: 96).

The problem with these two opposition parties was that both parties suffered from factionalism. Copper wrote that both parties found that "years of playing the role of KMT controlled parties made it difficult for them to find candidates who could win national elections," (Copper Winter 1993: 97). Thus, the KMT was never tested in any way by these two political parties and their existence never really served as a springboard for an opposition movement to build off of.

Nevertheless, one of the key events that tested the KMT's relationship with the opposition occurred in 1960, when Lei Chen announced that the China Democratic Party would be announced in mid September. This party originated on Mainland China and was comprised of Chinese intellectuals who were unhappy with the KMT's failure to implement democracy. It believed that the KMT's sovereignty over the Mainland was discredited by the lack of democracy and that this would undermine Taiwan's credibility abroad. Lei Chen led the movement that tried to operate within the framework of the Constitution, but it clearly was trying to test the KMT. To signal the KMT's dissatisfaction with this outright disregard of the law banning political parties, the KMT responded with the September 4th arrest of Lei Chen sentencing him to ten years in

prison. Other followers were also arrested and the party was immediately declared illegal.

Despite this setback, overall, the 1960's ushered in a new era of opposition politics. The independent politicians, who were usually of Taiwanese origin, played a more pivotal role in politics than they had in the past. They started to win more of the local elections. One of the most important victories was the election of Kao Yu-shu to be the mayor of Taipei in 1964. The win of this important seat signaled to both the KMT and other independents that the KMT was not completely invincible and independents could win important seats. For the time being, this was accepted by the KMT because the independent politicians had learned the lesson experienced by Lei Chen. Thus, they didn't try to challenge the KMT by forming another political party. The KMT knew that it could control government policies as long as it deterred the opposition from forming any type of cohesive unit. The opposition at the time didn't make any serious effort to challenge the KMT's legitimacy or influence national policy. Rather, it was complacent to attain local political power and influence. This complacency would not last long, however.

An intense campaign occurred in 1969 that convinced the opposition that it needed to form some sort of organization in order to compete effectively with the other KMT candidates. The electoral

laws demanded organization for any party or groups to do well. The opposition movement became more and more determined to become more cohesive so that it could be competitive.

In the 1970's the opposition started to gain momentum and strength. The opposition made it its mission to show the public how corrupt the KMT was. In particular, it tried to show how frequently the KMT had violated campaign laws and improperly counted votes in its favor. One such attempt of the KMT to stuff ballot boxes in the town of Chungli led to a riot in 1977 where police cars were burned. This damaged the KMT's legitimacy and credibility, creating a public relations catastrophe. The opposition knew that the KMT's legitimacy was already being tarnished by some of the overtures coming from the United States. Though the opposition may have misinterpreted the U.S.'s actions, it sensed that the KMT was becoming more vulnerable than ever before. The opposition was "buoyed-up in its confidence that the time had come to take more pressing measures and challenge KMT power at the grassroots level throughout Taiwan," (Hood 1997: 63). This was just another setback that could help the tang-wai garner support from former KMT voters.

It was about this time that the opposition, which comprised of independent politicians, became known as the tang-wai. The literal translation of tang-wai is "outside the party". The tang-wai was

formed in response to the mass violent protest demonstration that occurred in Chungli. At this point, the opposition politicians had had enough and knew that they needed to become more cohesive to counteract these acts of corruption.

The opposition politicians also formed an organization to coordinate the elections of campaigns of the politicians and to serve as the core of the opposition movement (Wu 1995). They also started an influential magazine movement. The final strategy of starting a mass movement pushed the patience of the KMT too far and had disastrous results. Nevertheless, they were witnessing some impressive electoral gains that the KMT had to take notice of. In the 1977 election, the tang-wai attempted to coordinate the events. It won 22 seats in the 77-member Taiwan Provincial Assembly. In addition, four out of twenty mayor/county magistrate posts were held by the tang-wai.

In these local elections where the tang-wai won some 35% of the seats in the local election for the Taiwanese Provincial Assembly and 20% of the seats of government positions, electoral politics at the local level was clearly becoming more and more competitive. The tang-wai was a force to be reckoned with and the KMT and the electorate recognized this. Nevertheless, with every positive step made by the tang-wai, a setback would accompany it. The tang-wai

became increasingly confident by this electoral victory. Thus, the irony of the electoral showing was that it radicalized the opposition and initiated a split within the opposition, to be discussed later. More positively, this showing also incited the opposition to forge and create new organizations to help further its cause (Chao, Myers 1998).

In 1978, the opposition formed the Tang-wai Campaign Corps in order to help coordinate campaigns. The opposition relied on magazines to get its opinions heard since the KMT completely controlled the electronic media. These magazines were very critical of the KMT and tried to undermine and de-legitimize the KMT's moral authority. One the most influential magazines representing the tang-wai's views was the Formosa magazine. The editorial board was comprised of tang-wai members (Chao, Myers 1998; Wu 1995; Hood 1997).

1978 was also the year that Taiwan was hit with a huge diplomatic setback, losing diplomatic recognition from the U.S. in favor of the P.R.C. This signaled to the opposition how illegitimate the KMT was and how vulnerable it was becoming. CCK's decision to postpone what were to have been the most democratic and expansive elections to date infuriated the opposition and led to a series of more explosive events (Chao, Myers 1998).

Opposition groups formed the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). This group set its agenda to talk to U.S. senators. The KMT regime was continuously accused of human rights abuses and violations. The U.S. was well aware of what was going on in Taiwan and received free negative press of every authoritarian maneuver by the KMT. The KMT had a watchdog that was fiercely covering its every move and tattling on it to a crucial source.

During the year of 1979, tang-wai politicians published a journal called Mei-li-tao (Beautiful Island) and held political demonstrations to protest KMT rule and spread Western liberal thought. On December 10 1979, the magazine sponsored demonstrations in Kaohsiung to celebrate International Human Rights Day. This protest was against the authorities alleged abuse of human rights, but ironically ended with clashes between the police and those demonstrating. The violent consequences served as one of the key points of contention for both the opposition and the KMT. More than 180 policemen were injured and more than 100 tang-wai leaders were arrested.

At the time the tang-wai was divided into hard-liners and moderates. The hard-liners advocated more decisive and confrontational ways to push for democratic reforms. They were

clearly agitating the KMT and making those in power more nervous by the minute. The hard-liners in the opposition were pushing the hard-liners in the KMT towards more reactionary and authoritarian policies. During this event, most of the tang-wai leaders who were arrested were hard-liners in the opposition movement (Chao, Myers 1998; Wu 1995; Hood 1997).

The jailing of opposition members did not set back the opposition movement's quest to democratize. On the contrary, it had many positive effects for the democratization process. The hard-liners in the opposition were stimulating harsh reactions from the hard-liners in the KMT. The refusal to negotiate was stalled because the hard-liners within the tang-wai had an all or nothing strategy and refused to negotiate on more civil terms with the KMT. This action and reaction cycle delayed the possibility of negotiating reforms. The severity of the hard-liners methods within the tang-wai was also creating dissention in the tang-wai itself. The tactics used by the hard-liners did not always appeal to the public. The soft-liners wanted to find more peaceful means to resolve their disputes with the KMT and thought that many of their goals could be achieved with a different approach.

With the moderate opposition leaders at the helm, this forced the KMT to normalize the political process by reinstating elections.

The absence of a formal opposition party enabled the tang-wai to present itself as a cohesive, unified and credible political force. It also helped the tang-wai coordinate its elections and campaigns better and adopt a common platform. Thus, the result of the harsh treatment of the tang-wai hard-liners was that the moderates were given room to take over the movement. This led to a strong showing in the 1980 elections where several opposition candidates defeated their KMT opponents. In addition, some of the wives of jailed opposition members were encouraged to run and received many sympathy votes from the electorate who were so incensed by the reactionary response of the KMT government. This indicated the overall frustration of the public with the KMT's behavior. It signaled that the public was not afraid to show its dissatisfaction with the KMT by electing opposition members' wives.

By 1982, however, the opposition was having problems with many factional disputes. The moderates wanted to concentrate on doing well in the limited electoral contests available. They wanted to win as many seats as possible in the supplementary and local elections. They viewed this as the only way for the opposition to grow and continue to influence the political process. Despite the problems of the national legislative branches, if the tang-wai could be given the chance to participate more in those bodies, this might

give the opposition some leverage to pressure the authority (Cheng, Haggard 1992: 123).

The young Turks, as they were called, who were associated with the Tang-wai association of Magazine Editors and Writers had no patience for the moderates' plan. The hard-liners hated the electoral parliamentary strategy. They believed that only concentrating on making gains in the national legislative bodies had almost no impact whatsoever because the majority of seats were held by senior legislative members from the Mainland. These Mainlanders had been elected in China many years before and never had to stand for re-election. To demonstrate how futile the plight of the opposition was, when the opposition won almost 25% of the vote, this still only translated into 4% of the seats. There was no way that the opposition could bring about any change and reform with only 4% of the seats. The hard-liners, therefore, advocated a more drastic strategy that would allow major changes to finally be set in motion (Chao, Myers 1998).

Those elected to office believed that in order to grow into an influential political force, the tang-wai had to win the support of certain local clientele. Though much of this clientele didn't share the views of the tang-wai, it still was willing to give the tang-wai some help. The problem however, was that if the tang-wai was to receive

some assistance, it needed to tone down its image. It had to realize, according to the officeholders, that maintaining its moral image at any cost was not beneficial to the group. The tang-wai was so divided on this issue that it hindered some of the future electoral contests that it was to participate in.

One of these setbacks occurred in 1983. The opposition was too disunited. The inability of the jailed Formosa Magazine leaders and the moderates within the tang-wai to come to any sort of agreements created problems. The Formosa Magazine group refused to bargain, creating a rift within the tang-wai. This explained why the tang-wai did so poorly at the 1983 election. Thus, this poor showing incited the tang-wai to establish the Tang-wai Candidate Campaign Support Committee. In order to play by the rules the opposition knew that it needed to start strategizing better (Copper 1993).

The Association of Tang-wai Public Officials for the Study of Public Policy (APPS) was also conceived to function between elections and enabled the opposition to coordinate its electoral strategies, minimize factional rifts and harmonize various political strands. It also allowed discussions and provided an imprimatur for binding members' actions and established some type of organizational authority. The APPS would also allow the opposition

to gain knowledge in key policy areas to help them better negotiate with the KMT. Finally, the APPS would provide legal protection for activities of the opposition. Thus, the APPS served a similar function to what had been used by the KMT for many years, in order to have a leg up on the competition. It was a clear message to the KMT that the opposition was wising up and learning to compete in the competitive environment that had for so many years played into the hands of the more organized KMT. CCK was less than thrilled by this development. Though he first threatened the APPS to disband, he allowed the organization to operate in two localities.

In 1984 the APPS was formally established. The KMT was clearly threatened by this strategic maneuver and threatened the tang-wai to disband it. The response had been rooted in the KMT hard-liners fear of the policies and tactics employed by the hard-liners within the tang-wai. The irrational strategies of the tang-wai hard-liners had caused harsh reactions from the conservative faction of the KMT. The key for the tang-wai, given the strength of the hard-liners of the KMT, was to avoid the mistakes of the more radical and violent opposition forces. Reform could be made more possible by avoiding some of the more irrational strategies of the Formosa Magazine group leaders. Thus, though the APPS was not approved by the KMT, the tang-wai began to play by the rules of the game in

order to make some progress. It tried to coordinate the elections and campaigns. It obtained helpful information that would aid to its cause.

Finally, it knew that it needed to not resort to violence that would adversely play into the hands of the conservative KMT (Moody 1992).

The opposition also benefited from Taiwan's growing legitimacy problems with the international community and, in particular, the U.S. As described before, when the U.S. decided to no longer recognize Taiwan diplomatically, this created an opening for the opposition to criticize the current regime. The opposition seized on this opening and started to increase its campaign in the United States. In 1982, opposition members in the tang-wai made visits to U.S. Congress. The opposition was being heard and improving its foreign relations. Some U.S. Congress members conveyed that they supported the opposition movement. The opposition knew that Taiwan was still dependent on the U.S. for favorable trade policies, market supply and weapons access. Despite the proclamation of the Taiwan Relations Act, the military ties were still vital to its defense. In addition, the U.S. consumed more than 50% of Taiwanese goods. The overseas Taiwanese tried to link the issue of human's rights for political prisoners to Taiwan's

qualification for a preferential tariff. Although the U.S. never went so far as to impose economic sanctions and the U.S.'s overall (although ambiguous) foreign policy indicated that it supported Taiwan, the opposition usurped on the possibility that the U.S.'s policy could change unfavorably towards the R.O.C.

The lobbying efforts of overseas Taiwanese were especially damaging. They continued to highlight the lack of democracy at the national level and made this more conspicuous to some of the most influential Congressmen. Though the tang-wai in Taiwan might have appeared threatening to the KMT, the overseas Taiwanese revolutionaries seemed completely out of control. They made the opposition in Taiwan seem moderate

There were not many more years left that CCK could continue to stall the democratization process. There were too many pressure groups that were getting impatient. He knew that if he wanted this process to happen in a calm and controlled manner he would need to appeal to the conservative faction within the KMT to do so, and initiate some sort of bargaining process with the moderate opposition members. Without their support, the process might be stalled too long resulting in a disastrous response from the tang-wai. If he could manage to get all sides concerned to behave moderately, calmly and rationally, he could convince the more conservative

faction of the KMT to pursue some of the deeply needed reforms, at his pace. This could not materialize without the cooperation of the moderate tang-wai members.

The opposition's strategy could not work without unity and cooperation amongst its own group. It learned the lesson of Kaohsiung and used the only available arena open for political action. Unlike the Korean case where the opposition was forced to go to the streets, the Taiwanese opposition had more reliable institutions to work with. By working within the system it could avoid repression and encourage public disdain.

The opposition was becoming more prudent by focusing on the ideas of Hume, Mill, Sunism, Confucianism and Western liberalism. It based its political thinking on respect for the law and constitutional rules. This not only helped make the KMT behave in a more harmonious manner, but it also made the opposition play by the rules, something that produced a better response from CCK.

The opposition wanted to avoid the direct closed-door negotiations sought out by the KMT. If it chose this option it would have given the KMT too much of an advantage. The KMT had obvious advantages if the negotiations were stuck strictly at the bargaining table. The KMT had a hierarchical structure for resolving its disputes. The opposition did not have that, nor did it want to rely

on such a structure. Nevertheless, this meant that it would have to come up with its own mechanism in which to combat this lack of cohesion and ability to resolve disputes that were brought to the bargaining table (Moody 1992).

The legislative arena was to be relied upon as a third arena of action for the opposition. Active participation in the legislature could help the opposition gain useful information, learn more about politics and slowly gain credibility. Playing by the rules enhanced its image as a loyal opposition and not an irrational and violent conglomeration of passionate politicians. The legislative assemblies were to be the best open arenas in which the opposition could challenge the government on a variety of issues.

The transition and strategic interaction between the opposition and the KMT was very implicit on negotiations. The prospects for a democratic outcome depended on the ability of both sides to set the agenda of the transition. Once the KMT had committed to political change, it could set limits on the range of tolerable debate. Nevertheless, this debate would be tested heavily with the tang-wai's next maneuver at the end of 1986.

What was the role of the rules that each party had available in easing the transition? It allowed the opposition a chance to run without completely overturning the ruling party. The lack of

uncertainty attached to the electoral laws allowed the KMT to hold elections without total fear that it would be ousted in office, as could have happened had single-member district/plurality (SMD) been implemented.

Role of Opposition: Bargaining for Reform (1986-1988)

The KMT knew that the gradual transition of reform was better than an overnight transformation. Higley claimed that, "the party that has the power to set the agenda can prevent issues that are unfavorable to itself from reaching the bargaining table, or it can squeeze the agenda in a way that will maximize its gains and minimize its losses," (1998: 491). The KMT's strategy during the crucial period of reform and bargaining with the opposition was to somehow find a compromise between the hard-liners and soft-liners and gradually normalize the political process.

CCK wanted to maintain as many constraints as possible on opposition activities. He wanted to appeal to the opposition through electoral reform. By making changes to the elections, this could modify the process and mitigate the chances for chaos and an overthrow of the government. The regime would create more seats for electoral competition. He also enacted electoral laws through which the investigative power was rested in a non-partisan Election

Committee. He also set out to initiate a mediated dialogue with the opposition (Copper 1993).

The question of whether or not the party could mediate in the face of conflict and respond appropriately was tested in September 1986 when the tang-wai announced the formation of a new political party, to be called the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This came before CCK had formally removed the ban on political parties. An even bolder decision was to participate in the December elections under the DPP. The opposition knew that it needed to form a cohesive party to test the waters and to make the people more aware of the need for political change at a crucial time. This clearly was testing the patience of CCK. His decision to accept the DPP was contingent upon the opposition meeting three important pre-conditions. By allowing the party and setting the terms, hopefully this could lead to the same outcome that he intended. The pre-conditions included no violence, no advocacy of separatism and no support for Communism. One of his main fears of allowing a new political party was based on the notion that another political party would advocate issues and behave in ways that were counterproductive to his main goals. By setting the parameters, he could allow the opposition to coalesce officially without allowing it the range to challenge issues that he deemed vital to Taiwan's survival.

The regime could also benefit from time and the fact that it still had control over the media. "It could commit to the goal of democratization while still keeping that commitment broad, undefined and incremental in nature," (Cheng and Haggard 1992: 16). It could control the pace by tying the transition to already scheduled events such as the regular elections.

Nevertheless, once the opposition had committed to some form of political change the opposition gained the advantage of being able to specify what some of the alternative paths would be. The sequence that it set forth was logical to achieving its goals. First, it demanded political liberalization such as the annulment of martial law and the restoration of freedoms of speech, press and assembly. Second, it wanted to call for the re-election of membership of the national representative bodies. Finally, it planned on calling for the direct election of the president and the provincial governors. The opposition identified that this sequence could play best with the government's own commitments to democracy. The opposition wanted to raise the cost of doing nothing and forced the KMT to act on some of these key issues.

In July 1987, the Legislative Yuan officially terminated martial law and also eradicated the ban on new political parties. This automatically led to an intense two-party system, however. The

DPP was not as adept at recruiting and fund-raising, both crucial tasks to succeed, given Taiwan used the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), to be discussed in depth in the next chapter. In addition, it had to compete amidst a spate of new parties. By 1989, the political scene was crowded with 23 new political parties. Though this was clearly a time of intense political change, this was not the only reason for this escalation. The KMT was too smart to let the DPP compete freely without more obstacles thrown in its way.

In early 1989, the KMT passed the Civic Organization Law that clarified the status of political parties and perpetuated this situation (Copper 1993). The election laws made it extremely easy to form new political parties. Thus, though the regimes had previously imposed severe constraints on the formation of any type of political party in the past, once it lifted the ban it completely reversed its policies. "There were almost no restraints on organizing and applying for party status. One could form a party almost by going to a government office and filing," (Copper, Winter 1993: 98). The regime didn't even require the party to demonstrate any type of voter support, membership or budget. The only requirement was that the founder be at least 20 and that the party had thirty members or more. Thus, there was little to deter one from forming a political

party making it more difficult for the newly formed DPP to compete effectively against the KMT.

Chapter 5

Examining the Electoral System: Manipulation and Reform

The previous chapters examined the political context in Taiwan from 1945 to 1988, specifically looking at the goals of both Chiangs and the environment that constrained them. This chapter briefly explains why elections were implemented in the first place. Moreover, because Taiwan uses such a unique system (SNTV), this chapter more comprehensively examines the effects of the electoral laws on factions, electoral competition, and the opposition. Finally, the chapter focuses on the effects of the more recent reform efforts.

Establishing Local Elections

Initially, during the first stage of KMT rule, Chiang Kai-shek allowed some form of local autonomy, but he needed to make sure that this would in no way get in the way of his primary goals. After the 1947 Incident, the KMT and Chiang's regime was widely unpopular. Martial law was established which did not bode well with the increasingly irate community. Chiang knew that by establishing local elections he could secure authoritarian rule and legitimize the regime. He wanted to distinguish the regime from China. There were clearly international pressures to prove this, and given that he

was highly dependent on the U.S., he needed to give it reason to support him.

In addition, the Taiwanese were no stranger to local elections, though they weren't very meaningful. As discussed before, the Japanese divided colonial Taiwan into five districts, three prefecture and eleven cities. These all fell under the office of the governor-general. The districts and villages had towns under them. The cities and towns were further divided into wards and the wards and villages contained neighborhood associations with association halls. Each territorial administrative unit had an executive leader. Cities were headed by mayors, districts were headed by governors, prefectures by chiefs and villages and towns by elected leaders. Thus, at the grassroots level, there was a network of informants, household registration and self-policing (Lai, Myers, Wou 199: 41-43). Though in the city and district prefecture levels the councils were advisory, in the villages and towns the Taiwanese were granted decision-making powers.

Before 1940, all positions were appointed, but many Taiwanese were elected at the town and village level. Later on, in the 1940's the role of Taiwanese in government grew. Of the 84,559 people in the bureaucracy, 56% were Taiwanese. Even in the top six administrative spots, the Taiwanese held 35% of the jobs. The

first local elections were implemented as early as April 1946. By December 1951, the first election was held for the Taiwanese Provincial Assembly, which was the first island wide election. In 1959, the Organic Law of Taiwan's Provincial Assembly was established. It formalized the election of assembly members for renewable terms of four years by direct popular vote and these elections were held regularly ever since (Lai, Myers, Wou 1991: 43).

In addition, half of the city, district and town level council members were elected. The Taiwanese were thus in charge of the community at the town level and were given the sense that they had some sort of say in government and the affairs that were important to them. According to Myers, Han and Wou, this increased participation "whetted the appetite of the Taiwanese elite,"(1991: 44). It attracted them to the idea of self-government that was popular dating back to centuries before.

The Taiwanese were used to the idea of basing local government on elections and this was one of several reasons why the KMT initiated local elections as early as it did. Continuing to allow local elections satisfied the minimum legitimacy requirement in Chiang's mind. But to satisfy his larger goals of stability and control, these local elections were accompanied by unfair institutional

mechanisms that he deemed necessary to ensure the outcomes that he desired.

Why Were Local Elections held?

It's first important to understand, that Chiang perceived no threat to the KMT at the local level. It had some pressure from the U.S. given its dependent relationship. Also, it needed to distinguish itself as "free" China to the international community and justify its so-called commitment to the goal of full democracy. It also wanted to legitimize its rule and justify its membership into the Western political camp (Cheng, T. 1989: 478). It also would serve as a political "safety valve to dissipate the political energy of disgruntled ex-landlords," (Cheng, T. 1989: 478). In other words, it was diluting political discontent as much as it could. By providing avenues for political participation, this would ease the ethnic conflict that resulted from the February 28, 1947 Incident. It would also reduce the level of Taiwanese hostility toward the Mainland and preempt the growth of more radical forces.

More importantly, however, Chiang wanted to infiltrate Taiwanese society and co-opt the local elite. This would help to build and develop more sophisticated organizations, vis-à-vis the masses and various social groups. Elections could not only divert

the people's attention away from national affairs and to issues that would not challenge the legitimacy of the government, but also give the KMT more leverage (Wu 1995: 28).

The KMT could now manipulate the local affairs if it could co-opt local elite and gain its loyalty. The KMT encouraged party membership at the local levels, which would enable the KMT to control the nomination process and force these candidates to respond to KMT demands. The KMT could also serve as a broker between the local factions, altering the role from authoritarian ruler to mediator.

According to Copper (1984: 43), the R.O.C. also established various kinds of organizations for farmers, women, etc and played a role in the operation of local government. These groups were important forces in elections and campaigns and were steps towards mobilizing the electorate. Elections were thus, fostering institutional connections between the émigré KMT regime and the local notables. This was achieved through patron-client relationships that were common in Asian societies. The KMT, as a result of these institutional connections, was able to exert more effective social control by virtue of political penetration through these elections, (Bosco 1992: 172). These political alliances between the KMT and

the local factions enabled authorities to constrain the growth of potential opposition movements.

In sum, "elections channeled political participation in a way that suited the party. The KMT election strategy was designed to maximize the loyalty of local factions, not to provide opportunities for exit of voice," (Dickson 1996: 48).

Role of Local Factions for the KMT

According to Cheng and Chou (2000) factions in nearly all areas of Taiwan were created and fostered by local elections that the KMT regime propagated. Local factions had been key to KMT rule since they had no connections to local society and lacked grassroots support in Taiwan (Chen, M. 1996: 176). The KMT was able to develop support from the bottom up with the help of local elites. The KMT used the local factions to manipulate local politics. These factions could help the KMT win strong majorities that were necessary to rule Taiwan. They were necessary to mobilize voter support because the KMT was not very popular in Taiwan. Factions also served to balance the power of the country's government vs. the county councils. In sum, with these factions, the KMT assumed that it could be used to help mobilize voters to win elections, obtain

resources controlled by other organizations, and distribute these resources to the member of the networks.

In return for the support of local factions, the KMT gave local elites special privileges that were exclusive to their assistance to the KMT, such as control over the credit union and transportation companies. They were granted procurements from local and provincial government agencies. In addition, they received many other economic benefits such as favorable zoning laws and public construction schemes for land speculation. Bosco wrote that with these party favors and state patronage, the KMT control over local factions institutionalized "a condition of mutual state society dependency," (1992: 157). Besides this, factional candidates had a higher election rate than non-factional candidates. This factor made it easy to uproot factions in a short period of time.

Taiwan's factions were primarily based on lineage, marriage, geography and academic ties. Lerman wrote that individuals learned through the socialization process that one of the main methods for satisfying needs was by manipulating human relationships. It was never established that coldly calculating human relationships for personal advantage was wrong. Thus, in traditional societies, individuals were taught to disguise such manipulations in terminology associated with trust and warmth. There were also

strong patterns of deference to authority that reinforced these relationships. Factions, in sum, encouraged the traditional interpersonal relationships that characterized most Confucian based societies and hindered democratic institutionalization from taking place.

Lerman claimed that the hostilities that formed between the Mainlanders/ KMT and the Taiwanese were nowhere near as heated as the hostilities that developed between factions at the local level. This allowed the KMT to fill the void of a mediator. Lerman wrote that the Chinese have a deep fear of conflict and need mediators (1978: 48). By filling this role of the mediator between these factions it was now closely related to all factions and was seen as neutral. It was not identified with any one faction and this gave the KMT more power and prestige. Therefore, although the Taiwanese competed for membership on the party committees at the local level, it was only the Mainlanders who claimed neutrality and fulfilled the powerful function of mediator. The more divisive they were at the local level, the more power this gave the KMT.

Though factions would later lead to some of the key divisions within the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek was able to contain factionalism at both the national and local levels. According Cheng and Chou (2000: 32) at least three unwritten rules prevented factional politics

from subverting the authority of the KMT regime. First, local politics was insulated from central politics and anyone who broke this informal rule would be punished. (This was later confirmed by the arrest of Lei Chen in 1961) Thus, there was a de facto standard of political behavior that was set that shouldn't be crossed. In addition, local elites were unable to ever make attempts at the national elections because national elections were suspended. Second, factions from the three national representative organs could never join together to form an alternative party because there was a ban on political parties. Third, factional spats needed to be confined at the national level to the Legislative Yuan. Party discipline was enforced at this time, as factions were strictly controlled and unable to make disruptions at the national level. Any non-compliant members were expelled from the party and there was little recourse at the time to vindicate itself with public support due to the law that banned the formation of any type of political party.

At this time, Chiang Kai-shek suppressed factional strife at the national level. He had strict control over his Leninist based party and required all of the members to profess their loyalty. He was able to weaken factions more effectively, however, with institutional mechanisms.

Role of the Electoral System in the Emergence of Local Factions

According to Bruce Dickson (1996: 47), local factions emerged after the revision of the electoral districts. In the early 1950's the KMT revised the districts to better suit its needs. Previously, there were eight counties and nine cities, but the KMT changed this to eighteen counties. This led to the "dissipation of strength of the local traditional elite". Local factions were now more numerous. Factions did not link up with other factions in counties or cities (Bosco 1992). Most factions were hooked up to the KMT and were strictly controlled. The KMT could exercise such control because victory was pretty much assured to any candidate belonging to a faction controlled by the KMT.

Because there were electoral laws that banned the formation of political parties, there were no viable opposition parties. This void enhanced the strength of local factions. Other individuals could not compete effectively in the atmosphere that they were confined to. Even the most prominent Taiwanese locals were unable to convert their social standing and popularity into electoral victory and many were eventually recruited by the KMT. These leaders were tempted by the KMT to join because they knew that they could win with the KMT and enjoy the spoils of office. This co-optation of local elite into

the party made the local factions that much stronger and more viable.

No one person was ever able to become too powerful due to the KMT's nominating procedures. The KMT was in control of who would get nominated. The leaders of competing factions belonged to the KMT local party committee and they used their power of nomination to alternate terms of office. This consociational system was designed to create stability and ensure and reduce the uncertainty of power struggles between factions. This system also ensured that no single faction could dominate the political sphere and pose any type of threat to the KMT machine.

The KMT also nurtured different factions to thwart any one faction's power. It would support certain rival factions at the same time to make the atmosphere more competitive. In fact, it would make sure that at least two viable factions remained in competition in each electoral district, giving out spoils to both to ensure that both were on an equal playing ground. Fierce competition between factions was further aggravated in attempts to reap these benefits. This divide and rule strategy served to ensure greater KMT control, dominance and stability.

Lerman wrote that Taiwan's system, at the time, was somewhat coercive. "KMT leaders sit on the top of the factional

systems and the boss keeps local level politicians from rising too high or powerful by dividing them," (1977: 1418). This was accomplished by fostering a balance of power between rival faction leaders. Though each faction leader was satisfied, "no leader was allowed to control resources to the extent that it could drive rival factions out of existence," (1977: 1418).

The SNTV system helped the KMT accomplish these objectives. Whereas SMD should create cohesiveness, SNTV is a divisive system, which creates a political environment so volatile and competitive that candidates from the same party are forced to run against each other. The fight to distinguish oneself from the next person became an all out battle. In order to accomplish this in a society that was not easily mobilized by pointing to the issues of the day, candidates relied on vote buying and pork barrel tactics, not uncommon to the Japanese system. Factions helped candidates maintain these tactics and helped provide the voters with what they demanded.

Candidates were placed under a great deal pressure to establish some type of intermediary. Whether these were personal relationships or business ones, candidates had to offer voters political favors and serve their material needs. The general rules were not legally binding which was why many of these services of

the politicians would be considered corrupt in western democratic societies. According to Arthur Lerman, (1977) politicians used factions to gain resources and to gain support from the electorate. Given the great competition between candidates and the need to obtain votes that was fostered by the competitive electoral laws, vote buying at the local level became a common practice. The growing competition between these factions in elections had negative effects for the development of democracy and democratic practices. Thus, patron-client ties and vote buying exacerbated traditional and modern social divisions already present. The result was the appearance of great divisiveness at the local level, yet no appearance to speak of any political issues.

Factions were needed by the KMT to allocate votes more effectively. Because the SNTV system brings with it problems of vote allocation, this creates demands to ensure that votes are properly distributed. This means that voters can only vote for certain candidates and this requires a great deal of coordination. To do this, the KMT used factions to target key voting areas and to avoid excessive competition that might split the votes between the KMT and non-KMT candidates. It assigned task forces to so-called responsibility zones to help these candidates. These responsibility zones and factions would help distribute campaign literature, get to

know voters more personally, distribute gifts and money and host banquets to introduce the KMT nominees, (Chao, Myers 1998: 391).

This all could not have worked so perfectly for the KMT, if the party was not well organized. The KMT was strong enough to handle many of the organizational requirements that SNTV requires. In addition, local elite could not have been co-opted if the KMT wasn't well organized. The party apparatus, according to Chu (1992: 28), enabled the ruling elite not only "to keep a limited pluralism with local elections in check, but to turn the competitive logic and screening mechanism of the electoral system into an effective instrument of legitimation, selective incorporation and political control".

Factions weren't the only example mechanism used by the KMT at the local level to help consolidate its power. There were other mechanisms used to suppress the power of any opposition groups during the early stages of political development.

How the Electoral Laws in Taiwan were harmful to the Opposition:

In Taiwan votes are translated into seats in a peculiar way as discussed before. Though single member district/plurality (SMD) is used for the elections of mayors and magistrates, SNTV is used for electing national parliamentarians, provincial assemblymen, city, and

county councilmen (Moon 1997). Though Taiwan's experience with elections is largely based on local elections, it did begin to expand the number of elections. From 1954-1958 elections were held for provincial and county level executives. From 1969, it started to experience elections at the national level. In 1969, the first supplementary elections were held and 11 members were elected to the Legislative Yuan for life long tenure as representatives from Taiwan. When the KMT regime immigrated to Taiwan, it brought with it officials that had been elected for parliamentary seats on the Mainland. Since the move was supposed to be temporary, those representatives elected were sustained and new elections were not held.

By 1969, the KMT had ruled for over 24 years and it was clear that its stay would not be temporary. The KMT justified its refusal to re-elect new representatives or expand the legislative body due to the perceived threat from the Mainland and the need to create an atmosphere of control and certainty. However, by 1969, some of these parliamentarians had either retired or passed away and the KMT believed that elections needed to be held to replace these parliamentarians. This appears to be an important concession to groups in favor of increasing democracy. Nevertheless, given the

electoral laws imposed, the opposition still had many trying obstacles to overcome.

There are several aspects of the electoral laws and the political system that created these hurdles for the opposition. These include, the district size, the one ballot system, dual representation, the multiple levels of elections and the low barriers for new parties. The SNTV system, itself, demands that parties be well organized, connected and well funded. The opposition did not easily fulfill these requirements and that played into the hands of the more equipped and experienced KMT. Thus, this section analyzes the various institutional roadblocks employed by the KMT to undermine the opposition through the years. First, however, the demands that the electoral system places on the political organizations and/or candidates will be discussed in order to explain why the system worked so effectively in the ruling party's favor (Hsieh 1996, 1999).

As the number of seats to be contested at the national level increased, the electoral laws became more important than ever to help the KMT stay in power. Thus, every institutional choice had to be carefully thought out. At different junctures, the opposition became more powerful and was better able to successfully contest some of the proposals offered by the KMT to change the electoral

laws in ways that served the KMT's interests only. Unfortunately, it wasn't able to contest everything.

Why was SNTV still used after the elections had expanded to the national level? SNTV was employed because it made it very difficult for opposition parties to do well. As discussed before, SNTV demands that parties possess many different qualities. First, parties must be well organized. Second, parties must have a lot of money and resources. Third, parties must be able to mobilize voters. Fourth, parties must be centralized, controlled and well disciplined to deal with the harsh and competitive environment. Finally, parties that have more experience are better able to fulfill these requirements (Hsieh 1996, 1999).

Why are the laws so demanding? Why is it so important to be well organized, networked and funded? SNTV, by nature, requires that parties are well organized, because the system requires much more strategy. To maximize the number of seats it wins, a political party in Taiwan must estimate how many votes it is likely to win in order to restrict the number of nominations to the number of candidates that run. It also needs to make sure that it allocates the votes correctly across candidates to ensure that one candidate does not take away all of the votes from the other candidates in the same

party running in a particular district. Thus, in order to accomplish all of these things, the party must be well organized.

The KMT can carry out this process because it has many departments to coordinate the campaigns and control the nomination process, such as the Department of Organizational Affairs. The party has also relied on the firmly established networks throughout society that can be attributed to the quasi-Leninist roots. Wu (1995: 85) wrote that it is through these "teams and cells and with reference to past voting records," that the Department of Organizational Affairs "is able to determine the number of votes it is likely to receive in every locale". It conducts elaborate polls to identify the strongest candidates in each major community. Wu continued that this helps orchestrate where the KMT candidates will confine his or her election campaign. This guarantees a better chance for election and re-election because candidates are organized to focus on small areas of voter loyalty within a district and don't have to worry about another KMT candidate infringing upon their voter base.

The KMT also has the capacity to sit down with local party officials to decide which candidates will concentrate on which organizations and areas. Leaders in those organizations and areas are then assigned to deliver quotas of votes to the designated

candidate (Nathan, 1993: 432). Though it has been stronger at delivering the quotas in the rural areas, it has designed ways to address the urban areas by assigning responsibility zones to individual candidates.

Local factions are thus, key to the KMT's success. In order to deliver these votes and assign responsibility zones, the KMT relies on factions to guarantee its electoral success. As discussed before, the history of local elections cemented the presence of factions. However, the electoral laws, themselves, encourage their existence. In rural areas, in particular, local factions have helped the KMT because in these areas society is tied together by kinship ties, and this makes them more likely to vote based on loyalties to informal ties over preferences regarding particular policy.

Factions also help calculate the approximate number of votes the candidate can get and ask the party to nominate candidates that are most likely to win. During the campaign, nominees organize the relationship networks, mostly through local opinion leaders and village and neighborhood chiefs. Several days prior to polling, local contacts come up with lists of voters that they are able to monopolize or influence either through interpersonal relations or bribery. Factions of these sorts are able to control these voters through the patron-client relationships that have formed and have

prospered for ages. The factions can guarantee whom each voter will vote for and can persuade or ensure that voters vote for specific candidates in order to allocate votes effectively (Wu 1995: 86).

The SNTV system led to factions that were easily controlled by the KMT early on. Before national elections were held, the factions competed for the resources offered by the KMT. The competition between the factions canceled out the possibility for any cohesive organization forming that could somehow threaten the KMT. The KMT regulated which factions received which goods and made sure that no one faction became too powerful. The government offered economic enticements to the factions such as a stake in regional oligopolies involving public transport, credit unions, farm produce cartels, construction, public utilities and illegal economic activities such as land speculation. All of this rent seeking filled the KMT reserves and allowed the KMT to continue to dole out carrots to different factions that it relied on.

In order for the factions to receive these enticements, they had to deliver and coordinate the votes correctly. To make sure that votes were allocated correctly, factions bought votes from voters. This extended to the national level as well and has been a common strategy of the KMT for many years. Why is this the case? Moon, Robinson and Brown (1998: 581) claimed that the system

encourages it. With multi-member districts, the vote can be decided by just a few votes. Thus, the KMT candidates/party saw it in its self-interest to buy those crucial votes. In addition, as stated before, votes also were bought to ensure that the votes were allocated correctly.

Nevertheless, this makes elections very costly. For example, in an election where 50,000 or more votes are needed to win, the candidate must bribe a minimum of 150,000 candidates. The prices range from 20-30\$ depending on the election. The KMT has been successful in past elections because it has the resource to deliver votes effectively. Moon (1997) claimed that the KMT has blatantly ignored any vote buying restrictions and has discreetly sent out red envelopes (hung pao) containing cash gifts to party supporters with specific instructions. It doesn't have much incentive to stop doing this because the return rate is still 3 to 1. In the rural areas this rate is even better because traditional methods of gaining loyalty are more effective than appealing on the basis of policy. Vote buying proves to voters that the candidate is successful, serious and prestigious enough to win elections. The amount of money being offered serves as a way of evaluating the candidate's characteristics.

The DPP's financial resources can't compare with the KMT's wealth. Because there are so many different electoral contests,

where vote buying or gift giving might affect the outcomes, this requires that the party be well funded and connected. The KMT can buy so many votes because it is wealthy and generates well over 140 million dollars yearly. A large share of the party business is concentrated in insurance, leasing, banking, brokerage, investment, mass media, public utilities and real estate. Thus, there is a huge stake for many different groups to make sure that the KMT stays in power. This stake is so significant that besides relying on vote buying the KMT also recruits gangsters and members of secret societies to safeguard the electoral strength. The KMT clearly has been willing to do what it takes to win elections. The system has facilitated this but it could of worked against the KMT if it hadn't been so well organized and well funded. Thus, because the KMT possess all of the qualities and resources mentioned above, the system has helped to perpetuate its dominance.

The opposition (referred to as tang-wai, meaning outside the party), however, had every single odd stacked against it. It was fragmented by nature, due to the fact that there were laws banning the formation of any type of cohesive organization. Given that it was fragmented to start with, how could it ever fulfill the other requirements? The opposition was also quarrelsome and inexperienced. It lacked organization and due to the many factional

interests and conflicting personal ambitions, this made coordination of a slate of candidates impossible. These problems were naturally further aggravated by district size. While SMD gives parties or factions/organizations incentives to coalesce before elections (*Duverger's Law*), SNTV is divisive and has candidates within the same party running against each other.

The opposition had trouble no matter how large the district was. Smaller districts tend to favor the ruling party because unless the minority votes are concentrated in certain districts, votes are wasted. In large districts, though the results are supposed to be more proportional, it is important to nominate the optimal number of candidates and to overcome coordination problems. This requires a party that is both rich, to dole out resources, and well organized. Thus, without an appropriate organization, it is not easy to do this. Consequently, the opposition lost more seats than it should have due to coordination problems.

Through the years, as the opposition became better organized and was allowed to transform the tang-wai into the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), it learned to fare better in larger districts. The KMT responded to its move by changing the district size, creating 58 election districts, which was a big increase over the previous system. The KMT did this to improve its electoral

gains since research showed that given its support base, the smaller the district, the better the KMT candidates fared (Hsieh 1996, 1999).

The KMT responded again in 1989 and 1991 with changes to the district size of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, resulting in smaller district magnitude. This change, however, upset the DPP because it didn't believe that it was given time to adjust to the changes. The DPP also thought that the change to district magnitude would facilitate the KMT candidates' vote buying and pork barrel practices, enabling the KMT to manipulate local factions to its benefit (Copper 1993).

The opposition was also hindered by the employment of the one-ballot system. This system was popular with Park Chung Hee from South Korea, who touted it patriotically as one-man, one-vote. In 1991, for Taiwan, this issue became very controversial. The National Assembly comprised of 409 seats, 84 of which had already been elected in 1986 and were not required to run for reelection. Of the remaining 325 seats, 225 were to be elected from 58 districts and the remaining 100 seats would be chosen from proportional representation, given that the party reached a five percent minimum. Simply put, the 100 seats were known as at-large seats that would be apportioned to political parties whose candidates had been elected. Prior to the election, each party fielding candidates would

register a ranked list of candidates that it wanted to fill any at-large seats gained. Once it was determined what percentage of seats went to candidates from a given party, that party would receive control of the same percentage of at-large seats and overseas Chinese seats to fill from its list of pre-designated nominees.

According to June Dreyer (1992: 68), the opposition objected to the one-ballot system for simultaneously choosing the elected members and those from the proportional slate. It claimed that it was unfair to have the same vote count twice for one party. Its rationale was that many voters might choose a KMT candidate due to vote buying factors and pork barrel politics, even though they might not be loyal to the KMT. These voters, the opposition argued would be inclined to split the ballot if given the chance to do so. The opposition favored a two-ballot system in which at-large overseas Chinese seats would be distributed on the basis of the results for the second ballot (voters would use the second ballot to register support for a political party). The opposition, however, was unable to persuade the KMT to reconsider.

The use of a two-ballot system wouldn't have resolved the accountability problem of unfair candidate recruitment that comes along with utilizing a partial party list. The use of the party list enables candidates to buy their way into office. These politicians do

not have to be accountable to the voters and can, essentially, buy their ticket to power. The parties both need money and resources and can offer rich businessmen a place on the party list in exchange for money or some other type of benefit. This contributes to more money politics and distances the voter further from the representative. More importantly, it decreases accountability, an important feature of democratic government.

Another roadblock to the success of the opposition was the use of the dual representation system. In the category of occupational and aboriginal districts, non-KMT candidates were always handicapped by the entrenched presence of the ruling party in these organized social sectors. According to Yun Han Chu (1992: 56) the elections for national representative organs are organized around an odd system of representation where a disproportionately large amount of seats are appropriated to six occupational districts. While most representatives are elected from the regional districts on the basis of geographic criteria, similar to how districts are divided in Japan, there are six districts whose criteria is based on occupation with two additional districts instituted exclusively for the island's aborigine. This requires members of certain designated occupational associations (such as women, farmers, workers, industrialists, business people, fisherman and teachers) and

aboriginal voters to register on separate occupational or ethnic rolls and vote on separate ballots.

Given the few seats contested at the national level before 1991, the number of seats appropriated to the aboriginal and occupational categories was significant. For example, in the 1986 election, 18 out of the total 72 seats were appropriated to 8 special districts, which accounts for 25% of the total seats. Why would the opposition care about having dual representation? Because out the 58 seats won by the KMT candidates, 17 were occupation/aboriginal district seats and the opposition only won one of these occupational/aboriginal seats. This demonstrated how firm the KMT's grip was on the organized social sectors. The KMT is the best organized and has the best resources to lure the votes from these districts. These functional seats are elected through KMT controlled occupational associations. They have essentially been guaranteed votes for the KMT. For the opposition to compete, it would have to have something to offer these districts. In 1986, there was little a fragmented group of independent politicians could offer. Thus, according to Winckler (1989: 12) the result of this "corporatist compartmentalization is that the KMT has safe functional seats to bolster its control of representative bodies against opposition erosion of KMT territorial majorities".

The multiple levels of elections have also hindered the opposition. The Taiwanese system is very complicated and this plays into the hands of the KMT. There are distinctions among representative seats at the national, provincial and municipal levels. Each has territorial and functional seats. Territorial seats are open to anyone, but constituencies with five or more seats are reserved for a woman candidate. Though this sounds very progressive, there are negative effects for the opposition. This complicates the electoral strategy because the opposition is not always able to field a female candidate. Thus, the KMT won easily in these instances and the rest of the votes she would have otherwise needed could be allocated to male KMT candidates.

The opposition is also not always able to nominate enough candidates for office. In an election in 1998, the opposition/DPP nominated only 273 candidates for 890 council seats and 110 for 319 mayoral and chief offices. Thus, even if all candidates won, the DPP could only control 325 of the council seats and 36% of the executive posts. The KMT machine, on the other hand, could easily find and field candidates for all of the elections. Because the DPP is still small, it is much more difficult for it to come up with enough candidates to run in all of the electoral contests at stake at every level. This serves to further consolidate KMT control throughout the

island at many different levels. In addition, according to Moon, Brown and Robinson (1998: 574) there are strategic problems for the DPP, because they must consider carefully who to run. The DPP has to make sure that it doesn't over-nominate in its areas of strength, which isn't always easily avoided.

Copper added that the problem of having so many levels of government is that it serves to disguise that most of the elections are for the local levels. In other words, most of the democratically chosen leaders can't rise to the top because most of the democratic political participation exists at the local levels. In addition, there is way too much overlap in levels of government, which is unclearly designated. This is problematic because the decision making process has too much red tape. Copper (1993) claimed that this two-tiered system can only disguise the lack of democracy at the national level for so long. As opposition groups become better organized, they will assert themselves more and push for more rights to have their voices heard in the decision making process at the national level.

The KMT has been very astute and clever at making the system look much more democratic than it actually is. The use of both the dual representation system and the multiple levels of elections illustrate this point. In addition, the KMT in 1983 employed

another tactic to undermine the primary opposition group while keeping up the appearance of moving towards democratic electoral reform. Because the opposition group known as tang-wai was starting to make electoral gains, the KMT knew that it needed to do something to thwart its chances. At the time, the KMT was not ready to sit back and let the tang-wai continue to threaten the status quo without a fight.

It revised the election law of 1983 by creating an even lower entry barrier for new political parties. The entry barrier is the threshold set by the electoral system to determine what percentage of votes a party needs to have its votes count. By creating a lower barrier this provided an incentive for more new parties to form, which would take votes away from the tang-wai, which was starting to become more cohesive and organized. Naturally, this law led to a mushrooming of new political parties from the constituencies that the tang-wai hoped to take over (Copper 1984).

According to T. Cheng (1989: 495), SNTV is biased against medium small organization/parties like the tang-wai that had to compete with the leading party in most districts. The system works best for the leading party that can nominate the optimal number of candidates and allocate votes accordingly in most or all districts. It also works well, proportionately, for smaller parties that can

concentrate their votes in a few districts. Thus, now there would be many smaller parties free to take away the votes from the tang-wai. This creates more fragmentation, without hurting the KMT. Thus, this helped the KMT sustain its dominance.

Later, the Civic Organizations Law passed in early 1989 would further clarify the status of political parties. This law was passed in response to the newly formed DPP. It made it easier than ever to form a new political party. One only needed to go to the government office and apply. As long as the founder was over twenty years of age and the party had at least thirty members, then its status was accepted (Copper 1993).

Later on in 1990, Dreyer (1992: 68) wrote that more negotiations occurred regarding the threshold. A 5% threshold was sustained even though the DPP (the tang-wai had formed into the DPP at the time) knew that maintaining this threshold meant that smaller parties would be taking away its votes. This however, was deemed a compromise since the KMT had originally wanted to have a 3% threshold, as did smaller parties. The DPP was able to contest the lower of the two barriers.

Another revision that looks much more democratic than it was, was the 1980 revision of the method for electing new members of the Control Yuan. Previously, a SMD method was used where

each member of Taiwan's Provincial Assembly and municipal councils of Taipei and Kaohsiung cast only one vote, electing at least one member of the Control Yuan. New regulations allowed for each councilman or assemblyman to cast multiple votes. This made it hard for the tang-wai to win any seats. The KMT members in these legislative bodies could each cast votes for as many as half of the open seats of the Control Yuan.

How did the KMT justify this change? They claimed that by only having one vote decide outcomes, it encouraged vote buying. In one instance, a candidate purchased six votes from the Taiwan Provincial Assembly member for three million NT dollars. The KMT changed the law to make it look as though it was trying to counteract these vote-buying tendencies. The problem was that this change favored the KMT since it split the tang-wai and the independent vote. Delegates elected to the Provincial Assembly would now be able to choose delegates representing a larger geographical area and a broader spectrum.

Another change made by the KMT to burden the opposition was proposed in the New Election and Recall Law in 1980 that provided severe campaign laws (Copper 1984). It stipulated the standardized size of campaign pamphlets, it limited the number of campaign vehicles and offered detailed restrictions and stiffer

penalties. In addition, it also made it illegal to use the mass media, parades or demonstrations, imposed penalties for bribery and vote-buying, placed ceilings on campaign spending and prohibited receiving funding from foreign governments, organizations, etc. It also divided the campaign into two parts, with candidates' sponsored meetings occurring during the beginning of the campaign and the election commission sponsored meetings occurring during the last days of the campaign period. This was problematic for the opposition because it restricted its candidates' ability to select places and times to meet during the most crucial days of the campaign.

The goals of the revised campaign laws were to prevent violence during campaigns, eliminate vote buying and bribery and prohibit illegal campaign activities. The problem was that the restrictions were so harsh, that in many ways the KMT benefited. Some of the harsher restrictions, set forth in Articles 46-52, were that the handbills and other printed materials contain a stamp bearing the printer's name and address. The opposition was upset by this stipulation because it feared that printers would not want to print any work of the opposition, due to fear that the KMT would find some way to punish them. Also, Article 45's limit on the duration of the campaign to 15 days for national representatives, 10 days for

provincial assemblymen, mayors and magistrates and 3- 5days for sub-county positions was unreasonable (Copper 1984).

Why would the KMT impose such harsh restrictions? These restrictions were imposed because it created more obstacles for the opposition. At the time, the opposition was not allowed to form any type of supra-body supervisory body, such as the Association for Public Policy that was later formed. There was no organization that functioned in between and during elections to enable the opposition to coordinate its strategies. The KMT counted on the oppositions' lack of organization.

The KMT could also rely on many other advantages that it had regarding campaigns. The KMT had enormous human and material resources. It was better run and operated. It had a well-established media network. The KMT had the resources to take these campaigns seriously. In fact, KMT campaign efforts have often been described as organizational warfare (tsu-chin-chan). The KMT knew that any type of poor performance could undermine its mandate to govern effectively. Thus, the KMT knew that it had to make a major effort in each election and in each constituency.

To do this, it established campaign-coordinating councils. These councils served the purpose of fielding reports, plotting election strategy, issuing restrictions, supervising the KMT's national

campaigns and directing activities within their own jurisdictions. They established a meticulous timetable for elections. They profiled voters in order to ascertain where they had the maximum political support. These coordinating councils were also able to mediate any rivalry between the KMT candidates. Since the candidates were forbidden to coordinate their own campaigns across constituency boundaries, (Huang 1995: 94) the KMT was able to overcome this problem with the coordinating councils.

The opposition was later assisted by the formation of its own organization to coordinate strategy and campaign activities. For the time being, however, it was competing against a party that had the resources to make door-to-door visits. It was also playing against a party that didn't have to always follow the rules. The KMT had the power to ignore some of these laws through loopholes or otherwise. Though the laws were enacted in order to decrease the occurrence of vote buying, this law did little to curb it, and KMT candidates felt fewer constraints on these illegal practices.

The KMT was also able to by-pass some of the laws enacted regarding the utilization of the media during campaigns. The law severely limited the amount of time that candidates could use the mass media to promote its campaign, such as rules to prevent advertising in the paper or television. Nevertheless, the KMT could

still conduct campaign publicity through the party owned media. Because the media was basically managed by the KMT, it could count on more favorable press coverage as well.

This was also enhanced by the fact that it could campaign more openly than the opposition before the brief official campaign period. While the opposition would be punished for any illegal activities, the KMT could get away with stretching the length of the unrealistic limits to the length of the campaign. The KMT was also advantaged by the limitations on the number of sanctioned campaign forums. The opposition relied on these types of forums to mobilize the vote. The KMT, on the other hand could depend on its existing factional networks to get voters to the polls.

There were also limits to the number of individuals that could help out in a campaign, and in particular, students were not allowed. This in particular, hurt the opposition because students were most likely to help its campaigns and students were often willing to work for free. Professional functionaries provided additional manpower to the KMT and helped the KMT get around the legal limits to the number of campaign staff a candidate could have. In addition, campaign platforms and speeches of the opposition members were subject to more scrutiny and restrictions.

Thus, the advantages to the KMT were amplified by the harsh restrictions on the campaign process. It favored a party that was well organized and well networked. The KMT candidates were empowered by large campaign funds and the party's ability to mobilize voters through interpersonal networks and vote buying. Many of the provisions that were meant to curb such illegal activities were ignored. In sum, the new campaign laws as stipulated in the New Election and Recall Law were justified on the basis of promoting democracy in theory. However, in practice the new laws simply helped the KMT sustain its power.

The KMT already had an edge at the time, by constantly revising the qualifications for candidacy and by proclaiming elections unexpectedly. Instead of maintaining that system, it opted for a change to the laws, that it touted as electoral reform. Most of the stipulations of the laws did little to enhance the opposition's chances to threaten the KMT. Nevertheless, there were some rules in the law that had intended positive consequences for the democratization process. These positive consequences will be discussed later.

Though there were positive aspects to the 1980/1983 laws that didn't mean that the KMT took down all of the barriers that it imposed on the opposition. Even in the early 1990's the opposition still faced many obstacles regarding the leverage given to it for

campaigns. The total amount of time for advertisements was still tightly regulated. There was also a regulation that the amount of airtime available for campaigning was to be divided among the qualifying parties on the basis of the number of candidates each party nominated. Obviously the KMT would field many more candidates than any other party and would benefit from more television time to promote its candidates. There were also deposits required that would only be returned to parties that were able to win seats for at least one-tenth of their nominees. This made it hard for the less organized parties to win back their deposits and chipped away at the few resources they had (Copper 1984).

The commercials to be aired also were subject to review by the KMT dominated Central Election Committee only eight days before the campaign (Chao, Myers 1998). Thus, if the Committee disapproved of one of the commercials, the party had very little time to regroup and resubmit a new tape. This is another of example of the KMT trying to have control over outcomes as the system became more democratic. By regulating the type of material that could be aired, particularly banning anything that seemed to promote Taiwan's independence, it could still pull the strings and shape policy without necessarily halting the democratization process completely.

The above instances describe how the ruling party relied on other institutional mechanisms to thwart the opposition. The ruling party could get away with these un-democratic reforms because the opposition didn't have enough bargaining feet to stand on. Nevertheless, there have been instances in which the ruling party attempted to employ institutional mechanisms that would have been harmful to the opposition, but weren't able to due to the opposition's growing bargaining power. This occurred in 1991 with the proposal of absentee ballots for soldiers. The standing rules are that individuals are eligible to vote only in the place that they have been registered as a resident for more than six months. Thus, soldiers and students are not registered at their homes away from home. It is often not possible to get to their home districts, depriving them of the right to vote. Premier Hau was in support of a proposal to give soldiers the right to cast absentee ballots from polling sites near their barracks (Chao, Myers 1998). This proposal might have easily been enacted in the past, but due to the growing bargaining power of the opposition, objections were heeded.

Why was the opposition (the DPP) so upset? As the opposition saw it, soldiers would be too easily monitored by their superior officers and the potential for abuse of forcing soldiers to vote for the KMT candidates was too high (China Post May 20,

1991: 1). This issue was battled over for several months but on June 5, 1991, the Central Election Committee announced that it would use the one-ballot system but would have no absentee ballots for soldiers. Though this was a battle won by the opposition, as discussed before, it was by no means an indication that the opposition had won the war.

An important question in Taiwan concerns the issue of reforming a key aspect of the electoral system; how votes are translated into seats. Many Taiwanese scholars argue in favor changing the SNTV system into one that would alleviate all of these problems of factions, vote-buying, patron-client relationships, candidate centered campaigns, and the lack of party discipline. Despite all of these problems, the electoral system is unlikely to change any time soon.

When Chiang Kai-shek was in power and was engineering the rules of the game, despite his convictions that factions were to be blamed for the lack of cohesiveness against the Communists, he still decided to employ a system where factions would play a huge part in politics. Why was this the case? Chiang was much more concerned about the opposition and its ability to challenge his power. In addition, in order to bolster his power even more, he wanted to not only divide the opposition through factions but also

supply the one link among several segments of the population. By employing a system that would encourage factions, Chiang could serve as the glue, and this increased his power even further.

Later on, the system was never reformed despite all of the demands that it places on political parties. It requires enormous amounts of organization and use of resources. It also makes it easier for a minor party to win some seats than other systems. The key for the KMT however, was not whether or not votes were dispersed among smaller parties, but whether or not it could guarantee the outcomes. Ensuring that these electoral outcomes were definite was more important than restricting the seats gained by a few opposition candidates.

Thus, because the system "makes it difficult for a minor party to displace a dominant party that has the resources and discipline to field the optimal deployments of candidates," (Winckler 1989: 9) the ruling party didn't have to worry about getting overthrown. Though SMD might ensure larger victories, there is too much uncertainty attached with that system that could result in a KMT defeat. It could provoke strong reactions from within the party and the electorate that might be too drastic. In addition, SMD encourages factions to coalesce before elections and form permanent unions. The KMT

wanted to fragment the opposition and guarantee victory. Thus, SNTV was the perfect system to help it accomplish its goals.

The DPP had no say in the matter regarding which system would be employed, but as it became more and more popular, organized and cohesive, it had opportunities to bring changes to the system, but didn't. Why was this the case? The DPP was also unsure whether or not moving to smaller districts would benefit or hurt it in terms of the direction of the vote accorded by other small parties. In sum, the inertia of the original system of SNTV must be still benefiting both KMT and the DPP in some way or another, or the system might have been more of an issue of debate.

Other Institutional Means to Control Opposition

The "Temporary Provision Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion" was another means to control society and ensure order. The laws gave the president the authority to take emergency measures not subject to procedural restrictions from the Legislative Yuan (Chao, Myers 1998). It was through this measure that the formation of political parties was banned. This law was seen as one of the biggest obstacles to the development of democracy.

This was not the only example of KMT manipulation. In 1967, the KMT noticed that some of the independent politicians were doing

better and were starting to gain ground. There was always the possibility that one of these independent politicians would be elected as mayor. The people in Taipei had too frequently elected anti-KMT candidates as mayor, infuriating the KMT. The KMT responded and eliminated the chance of this occurring through a round about method. On July 1, 1967, Taipei city was removed from the province of Taiwan by the Central government and raised to the status of a province itself, as a special municipality. This appeared to be some sort of a promotion to the city of Taipei. It was justified by Article 4, which stated that in the City Organization law, a city might be elevated to a special city if it meets one of the requirements. First, it must have a seat in the central government. Second, there must be a population of over 1,000,000. Finally, it must possess special political, economic and cultural importance. Taipei, according to the KMT fulfilled all of these requirements.

According to Lerman (1978: 21), this was clearly a response to the fear that Taipei might elect another anti-KMT politician. Mayors of special municipalities and governors of provinces are appointed by the central government. Cynics further argued that by dividing the island into two administrative jurisdictions, each was forced to compete with the other for scarce resources doled out by the central government. Thus, the removal of the city of Taipei's

right to elect its leader enabled the KMT to divide and rule the anti-KMT groups better.

Reasons Behind Adopting Proportional Representation

The adoption of the proportional representation was used first in the National Assembly elections of 1991 and then in the Legislative Yuan elections in 1992 (Copper 1993). There are many countries that use some form of PR in order to select representatives. It is an institutional mechanism that is used to make elections more inclusive and democratic, enabling smaller parties to be represented and mollifying the effects of the winner-take-all methods. In South Korea, PR was actually used as a mechanism to enhance the ruling party's power and not to make the elections more democratic and representative. In the Taiwanese case, the decision to use PR was more a result of practicality and not due to aspirations to make the electoral institutions more democratic.

Hsieh (1999: 78-9) claimed that the decision to employ PR was a historical accident. It began with the plan to retire the senior parliamentarians. As will be discussed, the demands to retire the senior parliamentarians became more prominent and vocal. There was much concern that these senior representatives were a liability

for the party. The party was left in a quandary regarding how they planned to fill all of the vacated seats.

The decision to retire the senior parliamentarians was made official on June 21, 1990 when the Council of Grand Justices said that the "central government should hold, in the free area, at an appropriate time, the election for the member of the next central legislature, comprising some seats elected from a nationwide constituency," (Hsieh 1999: 78). Thus, the government needed to figure out how it would go about electing new representatives.

One would think that the answer was simple: just use the same old method that it had used before with great success. Nevertheless, it couldn't use SNTV to fill these seats because there was no way that it could make more districts. There were many reasons why this was not possible. First the ballot paper would be too long and most voters would not be able to know who each candidate was. Second, with the exception of a few notable candidates, most candidates would attain a small percentage of the vote and this could lead to a lot of controversy. There was too much room for problems by adding more candidates in an already complicated system. The answer was to use a party list, whereby a percentage of the party's total vote would go towards filling up the seats marked for proportional representation seats. In Article 4 of

the Additional Articles of the Constitution passed in April of 1991, it stipulated that the "members of the National Legislature representing Chinese citizens residing abroad and the members representing the nationwide constituency shall be elected by way of party list with proportional representation," (Hsieh 1999: 79).

Thus, the end of 1991 gave the approval for the new parliamentary bodies. The National Assembly would retire all permanent members and elect a new body of 325 members. Of these members, 225 would be elected in districts using SNTV, 80 would be elected as national representatives using PR and 20 would be elected as overseas representatives. When the Legislative Yuan was renewed in 1992, it was decided that there would be 161 members. Of these members, 135 would be elected in districts using SNTV, 20 would be elected as national representatives using PR and 20 would be elected as overseas representatives (Copper 1993).

This adoption of PR would have some positive consequences for the party system in Taiwan. It enabled the government to find a solution to fill the seats of all of the departed representatives. However, in the long run, the use of PR lists strengthens the centralization of the party and makes candidates more dependent on the party than the public for approval.

Democratization within the KMT and “Taiwanization” of the Party

The previous KMT structure was based on Leninist parties where high-ranking officials held more power than many department heads. Power was heavily concentrated in the Central Reconstruction Committee and later in the Central Standing Committee. At the top of this power structure is the KMT party chair. This position must lead the party and exert influence over government decision-making. Why was the party structured in a way where almost all of the power was at the top? Simply put, because Chiang Kai-shek wanted to consolidate his leadership in both society and the party. The more the party was centralized the less it could permit challenges to decision making. This enabled Chiang Kai-shek to make the most of his decisions alone without being encumbered by dissenting voices that would impede on the realization of his goals.

Though pre-existing factional disputes were present, they were suppressed by party discipline. This is a departure from the way in which the party operates today. The death of both Chiangs led to the decline of party consensus. This is possibly because they both provided the glue for the various dissenting forces. The KMT

has always allowed factions but has only permitted them to take the form of soft factions rather than hard factions that exist in Japan. Soft factions denote that there are individuals within the factions whose allegiance may overlap to multiple factions. In other words, there are cross cutting factional memberships, which is less divisive because the individuals within these factions are not completely controlled by their loyalties. Their main loyalty extends to the party not to the faction, unlike in Japan where hard factions have been very divisive, resulting in a huge setback to the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

These soft factions continued to exist into the Lee Teng Hui era, but started to harden and become more divisive leading to a permanent division within the party. These divisions probably wouldn't have happened during either CCK's or Chiang Kai-shek rule. Both of them, and particularly, Chiang the senior were able to rule with enormous amounts of control over party loyalty and specifically, loyalty to the leader in power. Things changed dramatically during Lee's reign. During this time, the organization of the party changed, the demographics of the membership changed and the nominating methods for important positions in the party changed. These all had important effects on how decisions were made and altered the context that Lee had to work with when it

came time for him to make important decisions regarding the pace of democratic reform.

Previously, the party was structured in a way that was far from democratic. Formally, the highest authority of the party was the National Congress. Its delegates still are selected to serve four-year terms. The congress amends the party charter and determines the party platform. It also decides on other important policies and elects the party chairman and the Central Committee members. In addition, to those duties, it approves candidates to be nominated by the chairman to serve as vice chairman and members of the Central Advisory Council. When the National Congress is in recess, the supreme party organ becomes the Central Committee, which holds a plenary session every year (Chu 1992).

The Central Standing Committee represents the Central Committee when it is not in session. It is the most influential body in the KMT. It meets once a week to deliberate and approve important policies for the party and the government. It also nominates people for important party and government positions, including ministers, vice ministers and various commissioners (Chu 1992).

Every day affairs are handled by the secretariat. The current secretary-general is Lin Fong-cheng. He has a staff that is supposed to manage the various party departments and

commissions. Party organizations have their own secretariats at lower levels as well.

This level of organization is nothing new to the KMT. It has been organized at the grassroots level, with members organized into cells. There have always been many committees and congresses at the district, county and provincial levels. The highest has, for the most part, remained the National Congress and the Central Committee. Nevertheless, there have been significant changes made in how the party conducts its affairs. One of the most significant changes occurred at the first meeting of the KMT's 14th National Congress, held in August of 1993. At this time, it was decided that the National Congress would elect the party chairman through a secret ballot. A secret ballot was viewed as a more democratic procedure and was also a means of breaking down hard factions.

This decision to vote based on a secret ballot proved to be beneficial to Lee. He was reelected to party chairman with 83% of the votes cast. In addition, four vice-chairman were added to the Central Committee after being nominated by the chairman and approved by the National Congress. It was also decided that the chairman would appoint only 10-15 members of the 31 members of the Central Committee. Finally, it was also decided that that the

National Congress would be held every two years instead of every four. More changes would be made regarding how the president would be nominated and elected, which were discussed in the previous section at the 14th National Congress (Chao, Myers 1998).

In August of 1997, the 15th National Congress was convened. Lee was reelected as party chairman with 93% of the votes. The congress approved four vice chairman, one of who was Vice President Lien Chan. It also elected 230 Central Committee members. In the first plenary session of the 15th Central Committee held immediately after the congress, 17 members were elected to the Central Standing Committee and the chairman appointed an additional 16 members. It was decided that the Central Standing Committee needed to be enlarged to accommodate many of the growing changes of the party (Chao and Myers, 1998).

Another important change that impacted the overall democratization within the party was the changes made in party composition. As stated before, Chiang Kai-shek started to recruit Taiwanese into the party at the local level. CCK continued this trend with great consequences on the democratization of the party. By 1985 the party composition had changed tremendously. One study found that 40% of all party's policy-level officials were Taiwanese, and 75% were Taiwanese at the provincial level. At the city and

county level 100% of the officials were Taiwanese. These changes in the party composition led to changes in the party's direction. Older members were considered a nuisance and weighed down the pace of reform. As younger politicians continued to gain more power this also led to changes in the Central Standing Committee of the Central Committee, a stronghold of mainlander dominance under Chiang Kai-shek (Chao, Myers 1998).

Democratizing the Central Committee and Central Standing Committee

It can be argued that the overall level of democracy within the party itself is illustrated by the way in which the Central Committee and Central Standing Committee choose their members. Previously these committees were examples of the hierarchical structure of the KMT and the power of KMT leaders Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Ching-kuo. They illustrated how difficult it was to rise up in the party, because the selection of the members was not based on democratic procedures. This level of control over the party reflected the level of control over society as well. The readiness to reform these committees were important steps taken in the democratization process because it signaled a willingness on the part of the

leadership to conduct all procedures in a more democratic manner. This had important consequences for democratizing the electoral procedures for national representative institutions (Chu 1992).

Previously, the Central Committee members had been nominated by the party leaders and elected by a block vote. Because there were twice as many candidates as seats, the delegates to National Congress could only choose between candidates that were nominated by the leader.

In the 1988 election, the process became more democratic. There were twice as many candidates, but the leader now nominated half of them, and a joint signature of the delegates nominated the other half. By 1993, at the 13th National Congress, the nomination procedure democratized a little more with members elected by limited vote in which the delegates had more influence than before.

The methods for electing members of the Central Standing Committee were less democratic. During the 7th -13th National Congresses, the member of the Central Standing Committee could either be appointed by the leader or elected by a block vote. In practice, however, only the former method was used, (Huang 1995: 107).

Things changed, however, by the 14th National Congress. Almost half the seats were decided by the leaders and approved unanimously. A joint signature of the delegates nominated the other half. They then selected the candidates based on a block vote.

Origin of Primaries in Taiwan

The way in which party members were selected by the Central Standing Committee and Central Committee had evolved over the years, an indication that the party itself was democratizing. Nevertheless, the level of democratization within a party does not normally have implications for the level of democracy that a country enjoys (as seen in Western democratic countries). However, in the Taiwanese case, once the KMT became more democratized this set in motion many events that hastened the pace of democratization. Primaries marked a break from the practice of having those in powerful positions within the party choose candidates from lower positions within the party.

The evolution of the candidate nominating system occurred in seven stages. Immediately after the retreat to Taiwan and before the party had institutionalized its grassroots organization, the nominations of candidates were made by cadres and central and provincial headquarters. Thus, normal members of the party had no

say in the matter. Criticisms arose regarding whether or not this strategy of selective support was conducive to the best selection of candidates. In 1954 and 1957 in the Taiwanese Provincial Assembly elections, the KMT adopted a semi- primary system, although the outcomes of these primaries were kept secret (Copper 1993). Simply put, if the party wasn't happy with the winner, it made sure that nobody knew who the real winner was so that it could select another candidate whom it found more appealing. The KMT semi-primary system didn't last long because it intensified factional struggles within the party and was damaging to party unity.

As a result, the KMT changed to a more centralized nomination method for the 1957 elections of county magistrates and city mayors. The KMT continued to use this system through 1977. With this system, local branches of party organizations conducted informal surveys of members' opinions on the basis of suggestions that had been submitted to the national headquarters. Nevertheless, these suggestions were in no way binding and the national headquarters had the power to override them.

As the threat of the opposition increased, the KMT had cadres evaluate potential candidates and reported their assessments. Party members took one -fourth of the vote and the party cadres votes were worth three-fourths of the vote, giving more weight to the latter.

This quasi-electoral primary system was used to moderate the power of local factions. Now it could require local factions to bring its members into the party if it wanted to win nominations. Once these candidates were incorporated into the party structure, the KMT could have more control over them (Chen, M. 1996: 181). Nevertheless, the system was still highly centralized.

Despite how self-interested the reasons were for adopting a modified primary system, it is notable that another step was made towards broadening the influences of those in lower positions in the party in 1988. Primaries were used to choose more than half of the delegates to the 13th Party Congress. Now channels for choosing candidates widened and newly elected candidates who lacked the influence of other members could also join in and form new coalitions.

Thus, there were plenty of early experiments with primaries to ascertain how it would contribute to the political development of Taiwan and to the success of political parties. Dr. John Kuan was one such person who was responsible for some of these early experiments (Copper 1993). He used a modified primary system for the Taipei City Council when he served as the KMT municipal chief for Taipei. Dr. Kuan experimented with primaries because he was interested in the effects of party primaries and the implications that

they would have for democracy. Moreover, he wanted to implement more democratic reforms within the party. He wanted the party and the Central Standing Committee to vote by secret ballot rather than by standing to choose party leaders, chairmen and adopt new parties. He argued that voting by standing made ones' allegiance too obvious and thus influenced many to side with policies or politicians out of fear that if they didn't their power might be undermined. In addition, the absence of a secret ballot made factional divisions more apparent. Simply put, it made it harder to vote how one really felt.

The implementation of primaries would replace the traditional bargaining that occurred between factions and the powerful patrons. Primaries, according to Copper (1993: 81), "offer a way to screen office seekers, in very competitive constituencies, such as Taipei and Kaohsiung, where factions are less dominant than in the rural areas". In 1992 the KMT held primaries in 11 out of 25 electoral districts for legislative elections. The party members' candidate screening committee accepted 90% of those candidates who won their primaries. The final authority, however, at the time, was in the hands of Vice President Li Yuan-zu who had the power to recommend candidates for official endorsement by the Central Standing Committee.

Thus, the implementation of primaries did not come to full fruition in the KMT camp. It has been more interested in what primaries can do for the party than what primaries can provide KMT supporters. The KMT regarded the primary system as merely advisory and by no means conclusive. Thus, the KMT is seeking out the advice from the public and if that advice is not to its liking then it makes its own choice regardless. There was little concern amongst those holding powerful positions within the party about what the implications are for primaries and democratization. Primaries were adapted more for strategic reasons to poll and gauge the candidates that are most likely to win and this explains why they have not been institutionalized in the KMT.

In fact, there is no legislation that applies to voting qualification and balloting procedures. The Civic Organization Law makes no reference to candidate selection. This denotes that the willingness to trust the institution of primary elections is still fairly low. The KMT was so concerned about the prospects for primaries creating more problems than it was worth, that it used a unique method to choose members. The KMT still uses two-tiered system. Party member votes are counted once, yet party cadres have two votes, and this leads to a bias. In addition, party control is never completely ceded by this system because party cadres are more

likely vote than party members are and this enables those in power in the KMT to never lose their ability to pull all the strings.

The DPP adopted the primary system in 1989 to choose its nominees, and could be considered initially more sincere in its reasoning (Copper 1993). Given that it is the party that fought for more democratization of the government, it should come as no surprise that it would try to appear equally democratic in structure and internal organization. It wanted to adopt primaries because they were considered more democratic but also hoped that primaries would handle some of the mutual jealousies between the factions. Thus, the selection of candidates is no longer a top down process. There was also open registration. Though this process was non-binding and more likely reflected the preferences of rank and file members, it was an effort to democratize the party and allow those in lower positions to move up in the party apparatus.

Nevertheless, the methods used for nominating the candidates for the DPP has changed quite a bit over the years. At the party's 6th National Congress, held in April and May of 1994, a two-tiered primary system was initiated. In this case, ordinary members of the DPP voted for candidates in one primary election and party cadres voted for candidates in a second primary. Unlike

the KMT, the results of the two are combined with equal weight given to both (Moon 1997).

At the second plenary meeting of the 6th National Congress held in March of 1995, the nominating process for the president and the gubernatorial candidates were changed again to add open primaries for DPP members and non-members alike. It was also decided that candidate slots on the party's lists of national constituency representatives for the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly would be allotted equally among three groups. These groups included scholars and experts, the representatives of disadvantaged groups and finally, politicians (Chao, Myers 1998).

At the 7th National Congress held in June of 1996, more modifications and changes were made to the procedures. It was decided that the primary reserved for party leadership should be eradicated. A two-stage process would be used in the nomination of candidates for such offices as president, provincial governor, special municipality mayors, county magistrates, provincial municipality mayors, Legislative Yuan members, National Assemblymen and special councilmen. This two-staged process involved a closed primary for party members and an open primary for all eligible voters, with each given equal weight (Moon 1997).

Though the system appeared to be democratic and fair, the 7th national Congress held in December of 1996, overturned it. The procedures were modified so that during the second stage, the open primary for all eligible voters was replaced by opinion polls. Clearly the pressures to win were too much to allow the public to have that much control over the nominating procedures. The DPP wanted to appear democratic, but really only wanted to use the primary as a means of gauging public opinion.

A later meeting decided that the party chairman would not be elected or chosen by the public but would be elected directly by all members of the party, starting in 1998. More changes occurred at the 8th National Congress, held in 1999 regarding the manner in which to select a presidential candidate. Previously, the National Congress elected the party chairman, but there was a special rule adopted for the 2000 presidential election. The decision was made that a qualified candidate running for president must be recommended by more than forty party leaders. And if there was only one such candidate, the National Congress would convene to ratify his or her nomination by a three-fifths majority. This process was used to nominate former Taipei city mayor, Chen Shui-bien to represent the DPP in the 2000 election. This method for deciding

the presidential candidate proved to be successful, as demonstrated by Chen's electoral victory in March.

Nevertheless, there are many problems associated with primaries. Primaries are very divisive. It creates breaches in party discipline, which have been one of the notable characteristics of Taiwanese politics, similar to the United States. More and more candidates in the KMT were running without party affiliation. In the 1989 election, 19 KMT candidates ran in elections and claimed to be affiliated with the KMT without KMT authorization. The DPP witnessed 14 members do the same. Thus, the power within the party walls were broken down encouraging more independent thought and questioning of party policy.

Another problem associated with the primary system is that what it takes to win a primary is not always the same as what it takes to win an election. The strongest local faction can win the primary and then the losers of that primary may be apathetic in mobilizing their vote in the general election. This explains more reasons behind the cases of violation of party discipline. Losing candidates might believe that they have a better chance of winning on their own. For the KMT, the more recent results of the primary system have been that the stronger factions have been able to trample the weaker ones. The weaker factions and their candidates are seeing

no need to play to party discipline since they clearly have nothing to gain or lose from it.

T.J. Cheng questioned whether or not the process of implementing primaries helps all countries democratize. He argued that studies show that the level of democratization within the party doesn't denote that the level of democratization of the overall political system should be in question. He gives the example of European countries that are "highly centralized, exercise political control within the party and coordinate which candidates will be nominated," (1989: 496). He claimed that this has not affected the overall state of democracy in these countries. In Taiwan's case, however, the implementation of primaries though not necessarily followed, nor free of problems, has made important contributions in the democratization process. Because the KMT is deeply entwined with the state and the state institutions, "democratization within the party was crucial to the party's ability to democratize the political system," (1989: 496).

The DPP had more trouble maintaining the primary system as time wore on. In 1993, for the election of county magistrates and mayors, the party reverted to a less democratic method, basing nomination on an informal survey of rank and file opinions and

evaluations of local cadres. The KMT also used a similar method in the provincial and municipal council elections of 1994.

The KMT might have to seriously reconsider its nominating methods after its most recent defeat in the presidential election, a loss that many blamed on former President Lee's decision to nominate Lien Chan instead of James Soong, who was considered the more obvious choice. His decision to nominate Lien was viewed as a self-destructive measure that contributed to the KMT defeat. The decision caused major internal bickering and led to the defection of Soong, as he ran on his own in the election despite the fact that the party had not formally nominated him. The selection of Chen for the DPP was clearly a wiser choice and enabled him to overcome the KMT powerhouse and emerge on top of the fray to win the electoral cliffhanger.

Chapter 6

Examining the Reasons Behind Political Reform (1988-2000)

Role of Lee Teng Hui

As discussed in the previous chapter there were many institutional mechanisms set in place that made it difficult for the opposition to compete on an equal playing ground. Though Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) had carried out many reforms during his tenure, the system was still not fully democratic. It was not until Lee Teng Hui came to power that Taiwan truly finalized the last steps towards democratization. These changes, however, would not come without a cost to the power and strength of the KMT.

Thus, not surprisingly, when Lee was hand picked by Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) to be vice president in 1984, this sent shock waves through the KMT. It also created the onset of divisions that would never subside during Lee's tenure. Lee was a bright and well liked, Cornell educated Taiwanese who had made a name for himself in the KMT for his success overseeing land reform and agricultural development (Chao, Myers 1998). The success of this program was considered an important component to Taiwan's economic development and he was able to parlay this success into a political career. He served as a minister in the government and later was named the mayor of Taipei in 1978. In 1984 he was appointed to the position of governor of Taiwan.

Despite all of these credentials, he was looked at suspiciously among party hard-liners. Hard-liners believed that he was not concerned enough with party orthodoxy. It was rumored that he was secretly in favor of Taiwanese independence. The hard-liners also believed that his support for liberalization and party reform would thwart the KMT's ability to rule effectively. When CCK passed away, there was some disagreement about who should be the party chairman until the 13th party congress was held in July of 1988. There was concern from the Central Evaluation Committee, headed by Madame Chiang, the elder Chiang's widow, that there should be a collective leadership since Lee was not well equipped to handle the situation. Though he fought hard to dispel such worries, his detractors, in particular premier Yu Kuo-hwa and Madame Chiang made efforts to thwart his bid to be appointed as the party chief (Chao, Myers 1998).

This led to many debates behind closed doors that caused many internal problems for the party. In the end however, Lee survived this impasse, which embarrassed party hard-liners and Madame Chiang in the process. It also gave the opposition and many in the KMT who were in favor of change, ammunition to contend for more change in the KMT hierarchy, which appeared anti-Taiwanese.

Thus, the decision to choose Lee as vice president back in 1984 was monumental for two reasons. First, Lee was the first individual to govern the country who was not a family member of the Chiang Kai-shek dynasty.

Second, Lee was the first Taiwanese person to hold such a position. This was a clear move by CCK to adapt to the changes going on in the country and accept that it was time that more Taiwanese had the opportunity to hold powerful positions.

Nevertheless, his decision to select Lee created controversy. His opponents charged that he was too friendly with the opposition. Moreover, most simply felt that he could not fill CCK's shoes. They also had misgivings about his policies towards China. As a Taiwanese, he represented a different position ideologically on the unification with China issue. Though he kept his true feelings on the matter under wraps, many believed that he was not in sync with an important aspect of the KMT ideology. And that ideology could not be disregarded since it was integral to the regime's legitimacy. Lee had to build power in this environment. He had to balance the many forces pushing him in different directions. More problematic for the KMT, was the upcoming election. The opposition was gaining momentum just as the KMT was struggling to maintain some semblance of unity.

1989 Elections

When a year had passed after CCK's death, Lee spoke at the commemoration and tried to appease those who doubted him and vowed to continue the ideology of uniting China under Sun Yat Sen's ideology. At the same time, he also wanted to expand the national elections and retire the

older parliamentarians. The other more pressing problem was the lack of a democratic constitution. There was much need for some type of revision and the process of doing so would not be easy.

1989 was another critical year for the democratization process. New elections would be held at a regional level. In addition, the Legislative Yuan had previously passed the Law on Assembly and Parades during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. This gave people the right to hold public meetings and march in protests. The main proviso was that stability and adherence to the main ideology in Taiwan was met. This meant that the protests and meetings could not espouse communism, be divisive to the R.O.C. or be in protest of the constitution. In the beginning of 1989 the Legislative Yuan passed the Law on the Organization of Civic Groups (Copper 1993). This was another monumental piece of legislation. It put into law, what the DPP had already challenged. It allowed political parties to register and compete in elections.

This sent forth a flurry of excitement. The DPP and the KMT were registered by the summer of 1989 and many other new parties formed to take advantage of the new law. In January of that year, the Legislative Yuan also passed a revised version of the Law on the Election and Recall of Public Officials (Copper 1993). This law provided rules for how the parties would compete in the election, given that there were now parties competing and not just one party and independents.

The 1989 elections were significant for other reasons as well. This was not only the first set of elections that occurred after martial law had been lifted, but it was also the first time political parties would be competing (Copper 1993). Moreover, because there were more positions than ever to be contested amidst an environment where many competing views were advocated, it was believed that the results of the election could help gauge what direction the public really wanted to go on the various issues concerning democratization.

One of the ongoing issues was the retirement of the senior representatives. During CCK's tenure, they had talked about how the senior parliamentarians would be compensated. The final piece of legislation, which also occurred in January of 1989, entitled the Law on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians outlined the terms under which the senior members would be compensated until they retired. It is important to note that it did not outline when it would happen, but just how they would be compensated. Thus, it remained an issue that would be unresolved for a long period and was highly contentious.

In the December 1989 elections, the DPP called for more democracy, at a faster pace than the KMT was ready to give. The DPP witnessed the great speed of change that had occurred in Eastern Europe and wanted to democratize at a similar speed. The DPP began campaigning in November. Forty other political parties, including the KMT also competed. There were 16

county magistrate seats, 73 provincial county seats and 99 major city and district council seats available. All parties prepared to wage war with one another. This election was considered "crucial for future grassroots political party building," (Chao, Myers 1998: 164).

It also became important for the DPP because if it won at least 20 seats it could initiate legislation. The worse the KMT did in the election, the better chance of forming coalitions with non-KMT members. Nevertheless, being able to beat out the KMT would be easier said than done.

The KMT had over two million registered members and registered 557 candidates. The DPP, on the other hand, had about 17 thousand members and ran 204 candidates. The KMT continued to strengthen its ties to local factions and sent prestigious members of the party around Taiwan to help the KMT candidates campaign. The KMT was advantaged by the links that had already been established to local businesses and other key groups. It had superior headquarters and more campaign help to combat the stringent laws on using television to gain attention.

The KMT had relied on these types of strategies for years to maintain power, but opted to change its method of selecting its candidates. Both the KMT and the DPP used primaries to decide which candidates would run. There are many democratic countries that do not use primaries, and the use of primaries does not mean that one country is more democratic than another. However, in the case of Taiwan, it demonstrated that the KMT had

democratized somewhat, a process that was pivotal to Taiwan's overall democratization.

To no one's surprise, the KMT's first experience with primaries was not a pleasant one. It had made the ballots much too cumbersome and was not completely satisfied with the experiment. It decided to merely use primaries as an advisory tool, demonstrating its unwillingness to allow more uncertainty into the electoral process.

The campaigns for the Legislative Yuan that occurred simultaneously heated up quite a bit. Some of the posters and rhetoric would be considered shocking to most countries. As could be expected, enormous sums of money were spent on these campaigns, and candidates spared no expense on the lavish entertainment and vote buying.

The KMT continued to praise the stability and economic growth that it had brought the country in its campaign, but this time, it was not able to capitalize on this. When the polls closed on December 3rd, the election results were not what the KMT would have hoped for. The KMT won 14 of the 21 county/city races. The DPP had won 6 of those seats, with the final seat going to an independent. This was the first time non-KMT members had won so many seats. In the Legislative Yuan elections, the KMT won 72 seats, while the DPP won 21. For the county and city council races, the KMT won 101 seats while the DPP won 38. Of the share of the total votes cast, the KMT gained 59%, the DPP 30% and other parties and independents,

11%. Though, the DPP did not overtake the KMT, the press and the KMT itself viewed this election as a severe loss. The KMT had clearly been challenged, however. Many of the elections were very close (Copper 1993).

The press played a more active role in this election than ever before, due to the more lax restrictions, and thus, concluded that the KMT had not done well. The KMT was accustomed to winning more than 70% of the votes cast, and this time came away with a 10% loss (Hsieh 1996: 200-205). The party had been hindered by its lack of unity, which delayed it from mapping out its election strategies. Moreover, the party was hurt by the DPP's rising momentum and the public's thirst for some key changes. To remain competitive, the KMT would have to make some changes. The problem was would the KMT fall apart in the process of making these changes?

Why the R.O.C. Reformed

Even though Lee was chosen by CCK to be his vice president, his position in power had not been secured. Lee had many detractors and would not have an easy time remaining in power. Though the senior representatives were supposed to resign, as most of the public, the DPP and Lee and numerous KMT members had wanted, they stubbornly refused to budge. This would make Lee's chances for securing the presidency a little more difficult. The attention of the public was focused on this important position in February of 1990 (Chao, Myers 1998).

Lee's public approval ratings, at the time were very high. He was very well liked by the public and would have no problem getting elected, if direct-popular presidential elections were held. However, he did not have to be accountable to the public, but to the central committee members. The KMT endorsed his candidacy, but there were some problems brewing behind the scenes.

The big problem was that Lee had to choose a vice presidential running mate and that decision could upset many key people in the party. There were several individuals viewed to be the frontrunners. These included Lee Huan, the premier, James Soong, Chien Fu and Chiang Wei-kuo, who was CCK's half brother. He actively sought the nomination and made some daring comments to the press (Chao, Myers 1998).

He would soon be disappointed. On February 11, 1990, Lee announced that Li Yuan-zu would be his running mate. Li was not well known, and had few enemies or friends. His choice shocked many and Lee angered many top leaders for not consulting with them on the matter. Another surprise was the KMT's Central Committee proposition to change the method of ratifying the president. The Central Committee had always voted by standing up. This made it hard for individuals to vote how they really felt. It caused much internal discussion, but in the end, was not approved. With the exception of one individual, Lee and Li were approved for the slate of president and vice president, respectively (Chao, Myers, 1998).

The seeds of division had already been planted. Many KMT members openly criticized him, a first, in KMT party history. They were upset about his refusal to consult them on key decisions. They disliked many of his appointments. The cleavages in the KMT divided along lines of those who supported Lee and those who didn't. The divisive factions that formed would be known as the mainstream faction, who supported Lee and the non-mainstream faction, which was made up of party members such as Lee Huan, Hau Pei-tsun and others in the Standing and Central Committees. These factions threatened to seriously disrupt the proceedings at the upcoming Eighth Congress of the National Assembly.

One of the biggest problems facing Lee was that a new ticket made up of KMT members Lin Yang-kang and Chiang Wei-kuo, for president and vice president, respectively, seemed poised to run against Lee and Li. Chiang was obviously feeling jilted by his loss of face, after Lee chose someone else to run with him. Many individuals from the non-mainstream faction supported this ticket. Lee responded by forming a committee of respected elder members to moderate the factional struggles that were dividing the party.

The committee decided that Lin-Chiang ticket violated the party discipline of the KMT and that something needed to be done to get them to step down. Lee was forced to explain why he had chosen Li, without consulting others, in light of the various capable candidates who thought that they had a chance. Lee defended his decision based on Li's knowledge of

constitutional law. This, he deemed would be important to the upcoming changes that the country would have to go through. Thus, Lee believed that the R.O.C. would be making some changes and thought that Li's knowledge would come in handy.

For each political leader in Taiwan, "there were clear limits on how far the incumbent reformists could and would go. They demonstrated their capacity and intention to limit the scope of reform by controlling the course and pace of institutional reforms, setting the sequence of liberalization, and redesigning the political institutions and elections rules in the KMT's favor." (Chu 1992: 37). The leaders wanted to pre-empt possible chaotic situations that would thwart their power by making early concessions to democratize. In contrast to South Korea, there was much more constant external and internal pressure to reform. The need to do something was more eminent. While South Korean leaders responded amidst total chaos, Taiwanese leaders responded before the situation became too destabilizing.

The common thread was that all of the leaders involved wanted to sustain their power as much as their environment would allow them. Both Chiangs could accomplish this goal without fragmenting the party too much. The younger Chiang, in particular, could reform the system somewhat, while maintaining tight control over the party. Lee, however, had a different set of circumstances.

Lee was not as popular within the party or in control of the party, when he came into power. He did not have the blind support of party members in the same way as his predecessors. This meant that for him to stay in power, he would have to democratize. The problem was that he would divide the party in the process. Why was this the case?

Lee had incentives to pursue some of the most significant democratic reforms because he had more popular support from the electorate than from his own party. From the beginning, Lee pursued policies that divided the party. In mid 1989, Lee upset senior members of the Central Standing Committee by making new foreign policy initiatives. First, he sent a high level delegation to China to attend the meeting of the Asian Development Bank in 1989. This move was not well received because some KMT leaders viewed it as a de facto recognition of the Peoples Republic of China. Second, he directed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to seek dual recognition of the P.R.C. regime. This move departed from the R.O.C.'s long-standing "one-China" policy (Chiu 1993). Both moves angered conservatives within the party.

Soon after this, a schism appeared between two factions in the KMT (as mentioned before) that would later be divided into the mainstream faction led by Lee, and the non-mainstream faction, led by the more conservative members of the KMT (Chao, Myers 1998). Lee exacerbated this division further by refusing to adhere to the party on every issue. As stated above, when it came time to nominate a running mate, he ignored the advice of the

KMT members and chose Li Yuan-zu instead. Lee's rivals fought back by threatening to run other candidates on another ticket.

This threat only hardened Lee's resolve to undermine his enemies in the party further. This set in motion Lee's decision to accelerate institutional reform in order to weaken his rivals. However, the opening, to be discussed later, would also serve as an opportunity for the opposition. The opposition knew that it could take advantage of this split. It compelled many opposition members to seek outside help to further its agenda. Lee tolerated the mobilization of the opposition and other elements of civil society. He tolerated whatever would thwart his political opponents- and in his eyes, his more dangerous opponents were not in the DPP, but leaders within his own party.

The DPP took advantage of the opening and ran as an organized party in the 1989 election. One of the main demands during the election was the retirement of the life long members of the national representative bodies, such as the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. This demand was nothing new to the KMT. It had witnessed the ongoing complaints of tang-wai politicians outraged that out of touch representatives elected on China's Mainland were still in positions of so much power. Nevertheless, the complaints intensified as the DPP sensed its increased momentum. The DPP made this known by staging protests on the legislative forum. The DPP's antics were well noted by the press, but given Lee's agenda, it did not need to go to such extreme measures.

The retirement of the older politicians was something that Lee was in favor of, as well as many other KMT members who viewed them as obstacles to development. Lee, in particular wanted to be rid of these politicians. They were not only stumbling blocks to change, but they were rivals of his, still suspicious of his every move. The rest of KMT supporters for this measure knew that the existence of the senior parliamentarians had become outmoded and that they needed to enact a change.

The main question was how and when. Ironically, the institution that provided the legal grounds to do so was the same institution that suspended their re-election. The Council of Grand Justice rendered its 261st ruling days before the National Affairs Conference (Chao, Myers 1998). The ruling stated that the tenure of the life-long members would expire on a certain date. New representatives would be elected. This ruling on behalf of the Council of Grand Justice reflected the general "will" of the public that was pleased with the news. The majority of the KMT was also ready to abide by this ruling. The ruling enabled Taiwan to democratize and pursue more democratic institutional arrangements. This was a major step in the transition.

Another step towards democratization was the announcement in May that a conference would be held to negotiate needed reforms. This was the first of its kind in Taiwan and will be analyzed in depth later. In addition, to that announcement, Lee also announced in his May 1990 inaugural address that he planned to repeal the Temporary Provision and end the Period of

Mobilization and Combating Rebellion in less than a year. None of these issues were discussed at the Conference, however.

Bargaining For Reform:

The National Affairs Conference

After learning that the National Assembly had elected him to a six-year term, President Lee announced that he would hold a National Affairs Conference inviting scholars, legislators, journalists, and other experts to discuss the major issues of constitutional reform (Chao, Myers 1998; Chiu 1993).

It surprised many that Lee would hold a conference where so many divergent views and opinions would be aired out in one setting, including members of the DPP. The range of views advocated by those invited ran the gamut from those advocating unification with China to those fighting for independence. Thus, the conference to be held on June 28 to July 4 of 1990 was a landmark in Taiwanese history.

This conference was one of many events that occurred during Lee's tenure that hastened the democratization process. However, that does mean that Lee was not thinking about his own interests. Leaders democratize for reasons other than that they passionately believe that democracy is intrinsically the best form of government. In this case, Lee was hardly maneuvering selflessly. His moves reflected his self-interest in prolonging his

power. Therefore, the context of Taiwanese politics in the early 1990's will be explored from his vantage point in order to explain what constraints he operated under and to better understand why decisions were made.

Why did Lee decide to hold a conference? What were his motivations?

At the time, in March 1990, students were protesting the refusal of the older parliamentarians, who were elected on the Mainland, to retire from office.

Lee wanted to do something about that, but wasn't sure how quickly reforms could be passed on the matter. Lee needed to divert attention away from this problem and aimed to diffuse a possible crisis. It also countered the internal KMT division over his choice of vice president. He had previously barely escaped being replaced by other party members when the KMT attempted to run two other candidates on a different ticket. It had previously been announced that Lin Yang-kang, a senior party member and Chinag Wei-kuo, CCK's half brother and the former vice premier would run. Eventually, they withdrew, but it caused major headaches for Lee.

Lee also knew that time was running out for the country.

Internationally and domestically, support would wane for a small regime that continued to behave as if it was authoritarian, under the guise of democracy. The public and the opposition were getting restless and Lee needed to preempt any maneuvers to democratize so that the process could be handled on his own terms, in ways that would benefit him.

A conference was the perfect solution for this. The government needed to accustom itself with discussing varying views calmly and peacefully. The timing was such that failure to acclimate to the norms practiced by all of the other rich and industrialized nations of the world would have dire consequences. It needed to democratize gradually, but start the process soon, nonetheless.

Only a limited number of people were invited, but before the conference was even held, Lee sought out the opinions of a number of different people. In March of 1990, Chiang Yen-shih and his colleagues made up a list of 25 names of the National Affairs Conference's preparatory committee. On May 5th, the committee had drawn up the rules for choosing the 120 delegates. However, it is important to note that of those 120 people selected, 36% were from the KMT (Chiu 1993).

Public opinion polls were conducted to understand the attitudes of social elites and the public. The most overwhelming result was that more than 90% of the public thought that the National Assembly should be changed from its current form.

Before the conference would even take place there would be much heated discussion about what could be discussed and what this conference planned to accomplish. Elites were divided regarding whether or not the conference would lead to a political crisis. There was some suspicion that the conference was used by the KMT to appease the DPP somewhat while

pursuing its own agenda. The DPP did not want the KMT to dominate the conference, while it stood as a passive bystander. The DPP wavered over a couple of months to even participate. Some other elites worried that "if the conference failed, it would ruin the chance for real political reform," (Chao, Myers 1998: 200). The elites were worried that no reforms would be enacted, or even worse, that the public would be so upset with the KMT that it would respond in protest to the lack of progress.

As far as what would be discussed, it was divided whether or not the conference should talk about human rights, and policies toward the Mainland and unification. In the end, it was decided that unification of Taiwan and China was not a suitable subject and that there were many other pressing topics to discuss.

Thus, the agenda was set that unification of Taiwan and China would not be discussed yet, since in reality, it was not feasible. However, there were many other topics to be discussed. The topics to be discussed included the five following themes: 1) the reform of the Parliament; 2) the system of local governments; 3) the central government system; 4) the amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of China and related matters, including the Temporary Provisions; 5) the policy toward the Mainland and relations between Taiwan and the Mainland (Chao, Myers 1998; Chiu 1993).

The conference was held amidst an environment of change with several contextual factors to take into account. First, there were complex

security factors to think about. The very fact that a conference was being held did not go over well with China. The R.O.C. Constitution enacted in 1947 was a symbol of "one-China". Thus, enacting a new Constitution threatened that principle. The Chinese warned that Taiwanese independence would not be tolerated and enacting the Constitution would increase the tension in Chinese-Taiwanese relations.

Second, the conference was announced on the heels of the first election where the opposition party ran as a legitimate party. The DPP won 21 seats in the December 1989 elections, which was one more seat than was required for introducing bills into the legislatures. The DPP also won six of 21 magistrate offices, including those of Taipei and Kaohsiung, (Robinson 1990: 24).

The DPP had given the KMT one of its worst losses. Although the KMT did much better in the local elections the DPP made it known to the KMT that it was a force to be reckoned with. The DPP had a strong effect on the KMT and the KMT was forced to react differently than it otherwise would have. The party had new pressures to deal with and new concerns than before.

Third, the KMT was no longer the highly centralized monolithic party that it had been in the past. It became divided after Lee unilaterally decided to run with Li Yuan-zu, the secretary-general over a more popular party figure. A KMT faction offered an alternative ticket, making clear that differences were

no longer muted and were out in the open. In addition, when 750 questionnaires had been sent out, only 126 members responded. There was a lot of uncertainty regarding what KMT members believed should be accomplished at the conference. The members were also divided on several important issues, such as how to deal with China and amending the constitution. Thus, Lee did not have the same control over the party that CCK or Chiang had. This added more tension to the upcoming conference.

Fourth, a week before the conference was to be held, on June 21, 1990, the Council of Grand Justice of the Judicial Yuan rendered its interpretation of the Constitutions, which stated that all life-tenure representatives in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan should resign by the end of 1991 (Chao, Myers 1998; Copper 1993). This came after several days of student demonstrations for several days in March on Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei. The assemblymen had remained stubborn about this issue and their refusal to infuse new blood into the system infuriated students and opposition members alike. The decision to remove them significantly preempted possible chaos that could ensue.

Though most of the participants preferred that they resign at an earlier date, the majority of those attending the conference uniformly accepted the retirement of these officials. Thus, the conference would be held in an atmosphere of great change. This was an exciting time for politicians who

had fought so vigorously for democracy. The conference presented a chance for the pace of democracy to hasten in Taiwan.

At the very start of the conference, on June 28 of 1990, the DPP demanded that two procedures be used during the conference (Chao, Myers 1998). It wanted to use a secret ballot on major motions and use a national referendum on final recommendations. Both are democratic measures of deciding things but also would not be in the KMT's favor. The use of secret ballots was a divisive issue among KMT members. Lee had earlier advocated using secret ballots, to enable individuals to support him. Secret ballots had not been used because it decentralized the party. It also encouraged the more progressive KMT members to vote how they truly felt and could hinder the conservative KMT faction. The DPP, moreover, knew that the ploy was divisive and would put the KMT on the defensive.

The national referendum related to a constitutional issue, which made it problematic as well. The DPP's promotion of a national referendum challenged how the KMT viewed the nation. It gave too much practical and symbolic independence to Taiwan, and it distanced overseas Chinese from the political process.

The DPP started off on the offensive. Its bargaining strategy was to be as aggressive as possible in order to gain its most prized concession from the KMT: the direct election of the president. The DPP knew that its only chance to influence politics was through a direct election of the president. The DPP

could win more votes nationally than locally. It had more difficulty challenging the KMT at the local levels due to organizational weaknesses and a lack of financial resources. With the presidency, it could concentrate its campaign in urban areas.

The DPP was so adamant about this proposal that it threatened to walk out if the Conference rejected it. This would naturally taint the conference in notoriety. However, the KMT knew that the DPP might be blamed for ruining the conference since it had a history of outlandish behavior. The KMT held out for two days. In the end, the KMT agreed to directly elect the mayors of major cities and provincial governors, but did not want to decide on a directly elected president via national referendum.

Thus, one of the biggest issues to be discussed was the method of electing the president. The present form, where the National Assembly elected the president, was outmoded and not considered democratic, in light of all of the numerous advantages that the ruling party enjoyed to ensure that it maintained a majority in the National Assembly. Many of the participants agreed that the president should be elected "by the people" but were not sure as to what method. Some were in favor of adopting a system similar to the electoral college used in the U.S. Others preferred a direct election of the president. There were other choices as well, that were not discussed such as employing a two-stage system that is used in France to ensure that the winner comes away with the majority of the votes.

Making this decision was not an easy one. Though the best choice would be a direct election of the president by the people, it could signal that Taiwan considered itself independent, which would cause problems with China. An "electoral college system may include some national and overseas Chinese seats apportioned according to the party preferences of Taiwan voters," (Chiu 1993: 17). This however, would not bring about the semblance of any change, which is what Taiwan needed to quell the democratizing impulses.

Another area of contention was the central government system. It had long been a cumbersome system designed for a much larger country. It was clear that it needed to be changed. The question was how. Some opted for a presidential-system while others were in favor of a mixed system. There were others who were in favor of a cabinet system. The majority of the participants, for some reason or another, preferred the mixed system.

The direct election of the president was further debated on July 1st. The DPP wanted the president to be directly elected by the people, without the assistance of an electoral college. The president should then, be able to appoint the premier. The KMT wanted the National Assembly to still elect the president. It also argued that the senior KMT politicians should be given a deadline to retire and that a new national assembly should be elected to replace them. The KMT wanted the other offices, such as the president, the

premier, the cabinet and the legislature to still remain (Chao, Myers 1998: 209).

The DPP wanted a closer deadline for the senior representatives. It wanted them to retire by the end of 1990 and a new election to be held for 120-150 new representatives to be elected no later than the end of July of 1991. It also wanted the mayors of Kaohsiung and Taipei to be directly elected by the people. In addition, the DPP wanted these reforms to be ratified by the people.

The final demand from the DPP, which in some ways went hand in hand with its desire for the country to be independent, was its promotion of Taiwan rejoining the United Nations. This position, in particular, gained popular support. All of the previous positions espoused by the DPP were gaining more support. And Lee and the KMT knew that they needed to adopt some of them to remain competitive in the next election.

The atmosphere, nonetheless, was somewhat harmonious, demonstrating that Lee and the KMT appeared to be dedicated to reform. No decisions had been made yet, however. These decisions were to be decided later. A secret session of both KMT and DPP members was held on July 2. The DPP agreed to ease up a bit on some of its demands. The DPP conceded on its demand of ratification of constitutional reform by the people but only if the KMT made good on its promise to have the new president directly elected by the people. More secret meetings were held later in the

day. When word got out that segments of both groups were meeting secretly, other conference delegates were very upset by this. It negated the democratic openness of the conference.

Despite, the regression back to the previous way of dealing with discussions of policy, on the positive side, at least the opposition members were present during these discussions. It initiated dialogue between the KMT and the DPP. More importantly, the decision was made to directly elect the president, a first in Taiwanese history and a monumental moment for the opposition.

On July 4, the conference was officially over and President Lee held a big dinner wishing everyone good will. The KMT was still divided over what happened over the past few days, but the DPP was elated. There were several important decisions that had been made. The senior representatives would have to retire and elections would be held to replace them. Thus, the constitution would be amended to account for that. It was also decided that in the future (though very ambiguous as to when) a popular election of the president would be held. According to Chao and Myers, "The conference established the framework for formal contacts to be developed between the ruling party and the political opposition's leading party, the DPP," (1998: 215) but that did not mean that democracy had been consolidated. There were still deep divisions between the DPP and the KMT that had yet to be resolved.

The Retirement of the Senior Representatives And Other Democratic Reforms

It is not rare that individuals work as hard as possible so that they can retire at an early age. More often, individuals retire after it has become clear that their services are no longer needed or if they have been offered impressive retirement packages. This was not the case with the senior parliamentarians in Taiwan, according to Chao and Myers (1998: 221-224). Many simply refused to retire. This caused much grief and internal division within the KMT. However, the DPP was more unified on this issue and received much support from the public.

The government initiated legislation as early as 1989 regarding how the senior representatives would be compensated. One would think that this would not have been such a difficult process. Some of these representatives were in the nineties. However, despite the enormous pressure mounting on them to retire, many of them refused to budge.

Lee needed the seniors to retire in order to both acquire more power and to remove the obstacles to his reform packages. He received more support on this matter from the DPP than from his own party. Nevertheless, there was support from some KMT members on this issue. The party had planned to legally compel them to retire by a certain deadline. The DPP had hoped that they would be gone by September of 1990.

The DPP wouldn't get its wish, but the Council of Grand Justices did provide a deadline. The Council decreed in court case 261 that the senior representatives should retire by December 31, 1991. This meant that the new National Assembly and Legislative Yuan would have many more seats open to be contested given their absence.

This was not so simple, however. The seniors responded with a petition of protest. They also forced the KMT to continue to persuade them. Lee and Soong were forced to personally plead with them to comply. They were even ridiculed by the press for their stubbornness. The events that followed could be characterized as somewhat bizarre.

President Lee convened with the National Assembly in April of 1991. He had several goals that he wanted to achieve. He wanted to end the Temporary Provisions. He also wanted set out new rules for electing new members of the National Assembly. In order to accomplish all of this, he needed to retire the senior representatives by the end of the year, as was decreed by the Council of Grand Justices.

Lee wanted to take charge of the situation but was encumbered by the resistance from his own party and the more radical demands from the DPP. From the onset of the meeting that took place on April 8, 1991, the DPP and the KMT representatives bickered and made damaging accusations (Chao, Myers 1998: 220-223). The DPP was clearly tired with the inflexibility of the older representatives and charged that they should not be there, claiming that

they were too old. Some DPP members were holding signs, as Lee arrived to speak, in protest of the elders' presence. When the police came to control the situation and remove them from disrupting Lee's opening address, they screamed and swore. The elders responded by applauding their dismissal. The scene was out of control if not somewhat strange (Chao, Myers 1998: 221).

More fights erupted the next day. These disturbances were not just verbal clashes but individuals between both parties actually slapped and hit one another. Police protection was required to shield the individual who announced who would be on the 85-person committee. The DPP were not happy with the people chosen to be on the committee. Though the DPP's frustration was warranted, its response to this situation can be characterized as juvenile and immature. The DPP yelled and screamed in protest. Even worse, one representative walked up to the platform and grabbed a bunch of flowers from one of the vases and threw the flowers at the audience. The DPP's outlandish behavior was reported by the press and shocked the public.

Why did the DPP behave in such an immature manner? The DPP felt isolated and removed from the decision-making process for too long. Some members were no longer able to control their dissatisfaction with the status quo. It's a wonder that the opposition in Taiwan had remained relatively civil for so long. The opposition's representation in Taiwan had remained at the local level for a long period of time. The KMT controlled the process of

opening up the regime at a rate that was much slower than other countries that were democratizing. Thus, the opposition was willing to resort to violence and silly antics to gain some sort of publicity or recognition, due to increasing feelings of frustration and helplessness.

The DPP's behavior was etched in the minds of the public, and unfortunately for the DPP, was not received well by the public. This was not good publicity going into the upcoming election. The public was alarmed that the DPP members were too out of control and volatile to be included in the governing process. There were concerns that the DPP only knew how to solve problems in a violent manner.

In the end, Lee was able to accomplish many of his goals. He remained fairly calm amidst all of the chaos and the KMT was able to prevail and control the ratification process, (Chao, Myers 1998: 223). On April 22, 1991 the KMT agreed to end the Temporary Provisions, as Lee had wanted. The KMT also agreed to end the communist insurgency. More importantly, it approved 10 new articles to the constitution regarding the procedures for nominating and electing new members to the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. Elections for the first two bodies would be held at the end of 1991 and 1992 respectively. The Control Yuan would be held before January 31, 1993. In enacting this legislation, Lee was finally able to guarantee that the senior representatives would retire (Copper 1993).

With these new articles, the elections expanded to unprecedented levels. The democratization process was on the upswing. The DPP was now given the chance to compete with the KMT at the national level. In the past five years, the rules had been changed to allow political parties to compete. Now they were amended to make more seats available to be contested in the representative bodies. It was thus, up to the DPP to figure out how to compete in this new political environment.

Chapter 7

Post-democratization Politics in Taiwan

Major Elections 1991-2000

The 1991 National Assembly Supplemental Elections

The upcoming election to be held in December of 1991 was extremely important for both the DPP and the KMT. For the KMT, the ability to control the pace of reform hinged upon its ability to win as many seats as possible in the National Assembly. If the DPP won more than one-fourth of the seats, the KMT would not be able to control constitutional reform and this result would significantly shift the balance of power in the National Assembly. The KMT was also in danger of splitting even further if constitutional reform could not be decided in a manner that suited it. More problematic, was the fact that if the opposition did well enough in the election, it could call a national referendum and possibly even draft a new constitution. Thus, the upcoming election could have important repercussions.

One important aspect of the upcoming election was what the procedures for it would be. All parties convened on this issue in the spring of 1991. They decided to divide Taiwan and its offshore islands into 58 districts. From this, 225 representatives could be elected using the SNTV system, as had been used in the past. Twenty assembly representatives would be chosen based on a quota system from the overseas Chinese according to the

number of votes won from the parties in the general election. In addition, another 80 seats were available to represent women, aboriginal groups and other various professions, such as farmers, according to the same procedures used for the overseas Chinese. Thus, in the upcoming election, there would be 325 seats available for representatives.

The upcoming election required more strategy that had been needed before, when the KMT competed in the local elections. The KMT believed that it could still hold on to its power, because it was far ahead of the DPP in its organizational capabilities and access to finances. It hoped that it could nominate the correct number of representatives to win as many seats as possible, making best use of its party machine. The DPP was at a disadvantage because it did not have enough candidates to field in all of the 58 districts. It lacked resources and funding.

The KMT's strategy was to nominate 192 candidates, which were more than two candidates per district. This was in stark contrast to South Korea's ruling party that nominated only one candidate per district. The KMT hoped that its candidates could win at least 75% of the 225 nationally contested election seats. The other parties had not agreed to have so many districts with which to field candidates. They actually preferred fewer but eventually agreed in the end to have 58, in hopes of winning at least 25% of the seats.

No matter what the opposition hoped for, it still had to contend with a very well organized and determined KMT. The party attempted to reform the

amounts of money being spent. It also heavily screened its candidates and consulted with special committees, made up of party leaders and younger party officials. KMT secretary-general James Soong traveled all over Taiwan to make sure that the local party bosses were building up their networks of support for these nominees and establishing their party headquarters to be ready and prepared to compete. Other high officials also made sure to visit key areas to meet with the candidates and help them gain support.

The KMT also tried to use the power of being incumbents to its advantage. President Lee campaigned for KMT candidates. It had the funds to put up ads for the party, all over major urban areas. It drew on its record of economic and political stability to encourage voters to vote sensibly. It worked day and night to get the message to voters about how important the election was. It portrayed the DPP as maverick politicians who were likely to bring great instability to Taiwan.

None of the parties had the manpower or the financial means to compete with this type of meticulous battle strategy. They were not as well prepared and lacked the local party machinery to target the public. They were not able to recruit as many people to help them work on the campaign. They mainly recruited from universities and used students and professors. The problem in this case was that professors, though highly critical of the regime, rarely did much about it. Thus, the DPP lacked the large amounts of disciplined workers that the KMT used to help it with the campaigns.

Amidst these obstacles, the DPP's strategy was to draw up a new constitution that could get the attention of the public who would in turn, vote for the DPP based on its support for the new constitution. This was the DPP's effort at forming some type of platform, as parties in Western countries have. It also dropped the bid into the U.N. as a central issue in the campaign. Instead, it dramatically made one the of its goals Taiwanese independence. Though this may have garnered some attention, this strategy of promoting Taiwanese independence did more harm than good.

In addition to the independence platform, the DPP also advocated the direct presidential election of the president. The KMT campaigned with the slogan that it would bring "reform, stability and prosperity," (Rigger 1999: 157). The KMT was also able to capitalize on its previous years of economic growth. It warned the public that voting for the DPP would create enormous instability, both politically and economically. It also went against the DPP's assertion that the Constitution should be rewritten. The KMT claimed that it should be revised, but not completely taken apart. Overall, the KMT was quick to point out that the DPP's independence platform was not only impossible, but also dangerous, in light of Taiwan's relationship with China.

One of the problems with the independence issue was that it was a divisive issue. It created a rift within the DPP. The DPP split into three factions. The moderate faction, known as Meilidao, was the largest faction and was led by Hsu Hsin-liangan. Wu Nairen led a more extreme faction, the

New Tide faction. Finally, the most radical faction called the Taiwan Independence Alliance faction created the most fear for KMT members who opposed Taiwanese independence movements. The KMT feared that this faction would create instability. This was all creating problems for the DPP as its membership decreased from twenty- thousand, when it had originally formed, to fourteen thousand.

The head of the Meilidao, Hsu Hsin-liang tried to downplay these factional discrepancies and emphasized the party's conviction to democratize and to help the country progress. He did whatever he could to remain optimistic. As the campaign began in late October, the DPP continued to pledge the drafting of the new constitution, but without any mentioning of unification prospects with China.

In the end, the DPP decided to field 143 candidates, outnumbered by the KMT by 49 candidates. There were another 136 candidates who also would compete from five different political parties, illustrating the multi-member districts' encouragement of a multi-party system. To the DPP's dismay one of those five parties was a splinter party that had formed, named the China Social Democratic Party (CSDP) led by Ju Gau-jeng, an emotional and captivating speaker who created havoc while being a DPP member during National Assembly meetings. This party was radical, wearing yellow suits and red ties (Chao, Myers 1998: 232). It was unable, however, to garner much notice despite these efforts. In addition, much of the language

in its platform was esoteric and hard to understand. Its presence would be more of a hindrance as far as the democratization process was concerned.

Despite the split within the DPP, during the campaign, it was made known that there were many undecided voters and that the election would be very close. In this context, the role of vote-buying must be examined. Although this may have been one of the most democratic elections in Taiwanese history, thus far, (because it was the first time that so many seats would be openly contested) there was no shortage of resorting to corrupt measures to win votes. The KMT spent much of its campaign funds on buying votes, an issue that was more crucial in large districts with multiple candidates that required voter coordination. Red envelopes filled with money were distributed as was common in past elections. Lawyers, judges and accountants were also hired to distribute these funds to voters.

Candidates also spent on lavish entertainment, food, pens, calendars, make-up, and any other items to induce voters to vote for them. This was notably exercised by the KMT, who had the funds to accomplish this.

This election definitely had its shady elements to it. Though the campaigns laws regarding spending are very strict compared to elections in Western countries, the candidates in Taiwan actually spend much more on their campaigns. This was particularly true of the KMT. The average KMT candidate spent almost 800,000 U.S. dollars, a number that could rise to over a million dollars, if the campaign was close. It was not uncommon for

candidate to spend more than that. Several candidates spent more than 2 million NT dollars on the campaign. One had spent over 4 NT million to ensure a victory.

Was the public surprised by these astronomical amounts of money being spent on elections and the constant vote buying? No. The public was well accustomed to this type of behavior. Several attempts were made to charge candidates with vote buying, but in the end, only several were fined. This was nothing new in Taiwanese politics and the rampant vote buying did not overshadow the fact that the election held on December 21 had no reported incidents of violence or vote stuffing.

In the end the KMT did very well in the election, winning 80% of the seats in geographical districts and 78 % of the seats when at-large and overseas seats are included. The KMT outperformed the DPP in every way. It had a larger vote share, a larger seat share and attained a larger amount of seat bonuses.

The DPP lost seats and votes from the previous election. In the 1989 contest it had gained 30% of the vote, while the 1991 election left it with 24%. In the end, it only retained 18% of the seats in the geographical districts and 20% of the seats when at-large seats and overseas seats were included (Copper 1993).

Why did the DPP do so poorly? First, the DPP did not run some of its best candidates. It felt that it should save some of its best candidates for the

1992 Legislative Yuan elections. The DPP was also clearly hampered by its campaign strategy of focusing on the independence issue. The election demonstrated how controversial the independence issue was with voters. The DPP members from the New Tide Faction, which was most vociferously in favor of independence, fared the worst in the election.

The KMT also benefited from the economy. The economy was doing well and there was a strong feeling that the KMT would be able to continue this prosperity. The KMT's slogan was practical and fed on the public's perceptions that the DPP's antics would lead to instability. The KMT appealed to those who were tired of the protests and unrest.

However, the KMT mainly benefited from the electoral system and its ability to campaign with the current electoral system's rules. In each of the districts, the KMT candidates only received the bare minimum of votes needed to win a spot. This meant that KMT candidates were not capturing an excessively large share of the votes. The KMT better controlled its members and which members competed. The KMT was able to control its candidates from registering to run in the election without authorization. The DPP was far less organized and comprised of more maverick politicians who did not want to be constrained by a party.

In addition, the KMT had more nominees elected, than the DPP. It was better able to nominate the best number of candidates and also allocated the candidates votes more effectively. In the 1991 election, of KMT

candidates who were nominated, 86% were elected. For the DPP, only 45% of the candidates who ran were elected. KMT members also spread out their votes and distributed them well. The KMT candidates garnered just a few more votes than needed to win, which is the best strategy in SNTV (Rigger 1999: 160).

Given that the KMT was so much better organized, it could mobilize voters and coordinate the votes better. The KMT could not have achieved this without relying on the strong patron-client relationships that had been built over the years. It could count on voters to respond to its bribes, gifts and inducements.

In sum, the election improved the spirits of Lee and the KMT. The KMT was bolstered by its decisive victory. Another consequence was that moderates from both parties gained more control. The independence issues would have to be dropped if the DPP wanted to do well in the next election.

The problem now for the DPP was how to ram through an amendment to guarantee the direct election of the president when it had almost no legislative power to do so after the last election? What reforms would be enacted in the upcoming months without the DPP to contend with the KMT? The DPP would have to find a way to rebound from this electoral setback if it wanted to help push democratization forward.

1992 Legislative Yuan Election

There were three main issues dividing up the country before the election. First, how should the country diplomatically deal with China? Second, what would be done about constitutional revision? Finally, how should the president be chosen and when would these changes be initiated? There were many things to consider and all of these issues overlapped in some way or another. At least for the KMT, the more radical wing of the DPP was subdued by the election losses. Lee and the mainstream faction still had to contend with the non-mainstream faction who continued to pressure him.

In March of 1992, the National Assembly met to discuss the matter of constitutional revision. One of the more popular measures that passed through were the direct elections of key positions in Taiwan, including the mayors of Taiwan and Kaohsiung and the provincial governors. This was a big step in the right direction.

The bigger decision concerned the direct election of the president an issue that was supported by the public and the DPP, but still was a matter of contention. The main questions were how the president would be elected and when this election would take place. It was significant because a direct election of the president could signal moving towards independence for Taiwan. In light of the concerns regarding China, and the many KMT

politicians who were Mainlanders and completely against Taiwanese independence, this issue was more difficult to decide than it appeared.

Pressure, however intensified in the form of public demonstrations in April. This was exacerbated by the constant strain of relations with China. China had opened up its economy and had gained important trading partners. Due to China's sheer size and economic potential, its importance in the global arena could not be ignored. More countries wanted to form formalized relations with China. Because the issue of which government legitimately represented China was still unresolved, countries that had previously supported Taiwan were caught in a dilemma. Taiwan may be discarded for strategic reasons, but the consequences would have destabilizing effects on Taiwan domestically.

This was exemplified by two diplomatic setbacks. In August of 1992, one of Taiwan's most important diplomatic partners, South Korea, normalized relations with Beijing. The next setback was the GATT's decision to admit Taiwan as an observer, lowering its status. This all spurred the DPP to increase its campaign for a U.N. bid (Rigger 1999: 162). This would remain its main campaign issue in the upcoming Legislative Yuan elections.

The DPP was also upset by how poorly it did at the previous election. It was clearly punished by the electorate for choosing to push the independence issue too far. The KMT, on the other hand, had an impressive victory and entered the upcoming election, confidently.

Observers called the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections, the most significant to date (Copper 1993). It was the second non-supplemental election and the first full election of the Legislative Yuan and many changes had taken place. A new election law had made campaign costs more just to the other parties. It was also revealed in May that Taiwan's sedition law had been revised, which decreed that issues such as Taiwanese independence and communism could be discussed. In addition, in July, it was announced that the Black List of individuals who were unable to leave or enter the country had changed, leaving only five names, from a list of 282. Moreover, the Taiwan Garrison Command, one of the more controlling devices in censoring, maintaining social order and control over society, and using military courts to accomplish these tasks, was eliminated (Chao, Myers 1998; Rigger 1999). This meant that DPP politicians had ever more freedom than ever before. The political environment had changed dramatically. In addition, the stakes were very high because there were many more seats open to be contested. This meant that the DPP had the chance to come away with a majority if it did well in the election.

Because of these high stakes, tensions within both the DPP and the KMT rose to all time highs. They risked self-destructing due to how severe the internal divisions were within their parties. Members of both parties went outside party wishes and registered as candidates without their parties' approval. Other members were expelled, while others terminated their

memberships entirely and ran as independents. This was particularly telling of how much the KMT had changed. Years ago, that type of behavior was unheard of. The party did not have much control over its members and the notion of party unity was becoming more and more foreign. Though these factional divisions hindered both parties, in this case, they were more problematic for the KMT. These divisions would manifest itself continuously during the campaign and electoral process.

There was also division over the issue of publishing a report on the February 28 Incident, a bitter memory in the minds of Taiwanese of the brutality of KMT rule. This incident was not forgotten in the minds of the Taiwanese, and KMT members disputed about compensating the victims of the incident, where thousands had died or were injured. The opposition also put pressure of the KMT to make the day a national holiday. This divided the party even further.

Another area of contention was the upcoming constitutional revision. The KMT made further amendments to the Constitution, which gave the National Assembly a four-year term and more obligations. More paralysis ensued within the party over the election of the president and personal differences between Lee and Premier Hau Pei-tsun.

While the 1991 elections were relatively devoid of violence, the 1992 election campaign set the tone that the event would be a highly contentious one. The campaign was marred by charges of violence and vote buying,

possibly more rampant than usual. Before the campaign even began, more than 40 politicians requested that the police protect them. The Central Election Campaign Committee also made attempts to deter all of the cheating, but these attempts were to no avail. The election was one of the most exciting in Taiwanese history and much was at stake.

One of the less successful experiments for the KMT, the use of primaries was used again, though very reluctantly. The primaries were held in August and accentuated divisions within the KMT. Though primaries are a device to increase the public's involvement in the democratic process, the KMT was not ready to involve the public in this important decision (see chapter 5). The Central Standing Committee canceled 16 of the 29 primaries, claiming that it was only optional and that in "many cases regional offices could decide the nominations without them," (Copper, 1993: 48). Premier Hau claimed that primaries were too expensive and led to the factional manipulation of voters. Other critics pointed out that few people actually participated in the primaries. Hau, did however, honor the results of the primaries that clearly supported members within his faction. These cancellations of the primary results are telling of the lack of KMT commitment to allowing more citizen control over outcomes.

The undemocratic fashion that candidates had been chosen and the way that the procedures had been handled hurt the KMT as well. There were meetings held to revise the list of candidates and charges that Legislative

Yuan members should have been represented on the nominating committees. The KMT was not accustomed to the democratic process yet, and this was evident in the manner in which it proceeded to select members to run for office.

The DPP also emerged with bad publicity after the primaries due to charges of heavy vote buying, which demonstrated its lack of unity. The competition to be selected to run in the election became too fierce for DPP members and they resorted to tactics that they had severely criticized in the past.

The KMT had bigger problems, in the form of stubborn senior members who would not budge. Elder members from the Legislative Yuan announced that they would not retire. Nine of them even had the audacity to sign up for national constituency seats and another 32 sent a letter to Premier Hau, not President Lee, in protest of the growing Taiwanese in the legislative bodies. They argued that there should be equal number of Chinese as Taiwanese, due to the complexity of the one-China policy (Chen, M. 1996: 180-185).

The KMT tried to fight back in late October by severely punishing those who acted in defiance of party discipline. Four party members were ousted out of the party. More damaging, was the resignation of Finance Minister, Wan Chien-shien. Both scholars and the majority of the public, but not the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, supported his policies. Thus, he believed that

he had the support to go on his own and entered the election race. Wan's defection created havoc for campaign strategists in the KMT, who had already decided which candidates to run.

It's no wonder that KMT secretary-general James Soong threatened to resign after all of this. He was exhausted by the constant KMT bickering. All of these controversies took their toll on the KMT's image. The KMT was damaged by the lack of party discipline. Retrieving party unity would not be easy or possible at that juncture (Copper 1993: 51).

This demonstrates how some of the electoral laws started to take the effect that scholars predict. When Chiang Kai-shek and to a lesser degree, CCK were in power, party discipline was never damaged by the divisive electoral laws because, internally, the party was structured in a way that party discipline and unity was a given. Primaries would never have been suggested because the decisions were made in a top down process. The KMT had been a well-oiled machine that never suffered from the more divisive factionalism that plagued the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan. The factions were softer, due to voting procedures within the party that allowed for more factional overlap. More importantly, there were laws within the party that gave more power to the party leader. When the laws were relaxed, divisions that might have been hidden started to become more apparent. This was also expedited by the infusion of more Taiwanese into the party, who often had divergent views from the Mainlanders.

Nevertheless, the KMT still had the manpower and the financial means to run a good campaign. The campaign was described as an all out war. There were more candidates running than ever before. There were fourteen parties competing, most notably besides the KMT and the DPP, the Chinese Social Democratic Party and the Truth Party. There were 125 regional seats, but 348 candidates competing. The KMT ran 124 candidates, while the DPP ran 59. Competing against them were more than 120 independent candidates. This made the election especially competitive and illustrated that a number of former DPP and KMT candidates had clearly dropped out and ran on their own (Copper 1993: 55).

This was a marked change from the previous election that caused headaches for the KMT. One thing that the KMT did not change, however, was its platform. The KMT continued to be cautious on the China issue and promoted stability (although given the internal disunity of its own party, this was not as believable). The DPP, however, changed its campaign. The DPP eased up on the independence issue, learning its lesson from before. It also had better candidates to run, given that it had saved some of these candidates for this very election.

The election results revealed that these changes made an impact. The DPP did much better in this election than the previous one. Both rampant vote buying and accusations of violence, from both major parties, had marred the election campaign. However, when over 70% of the population went to

the polls, it was noted that there were fewer complaints of election irregularities than previous elections and there was no mention of violence or protests. Problems only arose in two districts, but this was negligible. The Central Election Committee was able to regulate the process more efficiently and fairly. The results were also posted much quicker than before, demonstrating the rising effectiveness of this institution, so important to democratic elections.

The KMT, overall, was very disappointed with the results. The KMT won 61.67 % of the popular vote and 73 of the 125 regional seats. It won 19 of the national constituency seats and 6 of the Overseas Chinese seats. In sum, the KMT won 96 seats and 59.6% of the total delegate seats to the new Legislative Yuan. Compared to most Western countries, the KMT made an impressive showing. However, James Soong declared that the party was very dissatisfied with the results, (Copper 1993: 57).

The KMT was upset that it was unable to capitalize on the victory in the previous election in 1991. The KMT won 71% of the votes in that election and by party standards, a drop of 10% was too high. In addition, the more vocal and liberated media charged that the party had done poorly, which was indicative of the problems within the party.

The DPP was very pleased with its results. The DPP won 36.09% of the popular vote. It won 37 of the seats as well as 13 appointed seats. Thus, it now had 50 seats in the Legislative Yuan, or 31.1% of the total seats.

Some of the other statistics of the campaign were more telling of the DPP's rising strength. The DPP candidates were outright winners in 14 of the 29 electoral districts, meaning they were the top vote-earners. The KMT had only 10 front-runners. The DPP also campaigned and allocated votes more effectively. More than 62% of the DPP candidates won seats while only 58% of the KMT candidates. In sum, the DPP did much better than it had expected and surprised both scholars and the KMT in its electoral victories, (Copper 1993: 58).

The election results demonstrated that the DPP had learned its lesson from the previous election. It also demonstrated the vulnerability of the KMT. The ruling party felt the repercussions of the opening and liberalization of the system. It was no longer the same party that it used to be. It had difficulty staying unified during the key stages of the transition. But democratization would not have occurred if the party remained a unified institution. These disagreements were part of the process of becoming an organization operating in a democracy as opposed to an organization operating in a guided authoritarian regime. It is important to note however, that the KMT was better equipped to handle this transition than any South Korean party. South Korea parties would have crumbled at this point and either merged or reappeared under a new name.

The KMT Splits: The Emergence of the New Party

It is testament to the strength and cohesiveness of the KMT that it was able to stick together amidst a slew of changes to the political system and challenges from the opposition. However, this unity would not last for long. The KMT was no stranger to divisive factions, but managed to stay together and campaign effectively during the 1991 elections. The 1992 Legislative Yuan elections demonstrated its vulnerability. During the campaign there were numerous defections and displays of ignoring party discipline. The KMT no longer had the strong grip that it once had over party member. The party itself had democratized and, in this process, had weakened. The most serious manifestation of this was when a faction composed of members of the New Alliance (a group of young Mainlanders dedicated to reforming Taiwanese political life) split off completely from the KMT, forming the New Party.

The emergence of a new party was probably inevitable given how acute the divisions within the party were becoming. The faction members of the New Alliance prided themselves for being highly moralistic, and ideological. They also were appalled by the corruption and vote buying in the KMT and argued for reform of these practices. They criticized the KMT for its relationship with big business and for the shady contributions that it received from businesses and business people. Having formed in August of 1989, the New Alliance spent the next four years attacking Lee on the Taiwanese

Independence issue and his willingness to let the country drift towards accepting that possibility.

Their most charismatic leader, Chao Shao-kang, had been elected to both Taiwan city council three times and also to the Legislative Yuan, but he had been upset by the unfair treatment of other New Alliance members by the KMT. The KMT had refused to grant New Alliance members high positions within the party, and thus, these members were angered by Lee's abuse of power. They also had many other reasons to splinter off and form their own party.

First, (as mentioned) they were fed up with the party chairman's abuse of power. Second, they believed that the methods of selecting the party chairman needed to be changed. They argued that the KMT members and not the Central Committee should elect the party chairman. In essence, they argued for more democratic methods of running the party. Third, they wanted the party and the political system to be more democratic in other ways as well. They believed that the political system needed to be reformed. They wanted more public involvement in the political process so that elections better determined the people's will. This indicated the transformation of political attitudes among many of R.O.C. elite. Now there was a young group of politicians that were so committed to political reform that they were willing to break off from a successful party to achieve their goals.

The reasons were not entirely ideological, however. This would not have happened if they didn't think that they had a willing audience to vote them into office. The public was not satisfied with any of the choices available to them at the time, according to an opinion poll. The results taken by a Taiwan Gallup poll of island wide political preferences indicated that the dissatisfaction with both the DPP and the KMT was high enough that if a new party were to form, it could have a chance to win a large number of votes in the upcoming election (Chao, Myers 1998).

Given the electoral laws that governed the elections, smaller parties had a chance to win seats. In the past, this wasn't the case, because there were laws that prohibited political parties from forming. Once those laws were amended, they were conducive to the formation of new political parties. The green light of support from at least thirty percent of those polled (primarily those who were well educated, cosmopolitan, under the age of forty and adamantly against any type of Taiwanese independent platform) signaled that New Alliance members could make their mark in the next election (Chao, Myers 1998).

The formation of the New Party demonstrated what a long way Taiwanese politics had come. A viable new party had formed to represent different cleavages and preferences in society. This may not have been possible under a different type of electoral system, showing that the predictions that scholars have made regarding the effects of SNTV (namely

that a multi-party system would form) are finally materializing at this stage in Taiwan's democratic progress. The political system was starting to look more like a democratic Japan than a one-party authoritarian state such as Singapore.

Bargaining over the Presidential Election

Lee was clearly more in favor of democratizing the regime than many of the conservative members in his party. He also appeared to be more ambiguous and cautious regarding the controversial independence issue. These two issues caused serious divisions among the party members. The factions that developed (as mentioned before) were called the mainstream faction and the non-mainstream faction. The mainstream faction comprised of those who were supportive of Lee. This faction wanted to preserve the executive dominance and the legislatures' inability to counterbalance the executive. It wanted to increase the presidential electoral mandate via some form of direct presidential election.

The non-mainstream faction demanded a parliamentary system. It argued that the 1947 Constitution was not a presidential system but was a responsible cabinet system. The non-mainstream faction was motivated by Lee's desire to consolidate de facto power and it argued that it needed some measure of counterbalancing Lee who it viewed to be a pro-independence advocate.

The DPP advocated a parliamentary system as well but then changed its minds in support of the direct election of the president. As soon as it saw that the KMT was split on the matter, it knew that it would have a much better chance to attain more power in a presidential system, with the direct election of the president. Why was this the case? The DPP knew that it would have a lower chance of achieving governance through a parliamentary system. In addition, the popularly elected president would be the clear choice of the people and with the KMT split, the DPP believed that it had a better chance in a head to head contest. It also felt that the popularly elected president issue could be used as a weapon to exploit the weaknesses of the KMT and create a divisive cleavage. The weaker the KMT was the better chance the DPP had of winning the election.

In addition, though the DPP was also divided into two factions stemming from the more volatile days when tang-wai members had been jailed, the DPP was in agreement on this issue. The Formosa faction, who became the more moderate faction, wanted to advocate the direct election of the president because it would weaken KMT unity. The more progressive New Tide faction believed that the direct election of the president would help it meet its goals of one day, proclaiming Taiwan as an independent state. Thus, this issue was not damaging to the DPP. Finally, the DPP believed that this issue would help internationalize politics in Taiwan and gain the recognition of the United States, who had been a long time ally of the DPP.

Despite the inherent risks in employing a direct presidential election, the mainstream faction believed that it could benefit from this for several reasons. Lee hoped that it could serve as a powerful device to eliminate hard-liners from the non-mainstream faction. He also believed that the employment of a direct election of the president was a symbol of democracy and could help the country attract sympathy from Western nations (Chen, Huang 1999: 5-10).

In April of 1990, Lee made an inter-party pact with the DPP. Later on he formed the Consulting Group for Constitutional Issues (CGCI). This one institution was to function in two stages with one of the primary tasks to discuss the reform of the system of electing the president. During this time, both indirect and direct election of the president was discussed as well as an electoral college. Early on in 1992, the KMT had to choose which method it would use. Both Lee's faction and the DPP still supported the direct election method but were held back by the conservative mainstream faction and its attempts to thwart their efforts. Nevertheless, Lee and the DPP were advantaged by the fact that the direct election appealed to the entire public, and this general will would make it hard for non-mainstream faction members to openly oppose the direct election of the president (Chen, Huang 1999).

A compromise was made between Lee and Premier Hau in the KMT on March 11, 1992. It was decided that there would be a semi-presidential system. There would not be any reduction of the powers of the president of

the Executive Yuan to co-sign laws. There would be a direct election of the president with one round using plurality rule. The tenure of the president would last four years, not six. Finally, the tenure of the legislatures would be increased from three years to four. The exact method of how the president was to be elected would be decided in the third stage of the reform effort (Chen, Huang 1999).

Why specifically would Lee want to implement the direct election of the president? What led to such a democratic plea for reform on his part? He wanted to decentralize the authoritarian power base and institutionalize his own legacy. He also thought that he had a good chance of winning and therefore, could rid himself of being dependent on the non-mainstream faction for support. He could concentrate more on popular support that would be easier to gain since he was a popular and charismatic leader. He knew that most of the power holders of the non-mainstream faction did not have a popular power base for their power and were not likely to win the election. The mainstream faction had a power base at all levels and was not afraid of having to battle things out in an electoral contest. In addition, the DPP's initiative for a popularly elected president opened up the chance for a cross-country party coalition, building the mainstream faction to gain a majority outside its party.

The 1996 Presidential Election

Lee and the opposition got their wish and in 1996, for the first time in history, the Taiwanese would have the chance to directly elect the president. This was monumental in Taiwanese history and a sign of Taiwan's development in the democratization process. This was in no way a safe venture, however. Though Taiwan's democratic allies lauded the direct election of the president as a significant step in the democratization process, the Chinese were not pleased with the implications of possibly electing a Taiwanese president. Lee braved the storm that divided the party in order to ensure that a popularly elected president became a reality.

The prospect of a direct presidential election showed that the R.O.C. would not back down on the democratization process, despite what it might implicate in its relations with China. China responded to this development with threatening overtures that culminated in its military exercises on the Taiwan Straits. This was a risky venture, but the fact that Lee and the R.O.C. held the direct presidential elections in the face of this controversy demonstrated their commitment to democratic progress (Chao, Myers 1998: 280).

The KMT nominated Lee to run against Professor Peng Ming-min of the DPP. The other two candidates were Lin Yang-kang of the New Party and Chen Li-an, an independent. This election was significant because the candidates attempted to stake out clear and distinct positions during the

debate, (although, in the end, many of them appeared to be saying the same things). For the first time, the Central Election Commission held nationally televised debates between competing presidential candidates. The candidates even answered questions from the audience.

In the televised debate, Lien of the New Party spoke first and emphasized how he would deal more effectively with China. He argued that current problems with the P.R.C. were due to Lee's inability to work with it and developed alone. He heavily criticized Lee and especially attacked his character. Pen of the DPP spoke next and tried to appeal to the Taiwanese, arguing that he was the only one who truly understood the reality. Like Lien, he also spoke of "purifying" Taiwanese politics, but unlike the New Party, advocated that Taiwan, one day become an independent nation. President Lee was attacked once again for being corrupt and for not really loving Taiwan (Chao, Myers 1998: 286).

Lee concentrated on his strengths, one of them being the ability to face criticism. He was ambivalent about the highly contentious Taiwanese independence issue and P.R.C./R.O.C. relations but emphasized establishing "cooperative links". Unlike the other candidates, Lee did not do as much mudslinging, which might have worked in his favor. He merely concentrated on his abilities as a leader and on his commitment to democratizing Taiwan.

The results of the election were a triumph for the KMT and also a milestone in R.O.C. history. Lee commanded 54% of the votes while Pen

came away with 21.3% of the votes. The other candidates Lin and Chen came away with 14.9% and 9.98% of the votes, respectively (Copper 1998).

How did Lee win this election? There are several reasons why he was able to come away with the win. Though China's threatening overtures created an environment of more tension and fear of the repercussions of Taiwan's defiance, China's personal attacks against Lee backfired. Instead, the attacks actually encouraged the Taiwanese people to rally behind him. Lee capitalized on his appeal to the Taiwanese and the controversy by speaking in Taiwanese instead of Mandarin and promoting himself as a defender of the Taiwanese and Taiwanese interests'. Suddenly the party had transformed itself into the party that put Taiwan first, despite all of the attacks to his character during the campaign.

Second, because of these changes in the KMT, it was harder to distinguish between the KMT and the DPP. On the many issues, Lee moved closer to positions espoused by DPP members and adopted many of the more popular DPP measures. He adopted the policy of striving for U.N. membership, a policy that was widely supported by the public and had been initiated by the DPP. He also promoted the idea of a higher international role for Taiwan, tapping into his Taiwanese roots, or at least, presenting this to the public, during the campaign. (It must be noted that he did not advocate Taiwanese independence at any time during the campaign and was somewhat ambiguous about the possibility of eventually unifying with China).

Third, the DPP was setback by its ambitions to gain a larger majority in the Legislative Yuan. This attempt to cooperate with the New Party, the splinter party from the KMT backfired. Attempting to align with a political party that appeared to be so different from its views and values indicated that the DPP was more committed to winning than policy. It was a strategic mistake.

Fourth, Lee and the KMT were naturally advantaged by the incumbency effect that gave them administrative control and access to large financial resources. It made it possible for the KMT to spend much more on advertising and also gave it more access to television. The KMT filled Taipei with its advertisements, billboards and posters and filled the airwaves with its commercials. Lee benefited not only from name recognition but his ability to take advantage of his past record as a selling point.

2000 Presidential Elections in Taiwan

Taiwan took great strides towards democratization during the last ten years. President Lee Teng Hui had now been in power for twelve years. Though corruption and vote buying characterized his tenure, typical of KMT regimes of the past, it also made important steps towards democratization. Given that he was of Taiwanese origin, his tenure reflected the major accomplishments that the Taiwanese had made since the KMT immigrated to

Taiwan over fifty years ago. Lee recruited even more native Taiwanese into the party and still kept the KMT competitive after the death of CCK.

Though the KMT remained the dominant party, it did not dominate as it had done in the past. Competition between actual political parties was permitted and elections were more competitive than before. Though Lee remained at the helm of the KMT both as the President of the R.O.C. and as the president of the party, the KMT was no longer as tightly organized and well centralized as it had been in the past.

The major issue that divided the KMT was of course, China. The manner in that Taiwan related and interacted with China was a major issue that had far reaching consequences. Many outspoken Taiwanese wanted to be independent of China and were ready to cut ties with the giant country looming over its every move. China, however, was in no way content to allow Taiwan to become its own independent nation. It viewed these types of sentiments with great hostility. It feared that allowing Taiwan to become its own independent country would set forth a spiral of other independence movements that represented large land masses in its country. China is not a homogenous nation with only one language and one ethnic group. There are officially 55 ethnic groups, but that is a conservative estimate. Many of these ethnic groups are by no means happy with the Chinese government and even Deng Xiaoping's conciliatory methods of dealing with them during his tenure were met with resistance. Simply put, letting go of Taiwan could have a

snowball effect that would result in a multitude of other ethnic groups declaring their own sovereignty.

Thus, more so than all of wealth that Taiwan had acquired and its technological know-how and export sector, Taiwan represented something for China that was too significant to give up. China was furious with any movement that tried to declare Taiwanese independence. This concern was apparent when Lee was elected for the first time in 1996. China responded by exercising its military off the Taiwanese straits. This was a clear warning that China was not going to permit Taiwan to pursue its own interests unattended to.

Lee was more than aware of this and what it meant for the overall stability of the nation and how it could affect its economic growth. He was cautious and non-confrontational with his every move. His words were always guarded and he avoided making waves. That is not to say that he did nothing. As described before, the decision to hold the direct presidential election was not well received as well as his decision to visit the U.S. Lee and the KMT, however, were more cautious than anyone in the DPP.

Besides its disgust with corruption and Lee's close ties to big business, the China issue was one of the major issues of contention for the New Party, the conservative faction that split from the KMT. This faction was comprised of primarily native Chinese who were more in favor of uniting with China and disliked any gesture made by Lee to do the opposite. As Lee's tenure wore

on, more became suspicious of Lee and his true agenda regarding the China issue.

As the presidential election neared in March of 2000, Lee had the important position of picking who would be his successor. The most obvious choice was the more popular and charismatic, James Soong, who was of Chinese decent. He had been Lee's right hand man, a close personal friend and had helped Lee consolidate power early on. Though he had been a close friend of Lee's, their union soured over personal disagreements. Instead of choosing Soong, Lee chose a candidate who, in the eyes the KMT, would have no chance of winning.

Lien Chan, in the words of a reporter from Taiwan, made Al Gore seem like the most exciting man in the world. He was simply not charismatic or appealing to the public. Soong, who was clearly enraged by this snub, chose to break from the party and run on his own. For the DPP, this was viewed as an excellent opportunity. The DPP ran Chen Shui-bian, a popular candidate who had been the mayor of Taipei. The KMT had split, and allowed an opening for the opposition to seize upon.

Chen won with only 39% of the votes, hardly a majority. Soong picked up 36% of the votes, despite running as an independent, demonstrating his popular appeal. Lien only picked up 23% of the votes. Lien's weakness clearly played to Chen's advantage (New York Times March 20, 2000).

Normally, it was the opposition that experienced self-destruction. But this time the ruling party was falling apart all by itself. It was argued that Lee orchestrated his own party's defeat. The KMT clearly could have won, if Soong had run, but ruined its chances. Why would Lee do this?

Jerry Ho claimed that "his strategy was to pull down Lien's vote so Chen would win the election," (New York Times, March 20, 2000). Why would he want Chen to win? Chen was widely distrusted by the KMT. He was much more outspoken about pursuing an independent Taiwan and his win was not greeted well by China. Lee was accused of secretly wanting Taiwan to be independent. It was argued that he was willing to make that happen even if it meant ruining the chances of his own party.

Though Taiwan, after this election, was showing its determination to stand up to China, it did not necessarily mean that the leaders behaved democratically to achieve these goals. Lee, by no means handled affairs in a democratic manner, concerning what best interested the party. Internally, as head of the party, he made decisions without the consent of other party members. If the party was more democratic, it would have chosen the candidate by a primary and Soong would have won by a landslide (see chapter 5). It was Lee's own failure to democratize the method of candidate selection that left the party divided and in the shambles.

Lee had alienated many Chinese. He had to be protected to go out in the streets to ward off protesters who were angered by his selfish decision.

His popularity had also been declining for his overt measure to do whatever was needed to win elections, resorting to ties with organized crime and vote buying. Thus, after the election results, Taiwan witnessed some of the worst street clashes in decades. Lee agreed to step down as the party chairman, in September, which was a year earlier than planned.

What are the implications for Taiwan? Taiwan is in a very thorny situation concerning its relationship with China. China and U.S. relations have not improved since the election of U.S. President Bush. In the past, China has made threatening overtures towards Taiwan and resents Bush's pro-Taiwan stance.

In addition, investor confidence has been shaken somewhat and the economy hit a downturn more recently as a result of people's anxiety over Chen's conflict with China. It will be important for Chen to not ruffle too many feathers, to maintain both stability and high levels of popularity domestically. Overall, the public values stability over independence and does not want to pursue an independent Taiwan at the present time.

The results of the election indicate that Taiwan's party politics have not democratized completely. Though there have been some attempts to adopt primaries, the leaders have not been ready to allow that much uncertainty to fill the decision making process. Lee's decision to not to listen to other members of the party and the public, by snubbing Soong, is a reflection of the

inability of the leaders to adhere to democratic methods of selecting representatives.

Though not all democratic countries utilize primaries, they can serve as an important tool for democratizing parties that abuse their power. By allowing primaries, individuals within the party no longer have to adhere to the positions of those in power within the party, and are able to follow their own heart, or the wishes of their constituents. By doing so, it is possible that the beliefs of representatives who are truly committed to democracy can be implemented.

The party can no longer dictate who gets to run. In addition, this may ease the practice of bribing those in power for a chance to run in the election. In the case of Taiwan, primaries also could improve the relationship between the voter and the representative. In Taiwan, the parties are too far removed from the voter as far as political issues are concerned. It is necessary for the party to lose some of its leverage on the individual politicians within the party so that the process can become truly democratic.

The case of Soong being passed over by President Lee demonstrates why Taiwan needs primaries. Since the main party continues to operate in undemocratic ways, failing to implement more democratic procedures within the party will have negative repercussions.

Despite the failure to adhere to primaries in the most recent election, Taiwan's democratization process is ongoing and has not reached a

standstill. By allowing an opposition leader to be in power, despite all of the controversy, the KMT has demonstrated its commitment to democracy.

Analytical Summary

In the previous chapters, I described the “trickle-down” process (as contrasted to later chapter’s depiction of South Korea’s “bubble-up” process) of Taiwan’s democratization. I have shown that democratization in Taiwan is a result of a combination of internal and external factors.

The most crucial internal factor and the chief motivating force, of this trickle down process of democratization is the regime’s legitimacy crisis. As defined by Pye, a legitimacy crisis refers to a “breakdown in the constitutional structure and performance of government that arises out of differences over the proper nature of authority for the system,” (Pye 1971: 136). Of Pye’s four sources of legitimacy crisis- conflicting or inadequate basis for authority, excessive and un-institutionalized competition, unacceptable historical interpretation and faulty promises, and dysfunctional socialization processes, the KMT in Taiwan suffered primarily from inadequate authority. The KMT then used incremental democratization to overcome its legitimacy deficit.

My study shows that a legitimacy crisis and hence, its remedy of democratization, is a moving condition. As Taiwan’s successful economic development progressed, the government needed to change the political system more and more in the direction of democracy.

Moreover, two forces (one internal and the other, external) pushed the KMT along the road to democracy. The internal force is the opposition, which grew stronger as Taiwan changed economically, socially and culturally. The

external force is the influence that the U.S. exerted on both the government and opposition in Taiwan. The U.S. played three roles for Taiwan's democratization: by being a role model, by restraining the authoritarian tendency of the KMT, and finally, by precipitating an acute legitimacy crisis in 1972, when Nixon went to Communist China to start the process of normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

My study demonstrates clearly the crucial role that elections and the electoral system play in Taiwan's democratization. The KMT had originally used local elections as a strategy of deterring democracy by partial incorporation (that is to say: accepting some democratic measures to stop full democratization). But the KMT, perhaps unwittingly, had institutionalized the elections. Having been such, local elections in Taiwan became a bridge between authoritarianism and democracy. Furthermore, institutionalized elections served as a public sphere for the opposition to enter into the local and national political processes.

The previous chapters on Taiwan thus demonstrate the following mechanism of the trickle-down theory of democratization: legitimacy crisis→ partial democratization→institutionalized elections→ rise of the opposition and external pressures from the U.S.→ full democratization.

In subsequent chapters, I shall describe the contrasting "bubble-up" process of South Korea's democratization. The variables, however, are the same as Taiwan - legitimacy crisis, democratization as a way to obtain regime

legitimacy, election as a bridge to democracy, external pressures from the U.S., and full democracy.

University of California

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**The Democratization of South Korea and Taiwan:
Elections, Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform**

**A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy**

in Political Science

by

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Part II.

Part III.

Political Context: South Korea's Path to Democracy

The Politics of Electoral Manipulation in South Korea

Chapter 8

Participation Without Democracy

Part I. focused on the effects of the Japanese colonial period. In particular, it was argued that Korea's experience with colonization was much harsher than Taiwan's, which had a lasting impact, stifling Korea's political development. Both countries remained colonies of Japan during World War II. This, however, would all change when the Japanese were forced to not only surrender, but also cede these territories. The previous section (in chapter 2) described what happened to Taiwan in the aftermath of World War II and its struggle to gain legitimacy, order and stability during troubled times. This chapter seeks to explain Korea's struggle to do the same.

After the Japanese surrendered on August 15, 1945, the United States and the former Soviet Union quickly fought to assert themselves in Korea. In the North, the U.S.S.R. systematically created a satellite regime, indoctrinating the Koreans with Communist ideals. This was accomplished in a fairly rapid and successful manner. The U.S. had a more difficult time getting the South to develop into what it envisioned. Nevertheless, the task was probably much harder, given the history of Japanese rule. Without the

democratic infrastructure in place, coaxing a democracy into life was not easy.

From the start, this process was complicated by the lack of reliable personnel available. General McArthur commanded U.S. officials from Tokyo but gave little support. There was also very little help from the state department. In addition, the U.S., much to the annoyance of the Koreans, continued to make use of Japanese who had been retained in the previous posts until 1945. Soon after, General John R Hodge was ordered to maintain order, establish an effective democratic government, rebuild a sound economy and train Koreans to govern themselves as a free and independent nation, (Pak, C. 1980: 15). Hodge was forced to rely on English speaking Koreans to carry out this plan and to implement his misguided decisions.

The U.S. had not acquired the necessary knowledge on Korea. Yet the U.S. carried out reforms aimed at not only changing the institutions but also changing the political culture, attitudes and behavior. This, however, created a permanent resentment of foreign intrusion and complicated the situation even more.

There was also a lack of coordination between the military government in South Korea and the policy planners in the U.S. This led to constant confusion and inconsistency. The result was a series of contradictory actions that were simply not working as the U.S. had hoped. The main problem was that the U.S. was not so much concerned with putting in the time and the

patience to help Korea foster a democratic government and society but with creating a bulwark against communism.

The negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. aimed at unifying Korea failed due to ideological differences and misperceptions. Neither party could agree on how to deal with Korea and the trusteeship that had been put in place. The U.S. then took the problem of how to handle the South to the U.N., which decreed that elections would be held in 1948. Syngman Rhee, an American educated Korean, was elected, giving some hopes for the U.S. that he could push forth democratic reforms. The Rhee government, however, faced many insurmountable problems, such as economic hardships, leftist inspired riots and continual pressures from the North. Also problematic was the fact that the South had an inadequate foundation with which to stimulate economic growth. All of the minerals and industries were located in the North. In addition, from a military standpoint, the North was also much stronger and was becoming more and more threatening.

Harry Truman, the President of the U.S. at the time, deemed Korea to be indefensible and likely to collapse (Keefer 1991). Secretary of State Dean Acheson decided to slowly withdraw troops and had very little faith in South Korea nor Rhee, who was disliked for his primary concerns of building a political following in the midst of a crisis. In January of 1950, the House of Representatives barely passed an economic aid package for the South. Other U.S. politicians indicated that South Korea as well as Taiwan and

Indochina lay outside the U.S.'s defense perimeter in the Pacific. At the time, U.S. policy wanted to rely on the U.N. if it faced external aggression in that area. The U.S. would soon be changing its tune however.

When the U.S. withdrew its troops in 1948, it signaled the South's vulnerability to the North. The North decided, under Kim Il Sung, to invade the South in June of 1950. Kim also had convinced Stalin of this venture and had his support. At this point, the North, with Stalin's help, had substantially strengthened its army. Given the perceived threat that Stalin wanted to spread his ideology and gain more Soviet power and influence, the U.S. believed it would have to play a larger role in South Korea. An international war in Korea raged on for three years, ravaging the country and leaving it more damaged than before.

The effects of the three years of war were devastating. There were enormous casualties, destruction of property and loss of production. The South, ironically, became extremely dependent on the U.S., a foreign force, for economic and military aid. The relationship between the South and the North was still very hostile with frequent armed incidents creating constant tension and fear.

The North was finally easing up a little by mid 1953. In addition, by 1953, Stalin had died, which loosened the Soviet's involvement in North Korea. Kim Il Sung concentrated more on securing commitments from the Chinese as well as the Soviets and played them off each other as much as he

could. Though security threats had eased to some extent, South Korean leaders would never let the people believe that they had nothing to fear.

Thus, both South Korea and Taiwan inherited a divided nationhood, which had several important consequences (Helgesen 1998). This made both regimes highly susceptible to Communist invasion. Both the partition of the Korean peninsula and the division of the Taiwan Strait were a result of the Cold War. They both faced constant military threats from their communist rivals and their political systems were heavily dependent on security commitments from the U.S. The U.S. base in South Korea, and the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty demonstrated this U.S. involvement. This involvement was important because stability of the regimes' depended on the ability of the U.S., and South Korea and Taiwan to delay or prevent hostile reunification ambitions.

In this tense situation, fear and uncertainty paralyzed both regimes. This caused problems for democratic development because concerns for security created apprehension regarding the repercussions of democratization. There was a constant concern regarding the effects of any process that could potentially destabilize the regimes'. Another consequence of this divided nation status was the inheritance of a military and security apparatus that would dominate civilian affairs (Helgesen 1998).

In addition, this divided legacy weakened the legitimacy of the regimes because of the temporary nature of their territorial structures. The legacy also

created an indeterminacy of the state structure and a constant sense of internal conflict over national identity. Thus, the status of sovereignty for both regimes was never fully institutionalized in international society. This created an urgent sense among the leaders of both regimes to establish legitimacy (Helgesen 1998).

In both cases, the strategic decisions of the U.S. had effects on their domestic policies, albeit, sometimes inadvertently. Both competed for diplomatic recognition with their neighbors from the North and fought for exclusive representation in international organizations and institutions. In addition, both would be affected by the contexts of their regimes' initial experiments with democracy.

Chapter 9

Impediments to Democracy: South Korean Leadership

In South Korea, as mentioned before, the post-colonial period was marred by a devastating civil war, followed by a highly chaotic political atmosphere. Democracy and democratic institutions were a foreign import that had difficulty taking hold. The overall political culture of the country was not democratic and had very little experience with democracy. Furthermore, the leaders that attained power were in no way committed to democratic ideals for their own sake. The implementation of democratic institutions was done so that the leaders could appease the various forces that applied any sort of pressure on them.

These leaders were operating in a highly uncertain environment and were unaccustomed to solving disagreements by discussing and offering different ideas. Though there was a consensus among the leaders that appearing democratic was in their interest, behaving democratic was not. They felt that democracy would bring the country too much uncertainty and instability. In particular, it made the leaders nervous that they would not be able to hold onto power. The answer for the Korean leaders during the first forty years with pseudo- democracy was to hold elections, but manipulate the electoral laws to ensure their survival.

Thus, because the leaders had so much power in South Korea, the role of the leadership and their manipulation of the electoral laws will be examined in depth, in this chapter. The leadership was a huge factor in delaying the transition to democracy. It would not be until the leaders were under severe pressure to democratize and faced with alternatives that were more threatening and uncertain to them (to be described in chapters 13-14), that they made any concessions at all.

Rhee's Reign: Authoritarian Rule and Corruption (1948-1960)

When Syngman Rhee came to power, the notion that he would bring Western-style democracy to South Korea was quickly dismissed. Rhee was initially supported by the conservative forces in the U.S (Oh 1999). At the time that he returned to Korea, an umbrella organization called the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence was soon established. The core group of this association was the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) whose support came from property and landowners, former bureaucrats and various non-leftist politicians. Party politics, at this point was very flexible. The country adopted a universal franchise system and held an election in 1948 and another one in 1950. In both elections almost half of the National Assembly members lacked any sort of political party affiliation. Rhee, in particular, was very distrustful of political parties and hesitated to commit to one himself.

Initially, the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) supported his presidency, but that support would be short-lived. Rhee was only concerned with consolidating his own power in whatever manner he could. He refused to grant any power to other sources, and sought to undermine those who obstructed this process.

The KDP responded by forming alliances with other political forces, becoming Rhee's main source of opposition. Thus, the 1950 election was the first time that these anti-Rhee political forces developed. Two months prior they unsuccessfully attempted to pass a constitutional amendment that would thwart Rhee's power with the adoption of a cabinet style of government.

Nevertheless, Rhee's opposition was able to do little to undermine his growing power. Why was this so? First, the election was held in an atmosphere of tremendous fear and chaos, as it was rumored that the North would invade. Thus, the electorate was forced to make voting decisions after only two years of experience with the democratic process. Rhee also helped his supporters in election campaigns, gave speeches and urged voters not to support the candidates who stood for the adoption of a cabinet system, which he deemed to be too unstable (Pak, C. 1980: 177).

Of the 2,235 candidates, the KDP only put up 155 candidates while there were more than 1,400 Independent candidates. The KDP fell from 68 seats to 24 while Independents, won 126 seats. Rhee, however, managed to win 57 seats and despite the fact that he was outnumbered by other sources,

the Independents were too fragmented to challenge him (Pak, C. 1980). Voters were early on expressing a preference for non-partisan politics and that made it more difficult for the less fragmented KDP to gain enough public approval.

Nevertheless, Rhee knew that he needed to create an organization that could help him sustain his power, despite his suspicion of political parties. He formed the Liberal Party (LP) in 1952. The LP had no ideology whatsoever, with the exception of prolonging Rhee's authority (Bedeski 1994: 63). He used this organization to help him consolidate his power and curtail the growing challenge of the National Assembly. It also helped him make constitutional amendments to accomplish his goals.

During the height of the Civil War, amidst tremendous confusion and chaos, he used the LP to help him guarantee the direct popular election of the president in 1952, instead of having to rely on the support of the National Assembly. Though this would appear to be a move towards democratization, the maneuver was clearly aimed at transferring his accountability from a group of politicians who were well informed of his malfeasance to an uninformed and easily manipulated public, who thought that Rhee was probably doing a great job. Originally, the proposal to adopt a direct method of electing the president was rejected by the National Assembly by a vote of 143 to 19. He wouldn't give up so easily, though. He declared martial law, mobilized thugs to intimidate opponents and staged spontaneous popular

demonstrations that demanded that the National Assembly be dissolved. He resubmitted this proposal with minor changes and rammed through a constitutional amendment by surrounding the National Assembly with military police.

After doing so, he arrested opposition leaders in the Assembly for alleged ties to the Communists. This would be important to achieving his next goal of lifting the ban on the third term of office for himself. Though the National Assembly was increasingly growing more hostile, it was unable to stop him. For the most part, he had popular support of a public that "was struggling for daily survival and knew nothing about Rhee's authoritarian behavior," (Oh 1999: 39). By November of 1954, he had repealed the constitutional prohibition against a third year term.

At this point several other changes had been made to the electoral laws. There was an elimination of the restrictions on former collaborators of the Japanese. There was a replacement of the voter registration system with one where an official compilation of eligible voters' rosters was used. This created a complete roster of eligible voter, which was eased by a compulsory general registration system. This was all done to counter communist infiltration from the North, but it eliminated an important block to voting registration. It also made Rhee's Liberal Party more aware of whom to connect with. Finally, there were severe restrictions on campaigning, which Rhee completely ignored, but other parties were forced to abide by.

By 1954, there were still an enormous amount of Independents running that worked to the advantage of Rhee, for the time being. At this point, to strengthen his chances, he began to use the LP to help distribute campaign funds and made the party play a greater role in elections. He also organized the party better by implementing party nomination procedures. The LP made these nominations based on the candidate's political strength in his district, which depended on networks, connections and personal charisma.

Major parties were also playing a larger role by officially endorsing candidates and were starting to involve themselves in actual political issues besides the task of doing whatever possible to undermine Rhee. Despite these efforts, party identification was never established. Though the parties were trying to appear as though their party was based on a platform with real issues, personal ties still overshadowed connections to any institution. Rhee's party, on the other hand, had no ideology and he only endorsed Liberal Party candidates who pledged their support to him.

Nevertheless, despite this lack of ideology, Rhee's Liberal Party benefited from the incumbency effect. Liberal candidates were able to offer administrative inducements, such as awarding contracts to gain support from key groups. There was also a lopsided amount of electoral campaign funds available to Liberal candidates. The Democratic Party was not well organized, ravaged by factional conflicts and seriously lacking in funds. The

Liberal Party needed to do whatever it could to improve its chances because its popularity wasn't exactly growing.

More changes occurred in 1957. Rhee and the LP were understandably nervous about their political standing. To combat this, they adopted two measures (Oh 1999). First, Rhee created an organization comprised of a people's team that were made to work in cooperation with the LP and designed to ensure a tight control of voters in elections. Second, Rhee revised the election law again. He decreed that there would be more government management of the election, which essentially meant that Rhee would use his military and police forces to ensure that elections went as he wanted them to. He also instituted an increase in the number of sponsoring votes that were required for candidacy. He raised the penalty for violators of the election law and expanded the category of violation. This meant that the opposition would have a much harder time meeting the legal requirements for registration and would make it easier to arrest campaign workers on the charge of election law violations, to the dismay of the opposition (Pak, C. 1980: 121).

Naturally, a coalition of anti-Rhee groups was upset by these maneuvers. The coalition charged Rhee with blocking candidate registration, which made it difficult for the opposition to run its candidates. It also claimed that the election committees were clearly biased and that these election committees allowed the ballots to be counted improperly. There were many

incidents where the candidates attempted to register to run for office and were told by the Election Committee that some of the necessary 100 eligible voters' signatures were cancelled which disqualified them. Street thugs were also used to prevent candidates from making the deadlines to register. The opposition tried to counteract this, by proposing its own election laws and holding rallies and speeches. Rhee thwarted these efforts as the public speeches were violently disrupted by LP thugs (Pak, C. 1980: 122).

By October 15, 1957 both groups met to settle the various disputes with one another. They argued about the size of the electoral districts, the bond deposit for candidates, the government management of elections, penalties for election law offenses, party nominated inspectors and the expansion of election inspectors' powers. By December 31, of 1957 a controversial compromise election law was presented (Pak, C. 1980). Most members of the DP, who attempted an unsuccessful filibuster tactic, resisted this election law fervently but there was a small faction that supported the bill.

On January 1 of 1958 the election law included the following changes (Pak, C. 1980). First, there was a change in the electoral districts, creating 233 districts based on population size for the House of Representatives and medium districts for the House of Councilors. Second, each election committee had to be composed of representatives of government and opposition party members in equal proportions. Third, candidates must deposit half a million won (about 1,250\$) each and candidates who failed to

receive more than one-sixth of the vote would have to forfeit their deposits. Fourth, elections were to be managed by the government to control political campaigns and election expenses. Fifth, the power of election inspectors was increased, to the dismay of the opposition. Sixth, efficiency in election litigation was to be improved. Finally, (and though not an electoral law, just as harmful) there were stricter provisions regarding the press.

What was the result of these changes as far as the opposition was concerned? It did little to improve its chances, since Rhee was given the power to arrest those who were threatening to him and would resort to electoral irregularities if he needed to. More damaging to the process of party institutionalization was the fact that the adoption of the compromise election law furthered factional disharmony within the DP and restored factional conflicts (Pak, C. 1980: 122-124).

The Fourth National Assembly Election held on May 2, 1958 was held under the new Election Law. At this point parties were nominating their candidates and both the Democrats and the Liberals were trying to appear as though they were launching program oriented campaigns rather than campaigns heavily based on personalism. The Democratic Party advocated South and North Korean unification and a cabinet style system. The Liberal Party appealed to farmers and fisherman, promising to abolish heavy debt repayments one year after the election, and trying to curb levels of corruption,

(which was ironic). This set the seeds of the government party gaining most of its support from non-urban areas.

For the 1958 election, the adoption of a cash deposit system curbed minor and frivolous candidates from running. If candidates received less than a certain percentage of the votes, their cash deposit would be forfeited. This created a little more stability, with 841 candidates running instead of the 2,235 and 1,207 candidates that ran in the Second and Third National Assembly elections, respectively (Pak, C. 1980). It also worked to the benefit of the opposition. In the 1958 election, minor parties and independents joined the Democratic Party (which had been formed as a response to Rhee's growing power and represented those politicians who had been in the KDP). This helped the DP significantly challenge the LP. This should have marked the beginning of a two-party system, but ruthless tactics by the LP forced many opposition members to withdraw before the election. The LP also ordered the Korean Industrial Bank to issue notes of guarantee to various commercial banks for loans to twelve major firms, which made huge contributions to the Liberal Party (Pak, C. 1980: 186).

Nevertheless, the DP defeated the LP in the vice presidential race and captured 79 seats in the 1958 National Assembly Election. Though the LP still had 126 seats, this was a definite improvement from the 1954 elections where the LP had two-thirds of the seats while the DP only had 15. This signaled to Rhee, that his power would not be secured for long and that he no

longer had complete popular support. His days in power would be numbered if he didn't take action.

Rhee was obviously unhappy with the election results, despite all of his efforts to consolidate his power. In the 1960 presidential election, he knew that he needed to take things up a notch to ensure his victory. First, he decided to call the election in March instead of May to allow the rural people, his main source of support, to vote ahead of the busy farming season and also to deny the Democrats any time to prepare. He also decided to rig the election in a way that was so obvious that he actually stipulated the exact plurality that he and his running mate Yi would be elected by. He was very specific, and instructed that forty percent of the votes would be put in boxes before voting. Voters were organized into three to nine man teams who would vote for LP candidates under supervision. LP supporters were also instructed to wear armbands to demonstrate whom they supported and to coerce others to vote for the LP as well. Democratic Party supervisors were also bribed and threatened and the police was instructed to use violence if necessary (Pak, C. 1980: 195).

At this point, the public could no longer tolerate Rhee's corrupt tactics of staying in power. Disgusted and frustrated, students demonstrated continuously; Rhee had no choice but to flee to Hawaii. This would not be the first time that the Korean public, in particular the students, would protest against the ploys of its leaders.

Park Builds Power: Manipulation and Control (Third Republic, 1961-1971)

The collapse of the Rhee regime also signaled the collapse of the Liberal Party. This should not come as a surprise since the party lacked any cohesive ideology to speak of and its support was largely based on doling out patronage, cheating and connecting with big firms in exchange for their financial assistance. The politicians within the LP connected with the public based on their own personal ties and made very little effort to espouse political issues. The one trend that continued, however, was the government party's attempts to connect with rural interests and to do whatever necessary to maintain their support, much to the irritation of the urban areas.

When the First Republic collapsed a new constitution was implemented and cabinet style of government was erected under Democratic Party leader, Chang Myon. Nevertheless, he was unable to keep his party together and it was wrecked with factional struggles. The party eventually split in two with half of the former DP leaders forming the New Democratic Party on February of 1961. Thus, instability and inefficiency plagued the Second Republic, making it very vulnerable. A shrewd military general named Park Chung Hee seized on this opportunity in May of 1961 (Lee, M. 1990). This maneuver was facilitated by the fragmentation of political parties. He quickly moved ahead to establish his own party to help him maintain control and help him accomplish his many lofty goals, none of which included democratization.

Park wanted to ensure that the transition was as smooth as possible and set out to make other changes as well. He instructed Kim Jong Pil to study the method of creating a post junta government. It initially attempted to guarantee Park a privileged status, but this was not possible in a civilian government, when he had only been a military man. Any arrangement that appeared to be suspicious might create a backlash from the public. How could Park maintain the control and power that he desired in order to achieve his goals? By establishing some type of democratic government, by holding elections, to gain the support from the people and by trying to establish legitimacy. To do this, first, Park (Lee, M. 1990) established a constitution that heavily favored the president. Second, Park set up a new party, which was named the Democratic Republican Party (DRP). Third, and to be analyzed more in depth, Park manipulated the electoral laws to create the outcomes he desired.

The constitution, to Park, was nothing more than a pliable piece of paper that could be altered to suit his needs at the time. Park wanted to establish stability and legitimacy quickly. To do this, on December 17, 1962, he drafted a new constitution that limited the presidency to two consecutive terms, but increased the power of the presidency considerably. It was supposed to provide an institutional framework for political order (it was ratified by more than 78% of the public) but it essentially increased his leverage (Kim, B. 1977). It replaced the parliamentary system with a strong

presidential system since the parliamentary system was regarded as ineffective. The president was to be elected by direct popular vote for a four-year term, with a two-term limit. The president's power increased substantially relative to the other organs of government. The legislative and judicial branch and the cabinet were completely overshadowed.

Overall, "the president could appoint the premier and other cabinet members without legislative consent. The president could also ratify treaties, initiate legislation, dispatch and receive diplomatic envoys, exercise supreme command of the armed forces and proclaim martial law," (Kim, Y. 1989: 81). The premier and the cabinet were also responsible to the president and had very little power to have any influence.

Legislative powers and activities were curtailed severely. The legislative sessions couldn't exceed 120 days and its power was mainly to approve the national budget but did not extend much beyond that. Simply put, the system lacked the necessary checks and balances. Nevertheless, this would not be the first time that Park would change the current rules and institutional framework to fulfill his agenda.

Building the DRP into a force to be reckoned with was a much harder task than manipulating the electoral laws. To build the DRP into a vehicle that would serve all of his needs, he set out to establish a mass party that was highly centralized and well organized. The supreme organ was to be the Party Convention that was to meet every year. This Party Convention was

supposed to elect the party president and the Central Committee members, nominate the presidential candidates and adopt a party platform and basic policies. Nevertheless, this convention was set up to automatically approve decisions of the Party President and Party Council, where the real power resided.

The Party Council was a major decision-making body and was comprised of a party chairman, a Chairman of the Central Committee and chairman of the Policy Committee. The Central Committee and standing committee had the responsibility of recruiting party members while party affairs were handled and organized by the party secretariat under the supervision of the secretary general. These committees recruited more than 1,000 young cadres to be part of the staff. In addition, the local secretariat consisted of a three-tiered hierarchy that included the center, the city and provinces and the electoral districts. They each had four functions that included propaganda, research, organization and consulting and record office, (Kim, Y. 1989: 100).

The DRP aimed at being well organized and efficient. By 1967 it was well equipped to help its candidates win elections. It campaigned to assemble mass level networks and created core and key organizations to do this. Core organizations, in particular were set up to establish support at the grass roots levels. Key level organizations consisted of ward leaders and

sub-leaders as well as precinct leaders and captains to gain support and educate, train and establish loyalty to the party.

It also supposedly launched a policy committee to emphasize the development of party platforms, but these programs could hardly be based on any sort of ideology. It aimed at being a mass party with a large membership and encouraged all to join the party, placing few restrictions on its membership. According to the Political Party Law, anyone over the age of twenty was allowed to register as a member (Kim, E. 1968).

Unlike the early days of electoral politics when numerous candidates and parties beset the elections, the 1967 Political Party Law imposed stringent organizational and membership requirements in registering a new party to deter frivolous campaigns and instability. He also wanted to prevent the emergence of splinter, progressive or leftist parties. How did he accomplish this? First, he installed a cash deposit system. All expenses incurred during the campaign were paid for with the registration deposits made by the candidates. The fees were two million won (about 5,000\$) for candidates who were endorsed by a party and three million won (about 7,500\$) for independent candidates (Kim, E. 1968). Any candidate who failed to receive one-third of the vote forfeited his or her deposit. The purpose of these deposits was to prevent excessive political fragmentation among the numerous candidates, which had created tremendous instability during the

first couple elections. It also limited elections to those with reasonable chances of being elected.

Second, Park also formally banned any candidates from running who did not have any party affiliation to deter the independents from running. Finally, the implementation of PR solidified the strength of the top two parties while giving a substantially greater advantage to the ruling party, so that Park could have the power to pursue his ambitious policies without challenges (Kim, E. 1968). Partial PR penalized minor parties and mitigated the accentuation effects of the plurality formula only slightly, thus increasing the rewards for the major opposition party. As was stated before, this was an attempt to make it appear as though there was a two-party system, despite the fact that the opposition never had a chance. By doing this it provided the illusion of a two-party system, which political leaders in the United States considered as a sign of stability and strength.

Thus, it was very easy to be a member of the DRP. Nevertheless, it wasn't easy for non-DRP supporters to elect their candidates. In 1962 Park made institutional maneuvers to ensure this and also made sure that the system somehow resembled a two-party system, which was considered most stable and effective to leaders in the United States (Lee, M. 1990). The previous defunct system during the Chang regime had implemented a bicameral legislature that used single-member-district plurality (SMD) for the lower house and two-member district for the upper house. First, though Park

retained SMD, he increased the district size to make it more difficult for candidates to win districts since many of them only had very narrow bases of support that were geographically concentrated and had already been established.

Second, he incorporated some use of proportional representation (PR). Theoretically, it is assumed that SMD favors large parties and is conducive to the creation of a stable two-party system. Theoretically, it is also assumed that PR allows more proportionality in the election results, and therefore enhances the chances of smaller parties and promotes fairness. It is used to ensure that all groups gain representation and is considered to disadvantage larger parties.

Given this, why would Park implement an element of proportionality? Wouldn't this maneuver serve the interests of other smaller parties that he was trying to compete with? He cleverly implemented a form of PR that would actually serve his interests more so than the pure SMD system. He introduced PR as a complement to the SMD system by creating a pool of seats available to parties based on the percentage of votes that were received in the election. He wanted to increase the occupational representation in the National Assembly. Thus, these seats were to be allocated, not to functional representatives, but to political parties on the basis of their share of popular votes at the national level.

The addition of PR provided bonus seats to political parties who did well at the national level. It was set up in the following manner. The National Assembly Election Law provided for a system with 153 single-member districts with a plurality. One-third of the National Assembly seats (51 seats) would be reserved for PR seats. Half of these one-third seats would be given to whatever party won a plurality. The remaining two-thirds of the seats would be allocated to the party that received the second most votes. In contrast, the smaller parties that won less than five percent of the popular vote or less than three seats in the directly contested elections at the district level were denied bonus seats (Kim, Y. 1989: 81). This was also complicated by the fact that voters could only vote once, making it more difficult for the proportional factor to have any effect. The double-ballot system would have introduced a degree of uncertainty into the electoral process. The one-ballot mixed system ensured that as long as Park could win a plurality, he could maintain control of the National Assembly with the bonus PR seats.

The system would also serve the interests of some of the military elite who lacked the local power base but were running for National Assembly seats despite this. The military elite could be placed on the PR list and be allocated seats when the DRP won a plurality. Besides incorporating more military personnel into government affairs it raised money politics because it ensured that anyone with enough money could essentially buy one of the spots and guarantee a seat in the National Assembly.

The SMD system was accompanied by too much uncertainty and would likely lead to gridlock, something that would serve as too large an obstacle to implementing his plans. He needed to guarantee the outcomes and there was always the possibility in SMD elections that a sweeping reversal of fortune could occur. The elections needed to be a formality and not an event that could lead to alteration in power.

What were the elections results, with these new electoral laws? The DRP won 67.2% of the seats, despite only winning 33.5% of the popular votes. In contrast, the opposition parties were scattered and amassed 32.8% of the seats despite having 66.5% of the popular vote. Under strict PR, the DRP would not have won a majority in the National Assembly. The overall effects of the new electoral rules were that the size of the DRP delegation in the National Assembly was 88% larger than would have been the case had the principle of proportionality been in effect (Kim, Y. 1989: 167).

Park also implemented a Political Purification Law. This law ensured the removal of older politicians who might cause problems for Park. He needed to eliminate any type of challenge to his party's electoral victories. This law issued a blacklist of 4,374 people that basically included almost every high-ranking government official, elected politician, party leader, or any one else who had power during the previous civilian regimes. All of these individuals were charged with some form of election irregularities, corruption, abuse of political and administrative power, factional behavior, communist

ties, political swindling and subversion (Kim, Y. 1989: 77). They were given little time to appeal to remove their names from the blacklist, leaving more than 3,000 names still on the list, unable to involve themselves in political activities for the next six years. What was the consequence of this move? It pretty much purged any potential challengers. Most of the victims were part of Chang's faction of Democrats. Thus, any possible contender to Park lost the right to compete, giving way for corrupt military leaders to enter politics.

Thus, the type of party system that emerged with this institutional set up was one with a strong party that could virtually implement whatever policy it wanted to with a smaller and less effective party to contend with it. In addition, though smaller parties competed, Park's institutional constraints ensured that these parties were still moderate enough to not initiate any controversial movements. For the time being, Park's electoral manipulation was producing the exact results that he envisioned.

Park Maintains Power and Refuses to Let Go (Fourth Republic, 1972-1979)

The ruling party at this point was playing a big role in the decision making process. Park had initiated a series of ambitious five-year plans to kick-start the economy and to help it industrialize and develop. Park was exercising his administrative arm over almost every single aspect of policy and left the National Assembly members to rubber stamp his policies and

proposals and attend weddings and funerals. The role of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency increased, however. It became a major instrument of power and control for Park. Thus, the traditional roles of the various institutions were twisted and turned around.

The political party organizations were confined to forming networks, making connections and doling out patronage. Non-party organizations assumed the role of political parties and took over the function of political recruitment. The regime was characterized by military authoritarianism with rule resting in careful appointments of close classmates from the military. Park was making more and more obvious assertions of his power and was gaining recognition abroad and domestically for the vast improvements made in the economy. Despite all of this, his popularity among urban voters (in his rapidly changing society) was very low, due to the authoritarian nature of his regime.

He was well aware that intellectuals, students and other urban educated individuals were not in favor of his means of controlling society. How was he so aware of this situation? The previous two election outcomes demonstrated that he lacked support and the urban population was disenchanted with him. In 1971, he had eradicated the two-term limit, which was justified on the basis of the need for stability and to continue his path of economic growth. Nevertheless, on April 27, of 1971, he barely won the presidential election with only 51.2% of the votes, which came primarily from

the rural areas, despite his many organizational and financial advantages. The 8th National Assembly election held on May 25, of 1971 was also a good indicator of how popular he was. The DRP lost 16 seats from the previous election while the opposition party, the New Democratic Party added 44 seats, which was an increase of almost 100% (Kihl 1976).

Thus, the opposition was starting to gain more support from those in these areas, largely to Park's aggravation. Park, thus, felt that he needed to make some changes to increase levels of control. He needed to ensure greater control over the National Assembly, increase his presidential powers and appear to have gained support from the coveted urban areas to present the image that he was well supported by the more modern and industrialized sectors of the country.

Park soon embarked on changes that moved the democratization process backwards. He decided to change the constitution again in 1972 creating the Yushin constitution in its place (Oh 1999; Lee 1990). This constitution included changes to his overall levels of power and also included substantial changes to the electoral laws. His two-term limit was coming to an end and Park was in no mood to step down. In 1971, he had eradicated the two-term limit, which as stated before, was justified on the basis of the need for stability and to continue his path of economic growth. However, this was not the only measure he would enact to increase presidential power. More specifically, the Yushin constitution eradicated the popular direct

election of the president. The National Conference would now elect the president for Unification (NCU), which was a warped electoral college that was headed by Park. It also empowered the president to appoint one-third of the National Assembly (although these appointments were to be rubber stamped by the NCU). The president also had a number of other extensive powers by emergency decrees.

To ensure tighter control over society, he utilized martial law. Again, this tactic was justified in the name of national security and as a means to ensure economic growth. Nevertheless, martial law was a more overt assertion of power. One of the more perplexing changes were the ones that Park made to the electoral system. The previous system was working as well as it could have, given how unpopular Park was with so many voters. Nevertheless, Park decided to change the mixed SMD/PR system to a SNTV. This system, however, was used much differently than the SNTV system used in Taiwan.

First, instead of creating large districts as is used in Taiwan, he settled on creating 73 two-member districts. (Before, the system used single-member districts) With two-member districts, the top two candidates win seats in a district. One might think that this would be more beneficial to the opposition party since there must have been instances where the opposition came in second to the ruling party. Park, however, wasn't bothered by this possibility. For Park, the most important thing was gaining support from the urban areas,

and the only chance he had of accomplishing this was by allowing the second place finishers to win a seat (Lee S., 1999).

It's important to note, that though this may not have been Park's initial intention, the fact that the districts had doubled in size, created more problems for the opposition. The districts now comprised many towns and villages. Opposition candidates depended on solid support from one particular town or village where they could garner enough votes to win a plurality. With such enlarged districts, the support was too dispersed and the opposition lost the organizational and financial resources to handle this.

Second, in Taiwan the districts were mal-apportioned so that rural areas, or more traditional areas of KMT support, were heavily over-represented. Park did not choose to re-apportion the districts to gain more seats from the rural areas. He was not concerned with showing that he had support from the rural areas. Rather, he wanted to prove that he was legitimate in the eyes of the more coveted urban voters. Thus, it was not necessary for him to over represent the rural areas. Instead, he gerrymandered the districts in an effort to gain legitimacy in the urban areas without risking a political setback (Choi S., 1974: 1093 from Lee, S. 1999).

Third, in Taiwan the electoral strategy was to run as many candidates that had a chance of winning. Curiously, Park made no attempts to run more than one candidate. This was odd considering in the rural areas his party might have had a chance of winning more seats than one. For Park, the

strategy was simple. He knew from previous elections that the DRP normally finished second in the National Assembly elections. He would therefore, run only one candidate per district and due to the weakness of other opposition groups, would most likely come in second or first in every district. He also wanted to make sure that candidates from the same party weren't running against each other in the elections to prevent factional divisions. He ran 80 candidates in 73 districts in the 9th election and 77 candidates in 77 districts in the 10th election. The DRP only needed to win one-fourth of the district level seats to have a majority in the National Assembly since Park would appoint one-third of the remaining seats, himself (Lee, S. 1999).

This enabled the party to escape problems of serious factional conflicts, which usually occurs with the candidate nomination process of SNTV. Why was this so? The party had more resources, effective organization and Park's leadership and presidential power to remain cohesive. He also prohibited any public debate about the party's nomination process and had many alternative options to dole out to those who were unable to obtain a nomination. Park had a much stronger grip on the party and was able to control for the negative side effects that came with SNTV.

The two-member district system is beneficial to parties that are both strong and well organized, but are not necessarily the voters' first choice. Though theoretically, this type of system works to the advantage of smaller parties, it also benefits a party that is well organized and highly centralized.

Simply put, it gives larger more organized parties more certainty regarding the outcomes and may split the votes of the opposition parties if they choose to run more than one candidate in a district. They have to face a coordination problem of over nominating and under nominating and they have to now deal with a more competitive atmosphere. While the DRP was able to escape factional conflicts that come with SNTV, the New Democratic Party (NDP) was not as fortunate. Various factions in the NDP competed for party leadership in order to control the candidate nomination process. The split was so severe that some of the members broke away and formed the Democratic Unification Party (DUP) just before the 9th election. In addition, seven of the eleven NDP incumbents who failed to win a nomination from their party decided to run as independents.

Why would they resort to competing against themselves? Why wouldn't they pursue the same strategies as the DRP? They didn't have the luxury to do so. Park employed one more maneuver to ensure his dominance. He reserved one-third of the National Assembly (73 seats), which he would appoint, himself. This meant that he only needed to win a certain amount of seats in the contested two-member district elections to maintain ample control over the National Assembly. Since these handpicked seats would be filled by those loyal to Park, other parties had to fight to win as many seats as possible. Nevertheless, at this point, they were aware that this plight was an exercise in futility.

The new campaign laws also prohibited the use of recording machines, speakers, vehicles and any other type of distribution of candidate produced placards and literature. It also prohibited mass meetings, door to door canvassing, signature drives, polling, parades, unscheduled speeches, and any type of advertisements in newspapers, magazines, radio and television (Kihl 1976). One would think that this would also hurt Park's DRP candidates' shell out their propaganda. However, on the contrary, since Park regulated these activities, his party could continue to do whatever it wanted and these laws served as an excuse to arrest anyone who might challenge him. It also made it more difficult, if not impossible for opposition candidates to educate more of the public on Park's wrongdoings.

There was also strict regulation of public management systems. All of the candidates had a limited number of joint speech conventions. Each candidate was allowed to make a short thirty-minute speech per meeting and was only permitted to put up a few wall posters. In addition, these posters were produced by the Park regulated District Election Management Committee which one could hardly deem impartial.

What were the effects of these campaign laws? First, they prevented both candidates and voters from becoming involved in the political process or to any meaningful degree in campaigning. In contrast, though Americans may complain about the lengthiness of political campaigns, it does give

American voters a chance to get to know the candidates and offers more opportunities to involve voters in the political process.

Second, it led to more illicit campaign activity. Campaigning often occurred behind the scenes and in a nefarious manner to make up for the fact that the campaign restrictions were so outrageous. It forced candidates to revert to even more expensive means of campaigning.

Third, another unfortunate result was that voters became increasingly apathetic. Their respect for politicians in general waned because politicians were forced to resort to corruption and unlawful activities to have a chance.

As the opposition continued to reap strong electoral gains despite all of these tremendous obstacles, Park changed the electoral laws again, doing away with the notion that the appearance of a two-party system was necessary. At this point, he was becoming more desperate to cement his legitimacy through electoral gains. He decided to amend the laws again to weaken the opposition's chances by providing incentives for independents to run. In the 9th election, for the first time since the 5th election, independents were allowed to run. The result of this opportunity was that numerous independents took votes away from existing opposition parties and received 18.6% and 28.1% of the vote in the 9th and 10th elections (Lee, S. 1999).

The rules were also changed regarding the formation of new political parties. Park decided to relax the restriction on the criteria and this led to noticeable fragmentation in the opposition. The requirements only demanded

that party branches be established in one-third of the electoral districts instead of one-half. They only had to have fifty regular members, which is less than the one hundred party members necessary under the old law in each branch. Immediately a new political party, the Democratic Unification Party (DUP) emerged that stole the thunder of the New Democratic Party (NDP). This party was founded only one month before the 9th election and was able to run 64 candidates in that election. Though the DUP only took 2 seats, it received 10% of the vote. This was especially detrimental in Seoul where the DUP obtained 14.5% of the votes (Lee, S. 1999). The success was clearly at the expense of the NDP, since the DRP could always rely on Park's appointment of one-third of the National Assembly. This also demonstrated the voters' lack of loyalty to one particular party and their ability to switch their loyalties, at the drop of a hat. It also was indicative of the opposition's lack of unity.

What were other overall consequences of the move to SNTV? It created a more competitive atmosphere for the opposition politicians; highlighted candidate oriented campaigns more than ever and distanced the voter from the political process. The competition became fierce between the NDP and the DUP. Weird coalitions formed between the DRP and the NDP who were fighting against the DUP for second seat in the districts. The term "sonmyongsong," which means the purity of the opposition, became an important issue because the opposition was now split and knew it was no use

challenging the DRP (Lee, S 1999; Kihl, Kim, Anh 1987). The opposition groups fought against each other for second place and tried to assert themselves as the true opposition in a highly competitive atmosphere.

Candidate centered campaigns with local level concerns dominated the agenda. This emphasis on local issues and personal needs of voters heightened personal forms of vote getting, as seen in Taiwan as well where patron-client relationships and pork barrel legislation dominated politics. There were numerous pledges made to deliver government-funded projects, which planted the seeds of the lopsided amounts of investments that penetrated Park's native region of Kyungsang at the expense of the Cholla region (Lee, M. 1990).

Vote getting machines formed, that are similar to the koenkai's in Japan. Personal ties and connections became more and more important, since issues were no longer important. Major issues were limited and policy debates were rare due the Draconian laws of the Yushin Constitution. Candidates had to maintain these organizations by giving out favors and doling out patronage, such as jobs and other gifts.

National Assembly members had little opportunity to initiate policy under Park's controlling regime. Their jobs became more focused on attending weddings, funerals, and other types of ceremonies to satisfy the needs of their constituents and connections. To accomplish this, candidates were forced to attain money from other sources, and routinely resorted to

corruption and made deals with large firms in order to receive major benefits. It prevented contact and interaction between candidates and voters about the issues and thus, reinforced parochial and traditional issues and personalistic voting behavior (Lee, S., 1999: 62). Lee continued that the "manipulation of the electoral process reduced opposition parties political challenges to the regime while engendering fierce competition among them. It also resulted in the absence of political party and policy debates during elections and contributed to the significance of locally oriented campaign issues and strategies," (Lee, S., 1999: 62).

Park's authoritarian tendencies would not go unnoticed for long. He was clearly losing his grip on reality and was becoming more paranoid and insecure. This insecurity manifested in his seizing more and more control over close personnel within his regime and his desire to do whatever necessary to thwart any one who was becoming too powerful. This all came to a standstill in October of 1979 when Park was assassinated by one of his most trusted advisors, Kim, the head of the KCIA (Lee, C.S. 1980). He was shot within his own compound with the cooperation of a couple of other close friends of Kim. This resulted in student support for Kim's brave maneuver, confusion and collapse of the DRP and worries from the U.S. that South Korea would become unstable and vulnerable to attack from the North. Kim was later assassinated and another military leader, Chun Doo Hwan made a successful coup attempt, taking over South Korea. At this point, instability,

disorder and authoritarian seizures of power were nothing new in South Korean politics.

Chun Takes Over: More Manipulation and Control

Choi Kyu Ha, the premier during the Park regime, was quickly chosen as the successor. However, Choi did little to inspire much confidence and Chun took over in a military coup. Chun's authoritarian regime was quickly established after that. Nevertheless, his legitimacy was soon questioned when an uprising occurred in Kwangju, the region where Kim Dae Jung, one of the more vocal and popular opposition members, hailed from. This bloody massacre that erupted on May 18, 1980 left a permanent scar on the Chun regime and also created a deep resentment of the U.S.'s alleged involvement. Special military forces crushed student dissidents, an episode so violent that it left an indelible mark in South Korea's history.

The Kwangju Massacre would forever taint Chun's popularity. He was very concerned about sustaining stability and continuing to benefit from the U.S.'s support for his authoritarian regime. He was nervous about appearing to be unstable in the eyes of the North, in particular. However, transforming the regime into a dictatorship was not an option given the rising contentiousness of the opposition and the public and, in particular, the students. It was therefore, important for him to find ways to exercise control over society, appear stable and somewhat democratic in the eyes of the

public, the opposition and the U.S. This was no easy task, but was facilitated by continuing to hold elections and borrowing from tactics of South Korean leaders in the past.

First, Chun consolidated power by purging the KCIA, Park's main power base, as Park had done before with politicians leftover from the Rhee administration. Second, he established a new political party. The Democratic Justice Party (DJP) was established by Chun on November 28, 1980 and was supposed to build a democratic and just welfare society, hence the name. His so-called platform highlighted five concepts: democracy, national integrity, welfare, justice and national unification (Oh 1999).

Third, he changed the electoral system. At the outset, the changes appeared to be efforts to democratize the overtly unfair previous system where one-third of the National Assembly was hand picked by Park. Nevertheless, the changes that were made still worked to Chun's advantage. He retained the two-member district system but gerrymandered the districts in the ruling party's favor.

He also decided to reinstate the PR formula to ensure that the ruling party had enough control over the National Assembly. There were 92 two-member districts for a total of 184 directly contested seats. There were an additional 92 seats added, which were reserved for PR. Of these at-large seats, two-thirds automatically went to the party who attained the most seats. The remaining one-third was divided up proportionately among the other

parties that obtained at least five district seats. This was all done according to the number of seats won rather than the popular vote, which might have advantaged the opposition parties. The DJP was ensured a working majority since it was automatically ensured 61 seats.

On the March 1981 election the DJP won 151 of the 276 seats in the National Assembly despite the fact that the DJP received only 35% of the popular vote. His National Assembly Election Law enabled him to control 55% of the seats (Kim, H. W. 1992).

His party also enjoyed many financial advantages that enabled it to campaign more effectively than the opposition parties. In 1982, he raised over 8 million dollars, which was 92% of the total funds raised by all political parties.

The Chun regime was widely unpopular. It clearly benefited from the unfair electoral system. Even though only 61 DJP candidates out of 92 finished first in the respective electoral districts, the two-member district system allowed the DJP to send 87 of the direct constituency candidates to the National Assembly. How was this possible? The DJP benefited from the 26 second-place finishers who were also elected (Brady, Mo 1992: 412).

In the 1985 National Assembly Election on February 12, the highest voter turnout was recorded in 27 years. The DJP received 35.3% of the votes, hardly a majority, but due to the twisted electoral laws, obtained 148 of the seats (Koh 1985: 890). This result demonstrated one of the many

problems in the Korean party and electoral system. The most obvious problem was the electoral laws that have already been criticized. A symptom of this problem was the lack of a stable opposition party. The opposition party continued to experiment with merging and splitting of new political parties that played into the hands of the DJP. The newly formed NKDP, (which will be explained in more depth later) was barely a month old and headed by Kim Dae Jung. Despite this, the party managed to win 29.2% of the votes, outperforming the other two already established opposition parties. Though the party nearly won 30% of the votes, this translated to only 67 seats, not enough to challenge the DJP's hegemony (Koh 1985: 890).

The NKDP, like opposition parties from the past, did well in the urban areas, outperforming the DJP with wide margins. The DJP also does not have support from areas of high education. This phenomenon of strong support from voters in well-educated and urban areas has been dubbed yado yochon. This literally means, opposition support in the cities and government support in the villages (Lee, S. 1999). This phenomenon was what Park tried to combat when implementing the two-district system

B.C Koh argued that in an ideal world, the proportion of votes should translate directly into the proportion of seats won. He wrote that "the values in each cell ought to be 1.00," and "anything over 1.00 implies over representation," (Koh 1985: 892). Further, he wrote that the "DJP obtained 34% more seats than it is entitled to in regular constituencies," and by

contrast, the NKDP was “short changed as much as 7% in the contested election and 17% overall,” (Koh 1985: 892). Koh added that there is a need “to emphasize manipulative uses to which electoral rules can be put by a governing elite to legitimize or perpetuate its rule,” (Koh 1985: 892).

In sum, the leadership has made numerous changes to the electoral system, which has had profound consequences on South Korea's party system. These changes to the system stifled political development, making it difficult for the opposition to ever compete effectively. In addition, the many changes to the system distanced voters from the electoral process. Thus, elections ceased to have meaning. These changes made to the electoral system reflected the turbulent history of South Korean politics. Moreover, they contributed to the boiling frustrations of the opposition, and in particular students, concerning the lack of democratic progress.

Why South Korea Struggled to Reform

Chapter 10

Role of the United States

While Taiwan was slowly democratizing by 1972, South Korea embarked on its most authoritarian constitution to date. Clearly, the role of South Korean leadership played an important role in delaying reform, as described in the previous chapter. However, it's also possible that the U.S. could have inadvertently triggered these developments due to changes in U.S. foreign policy that were perceived to have a big impact on South Korea and Taiwan. Both countries were caught up in the web of big power politics to some extent. Thus, they had to be and still are more sensitive than most countries to the changing international scene. Because their security and pace of economic development heavily depended on connections established with other countries, outside influences affected the nature of both their political and economic systems.

Thus, this chapter explains how U.S. strategic considerations affected its policies towards both South Korea and Taiwan. These diplomatic, economic and security policies had repercussions on both Taiwanese and South Korean domestic and political environments. The overtures that the U.S. made towards China inspired the opposition in Taiwan to push for reforms from the ruling party. The wheels of democratization were set in

motion as a result of this. South Korea, on the other hand, did not democratize until 1988 and it can be argued that the domestic situation in South Korea was more oppressive and authoritarian than in Taiwan. Thus, several questions will be explored and answered. First, what was the role of the U.S., if any? What were the security concerns and the context of the U.S.'s initial involvement in Korea? Second, why did the U.S.'s strategic maneuvers elicit varied responses? In other words, what were the effects of U.S. actions on South Korean domestic policy? I argue that while changes in U.S. foreign policy seemed to have propelled Taiwan into democratization, in South Korea, the effect at times, was the opposite.

Some authors argued that the U.S. gave its approval to use authoritarian measures in order to dispel the possibility of instability accompanied by democracy. This could have had an important impact in stunting the democratization process. Other perspectives claimed that the U.S. did not advocate the use of authoritarian tactics to maintain stability and hoped to eventually promote democracy. In the end it is inconclusive, as to whether or not the U.S. wanted to intentionally impact South Korea's domestic political situation, and what its involvement was.

However, regardless of the U.S.'s intentions, before the late 1980's, it is possible that South Korea responded to changes in the U.S.'s foreign policy by tightening up the grips of control and becoming more authoritarian. When the U.S. made overtures towards normalizing relations with China and

indicated that some U.S. troops may be withdrawn, South Korea responded much differently than Taiwan. The reasons for this will be explored in this section.

Role of the United States (1950-1960)

As described in chapter 8, the U.S.'s initial interest and involvement in Korea was not as extensive as it would become. This lack of interest would soon change. When the U.S. disengaged from South Korea, this contributed unwittingly to an attack by the North on June 25, 1950. The North Korean forces had been well trained and were heavily armed with Soviet weapons. President Truman believed that the U.S. had to get involved as well, which resulted in a stalemate at the 38th parallel. The war finally ended on October 1, 1953 when a truce was signed between the two sides (Keefer 1991).

The U.S. then signed a Mutual Security Treaty with South Korea that promised to defend the South from external aggression. The South, at this point, was completely dependent on the U.S. for security. At that time, the South Koreans were not as well armed as the North and lacked the training as well. The South was in a constant state of vulnerability.

These problems were exacerbated by Rhee's authoritarian maneuvers. His total disregard for the goal of implementing democracy eventually created public unrest among students and intellectuals. He had alienated many National Assembly members and did everything in his power to undermine all

of his political opponents. The U.S. was not pleased with these developments, and found Rhee difficult to work with. The U.S. came close to orchestrating a coup to be rid of him, but decided against it, at the last moment. Rhee was supposed to be a democrat who could help the U.S. establish a democratic government in South Korea. Instead, he was a self-serving (he refused to sign the treaty because he did not want to end the war yet), autocrat who preferred to rule with an iron fist. Rhee's behavior did not set a good precedent of how leaders should comport themselves. More importantly, his actions fostered more political instability.

South Korea also suffered from economic problems that left it completely dependent on the U.S. for economic aid and support. The South had been ravaged by the war and was one of the poorest countries in the world at the time. It lacked infrastructure and many natural resources. The economy was in complete disarray. The U.S., though not supportive of Rhee, knew that it had no choice but to support South Korea if it wanted to prevent another civil war on the peninsula. In 1960, student protests over Rhee's rigging of the election finally drove him from power.

Role of United States (1961-1979)

By 1960, South Korea endured thirteen years of political instability and turmoil. Though the U.S. tacitly supported the students' overthrow of Rhee, there were concerns regarding South Korea's security and political stability.

These concerns would not be eradicated any time soon. In 1961, General Park Chung Hee took over the government in a coup. Thus, South Korea was still experiencing many political problems that made it vulnerable to a North Korean attack.

By 1969, Park had been in power for eight years and despite his utter lack of concern for human rights and for furthering the democratization process, his regime was still supported by the U.S., to some extent. He promoted stability and made the U.S. feel more secure that he was committed to maintaining order and economic growth, two things that the U.S. deemed important to staving off the North.

Nevertheless, 1969 was a pivotal year in South Korean and U.S. relations. Nixon had not been in power long but knew that with the Vietnam War still raging on, a reduction of U.S. military in Asia would be beneficial to his popularity. The U.S. had committed armed forces to wars in mainland Asia and maintained troops there. In mid 1969, the U.S. decided to only keep its treaty commitments to its allies, but primarily with sea and air power, rather than with ground forces as it had in Vietnam.

The U.S. was also forging diplomatic relations with China, which signaled a shift in U.S. priorities that alarmed the South Korean government. It signaled to Park that the security that the U.S. provided could no longer be assumed as a given.

On September of 1970, Vice President Spiro Agnew visited South Korea and made it clear that one of the two ground forces stationed there would be withdrawn by 1971. He also claimed that by 1975 the U.S. would withdraw the second division. This was to coincide with the plan of the Nixon Doctrine, which aimed to modernize the Korean army with U.S. equipment so that it could successfully defend itself (Kim, J. 1976).

Park was outraged and very worried about this new development. Nevertheless, this move on the part of the U.S. was not decided based on South Korea's lack of political development, but was based on the desire to limit U.S. involvement in Asia, after the U.S.'s experience with the ongoing Vietnam War. Thus, Park did not respond to these changes in policies by democratizing the regime. Instead, Nixon's approach to Asia made him more concerned than ever that he needed to maintain stability. His security concerns, both on a personal front (due to electoral success of opposition member, Kim Dae Jung) and an international front, contributed to the declaration of the Yushin Constitution. This controversial declaration firmed his control over society and eliminated the public's involvement in the political process.

Nevertheless, Park would not have to worry for long about the U.S.'s troop withdrawal. The area became too unstable and vulnerable for the U.S. to withdraw from South Korea. By 1975, when the second division was supposed to evacuate South Korea, U.S. priorities shifted after the fall of non-

Communist Indochina and Kim Il Sung's visit to China in the middle of April. The U.S. felt that South Korea was in a precarious situation and decided to expand its contact with South Korea on all levels. By this time, Park had passed his controversial Yushin Constitution, to the dismay of all opposition forces within the country fighting for democratization. This, however, was of little concern to the U.S., given how shaky it believed South Korea's geo-political environment's was.

Though the U.S.'s role in aiding South Korea's security fluctuated to some extent during the 1970's, the U.S.'s involvement in the South Korean economy had always been very high. The U.S. granted development loans, and continued to engage in trade and investment in South Korea on a significant scale. In general, the U.S. was very impressed and pleased by the level of economic growth that took place.

By the late 1970's, however, the U.S. was not pleased with the numerous human rights abuses that were taking place. Park had in some ways lost sight of reality and was alienating individuals even within his own administration. He continued to aggressively usurp power and did so, with little concern of alienating his sources of support (Oh 1999).

The U.S. was well aware of his containment of the opposition and his brutal punishment of dissidents. By the late 1970's, more liberals in the government became upset by his actions. Public opinion polls indicated that South Korea's image in the world was not favorable. President Carter, who

was elected in 1976, was committed to human rights and made that his major foreign policy concern. He, too, was not pleased by the developments in South Korea. He looked upon the Park regime negatively and wanted to reduce U.S. commitments to its security (Oh 1999).

In the spring of 1977, the Carter administration announced that it would gradually pull out the second division in stages by 1982 (Oh 1999). Park, again, was incensed by this lack of support. This announcement indicated to opposition politicians that Park's regime would be more vulnerable. The problem was that it also indicated to the North that it would be in a weaker position. For this reason, the Japanese were also concerned with this development. The Japanese were concerned that another civil war would erupt, which would disrupt the stability of the peninsula. North Korea and the U.S.S.R., however, welcomed this new development.

Carter didn't have much time to implement his plan, however. Park was determined to reverse this decision. It was soon deemed that North Korean forces were much stronger than previously thought. He convinced Carter that the South was still too vulnerable when Carter visited Park in June of 1979. Thus, it was decided that the withdrawal of troops would be postponed until 1981.

Why did the U.S. not put more pressure on the Park regime? First, promoting democracy was never the most important goal of the U.S.'s foreign policy in Asia at any time. In addition, the U.S. did not have much choice. A

body of water, as in Taiwan's case, did not separate South and North Korea. Thus, there were constant security concerns for South Korea. Though Park was not well liked by the Carter administration, he did provide continuity and stability. Park, however, had alienated too many people within his own base of support. He was assassinated in October of that same year by one of his most trusted confidantes. Despite the problems that Carter had with the Park regime, his assassination caused the U.S. to be gravely concerned.

Role of the United States (1980-1985)

The political unrest that erupted in the fall of 1979 and the October 1979 assassination of former President Park Chung Hee created a sense of panic in the U.S. administration. The U.S. was hoping to improve relations with South Korea and aimed to ensure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The goals outlined by Carter were to continue to foster the U.S.'s economic relationship with South Korea and second, to improve the environment for human rights through the evolution of liberal, democratic political processes, according to cables sent from Secretary Vance. The latter goal was not as important as the former, however, and during the next 18 months it would become less and less important.

In June of 1979, after extensive negotiations between the U.S. and South Korean governments, it was decided that President Carter would visit South Korea and meet with President Park. During that visit, Carter decided

to end his policy to withdraw troops and declared that the two countries could develop closer military ties to counter what was perceived to be a growing Soviet and North Korean military threat. Park responded by relaxing some political controls, though he never had the chance to do anything drastic. At this time, the U.S. was overwhelmed by the hostage crisis in Iran and deepening tensions with the Soviet Union. Thus, when the crisis in South Korea occurred during the fall of 1979, the U.S. became fearful that a political confrontation in South Korea, after Park's assassination, could spark an explosion and precipitate a third crisis point in the world. Above all else, it was emphasized that the U.S. must avoid another situation like Iran in South Korea.

Soon after Park's assassination, General Chun Doo Hwan took over in a military coup. Ensuring political stability became the overriding policy goal throughout the Chun period. The U.S. would occasionally express its dissatisfaction with Chun's authoritative tactics but would never place any direct pressure on him to reform. In addition, unlike the Taiwanese case, where opposition members had both the ears and support of some U.S. Congressmen and government, the opposition members in South Korea were at times, treated by the U.S. like destabilizing agents. It's possible, that the U.S. was worried about any actions by the opposition and tried to persuade these dissidents to not press for democratic change.

There are contrasting interpretations regarding U.S. intentions in South Korea during this period. Some scholars believed that the U.S. was in no way to blame for the tragic events that occurred during the initial stages of the Chun regimes. Korean students, however, possibly manipulated by Chun, believed that U.S.'s involvement was more sinister. Though it is inconclusive, both arguments will be explored.

According to the "Cherokee files", (Shorrock 2000), it is alleged that this frustration with the opposition in South Korea was expressed in several cables sent to Seoul from Mr. Holbrooke, who presided over U.S. Asia policy during the Carter administration. The cables claimed that it was disgusted with the dissidents who were not concerned with maintaining stability, which was so important to the overall security of the U.S. For example, in a Cherokee cable sent on December 8, 1979, Holbrooke asked Gleysteen to send a direct message to Korean Christians that they should not expect long-term support for their struggles. This cable was written after Holbrooke had discussed the Korean situation with Congress, including the top Democrats that were involved in East Asian affairs. Holbrooke claimed to have the full support of important Congressmen. He wrote that "their attitudes, like everyone else are dominated by the Iranian crisis, and needless to say, nobody wants another Iran. By which they mean American action which would in any way appear to unravel a situation and lead to chaos or instability in a key American ally," (Shorrock 2000: 6).

It is alleged that he was clearly worried about any type of extreme behavior from the side of the opposition and wrote that to deal with hard-liners required a "delicate operation designed to use American influence to reduce the chance of confrontation and to make clear to the generals that you (Gleysteen), are in fact trying to be helpful to them, provided they in turn carry out their commitments to liberalization," (Shorrock 2000: 7).

Holbrooke was in favor of sending direct messages to the dissidents that "in this delicate time in Korean internal politics, the U.S. believes that demonstrations in the streets are a throw-back to an earlier era and threaten to provoke retrogressive actions on the part of the Korean government," (Shorrock 2000: 7). He even went as far to say that any action that was in defiance of martial law was not helpful. The U.S. made it clear that it was not putting up with dissident behavior and did everything that it could to discourage it, even if this meant that it was thwarting the prospects for democratic reform.

After Park had been assassinated in October of 1979, the Choi government was installed, during the interim. The plan was to tell Choi to promise the dissidents and the public that democratization would eventually occur, but to not set any type of date on the matter and to be as vague as possible. The reasoning was that if President Choi demurred on the matter, Holbrooke believed that he could convince him on the logic that democratization did not need to be fulfilled, just promised. Apparently,

President Choi agreed with that reasoning and reassured Holbrooke that he would proceed with his plan.

When Chun and Roh Tae Woo seized control of the military on December 12, 1979, the administration did not think that Chun would take over the country. The cables that were being sent back and forth from Choi to Holbrooke were reassuring and all hoped that Chun could be constrained and behave himself well. The U.S. didn't want to do anything at the time that might strain the relationships that the Carter administration was trying to repair after he declared that troops would be withdrawn. The relationship with Park had been worsened by the military pull-outs that occurred after Vietnam. Park viewed the U.S. as unreliable, from a military stance. The U.S. therefore, didn't want to do anything too drastic, given the delicateness of the situation.

According to the "Cherokee files" this explained why appeals for sanctions and other measures to pressure South Korea never materialized. The U.S. government was more concerned about how any move of removing military forces would be interpreted by North Korea. Economic sanctions were also never placed because the U.S. didn't want to do anything that might victimize the public. In sum, nothing was going to be done that would in any way disrupt the current U.S.-South Korean military ties or create the appearance that the U.S. was unhappy with South Korea to the international community.

By April of 1980, despite the continuing signs that Chun was planning a full-scale military takeover, the U.S. appeared to be happier with the situation in Korea and the stance with the Korean government was to be "business as usual". Political tensions however, were mounting in March and April of 1980, and hundreds of thousands of students began demonstrating for an end to martial law. The U.S. was in communication with Chun and responded to his statements that he would behave himself but would need to have contingencies if things got out of control. The U.S. agreed that if things did get out of control, in this context, it would go ahead and use the military.

It is argued in "the Cherokee Files" that the U.S. expressed that it was generally pleased with how Chun was handling most of the student demonstrations. Even the behavior of the Special Forces in the October 1979 demonstrations at Pusan and Masan (Black Berets were willing to break heads according to DIA documents) did not indicate the severity of what happened in Kwangju. Nevertheless, the senior officials from the Carter administration had approved Chun's plans to use military force against pro-democracy demonstrators ten days before the former General Chun seized control of the country on May 17, 1980. U.S. officials knew about the contingency plans that included the deployment of Special Warfare Command (SWC) troops to Seoul and Kwangju, according to the documents known as the Cherokee files. This deployment of Special Forces appeared in a Defense Intelligence Agency cable to the Department of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff

on May 8, 1980. It stated that all Korean Special brigades are on alert and noted that the 13th SWC brigade had been moved to the Seoul area on May 6, while the 62nd battalion of the 11th SWC brigade had moved into the Seoul area on May 7, 1980.

According to the DIA cable, all Korean Special Forces units had been receiving extensive training in riot control and in particular, how to use CS gas, a virulent form of gas considered to be a form of chemical warfare. The Carter administration decided to support Chun's repression of the Kwangju Uprising on May 22, 1980, at a high-level White House meeting. This decision was made after the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and the military intelligence had filed extensive reports on the massacres that took place in Kwangju on May 18 and May 19 of 1980.

Kwangju was one of the most devastating events in South Korean history. In Kwangju, two brigades of Special Forces were later held responsible for killing hundreds of people in a massacre that drew worldwide attention. On May 19th it was reported to the Joint Chief of Staff in Washington that about 30,00 students were rioting the streets in Kwangju and had been joined by an undetermined amount of others. It was also reported that the R.O.K. military was using the virulent gas and was using any means to disperse the crowds, with little effect. The situation was reported to be "extremely serious". The next day reports came in that the riots involved at least 10,000 hard-core demonstrators and as many as 90,000 to 100,000 on

lookers who were sympathetic to the marchers. The troops were retaliating and were not holding back, (Shorrock 2000).

On May 21, it was reported that the R.O.K. army was using officers, who hailed from the Cholla region, where the riots were occurring, to control the rioters. This decision was made based on the reasoning that officers from the same region would have more success at quelling the demonstrators. At this point it was reported that there were growing sentiments of anti-Americanism and that the U.S. decision to release R.O.K. OPCON forces for riot control duty in Kwangju had exacerbated this mood. Nevertheless, the U.S. did not respond in ways that would change these sentiments (Shorrock 2000).

The U.S. was obviously upset about the magnitude of the riots and the aftermath, but did little to chastise the Chun regime. The U.S. was far more concerned with maintaining stability and wasn't going to do anything that would jeopardize this goal. The Carter administration established a new policy line that emphasized how important South Korea was and how important the Korean military was for security. It expressed that Chun had effectively established military control of the Korean government and given this, would only focus on moderating the way Chun dealt with dissidents. It was concerned that if Chun responded too harshly this could provoke revolts that would be extremely destabilizing to the area. The U.S. emphasized the implementation of sensible economic policies and hinted at the need to move

towards constitutional government, and a reduction of the military's involvement in politics and administration.

Thus, it was conveyed to Chun through meetings with DIA official Muskie, that the U.S. was committed to Chun from a security stance but that it wanted him to establish a government that would have the support of the people, and thus, be consistent with their mutual security concerns. Thus, no matter what Chun did, because of the U.S.'s security concerns, the U.S. government believed that it had little that it could do to punish him without shooting itself in the foot. The U.S. reassured its security commitments to the region, dissuaded dissidents, and tried to moderate Chun's behavior. However, it never did anything drastic that would force Chun to reassess his behavior. This allowed Chun the freedom to avoid pressures from reform and conduct government in ways that were very authoritarian.

This previous excerpt from the Cherokee files contrasts directly with the views in Korea: Old and New; A History. It is argued that Chun convinced the public that the U.S. had a hand in his capture of power, which shaped the public's perception of the U.S. The authors also claimed that the U.S. was in no way to blame for the Kwangju uprising and was upset by the violent measures that were used by the Chun regime. This view also held that Chun manipulated the public to believe that the U.S. supported him, by successful maneuvers to characterize an unauthorized visit to the U.S. to meet with Reagan as proof of his regime's legitimacy and U.S. support. The authors

argued that there "is no evidence that the U.S. conspired with or directly supported Chun during this period, and the dispatch of the savage paratroopers who provoked the Kwangju Incident was outside the operational controls of the U.S. forces," (Eckert et al 1990: 379). It is therefore, contended that the students were unaware of this yet still blamed the U.S. partially for the atrocities. Their suspicions were somehow confirmed not only by the U.S.'s supposed "honoring" of Chun during the Reagan administration, but also by inflammatory statements by General John A. Wickman (Eckert et al 1990: 380) and later comments that the Koreans were not ready for democracy.

This presentation argued that the students have unfairly characterized the U.S. and claimed that the U.S. played a pivotal role in saving the life of one of the more possibly destabilizing elements of South Korean politics, opposition leader Kim Dae Jung. Richard Allen, Ronald Reagan's first national security advisor reported that the U.S. played a large role in releasing Kim, which for many years had been unbeknownst to many South Koreans, as well as to Kim himself. The U.S. expressed to the Chun regime, that executing Kim would have "serious consequences". An agreement was later made that would allow Chun to visit Reagan shortly after his inauguration, though not on a state visit, in exchange for drastically reducing Kim's sentence. All of this was kept private, and was not made public until later on. The problem, however, was that the students and much of the public believed

that the U.S.'s involvement in South Korea had largely been more supportive of the authoritarian regimes. In particular, the U.S.'s alleged involvement in Kwangju incited a slew of criticism.

The consequence of this (regardless of whether or not the U.S. actually played a role supporting the Chun regime in the Kwangju massacre), was that a very powerful group in South Korea became more mobilized and vocal than ever before. Whether or not its animosity towards the U.S. was justified or not, the end result was that a large group of individuals had a common bond to mobilize themselves and rally around a common cause. In addition, their shared disgust and frustration with the ruling regime would make life increasingly more difficult for Chun to sustain the status quo.

Chapter 11

Role of Political Opposition

South Korea's resistance to democratic reform cannot completely be attributed to the leadership and the lack of insistence from the United States. Another important factor that impeded reform was the self-destructiveness of the opposition. The opposition in Taiwan was relatively more effective in pushing for reforms and getting those in power to respond to its demands. This chapter seeks to analyze more thoroughly the role of the opposition- or lack there of, in attaining results from its demands. Why was the opposition unable to force changes early on? Why was it so ineffective? These questions will be answered.

As stated above, one of the more notable features of traditional Korean politics has been both the absence of a strong opposition and the absence of institutionalized political parties. The causes of these phenomena are related. Institutions never had a chance to establish themselves during the period of Japanese colonialism and Koreans reverted back to their traditional means of handling things prior to colonization.

Nevertheless, South Korea's foundation of political party competition wasn't completely nonexistent. Though there were no parliamentary or electoral systems during Japanese rule, there was some partisan competition. There was a presence of independence movements that advocated the removal of Japanese rule (Chen, I. 1968). This aversion to Japanese rule

helped these groups solidify and they were organized under different party banners. Nevertheless, these political groups could never solidify into institutionalized political parties. There was too much tight control under the Japanese period. These groups were much more active overseas, but had little contact with the Korean masses.

During the occupation period, efforts shifted from combating Japanese colonialism to more severe ideological divisions. There were several factors that influenced political competition during the occupation period. First, political competition was affected by the absence of effectively organized indigenous political forces. Second, the occupation by Soviet and U.S. forces also affected political competition. Finally, the onset of the Cold War created ideological divisions. Right and left wing domestic forces intensified their ideological fighting. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. aggravated these divisions (Helgesen 1998). The country was divided in two, with the South homogenized into a staunchly anti-Communist regime that limited any ideological proliferation from the left.

Thus, the lack of institutionalized political parties started with the Rhee regime. There was very little organization in general from the outset, even in the government. Unlike Taiwan, which began the post-war era with a political party, which was determined to strengthen and organize the party to be a well-oiled machine, South Korea started off with no such foundation and was hurt even more by a cultural aversion to organized groups of men disputing.

Rhee would eventually realize that a political party would help him consolidate his power, but he had at his disposal government funds, recognition and backing from the military and police. For the time being, he also had the brainwashed public behind him. He was in a much better position to create a vertical hierarchical organization that would serve his interests and do his dirty work.

During Japanese colonial rule, Koreans had no political rights and were not as accustomed with self-governing practices as the Taiwanese (Chen, I. 1968). The country attempted to implement a party system based on democratic ideals after Japan's departure but this was not a successful experiment due to a lack of political training and experience. In 1946, six months after liberation, there were 134 parties that existed. By 1947, there were 354 political parties that were set up in a very hurried fashion (Pak, C. 1980).

Nevertheless, this did not imply that Koreans accepted party politics. It just meant that these parties were very unsubstantial and were essentially formed at the drop of the hat by independent politicians. Without any experience from the colonial period, they were nothing more than political clubs, without much public support based on issues and ideology. Political support early on hinged on regional, kinship, school and other personal ties.

Thus, as mentioned above, another common phenomenon was the prevalence of independent politicians. Though this would make more sense

in Taiwan, since political parties were banned, in South Korea it was a result of the general cultural disinclination towards political parties. They were seen as something that was undesirable and thus, this led to the emergence of a large group of politicians that lacked formal party affiliations. To them, political party affiliations meant representing factional interests rather than a group of voters. The people more readily accepted Independent politicians.

There were other reasons for this phenomenon. Independents refused to join with the already existing parties due to selfishness. Many were political opportunists. Others ran as independents while they waited for the highest political bid. Others remained independents as a means of expressing their disapproval with factional politics. This was all a reflection of hesitant and ambivalent political attitudes due to the lack of orientation towards more competitive politics. Independent politicians viewed the conflicts between the anti and pro Rhee forces as personality oriented power struggles that didn't affect the democratic process (Pak, C. 1980).

As far as any issues were concerned, there was a preoccupation with questions of national independence. This stemmed partly from the Yi dynasty and the colonial period when Korean political groupings concerned themselves with national independence. Helgesen wrote that nationalist aspects of Korean politics were rooted from this period and kept alive with the division of the country (1998). By 1958, this crystallization of some political

issues resulted in the decline of independent politicians and their splinter parties.

The pattern set early on for political parties during this period, was that political parties would mushroom right before the elections and then disappear when the powerful political party, the LP won the election. Rhee and the government with the help of the police, the military forces and secret service, supported the LP. These groups all helped the ruling party ensure a victory in election after election, giving little suspense during the elections. Other parties were left with the strategy of disappearing after defeat and forming new political parties, under different names, with the same people.

These organizations were, for the most part, unknown to most of the voters. There were no clear platforms or grass root support bases. Few knew what the names of the parties meant and could only identify parties by their abbreviations. More individuals were aware of politicians, than the actual parties. Voters early on associated individual leaders with politics, not political parties who espoused various issues and ideas. This impeded on the opposition's performance. Opposition political parties were just formed around a dominant leader and no policy consideration was involved to help develop a loyal following to institutions. As a result, the sense of party loyalty was very weak and the opposition shifted according to the rise and fall the leader.

Given this, it was almost impossible for voters to distinguish between the political platforms of the political parties. The descriptions of political parties were that their views were more or less the same concerning the poor and North Korea. Political parties could be described as mass parties all based along a conservative ideology. Their main concern was gaining as many members as possible. In addition, few voters were aware of any political party, besides the LP that had existed for more than a year. There was a consensus, with any new party that sprouted up, that it would not survive long.

Political parties have always been feeble entities of the Korean political system. During the Rhee regime, South Korea had a one and half-party system. This would not be uncommon in years to come. The ruling party dominated while a weaker opposition party tried to contend with it. Along the way, a multitude of other political parties struggled for recognition, but failed to have any impact.

The main political party in opposition to Rhee was the Democratic Party, which had initially endorsed him. Rhee didn't want to ally with any one party at the time, and didn't want to do anything to share the spoils (Oh 1999). The DP had quickly become displeased with his authoritarian tactics but was unable to thwart his power. The DP relied on informal forces of regional identification and was more of a personalistic organization. The opposition tried to block Rhee's many bids to change the constitution, but was set back

by his power and control over all of the military and security apparatus. Many of the politicians in this party were threatened during the elections and were roughed up to comply by Rhee's wishes.

Rhee, early on, had the support of the public, who were so caught up in trying to fight a war that it was unaware of all of his authoritarian attempts to consolidate his power at the sake of democratic development. In particular, the opposition was upset with his implementation of a direct presidential election to make him unaccountable to the legislature. He was able to ram this through while the public was struggling to survive, in July of 1952.

The Democratic Party soon evolved into the Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP) by 1950, merging with other groups. During the election that year, the DNP fell from 68 candidates to 24. Despite the attempt at a merger that should have helped the system evolve into a two-party system, the prevalence of independents divided the opposition (Pak, C. 1980).

During the third National Assembly election in 1956, the DNP and the LP, for the first time, nominated party candidates. This should have been a sign that the opposition had increased its organizational capacity and would be able to make politics more competitive. Nevertheless, Rhee would never let the opposition have any chance to contend with him. He blocked candidate registration and didn't count votes correctly. He also resorted to arresting any opposition candidates who appeared threatening.

By 1960, there were clear choices available to voters. The alternatives available were pro vs. anti government forces. This was made obvious by Rhee's attempts to control the government and society. His popularity dwindled, culminating in his overthrow after the 1960 election. The Democratic Party would win a majority in the July 1960 election, but now the opposition did not have an enemy that temporarily unified them (Pak, C. 1980). The lack of internal party organization and institutionalization became evident as rivalries within the parties emerged and instability plagued the Second Republic. It would quickly be just a memory as Park swiftly took over in a military coup.

In sum, the opposition during the Rhee regime was functionally non-existent. Though it tried at various times to counter Rhee's authoritarian maneuvers, it did not have the resources that Rhee had at his disposal. The opposition was not well organized and was undermined both by Rhee's tactics to decrease its ability to influence politics and by the prevalence of selfish independent politicians with little political training. Also problematic for the opposition, was the cultural suspicion of opposition political parties. This created an obstacle to the democratic development of a competitive party system.

Role of Political Opposition (or lack there of)- Park Era (1960-1979)

When Park came to power he brought with him more military involvement in politics. As the military seized power, a large segment of the population was out of political activity. Thus, the military inherited, according to Y. Kim, a lot of "partisan space which could be used to penetrate into society," (1989: 35).

Nevertheless, there were opposition parties that emerged, though largely based on personalities. At this point, the DRP had expanded its organizational membership at central and local levels and had recruited political elites who were known for being corrupt. The DRP established grassroots level organization in 2,275 townships out of 2,679 (Pak, C. 1980). Some of these grassroots level committees were supposed to be only temporary to get around the Political Party Law that forbade permanent organizations beyond the province level.

Park won his first election easily, taking advantage of the disorganization and chaos of the country in the aftermath of the coup. In the second election, he took advantage of the incumbency effect. He attended ceremonies and weddings to sustain voter support. He also delivered pork barrel projects to gain votes, mainly in Seoul and his hometown region of Kyungsang.

The election, nonetheless, was very close. Park won the race with 46.6% of the votes while the Yun Po-son received 45% of the votes (Pak, C.

1980). Again, this was a pattern set that seemed to take years to eradicate. The opposition failed to unite and this played into the hands of the ruling party. If opposition groups would have united effectively under a pan-opposition candidate, instead of being divided, they could have beaten him.

The opposition was not solely hurt by its own self-destructiveness. Park's DRP did as much as it could to worsen its chances. Park, like Rhee, utilized tactics of blocking nominations, deterring candidate registration by resorting to threats, and bullying the opposition. This resulted in demands of frustrated local activists and some violent protests, but this did not seem to help matters. The DRP had other tricks up its sleeve that it could benefit from.

In the next National Assembly election, the major opposition was the Civil Rule Party. The DRP, concerned by the previous election, took advantage of its campaign leverage. The DRP benefited from Park campaigning around the country for his candidates in the name of national stability. The DRP was also advantaged by the party's close access to the media, who were somewhat biased towards the ruling party (due to Park's close scrutiny and control over the media). The DRP had many political funds. It was therefore, able to allocate a lot of money to its candidates, ignoring campaign laws and lying about the amounts of money spent. It was believed that the DRP spent seven times more than the CRP. The CRP

candidates also were forced to rely on their own sources for campaign funding. The Election Management Committee did little to rectify this situation.

The results were misleading. The DRP emerged as a strong government party, clearly aided by the electoral laws. It captured 110 seats out of 175, (67.2%) but only 33.5% of the popular vote (Pak, C. 1980). The CRP, too, to a lesser extent benefited from the electoral rules. It received 14 of the 41 seats from the PR allocation formula. This made it appear to be a two-party system. Nevertheless, this was not enough to challenge the DRP and it had no chance of influencing the agenda. In total, the opposition amassed 66.5% of the popular vote (Pak, C. 1980). If the opposition would have united, it could have overcome Park's advantages. However, because it failed to do so, it ended up with only 32.8 % of the seats and would be forced to contend with Park's rising assertions of power for the next sixteen years (Pak, C. 1980).

Park took advantage of the opposition's weakness and in 1962 passed a constitutional amendment that gave him extensive powers as the President. It made him constitutionally independent of the National Assembly, limiting the opposition's only chance to influence politics even more.

Why was the opposition so weak? Why were political opposition parties unable to contend with Park? One of the first problems was at the outset of the military dominated government under Park, political parties were banned from May 16, 1961 to May 17, 1962. During this period, opposition

politicians were also suppressed (Oh 1999; Lee, 1990). Thus, the opposition was not much more than little groupings, which were not issue-oriented organizations. Rather, the groupings consisted of individuals and powerful personalities who inconsistently pursued political interests with their own desires for power. Thus, they are just loose coalitions of politically active individuals organized around easily identifiable leaders. These parties, like the DRP were largely based on patron-client relationships and it was common for the parties to disappear and then reappear under new names, merge and then split up again.

The institutionalization of political parties has always been a foreign import, which has experienced difficulty, taking root in South Korea. They have suffered from a lack of adaptability and coherence. They have had trouble dealing with any complexity and withstanding crises. They have been unable to adapt to the changing political environment. They also have lacked the institutional mechanisms to deal with any type of internal crisis.

Korean opposition parties are unable to offer differentiated programs. They are also unable to develop networks and organizational links to interest groups within a civil society. They are devoid of permanent organization bases in the rural areas where the DRP has a lot of support. They also failed to gain external support for their causes.

Moreover, the opposition parties were hindered by the operation of the party structures. Three of the opposition parties adopted a committee system

in order to provide more effective leadership. However, the role, influence and power of the party leader were institutionally weak. The power was too decentralized among different party bodies. These weak arrangements were the result of the diverse coalition of anti-Rhee groups. Their lack of consensus inhibited the mobilization of the necessary efficiency in leading the party.

The opposition parties, as a result, were unable to move decisively. The decision-making patterns within these parties did not conform to formal rules. They operated more informally and were handicapped by this low level of institutionalization within the party apparatus. There was little coordination of their actions. There was little communication between central party headquarters and provincial and local party organizations. There was minimal coordination regarding campaign strategies. Most of the functional departments within opposition parties were inactive or invisible. At the most, these departments were instruments for consolidating the party leaders' power.

Opposition parties were also strongly handicapped by their lack of funds (Pak, C. 1980). Many of these problems, mentioned above, stemmed from financial difficulties. The central party headquarters had never been able to effectively allocate political funds for local organizations and only nominal membership dues were required. The opposition was forced to rely

on contributions. This was made more difficult by the government's attempts to stop this from happening and by discrediting the opposition.

The lack of funding created tensions in more ways than one. Obviously, it hindered the opposition parties' ability to win seats. But because of this, it made it more difficult for them to co-opt disgruntled party members. This created a lot of tension within these opposition parties and led to splintering. Because the opposition parties lacked funds, they had to rely on rich party members to fill campaign funds and this excluded poorer members. Many of these poorer, yet loyal members, who were waiting to be appointed to party leadership positions, were upset and this caused serious internal disruptions.

The electoral laws have exacerbated this reliance on politicians with personal connections and resources (Kim, Kihl, Ahn 1987). There are just a few charismatic personalities that hold the very weak link of voter support together. The other leaders in the opposition parties only concentrate on achieving personal connections and resources as a means of achieving high positions within the party. The bonus system, instituted since 1963, gives more advantages to those with connections and resources. Prior to an election, each party must prepare a list of names that will receive the bonus seats, as stipulated by the addition of PR. Thus, there are a certain amount of seats that the main opposition party receives as a result of this bonus rule and because these seats are guaranteed without having to campaign, the

parties give these seats to politicians who can help the party the most financially. This creates more internal party divisions and brings in money politics.

The opposition was too fragile in structure to do anything and was more impeded by the character of opposition parties. It was plagued by factional conflicts. The opposition was personality oriented with no policy consideration involved in the affiliation of the parties. The opposition parties disappeared and reappeared sometimes within the same year. When individual politicians believed that they could gain more on their own, splinter parties would appear that weakened the opposition further. The government party benefited from this internal destruction and funded some of these splinter parties. This made it nearly impossible for the opposition to gain any sort of loyal support base.

Thus, party loyalty for the opposition was weak. This was especially true for the opposition more so than the ruling party, because the ruling party could gain loyalty by doling out patronage. The loyalty for the opposition parties shifted with the rise and fall of the various personalities.

Some of these personalities were well known for exacerbating these divisions. One of the more notable rivalries occurred within the opposition itself. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung would forever struggle to be the number one opposition leader. They would fight over bids for the presidency and for control of the opposition movement. This culminated in the 1970

party convention for the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) (Pak, C. 1980). The NKDP was essentially an alliance of convenience and the two Kims, in addition to Lee Chul-Seung, were the faction leaders of the party. At the convention, Lee changed his allegiance from Kim Young Sam to Kim Dae Jung and instructed his supporters to shift their allegiance as well, in order for Kim Dae Jung to receive the nomination for president. On a positive note, Kim Dae Jung surprised many and did very well against Park in the presidential election.

The following year, an alliance between Lee and Kim Young Sam denied Kim Dae Jung the party presidency, despite how well Kim Dae Jung had done. All of this moving around and shifting alliances exacerbated the divisions within the opposition, which just played into Park's hands.

By 1976, parties only performed a limited function in South Korean politics (Kilh 1976). They remained dormant during the off election years and were only active when it came time to campaign. They only operated as a procedural device in the formalization of candidates for the president and the National Assembly. Essentially, they were non-threatening to the Park regime.

The opposition simply worked as a safety valve for the explosive elements in society that could undermine the government (which were becoming more and more frustrated). The purpose was to elect a few old opposition candidates that were themselves, selfish and oriented towards

personalities over issues. These parties were run by strong personalities who were involved in politics for their own personal gain and had great difficulty working together for the benefit of the opposition movement as a whole.

But it was not just the opposition party that lacked power. The ruling party was not much stronger. The relationship between the ruling party and the administration, at the time, was one where virtually no decisions were being made by anyone but Park. The DRP did not play a role in decision-making and simply acted as a rubber stamp. The legitimacy and power of the DRP eroded as the executive power continued to increase. There was also a larger role played by the KCIA, which was a major instrument of power and control. This development also obstructed cooperative relationships between the ruling party and the administration. Heavy reliance on the KCIA for social control created more political tension among subordinate leaders within the Park regime.

Thus, the opposition was relegated to the position of permanent opposition status with no room for improvement. The party and government leaders existed in a state of tension whereby party leaders' power was continuously undermined, increasing their desire to have greater control of government decisions. The result is that non-party organizations were assuming the largest role in government decision-making and were taking over the functions of political parties.

What were the consequences of this? It gave little room for parties to develop into viable political institutions because non-party organizations were attached to the executive, and had a greater degree of coherence and a greater degree of functional effectiveness. Thus, the lack of detachment from coercive organizations undermined the independence of political parties.

Role of Political Opposition- Chun Era (1980-1988)

The political opposition during the Chun era started to gain more momentum. This was aided by the growing strength of students who served a pivotal role in protesting the government and in informing the public of the government's atrocities.

Students and intellectuals had long been critics of the government and thus, were perceived as threatening to government power as early as April of 1960 after Rhee had committed election irregularities to secure the presidency.

During the interim period when the cabinet government was set up, the students were also active in campaigning in local districts for reformist party candidates. They also organized progressive organizations and associations and clubs. Many of these clubs served as the foundation for the Student League for National Unification.

In 1971 students protested government abuse again, but this time it was pointed at President Park. By this point, despite the rapid economic

growth and development that the country was experiencing, Park was becoming more and more controlling and involved in every area of politics.

The 1971 protest was very well organized and had an ideological slant to it that was radical. While the 1960 student protest was concerned with fighting authoritarianism without voicing what the alternative should be, the 1971 protest focused on democracy, freedom and autonomy on campuses and social justice issues.

Though the students were able to overthrow the Rhee regime, their protests were not as successful during Park's reign. He was deeply concerned with maintaining control over society and wanted to appear legitimate and strong in the eyes of the international community. He was concerned with not only maintaining his power but with deterring the North from any type of attack. He thus, responded in a harsh manner to the student protests and became more and more violent.

Thus, the pattern that emerged throughout this period was that students would become frustrated with the government's abuses and launch protests in major cities. The government would respond by arresting the protest leaders. This would intensify the protests, as they would demand the release of the prisoners. This would then, result in the temporary collapse of the movement as the government would respond with even more repressive measures.

Student protests during the Chun regime were more effective due to the spillover effects. Previously, these groups that were not in favor of the government had to deal with a better organized and more repressive Park regime that seemed to have half of the country brainwashed. By the time Chun came into power, there was more awareness of democratic ideals and different ways of governing effectively. In addition, Chun's regime was ushered in with the devastating Kwangju massacre. This de-legitimized his regime from the beginning in the urban areas. More groups were aware of the problems of the Chun regime and also believed that other groups supported these sentiments.

In addition, because the Olympics were to be held in Seoul, the students knew that they had international attention and could more easily discredit the Chun regime. This led to student protests in 1986 that caused serious headaches for Chun (Lee, M. 1990). He needed to do something in the near future to calm the students down and somehow appease them. History often repeats itself and he was well aware of how Rhee was treated.

Given all of this propaganda on the part of students to de-legitimize the Chun regime, why were voters still continuing to elect Chun? Even if the electoral laws were unjust, Chun's DJP was still receiving a percentage of the votes in the National Assembly elections. Why weren't voters boycotting the DJP in favor of the opposition?

The common campaign strategy for the DJP was that it was the party that could be counted on to provide stability and continued economic growth. The DJP could rest on its laurels so to speak. The opposition never had the responsibility of running the state. Thus, voters were reluctant to "entrust an untested organization with reins of power," (Bedeski 1994: 57). The opposition parties were perceived as behaving irresponsibly. There was a sentiment among the public that they were disorganized and self-centered. This all indicated that there was an inability to provide stability and an orderly government.

The opposition was also dealing from a position of weakness because the government, just like the Park regime before, was able to dole out patronage. The Chun regime was no stranger to pork barrel legislation. Over 1.2 billion dollars was loaned to fisherman and farmers to ensure their loyalty and support. It also had to contend with the DJP's access to all of the government officials to help out with campaigns and such.

The rivalries within the opposition were quite damaging. The level of personalism in politics was taking over and encumbering it from achieving its goals. The opposition disagreed too often over petty issues. The opposition leaders were fighting to see who was the purest opposition leader. Many political commentators suggested that the opposition would be much stronger as soon as the three Kims, as they were known, got out of the Korean political scene.

The central issue for the opposition was to change the method of electing the president. It made that its main source of contention with the government party. Though this is an admirable and important goal to concentrate on, it hurt the opposition to be so one-tracked. Instead, the opposition should have focused on issues and policies to mobilize the constituents. It spent all of its time bargaining in a disorganized manner for democracy and only mobilized support and loyalty to personalities. This meant that political power would continue to be personalistic instead of institutionalized.

Other areas that the opposition contended with the government concerned the release of political prisoners, ending police brutality and equitable redistricting to reflect some of the population changes. One issue that it was able to gain some concessions from the government was the reintroduction of local autonomy, which had been suspended since 1961. The lack of local autonomy had been a huge impediment to democratic development. It made it difficult for any grassroots organization to take root.

By November of 1984 the opposition was starting to make some headway under the Chun regime. Chun was under much more pressure than Park was both from external and internal sources. A ban of many opposition politicians was lifted on November 30, 1984 and it was also announced that Chun would look into implementing local autonomy (Bedeski 1994). The opposition, bolstered by this news formed a new party that was comprised of

many of the previously banned politicians. Both Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam supported the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) in an effort to provide a united stance against Chun.

In the 1985 National Assembly elections, the opposition was determined to improve the status of democratization. Though it did not win a majority, there was hope that the opposition could pressure the government to make more concessions. The opposition demanded more constitutional revisions, which were supported by anti-government students and workers. The NKDP party leader, Yi Min-U had previously drafted a seven point proposal but made a joint announcement with Kim Young Sam that the main goal would be the amendment for direct election of the president by January of 1987 (Koh 1985). Kim Dae Jung did not meet this decision with great enthusiasm. He was tired of compromising with the Chun regime and wanted to take more direct action. He was irritated by Kim Young Sam's decision to settle for less.

Chun did not want to deal with all of these pressures for reform until after the 1988 Summer Olympics, to be held in Seoul (Bedeski 1994). Debating over the amendments might create too much chaos and would make the country look unstable while all eyes closely focused on it. He officially resigned in February of 1988, which made the opposition more optimistic than ever that change was on the horizon. Previously, he had chosen a successor, but the opposition team of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae

Jung believed that they could beat the DJP candidate if they could just compete with Roh in a fair and directly contested election for president.

Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung had sensed the mood of the ruling party and split from the NKDP and formed the Republican Democratic Party (RDP) earlier, in 1987 (Kim, Kilh 1988). Kim Young Sam was elevated to president of the party on August 8th 1987. Students continued to protest and wreck havoc in the fragile country. The U.S. reversed its previous policies and conveyed its support for democratic forces. The Chun regime was feeling the pressures from everywhere and after witnessing the overthrow of the Marcos regime in the Philippines, knew that it needed to preempt the opposition from taking over completely. Roh decided, as the successor to Chun, to opt for a directly contested election instead of relying on his confirmation by the 5,000 member electoral college. This finally set the stage for the opposition to elect one of its own candidates.

The opposition should have been working around the clock to make sure that it was as cohesive and well organized as ever. It should have taken the time to coordinate its campaign and unite under a solid banner. Instead, personalism in politics made the opposition self-destruct. Before the 1987 presidential election, Kim Dae Jung left the RDP and formed the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD). How did this happen?

Both Kims were negotiating to create a more unified opposition party to successfully compete in the 13th National Assembly election, to be held on

April 26, 1988 (Bedeski 1994). Despite these attempts, their long time rivalry interfered. They could not agree on anything and this was only worsened by their personal contempt and distrust for one another. While in talks to discuss the terms of Kim Young Sam's bid for presidency, Kim Dae Jung became frustrated and they became involved in a power struggle. Kim Dae Jung was an uncompromising individual and believed that he could win on his own without being encumbered by Kim Young Sam's conciliatory policies. He formed the PPD, sealing the fate of the opposition.

Chapter 12

Lack of Local Autonomy: Government's Hidden Agenda

The self-destruction of the opposition was not the only factor inhibiting the democratization process in South Korea. South Korea's rocky road to democracy was also hindered by the lack of participation and autonomy at the local levels. In Taiwan, local autonomy was institutionalized early on, starting with the latter part of the Japanese colonial period. Thus, though there were many factors that obstructed democratization at the national level, (such as the ban on political parties) there were other means for the Taiwanese to express themselves in the democratic process. In addition, the Taiwanese became accustomed to having the right to participate, albeit on a small scale. Most importantly, it socialized the politicians who were not a part of the KMT machine how to compete effectively and bargain with the ruling party. They used the institutional outlets available to push the ruling party to democratize. This gentle pressure eased the ruling party of the chaos and instability that might accompany democratization. The establishment of local autonomy not only co-opted Taiwanese politicians, it also satisfied them enough and muted some of their frustrations. This eased the process in Taiwan considerably.

The opposition in South Korea was not afforded this luxury. The government refused to allow local autonomy to exist to the same extent as it did in Taiwan. South Korea has been highly monolithic and centralized, never allowing local autonomy to prevail.

In Taiwan, local elections were a prearranged and established institution. In South Korea, there were frequent changes made from the very beginning in the local government units, the legislative councils and with respect to local chief executives' power and terms of office. The government also abolished or postponed the implementation of the local self-government law.

When Syngman Rhee came to power in 1949 local autonomy was constitutionally mandated for the first time in Korean history. Article 96 provided the general principle that local self-ruling bodies should manage local administrative affairs and properties in accordance with laws to be adopted by the central government (Oh 1999: 153). The 1947 Local Autonomy Law in Japan, under the American occupation, had inspired the local autonomy laws. It was promulgated on July 4 and provided two layers of local administrative organizations for provinces and cities.

From the beginning there was little stability. For legislative council, the terms were changed constantly from four-year terms as stated in the 1949 Local Self Government Law, to three-year terms by 1956 (Oh 1999). In addition, the legislative council sessions were changed. The number of councilmen was reduced by 10% across all local governments. In addition, the vote of no confidence, which was originally banned, was applied to the mayor of the special city of Seoul and governors of provinces under the second amendment of 1956. The method of electing the provincial governors

and the mayor of Seoul also changed. The original draft called for a popular election of these positions. Rhee exercised his veto power and eliminated the direct election in favor of appointing these positions himself.

The first elections were not held until May 10, 1952 (Oh 1999). The government argued that numerous internal disturbances made it hard to hold local elections. It was amazing that local elections were held at all, given that they occurred in the midst of the Korean War. Despite this significant event, Rhee made sure that these popularly elected local councils had very little power and resources.

After 1958, he changed the methods for electing chiefs of towns and villages as well (Oh 1999). Previously, the Rhee regime had more popular support and he had more control over his future and the polity. As his legitimacy and popularity waned, he responded with counter measures to curb possible sources of contention and started appointing these positions as well.

Though local autonomy was restored in 1960, this period would be short-lived. After Rhee's regime collapsed, all members of councils in 1960 as well as chiefs of local governments at all levels were popularly elected. However, as soon as Park's military regime replaced the weak democracy in 1961, local democracy was destroyed. Local councils at all levels were dismantled and chiefs of all local governments were appointed by the central government.

Why was local autonomy not established in South Korea, while used to the advantage of the ruling KMT in Taiwan? The KMT needed to establish local autonomy to quell the aggravated public and also to co-opt the local Taiwanese elite. As an émigré regime, the KMT needed to establish some ties at the grassroots level and form connections to the public. The KMT was already a well-organized political organization that could incorporate local politicians and use them to its advantage. The Taiwanese were also accustomed to participating at the local level under Japanese colonial rule.

In South Korea, there was no need to co-opt local elite. Rhee and Park were both Korean born and did not need to appeal to the South Koreans in the same way that the KMT had to appeal to the Taiwanese. In addition, in South Korea, more so than in Taiwan, there was a deep suspicion of factions or anything that might lead to factional conflicts. The remnants of the Civil War left a permanent wound on their psyche and the need to maintain stability was paramount in the minds of the government as well as the public. There was also the contention that the Korean people lacked a strong political consciousness and didn't desire to participate in local elections. Rhee's Liberal Party lacked the political organization that the KMT enjoyed. The LP suffered from more legitimacy problems and could not guarantee that it would be able to use the local politicians to its advantage.

Park claimed that local autonomy should not be re-instated "until the unification of the fatherland had been accomplished," (Bedeski 1994: 49).

The government also claimed that the government had to wait to have more professionally trained individuals who were qualified technocrats that would be able to help the country achieve its goals in the ways Park envisioned. He claimed that national leaders were better equipped to handle the problems that governments faced at the local level and could better alleviate the gaps between local governments to promote more stability.

Park argued that local autonomy leads to intense political competition between political parties, factional and clan strife (Pae 1986: 117). He was concerned that the competition between political parties at the local levels would result in a political crisis that would freeze the administration. He was concerned that this factional strife would be a de-stabilizing factor in his own party.

The plea for local elections was not aided by the experiences with political corruption and mismanagement of personnel and public finances. As a result of the intense competition between politicians, there were many incidents of corruption, including bribes of key officials. Politicians also had to compete for votes and had to bribe voters as well, which led to the misappropriation of government funds. Local governments were also only concerned with short-term goals and were not in step with the national government's objectives because local politicians were more concerned with delivering immediate benefits to their constituents.

Park was concerned with building and later sustaining his power. Thus, allowing any type of grassroots movement to flourish would have directly threatened that. He did not need to satisfy the public with granting voters local autonomy. The public was already given the right to participate in national elections and as he saw it, that was sufficient.

What were the effects of the postponement of local autonomy? It removed institutionalized channels for effective citizen participation. There weren't institutional means for the public to express its demands and make the government accountable for its actions. The only mechanisms left for the South Korean public were more aggressive and obvious displays of emotion such as violent protests and uprisings. It also never enabled the opposition to gain more meaningful experience with the political process so that it could learn how to compete, how to campaign and how to slowly move the democratization process forward.

The government's prohibition of local autonomy would not be tacitly accepted for long. The opposition grew more and more impatient with the many years of authoritarian assertions of power and started to force more pressure on the Chun regime. Students were also playing a more pivotal role, creating an obstacle for the Chun administration. The Chun regime was facing severe legitimacy problems and was no longer receiving the same blind support from the U.S. as it had enjoyed in the past.

Chun needed to do something to appeal to these forces and decided in November 1984 to re-instate local autonomy during the first half of 1987. He commissioned the Research Committee on the Implementation of Local Autonomy in 1985 that was focused on the task of implementing it (Hahm, Sang 1997). Local autonomy would only be implemented to a limited scope in a few select areas and would occur in two phases, in order to smooth the transition, (so Chun argued). In order for an area to receive local autonomy it was argued that it must be financially self-reliant. Though numerous other cities were eligible in accordance with the Constitution, they were excluded nonetheless. Some of these inconsistencies were particularly suspicious given that many wealthy cities were not deemed financially self-reliant while smaller rural areas were granted autonomy regardless.

In addition, the central government refused to loosen its grip to any large extent, as important city and provincial government heads were appointed instead of elected. The government responded to the short period where these positions had been popularly elected during the Rhee regime and were changed because the non-appointed chief was not accountable to Rhee and did not obey his instructions. Chun wanted to keep these positions accountable to him.

To ensure that the DJP maintained control over governments at the local level, multi-member districts were installed that ranged from 2-5 seats per district. The decision to use SNTV was based on the notion that SMD

might provide too much uncertainty since the DJP was especially unpopular in the urban areas. A majority of the DJP's candidates won seats in the urban areas as secondary winners (Oh 1999).

In addition, to make matters more difficult for the opposition, the electoral districts were mal-apportioned. More than 36% of the thirty major urban districts had over 300,000 voters, while only 4.8% of the 62 rural districts had over 300,000 voters. The ratio of the average number of voters in seven major urban districts to rural districts was 279,543 to 171,188. Thus, there was an unequal distribution of electoral districts at the local level (Lee, S. 1999).

There were clearly problems with the local autonomy plan installed during the Chun regime. Roh had mounting pressure to improve the situation. In his Eight Point Declaration in 1987, one item announced that local autonomy would be improved to some extent. In 1989 the Local Autonomy Act was revised to allow the direct election of local councils at both the provincial and county levels (Bedeski 1994).

Initially after the Local Autonomy Act was drawn up and set forth, Roh was not pleased. He and his Democratic Liberal Party were concerned that the plan would aggravate regionalism. He was also concerned that local elections would require large amounts of money both for administrative purposes and for additional party campaigns. The government party was also

concerned that its popularity had decreased and Roh believed that implementing the Local Autonomy Act would be premature.

Though Roh tried to veto this act, due to fear that the government would lose control over local politics, three opposition parties gathered together to propose some sort of acceptable compromise. The opposition parties proposed a two-stage plan where there were local councils and local governments that would be established in 1991 and 1995, respectively. The first election for local council would be held in 1991 with mayoral and gubernatorial elections to be held in 1992. Roh agreed to this because the recent merger of his party with two other opposition parties reinforced him.

By re-instating it in 1991, it gives voters another institutional means of political expression, and enables political parties to involve themselves in recruitment and contact with the public. According to Bedeski, "the lack of local autonomy previous to June of 1991 has been crucial to the retardation of the party system and viable democratic government," (Bedeski 1984: 50).

Examining the Reasons Behind Reform in South Korea

It's important to note that the period of democratic reform has been much more recent for South Korea than Taiwan. As mentioned before, while Taiwan's path to democratization has been gradual since 1972, authoritarian leadership, lack of pressure from the United States and a weak opposition has stunted South Korea's democratization process. The leadership, in particular, was given the leverage to wreck havoc on South Korea's political development. Thus, the period of reform to be examined is more recent and occurred during a much shorter period. It was not until the United States changed its policies towards South Korea and the opposition (namely students) became much more demanding, that those in power were forced with no choice but to pursue democratic reforms. Again, the role of reform to the electoral system is examined in depth, in chapter 14.

Chapter 13

Role of the United States (1986-Current)

The U.S. was not only concerned with maintaining security and stability, but also with fostering economic growth. From 1954-1971, the U.S. assisted South Korea with a total of 3.8 billion dollars in aid. South Korea industrialized quickly and its per capita income reached 7,500 per year in a short time period. South Korea relied on the U.S. to absorb more than 25% of its exports. The U.S. was and still is South Korea's largest trading partner, exporting electronics, textiles, footwear, machinery, steel, iron, cars, toys, luggage and tires. The U.S. is crucial to maintaining South Korea's economic growth. It became apparent that the development of more reliable democratic institutions was also crucial to economic development. The U.S. had allowed the South Korean government to remain authoritarian during key stages of economic growth because of deeper security concerns in the region. The U.S. no longer provides South Korea with direct military assistance, but maintains the 37,500 plus number of troops necessary to counter the North's 1.2 million people army.

Thus, there is no doubt that the goal of security over the region had never waned but the patience with South Korea's lack of democratic development had expired. What took the U.S. so long to put serious pressure on South Korea to democratize? First, American Congressmen during the Reagan administration started to place more pressure on South Korea to

democratize, after the Kwangju incident. They knew that the U.S. needed to counter the anti-American sentiment among Koreans who believed that the U.S. was responsible for hindering democratic development in South Korea.

Second, it was not only the concern that the lack of democratization was not good for long term economic growth, but also the belief that the public was ready for it. The various student demonstrations illustrated this dissatisfaction with the lack of democracy. In addition, because of these protests, the U.S. believed that if the country didn't enact some democratic reforms soon, the result could be a great deal of political unrest that was destabilizing and threatening to security. Thus, given that the U.S. deemed that the country was ready for democracy, it now believed that the implementation of democratic institutions would bring in more stability than the previous system, led by Chun, which was widely unpopular.

Finally, the U.S. knew that all eyes were on South Korea after it won its bid to host the Olympics in 1988. This meant that political stability was of paramount importance to the success of the Olympic games. This was a tense time when any actions of suppression could result in retaliations from the public that would make South Korea appear to be vulnerable to North Korea. South Korea needed to provide a democratic face that seemed both stable and legitimate and invulnerable in the face of any threat.

This was evidenced by the actions on the part of the U.S. in the middle and late 1980's. First, the Reagan administration and U.S. Congressmen

made it known that they supported mass demonstrations in 1987. There were also resolutions in Congress to support the demands for more democracy and the U.S. finally warned the Korean government not to use military force to suppress popular dissent. This resonated stronger with the Chun regime due to the large level of coverage and exposure on the South Korean government, during the upcoming Olympic games to be held in Seoul.

The Chun regime also felt pressure to spare the life of Kim Dae Jung, who was on the verge of being executed. This was accompanied by pressure from the Japanese as well. Chun heeded these warnings because he knew that he would not gain any new supporters by refusing to do so. He could not afford the costs that would follow from Kim's execution, from either a domestic or foreign policy standpoint. Chun announced that Kim's life would be spared in exchange for life imprisonment.

Gaston Sigur, the assistant secretary of state, claimed that the U.S. made it clear around the time of 1987, that the South Korean government must respect the interests and rights of the people and supported the establishment of democratic institutions and processes. During a visit on February 6, 1987, he claimed that the U.S. government now perceived democracy to be the best prescription for economic growth and political stability. The U.S. also made it clear that it supported Chun's decision to step down and have free and fair elections.

Schultz, the secretary of state during the Reagan administration also made a visit to Seoul in 1987 to clarify that the U.S. government was squarely behind the democratization movement and wanted South Korea to establish democracy. He pressured Chun to establish democratic institutions and step down. The U.S. also made known that it was opposed to martial law and wanted the government to become more civilianized. In addition, both the House and the Senate passed resolutions calling for South Korea's resumption of negotiations on constitutional amendments to facilitate democratization. Thus, there were pressures both from Congress and Reagan to democratize (Clough 1987).

Why did it take the U.S. so long to change its policies? Why did it finally decide to place pressure on Chun to reform? First, the U.S. believed that democratic reforms were the most effective way to offset the widespread anti-American feelings that resulted as a consequence of the violent Kwangju Massacre.

Second, the U.S. foreign policy was undergoing a transformation. This was instigated by the fall of the Marcos regime, a revolution that stemmed from the bottom up in response to Marcos's authoritarian ways. The U.S. knew that, in the South Korean case, supporting a corrupt and authoritarian regime in the name of maintaining stability no longer served U.S. interests.

Third, the Olympic games constrained the hard-liners' positions in the Chun regime. There was no room for neutralizing democratic movements

through coercive measures as had been done in the past. The U.S. was well aware of the complexity of the situation. Coercive and reactionary responses to protests in light of the attention placed on South Korea could be very problematic for stability. The more logical choice was to emphasize pacifying the domestic political scene through compromise and conciliation.

Thus, the U.S. started to make its role in the democratic process more visible. This departed from the past pattern of only being concerned with security and economic stability. The Chun regime responded by announcing the lifting of martial law on January 24. He also agreed to step down, making the formal announcement in February of 1988. South Korea was finally making some progress in democratizing the government.

Chapter 14

Electoral Reform

The common pattern in South Korean politics according to Mo and Brady was that the dominant leader/party finally democratized only after being exposed to pressures so forceful that he believed that he had no choice. This was a conscious choice by the leaders to reduce the uncertainty that accompanied violent protests and demonstrations in favor of the uncertainty that accompanied the voting box. By 1988, these pressures were at a boiling point.

Thus, in order to reduce uncertainty most effectively, two goals had to be achieved. First, the leadership had to convince the opposition forces that the elections held under the new laws were legitimate. Second, the leadership needed to create an electoral system that would reduce its power as little as possible (Brady, Mo 1992: 427).

In reforming the electoral laws, these leaders were responding to a number of pressures that were becoming too much to deal with. The electoral reform that resulted after the negotiations between Roh and the opposition was a conscious choice by Roh. He believed that reform was the best solution to the internal and external pressures and would better enable him to achieve his objectives.

Why Roh Reformed

The Chun regime had been plagued by legitimacy problems from the beginning, stemming from the violent Kwangju Massacre, which left an indelible scar on his administration. Matters were exacerbated by his close connections to the military and coercive use of the police. His regime had also been accused of blatant acts of corruption and excessive pressure placed on the population to keep up the dramatic pace of labor that had characterized the Park regime. Finally, the absence of alteration in power helped frustration accrue, and unfair electoral laws were seen as another source to this problem. At this point, there were four sources of pressure on the Chun regime that shaped the political choices made available to his successor.

South Korea's socio-demographic characteristics had changed considerably with more and more educated individuals attaining more access to Western thoughts and ideals, particularly in the manner that the government was run. The student population, in particular, was frustrated and fed up with the Chun regime and the lack of democratic progress or for that matter, justice that had been made with his Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Students, the middle class and labor were demonstrating on the streets in 1986 (Bedeski 1994). They were tired of the broken promises. They were tired of living in a military state and they were tired of one-party

dominance. The country was ready for a change and the opposition seized upon this mood.

The opposition was well aware that students and workers were gaining more recognition from the United States, who was growing tired of the authoritarian abuse of power as well. The opposition, was getting more and more unyielding and seemed to be supported by the public and more so by the United States than in the past.

The U.S. at this point could no longer support a regime that seemed to be so illegitimate in the eyes of the public. To prevent further instability, it made more sense to enact democratic reforms so that the more vocal and destabilizing sectors of the country could be quelled.

Finally, South Korea had worked extremely hard to win a bid to hold the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul. Holding the Olympics in Seoul was sign of prestige and to some extent a sign of international acceptance. It was very important to South Korea's pride that the Olympics were held there and that everything went off without a hitch. Therefore, the responsibility was two-fold: South Korea needed to maintain as much stability as possible so that the sight of the games was not changed; and the country needed to appear democratic and not in the midst of domestic and political turmoil. Because of this, Chun decided to postpone the debate on Constitutional revision that had been demanded. He resigned on February 25, 1988 and

selected Roh Tae Woo to follow, who was subsequently voted in by a 5,000 member electoral college, (Kim, H. W. 1992: 213).

Roh Tae Woo was handpicked to be Chun's successor amidst an atmosphere of tension and pressure. Roh knew that his regime would be characterized by problems if he refused to make any changes. There were too many possible points of pressure that could result in a disastrous situation. Given almost no choice, Roh decided to declare his famous Eight Point declaration that probably shocked many in Chun's Democratic Justice Party.

He claimed in February of 1987 that the constitution should be amended to account for the changing character of the nation. He also claimed that civil rights should be restored and that amnesty should be given to political dissidents. He wanted to promote more freedom of the press and implement greater levels of local autonomy.

Also included in this declaration was the promise to hold a direct presidential election. This would be the first time ever since the Rhee regime. This promise of reform raised the hope to move the democratization process forward. It also meant that serious negotiations needed to occur regarding the electoral system.

How would the president be elected? A new National Assembly election was coming up and the previous electoral system was deemed to be overtly unfair to opposition parties. It was a huge impediment to

democratization. This section discusses the reasons behind the electoral choices made in 1988 and the bargaining that was involved in electoral reform.

Before discussing the electoral reform of the National Assembly, Roh had to decide how the president would be elected. More importantly, he had to make sure that he would win. Since he was chosen by Chun, he could have decided against holding an election, or fallen back on having the National Assembly elect him. Despite this, he knew that his reign as president would be tainted if he chose the latter routes. Thus, he announced that the presidential election in 1988 would be by direct popular vote.

Now the question was how was Roh going to win the election? He was associated with the Chun regime that was extremely unpopular and, unlike Park, was not considered responsible for the rapid economic growth and development the country had experienced. The opposition was a force to be reckoned with, and had two popular leaders in Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, that combined could garner a lot of votes. If this election had occurred in another setting, Roh's defeat would have been sealed.

Nevertheless, Roh knew that he could still win the race if he concentrated on three tactics. First, he needed to distance himself from the Chun regime, (which he did by later forming a new political party, during the negotiations for electoral reform of the National Assembly). (Which is nothing new in South Korea politics). Second, he needed to take full advantage of his access to

government funds and resources. Third, he needed to do what he could to split the opposition. This was a more difficult task, but was naturally facilitated by the self-destructiveness of the political opposition.

Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam were both very powerful personalities who had strong support from their respective regions of origins. It was observed that they did not always agree with one another on many issues and the manner in which the opposition should try to contend with the government. Kim Dae Jung advocated a more uncompromising approach to dealing with the ruling party and Kim Young Sam wanted to work more with the ruling party to enhance the prospects of reaching a compromise. They clashed often on issues and were often viewed as a stumbling block to the opposition's success.

Kim Dae Jung enjoyed almost a martyr like image due to years of being in prison and the various times that his life had been threatened by the Park regime (Oh 1999). He would have been killed during the Chun regime, if the U.S. had not pleaded with Chun to spare Kim's life. He was considered by many to be an unyielding fighter for democracy and justice. He also rallied many that demanded more radical changes. He hailed from the Cholla region where the Kwangju massacre had occurred and garnered much sympathy and popularity from those that had been affected and enraged by that event. He was also extremely stubborn and he butted heads with the more conciliatory Kim Young Sam.

Kim Young Sam was from the Pusan region of Korea and had strong support from this area. He was another popular figure, though he did not grow up in such an under privileged background as Kim Dae Jung had. Thus, the problem was simple. They differed on too many different issues and felt that they had strong support from their respective regions of origin. They both believed that separately and not together, they had a better chance of accomplishing their agendas.

Roh seized upon this and provided encouragement to each candidate of his chances without the other. The two Kim's could not agree on a single opposition candidate for the presidential election. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung decided to create new political parties, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), respectively, to back them up and risk their chances. A fourth candidate, Kim Jong Pil, who had long been a fixture in Korean politics since the Park regime also decided to create his own new political party, the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) and run on his own. Thus, an important aspect of this election was that no candidate had national constituencies. Each candidate, "like a Chinese warlord had his own solid territory", (Lee, M. 1990: 46).

Another aspect of the election was the clear advantages to the ruling party. It was equipped with more sophisticated computer facilities that were used to disseminate information and help the party communicate with voters.

It had better instruments to study the attitudes of voters. They relied on "dongs" or precincts as indispensable tools for gaining this information about voters (Lee, M. 1990: 48).

The ruling party was also advantaged by its access to financial resources, organizations and information. The party knew that it needed to manipulate just 15% of the vote in a four-way race, knowing that it could count on 20% of the vote (Lee, M. 1990: 49). The DJP could also count on absentee ballots, since the balloting could be easily worked with. In addition, soldiers often voted in front of their battalion commanders, which guaranteed their support for the ruling party.

Another strategy that was nothing new to South Korean campaign methods was resorting to vote buying in the form of "gift giving". There were many Korean voters who were unsophisticated and ill informed, poor and vulnerable, and were thus, willing to exchange their votes for 20\$-30\$ or towels, soaps and free trips, etc.

The opposition did not benefit from this. It lacked the necessary resources to campaign in this manner. The opposition estimated that the government party spent over one billion won (25,000,000\$) for the campaign (Kim, H.W. 1992). The DJP clearly benefited from the centralized and administrative organizations for campaign purposes. The opposition also seriously underestimated the achievements of the previous regimes (despite all of the corruption, repression and human rights abuses) and how many

military supporters were concerned that an opposition leader, and Kim Dae Jung, in particular, constituted a possible threat to South Korea's security. Despite all of the numerous problems associated with the previous regimes and the vocal opposition of students, the ruling party was considered a safer choice, especially among those with little education, the reactionary upper class who did not want to change the status quo, and farmers, fisherman and miners.

Roh's next strategy was to make sure that all of the candidates entered the race, to split their vote. The DJP encouraged Kim Dae Jung to run on his own. There was evidence to prove that the ruling party had carefully helped mobilize crowds for each of the Kims to make them think that they had more popular support than they had. Both Kims were drawing large crowds of more than one million people. They were unable to detect that the ruling party mobilized many of these spectators.

Though Kim Dae Jung's image was raised to hero status in his hometown, he was deemed as selfish and ambitious when he decided to run on his own, by many. This decision made him appear unwilling to compromise and tarnished his image. He failed to expand his support base outside his region. Some of Kim Young Sam's more moderate supporters were also upset by his selfishness. Many withdrew support during the latter stage of the campaign to Roh's advantage.

During the election campaign, all presidential candidate's exploited regionalism by emphasizing his own regional attachments repeatedly. Another campaign ploy was to denigrate the regional attachments of the other candidates. "Political violence and regional antipathy marred campaign rallies of all of the candidates", (Lee, M. 1990: 49). Kim Young Sam was broadly supported everywhere except in the Cholla regions. He was the only one who had a chance of winning among opposition candidates, and probably should have been the unified opposition's choice to run.

However, there was a huge rivalry between the Honam (where Cholla was located) and Kyungsang (where Pusan was located) regions. Cholla voters would not vote for Kim Young Sam and Kyungsang voters would not vote for Kim Dae Jung. The result of the election demonstrated how strong regional ties affected voters. Kim Dae Jung received 90.3% of the vote in South Cholla and 83.5% of the vote in North Cholla, both part of the Honam province, but only received 26.5% of the overall vote. Overall, Roh was able to win due to the inability of the opposition leaders to field a single candidate. In term of popular votes, Roh's party, the DJP received 34% of the vote, Kim Young Sam's party, the RDP received 23.8% of the votes, Kim Dae Jung's party, the PPD received 19.3% of the vote and Kim Jong Pil's party the NDRP received 15.6% of the votes (Lee, M. 1990: 49). Many scholars argued that if the opposition parties could have banded together, they would have easily won.

However, M. Lee (1990) wrote that there was an important obstacle to the success of the opposition in this election. As he saw it, the electoral laws caused this situation. Lee argued that the opposition's inability to field a single candidate was built into the structure of opposition politics. There was no effective mechanism to resolve this kind of conflict. The opposition never had a stable institutionalized democratic structure. The parties had been based on personalities and did not have a strong organization structure.

Furthermore, Lee claimed that this situation could have been rectified with the use of primaries to settle the nomination issue of the election. Primaries would have been beneficial to the ruling party because it would help the leaders within it adhere to some sort of rules to guide their decisions, and make them accountable to the public. The absence of primaries was more acute given that there were no reliable national opinion surveys to help the opposition settle the issue. Article 48 of the Constitution banned any type of mock balloting of a candidate's primary to the presidential election. Anyone who engaged in this action faced going to jail for up to three years or paying a large fine. This banning of primaries served the interests of the ruling party that was organized in more centralized and hierarchical structure and could easily regulate the nomination process. The opposition, however, was left to self-destruct in the absence of procedures to help run and organize itself.

Electoral reform of the National Assembly was the next item on the agenda. The DJP had done so well due to the two-member district system,

which was biased against the urban areas, gave unequal vote values and over-represented the ruling party with the addition of PR.

The bargaining over electoral reform occurred under the following conditions. According to Mo and Brady, the final choice must be viewed as legitimate (1992: 411). This was important since the legitimacy issue was important to all of those involved. Thus, for the regime to be considered legitimate, the electoral laws needed to be fair. They also claimed that there are different electoral systems that can be considered acceptable, and in this context, any system that resembled the previous corrupt systems, would be out of the question. Third, Mo and Brady argued that these choices that the political party leaders make in this process are affected by the uncertainty of the situation (1992: 411).

There were four areas of contention regarding electoral reform. First, when would the election be held? Second, what type of system would be chosen? Would it be divided in districts, would proportional representation be used or would a mixed system be used? Third, what would the district magnitude be? Fourth and finally, how would district lines be drawn?

The DJP had been happy with the results of the presidential election and wanted to take advantage of this momentum by holding the National Assembly elections as soon as possible. Roh based this decision on the amount of information available about the voters, and believed that voters would cast their ballots in a similar manner.

The NDRP, Kim Jong Il's party, was also in favor of holding a quick election in order to prevent the PPD and the RDP from gaining too much power early on. Because the PPD and the RDP had not done well in the election, they wanted to postpone the election as long as possible, so Roh's party did not benefit from this momentum.

There were three types of systems that were discussed. First, South Korea could have implemented complete SMD. This gives the parties a lot of uncertainty but could lead to big rewards. This type of system benefits parties that came in first in certain districts due to their regional allegiances, but aren't so big and dominant that their votes are dispersed throughout the country. It should also eventually lead to a two-party system, which was considered most stable.

The other possibility was the implementation of a mixed system that used partial SMD. This allows more room for mistakes, since the threshold is not as high as in a purely SMD system. Thus, a party who does not do well in the direct election may be able to still gain representation with the proportional allocation of votes. It tempers the chances of extreme and disastrous results that can lead to a radical change.

The final possibility was using multi-member districts which gives parties that have strong candidates a real chance and guarantees them that they will win seats where they otherwise wouldn't have in SMD. It guarantees that almost all parties will gain some representation, especially if the district

sizes are fairly large. Nevertheless, as demonstrated with the Japanese and Taiwanese case, it leads to factional strife and is associated with money politics and pushing candidate characteristics to the forefront.

In the beginning, the DJP favored a mixed system. The ruling party had benefited from it in the past and was aware that this type of system would do damage control for any close election. It added more certainty that no matter what, the DJP would always be in power or have a fair amount of control since the dramatic aspects of SMD were moderated. Both the PPD and the RDP favored single-member district/plurality (SMD) as was practiced in the U.S., although the RDP was aware of the benefits of the mixed system, since Kim Young Sam knew his votes were more dispersed than Kim Dae Jung's. Kim Dae Jung argued in favor of SMD because he believed that it would truly democratize the system. Kim Jong Pil's NDRP naturally favored using multi-member districts since his party could benefit from the lower threshold. (MMD tended to help smaller parties gain seats, although the KMT benefited from it because it was extremely well organized).

The biggest issue of contention became the fight over district magnitude, regardless of whether or not it was mixed or not. This issue was so controversial due to the large distortion in the voter-seat relationship that had been created with the past system. The use of two-member districts had put a negative taste in voter's mouths and they associated it with the unfair authoritarian regimes of the past.

During the first round of negotiations, Kim Dae Jung was the most unyielding. His hard-core stance, actually alienated some of the members within in his own party and he realized that he needed to ease up after some defected to another party. The negotiation process was at such a standstill, that the public began to pressure the Kims to step down, because their stubbornness was viewed as a huge obstacle to the opposition's unification and further democratization.

The leaders also had to take into consideration the overall mood of the country and their individual supporters. Of DJP supporters, 49.4% favored SMD. Of RDP supporter, 68.4% favored SMD. Of PPD supporters, 78.6% favored SMD. Finally, of NDRP supporters, SMD was a preferred at a ratio of 2.3 to 1 (Mo, Brady 1992). Nevertheless, parties differed on this issue compared to their identifiers because their interest was determined by the spatial distribution of votes. Parties with more concentrated strength would favor SMD whereas parties with flatter distributions would favor multi-member districts or a mixed system.

Nevertheless, not all of the parties enjoyed a concentrated strength and could have benefited more from PR. Why was it not adopted? The system would have been the most just and it would have minimized the discrepancy between votes and seats. PR had proven to be a power sharing mechanism in most countries. Despite these credentials, the PR system was not used in Korea. Despite the strength of regionalism, compared to Western

nations, South Korea does not have as many political cleavages. Pure PR is conducive to multi-partyism and fragments the party system. The incentive to form new parties is too strong, something that caused instability in the past. Thus, the four largest parties involved in the decision-making process had no incentive to use PR, and further increase the number of parties.

During the second round of negotiations, both Kims from the PPD and the RDP tried to get over their differences and attempted to work out a merger between the two parties. They came to a tentative conclusion where it was decided to advocate a one to three-member district plan, which would give Roh a chance to become the opposition party leader. The RDP would not have benefited from the SMD system on its own because its strength was too widespread. It had finished second in 119 districts but only won 35 districts outright. The DJP and the RDP had received 25% of the vote in ten regions in the 1987 presidential election. The PPD and the NDRP were only strong in two regions, but because the PPD was guaranteed wins in the Cholla regions, it benefited more from SMD than any other type of system. Nevertheless, being strong in two regions was not enough to have much control in the National Assembly. The PPD knew that it needed to merge with another party if it was to have a chance.

On February 19th of 1988, a MMD plan was pushed forward. However, four days later the proposed merger between the PPD and RDP was dropped because there were too many two-member districts and only thirty single-

member districts. Kim Dae Jung was having trouble making an agreement with Kim Young Sam and decided to renege on his agreement in favor of SMD (Kim H.W. 1992).

Ironically, the PPD, RDP and the DJP ended up proposing SMD on February 28th. What made Roh change his mind? First, the Roh and DJP knew that the proposal would be risky, but they believed that they could win a majority based on the results from the recent presidential election. They knew that any type of system that too closely resembled the electoral systems of the past would not be accepted. It was not viewed as credible because it was inherited from an authoritarian past and the origin of its design was to perpetuate political power. They wanted to promote a system that looked democratic and promoted stable government in the eyes of the international community. There was a lot of pressure on Roh from so many different angles that it served his interests to pursue the system that would best enhance his legitimacy. More importantly, he believed his party could benefit from it.

Brady and Mo (1992) illustrated Roh's cost/benefit analysis and what affected his risk evaluations. He was aware that there were 52 districts that would be very competitive, 33 districts with possible wins. Though MMD would be a safer bet, it was less lucrative. He believed that promoting this system would also split the negotiations between the two main opposition parties and their votes would be split in the election. Brady and Mo also

noted that optimistic media reports skewed the DJP's risk evaluations of the SMD formula. At the beginning of March, the Dong a Ilbo, (a news publication) predicted that 70-80% of the DJP would win. On April 9th, the Korea News Review described the popularity of the DJP as "fast soaring" (From Brady and Mo: 434).

As was stated before, public opinion also pushed for change. Given this, Roh was in a unique opportunity where he had the resources to make an important change that could both fulfil some of his personal goals and make him look admirable in contributing to the democratization process.

Roh seized upon this chance to appear as a fighter for the people's rights and democracy, arguing that SMD was the people's wish. He claimed that it was the most honorable and moral choice. He knew that his party would benefit from the rhetoric in the process. More importantly, if he preempted the squabbling and disorganized opposition, he could dampen the risk factors and get to draw up the district lines in a favorable manner, another hot area of contention.

He wanted to emphasize the rural areas where the government party had traditionally garnered support. He assigned disproportionately fewer seats to Seoul than the more rural areas in the expectation of these traditional voting patterns. The low district limit of 88,000 voter per district versus the high limit of 350,000 also permitted the DJP more leverage in drawing district lines compared to the PPD's plan which ranged from 100,000 to 200,000

voters per district. The DJP wanted to give the five largest cities that had 44.4% of the population only 34.3% of the seats (Kim, H.W. 1992). By submitting this proposal early, he could preempt anything from the opposition and allow the DJP to build in some presumed advantages such as gerrymandering the districts without facing as much criticism.

Given, that Roh's term was not renewable, Roh had three reasons for pursuing the more risky SMD plan. First, he could preempt the opposition and get some compromises from the opposition regarding the drawing of district lines. Second, he could take care of public interests and make a name for himself in the democratization process. Brady and Mo wrote that in "wake of the democratic transition, public expectation was high for Roh to deliver public goods, such as a fair electoral system to consolidate democracy as peacefully as possible – while memory of public uprising on the eve of the transition was still fresh," (1992: 434). Third, he thought that he could still win more seats with this system, nonetheless.

This strategy created problems for the opposition. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were having trouble coming to any agreement. They were fighting over how the capital city of Seoul should be represented and argued in favor of giving 21.8% of the seats to Seoul. As they continued to bicker over their differences, the final bill was passed unilaterally by the DJP, giving 18.8% of the seats to Seoul. The final bill assigned nine provinces with

55.6% of the population share with 65.7% of the seats and further divided up the opposition in the process, (Mo, Brady 1992: 425).

Oddly enough, Roh's party did not benefit as much as he had thought from all of this bargaining. The results were a setback for the DJP. In the 13th National Assembly election that was held in April of 1988, to no surprise to many, the pattern of regional voting continued. However, what might have surprised the ruling party was how poorly it did.

The DJP earned only 34% of the popular vote, which was lower than the previous election. Despite all of the promises for democratization by Roh and his recent election as President, none of that momentum helped his party win a majority. His party came away with 125 of the 299 seats in the newly expanded National Assembly. Kim Dae Jung's PPD gained 70 seats and Kim Young Sam's RDP won 59 seats. Finally, Kim Jong Pil's NDRP (NDRP) earned 35 seats.

The opposition should have banded together to seize the ruling party's vulnerability, but to no surprise to political insiders in South Korea, was unable to cooperate. The ruling party's majority had collapsed and secured only 42% of the seats. Previously it had a 58% majority. Now the opposition was in control. Nevertheless, the three opposition party leaders could not cooperate on anything. They simply could not work together. Kim Dae Jung's tactics were too radical for the more conservative Kim Young Sam and Kim

Jong Pil. Moreover, personal animosity and an inability to trust one another wrecked the chances of compromise and cooperation.

Though the inability of the opposition to cooperate did not shock many, the willingness of the ruling party and two of the opposition parties to merge did. The move seemed unjustifiable for the opposition parties. Both parties were the "rival anti-power symbols in South Korea" and could not "risk a unilateral, pro-government move because a compromise of one Kim with the ruling side would automatically be condemned by the other as outright collusion," (Pak, J. 1990: 1157).

In January of 1990, Kim Young Sam told Roh Tae Woo that if the DJP wanted to dissolve itself, the RDP would do the same so that both parties could merge. Kim Jong Pil's NDRP also joined the bill and the merger was announced on January 22, 1990 that all three parties would now be known as the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). This merger helped the DLP secure a total of 221 seats out of 299. (Which was a big jump from 127, for the DJP, 59 for the RDP and 35 for the NDRP). The integrated DLP was formally founded on February 9, 1990, giving it an absolute majority in the National Assembly (Kim, H.W. 1992). The DLP pledged its commitment to democracy and to creating a new political order.

Chapter 15

Key Elections in the Democratic Era

1992 Presidential Election: Kim Young Sam is Elected- The Opposition Finally Wins

Huntington argued that the litmus test for a consolidated democracy is when a country holds two fair and democratic elections in a row, known as the two-turnover test, (1991). South Korea looked to be on its way to achieving that with the upcoming 1992 presidential election. It was ushering in a new era of "civilian government, as Roh was prepared to step down with many of the former opposition candidates given the chance to succeed him.

Nevertheless, one problematic feature of the South Korean political system is the persisting strength of personalism. The political selfishness of the opposition politicians and their inability to agree on a single candidate ruined their opportunity to win the seat of the presidency, as described in the previous chapter. South Korean politicians continue to behave in ways that impede on the country's democratic development. They are more fueled by greed and the thirst for power, than the commitment to democracy. This desire for power influenced the shocking merger that occurred on January 22 of 1990 (Kim, H.W. 1992). It was announced that Roh's ruling Democratic Justice Party and Kim Young Sam's Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Jong Pil's New Democratic Republican Party would merge into the Democratic Liberal Party. This enabled the party to have a super majority in

the National Assembly and illustrated how pliable these parties' platforms were when the opportunity knocked for more power.

Though both Kims and Roh had been bitter opponents at one time, Roh agreed to the merger in order to have more control over the National Assembly, which had been plagued by gridlock. For, Kim Young Sam, however, the move was viewed with deep suspicion. How could someone so intent on criticizing the ruling party and the years of authoritarian oppression (and Roh, himself, for his involvement in the December 12 incident), suddenly change his tune to join his former opponents? Kim Dae Jung was particularly irate about the merger. He argued that it was a calculated maneuver to stymie his efforts. Kim Young Sam viewed it as the opportunity to finally win the presidency. He had the best chances of being elected to head the party by catering to the more conservative faction members and joining the merger. Still, many of his followers were stunned by his decision and not every member of his Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) followed him into the merger. Though the merger was justified in the name of easing the gridlock, it was viewed as purely a political move to serve the ambitions of greedy, power-hungry politicians.

Since Roh could not run again for election, Kim Young Sam's real rival was not Roh, but Kim Dae Jung, the perennial opposition candidate with whom he had an embittered personal relationship with. The fact that their personal rivalry seemed to constantly get in the way of political affairs

illustrates the level of personalism in South Korean politics that has yet to be removed. It detracts from the development of communicating more important political issues to the public so that political decisions could be based on policy and not on personal characteristics.

This election would not depart from the past in that respect. Personal issues were at the forefront of the battle to win the presidency. The stakes, again, were extremely high, placing more pressure on all candidates involved to pull out all the stops during the campaign.

Kim Young Sam's decision to merge proved fruitful as the party convened on May 19, 1992 and nominated Kim Young Sam as its candidate to run in the presidential election. Kim Dae Jung would also run under his Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD). The third candidate was Chong Ju Yong, who entered at the last minute under the United People's Party (UPP), who previously was the chairman emeritus of Hyundai (Oh 1999). Unlike previous elections, all of the candidates were civilians, a first since General Park had usurped power over thirty years ago.

In addition, the public clearly demonstrated that it was becoming more and more committed to democracy, or at least to fair elections. A coalition of over 250 organizations, established local watchdog groups "to expose any corrupt or coercive practice in electioneering such as the distribution of gifts of money or the application of pressure by local officials, including the police," (Oh 1999: 123). This was a far cry from the infamous 1960 election, where

the election had been treated like a formality to anoint the ruling party and all methods of ensuring the victory were pursued. The public was clearly tired of both electoral fraud and the unfairness of the electoral laws. Though the electoral laws had finally been changed, the practice of vote- buying and gift giving had not. The public demonstrated an effort to clean things up. Thus, though there are many elements of the South Korean public's political culture that are not compatible with democracy, it is certain that holding fair and democratic elections has taken on a significant meaning to the public, and the public is committed to bringing them.

In addition, on October 8, 1992, Roh, in a democratic gesture, nominated a non-partisan cabinet to administer the upcoming December election. This was a well-received move that demonstrated the commitment of the South Korean leaders to at least hold fair electoral contests. However, it did nothing to eradicate the nature of the campaigns, which were extremely expensive and where personal characteristics overshadowed important issues.

Kim Young Sam campaigned with ceaseless amounts of energy for days. As stated in the previous section, he benefited from numerous campaign perks, such as access to government helicopters. Kim Dae Jung, did not benefit from these advantages, but was a charismatic figure, nonetheless. Both candidates again, drew large crowds during the campaign, and this time, the onlookers had not been paid off by Roh to attend the rallies.

In the end, Kim Young Sam came away with the victory (Oh 1999). And though the public demonstrated a commitment to democratic elections, the public's voting behavior illustrated its reliance on traditional patterns of voting. Once again, regional ties still overshadowed the importance of political issues. The regions of origin of the two Kims demonstrated this phenomenon.

Kim Young Sam came away with 41.4% of the votes while Kim Dae Jung earned 33.4%. Chong received a respectable 16.1% of the votes, given that he was a last minute candidate. Though regionalism had clearly guided the voting behavior of the masses in South Korea, the important fact was that a transfer of power occurred peacefully. Kim Dae Jung did not contest the victory and gracefully conceded his defeat, (Oh 1999: 124). This was an important step in South Korea's political development. It had passed the two-turnover test.

1997 Presidential Election: Kim Dae Jung is Elected –(Ushering in a New Era?)

The upcoming 1997 presidential election was another chance for South Korea to prove that it was committed to democracy. The previous years had been wrecked by both political and economic turmoil. Kim Young Sam's administration had been rocked by corruption and scandal after scandal. The collapse of the Hanbo group, which was billions of dollars in

debt, lead to a major recession. The arrest of his son and the numerous allegations of his involvement in scandals had further hurt Kim's credibility.

Kim Young Sam's approval ratings were at an all time low compared to his over 80% approval ratings in 1993, when he was first in office. All of this, however, boded well for Kim Dae Jung to make a come-back and seize the opportunity to finally win the prize that he had coveted most; the office of the presidency. Though he declared magnanimously that he was retiring from politics, after his 1992 defeat, one could hardly believe that he would stick to those words. He did not spend much time hesitating on the decision once the opportunity appeared and he quickly formed a new party, the National Congress for New Politics Party (NCNP), which he headed, himself (Oh 1999).

The other Kim, to no surprise also was nominated to run under the United Liberal Democratic Party (ULDP). He had started up this party shortly after he had lost his position of chairmanship of the DLP, now called the New Korea Party (NKP). He advocated a parliamentary style of government to free the country from the corruption of the presidential system (Oh 1999).

In a first for South Korea, the NKP held a primary to nominate its presidential candidate. This was much different than the previous practices of nominations made by party bosses in highly centralized political parties. Both the opposition and ruling parties were in no way organized and run in a democratic manner. The opportunities to run for office were based on

calculated decisions on the part of those in high positions within the party's vertical structure that were based on loyalty and bribes. This departure from that method allowed seven aspiring candidates from the NKP to compete. Lee Hoi Chang won the highly competitive battle, in the first open and competitive primary, possibly in an effort to find the candidate that the public would most approve of. The party was damaged by the transgressions during the previous administration and needed all the help it could get.

The final candidate was Cho Soon, who had been the first elected mayor of Seoul. Cho was considered a dark horse because of his knowledge of and expertise in economic affairs. He had been an economics professor and was the former Vice Prime Minister in charge of the economy under Roh.

This economic expertise was of the utmost importance given all of the problems that were plaguing the South Korean economy. Though it had previously surpassed the ten thousand dollar mark in per capita income, it was hit by an economic crisis that necessitated an IMF bailout. The country was over 90 billion dollars in debt and the future looked gloomy.

The stakes were high for both Kims as it appeared that it was their best chance to finally win the presidency. Somehow, the formal political rivals were able to resolve their differences and they managed to form an alliance with one another, for obvious political reasons. Kim Dae Jung demonstrated once again, that his commitment to winning was more important than his commitment to his party's platform. Kim Jong Pil merged to guarantee him

the position of Prime Minister and the promise from Kim Dae Jung to pursue the parliamentary system. Nevertheless, it glaringly illustrated that power was more important to South Korea's political leaders than policy.

A positive trend however, possibly stemming from the March 1994 Reform package (to be discussed later in the chapter) was the emergence of more public opinion polls to monitor the elections and measure the mood of the public. Kim Dae Jung was the frontrunner in this battle. He benefited from the allegations that Lee Hoi Chang's sons had evaded military service. In an action that demonstrated South Korea's lack of commitment to the primary system, one of the other candidates from the NKP, Rhee in-je ran on his own, splitting the ruling party's chances of winning for certain.

Allegations, however, were also thrown in Kim Dae Jung's direction regarding the amounts of money that he had stashed away in slush funds. Luckily for Kim, the investigation was forestalled until after the election. Though the news provided more fuel for his critics to dislike him ever more than before, it did not change the outcome of what the polls were predicting. More than 80% of the public turned out on December 18, 1997. He received just over 40% of the vote, while Lee received 38.7% of the vote. Rhee received 19.2% of the vote, demonstrating that his actions were selfish and self-destructive to the ruling party (Oh 1999). Kim escaped with the victory due to the timely errors of his opponents, a blunder that he had committed himself, ten years ago.

Again regionalism played a significant role in voting behavior, but the troubling economy was also a factor. The ruling party was blamed for the economic crisis and many angry middle class voters apparently wanted to punish Lee for this, by voting for the opposition. The election was a major victory for Kim who had almost died in his efforts to fight the ruling government in previous years. He had been a candidate several times before and survived somehow to comeback and win the presidency after being kidnapped, jailed and exiled. Though his ambitions often overshadow many of his achievements, it must be noted that he had overcome many obstacles. The question is, now that he has achieved all that he could possibly want, will he remain so committed to democracy?

2000 Parliamentary Elections

In the late 1990's, South Korea suffered from a disastrous economic slump with the Asian Financial Crisis putting the country in billions of dollars in debt. Politically, however, South Korea was taking steps to consolidate its democracy rather than regress, as it had in the past. South Korea was passing what Huntington would refer to as the two-turnover test (1991). It had two fair and direct presidential elections with Kim Young Sam winning in 1992 and Kim Dae Jung winning narrowly in 1997. In light of the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, Kim Dae Jung needed his party to win as many seats as possible in the National Assembly elections, to be held on April 13,

2000, in order to push through his economic programs. The results would impact how effective Kim could govern. Naturally, there were a number of new names competing in the election. In addition to this phenomenon, there was more evidence that confirmed that Korean politics had not let go of old bad habits.

The ruling party, led by Kim Dae Jung was the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), quite possibly the seventh or eighth party that Kim had belonged to. Also competing was the leading opposition party, the Grand National Party (GNP) who argued that Kim and the MDP had not been governing well and ineptly dealt with the many problems facing the economy. It also believed that the MDP was abusing power, a common accusation of Korean ruling parties. The MDP was formed as a result of a (temporary) merger between Kim's previous party, the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP) and the Kim Jong-Pil's party the United Liberal Democrats (ULD). They combined since Kim Dae Jung had only narrowly defeated his competitor in the 1997 presidential election. Nevertheless, their combined number of seats was not enough to have any type of command over the National Assembly (Kim, H.N. 2000).

This temporary merger did not sit well with the opposition. The opposition was bitter over this maneuver and took it out on Kim when voting for his initiatives and reform packages. It was uncooperative and took almost six months to confirm Kim Jong-Pil as Prime Minister. Kim knew he needed

to restructure the balance of power in the National Assembly and thus, pleaded with opposition members to defect. As has happened several times before, numerous defections took place. Why has this been such a phenomenon in Korean politics? Kim resorted to the common tactic of threatening to audit various opposition members suspected of corruption, violating campaign finance laws and tax evasion. Naturally, the charges were dropped as soon as the opposition members defected (Kim, H.N. 2000: 896).

The effects were distressing for the GNP. Kim Dae Jung's tactics led to a defection of 25 opposition members. In addition, three GNP legislators lost their seats after being found guilty of the charges since they did not cooperate and five resigned while another chose to run as an independent. This enraged the GNP even more and gridlock ensued, as the GNP refused to work with the ruling party in any shape or form.

One would think that after years of fighting for democracy, Kim Dae Jung would practice what he preached once he had the chance to do so. The events that occurred next proved that the leadership in South Korea has not been devoted to democratic practices for its own sake, and has merely fought for more democracy to increase its own chances to rule. Kim pursued the same tactics of his predecessors. He tried to make his party more of a vote getting machine, by broadening its appeal, and aimed to change the electoral system to benefit his own party.

In order to reorganize his party, he tried to merge again with the ULD. By this point, it was nearing the end of 1999 and Kim Dae Jung had already opportunistically renamed his party to coincide with the millennium. The two Kims had merged before when Kim Dae Jung promised to implement a parliamentary cabinet style system by early 2000. When it became clear that that was not going to happen, Kim Jong-Pil decided it was not in his best interest to ally with Kim Dae Jung again. Kim Jong-Pil also wanted to distance himself from the Kim Dae Jung regime since it had been entangled in scandals that had brought about a decline in government popularity (Kim, H.N. 2000).

Thus, Kim Dae Jung was now left with the MDP without the support of the Kim Jong-Pil. The party's core elements remained virtually the same, though he did manage to recruit some new faces. His other concern, the revision of the electoral system, would have more significant consequences. Negotiations took place during the fall of 1999. Initially, the ruling coalition that comprised of the ULD and the NCNP wanted to replace the existing electoral system that was comprised of predominantly SMD and some PR with SNTV, similar to what is still used in Taiwan. After having analyzed the effects of SNTV, it should come to no secret why the ruling party would want to use it. It could divide up its main competitors and enable the party to win all of the seats in Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil's regions of origin. It could also enable them to win seats for third and fourth place finishers in districts

where their popularity base was not as large. The GNP, however, was not in favor of this change.

The current system, more specifically, allotted one-sixth of the assembly seats to be allocated to the parties in proportion to the percentage of total votes that each received under the SMD portion (Kim, H.N. 2000: 897). In this set up, the GNP could win a comfortable majority because it had well-organized constituencies throughout South Korea, with the exception of the Honam region. The GNP didn't believe that it could benefit from having its candidates compete against each other and were afraid that it might get shut out in the regions where both Kims were popular. In addition, a change to SNTV was associated with corruption and excessive vote buying that had plagued the Park and Chun regimes. Simply put, it put a bad taste in the mouth of the GNP.

After a long negotiating period, the ruling NCNP and the GNP agreed to a hybrid system that used both PR and SMD, and was similar to the system used in Japan. Under the proposed system 258 of the 299 National Assembly seats would be elected by SMD and the remaining 41 would be chosen under the PR system from party lists. Unlike the previous combined PR and SMD systems, in this system the voter would be allowed two votes to cast (one for the PR list and one for SMD) instead of one.

The proposal never passed, however. It was met with pressure from civic groups who criticized the fact that a candidate could run simultaneously

both in an SMD and a PR list. This was viewed as undemocratic since a candidate could lose in one election but win in another. Civic groups were also displeased with the amounts of seats that were available to party lists. The practice of running candidates on a party list had the opposite connotations of the intended theoretical consequences of PR. Instead of allowing for more representation of smaller parties, it allowed seats to be sold off to the highest bidder and was a means of acquiring money for party bosses.

At this point, time was running out for more negotiations. As a result, the NCNP and the opposition party agreed in early February of 2000 to keep the existing electoral system, but to reduce the total number of seats from 299 to 273. They also decided to reapportion legislative districts where the changes had occurred in the population. The PR system was also retained with 46 seats to be distributed to each party who met the requirements of winning at least 5% of the popular vote or five seats in the assembly. The allocation of those seats would be made in proportion to each party's share of the popular vote (Kim, H.N., 2000, pg. 898). The remaining 227 seats would use SMD.

Though the ruling party had tried to change the system to better suit its needs, it was unable to do so, due to the more effective checks on presidential power. Previously, changes to the electoral system could have easily been maneuvered. Now, the legislature was no longer a rubber stamp

to the executive's policies and could successfully contend with the ruling party. Thus, though the leadership in Korea has not exhibited a serious commitment to democratic practices, changes in the institutions have prohibited these leaders from increasing their authority and power.

Kim Dae Jung was unable to secure his changes to the electoral system, but why would he need to? Why did he think this was so important? Kim knew that his regime was in trouble for many reasons. The country was still experiencing economic problems. Moreover, corruption and scandals, the very focus of his campaign had tarnished his administration. There were many individuals in his administration involved in various scandals and his inability to take action did not bode well for his regime, in the eyes of the public.

In addition, his manner of ruling the government was not much different from Korean leaders of the past. He was revengeful of his opponents and used his power to enact his revenge on them. He was also accused of illegally monitoring his opponents' activities, just as what had been imposed on him, and used the KCIA to do so.

He also had been accused of trying to restrict the rights of the press and exercise greater control over them. Though this was vehemently denied, it was no secret that his regime had engaged in regional favoritism, not unlike the Park regime many years before. He doled out many government jobs to

those from his Honam region and also granted key jobs in government controlled firms to individuals from his region.

The 2000 parliamentary elections, however, demonstrated the growing prominence of civic groups. The Citizens' Alliance or the 2000 General Elections (CAGE) and other major civic groups came up with a blacklist of politicians who had been deemed unsuitable to run for various reasons, including overall incompetence, criminal records, or past collaborations with the military governments. This list was comprised of over 300 politicians, 86 of which still ran despite the warnings from the CAGE. Thus, the CAGE quickly submitted a list of these 86 candidates, identifying, in particular, 22 candidates who were so unfit to run, that they "must be defeated," (Kim, H.N. 2000: 902).

Though the blacklist was new to South Korean politics, the opposition's self-destruction was not. It was strategically hindered by its nomination strategy, which created major problems within the party that did not rely on primaries to select the candidates but a hierarchical decision making process that was never smooth sailing. The process was so combative, that the opposition party, the GNP, split right before the election (Not the best strategy). Another occurrence that was nothing new to Korean politics was the creation of a new political party right before an important election. The more conservative wing of the GNP created the Democratic People's Party (PPD), which was great news for the MDP.

The campaigning that ensued during the 16-day campaign period focused little on issues or ideology. Fierce charges and exchanges between candidates characterized it, with exaggerated warnings about the economy. Kim Dae Jung opportunistically announced three days before the election that the first North-South Korean summit would be held in Pyongyang on June 12-14 of that same year. Almost 80% of the public was in favor of this summit, regardless of how opportune his announcement was. The opposition charged that the announcement was a "despicable campaign ploy," (Kim, H.N. 2000: 904). Nevertheless, no matter how "despicable" his timing was, it was at least a fair way to gain votes.

Despite the fact that the opposition had been split in two, the remaining members of the GNP won a plurality of 133 seats (39% of the popular vote) when votes were cast. It left it four seats short of legislative majority, however. The MDP came in second with 115 seats and 35.9% of the vote. Kim Jong-Pil's party fared much worse and only won 17 seats, with 9.8% of the votes, which was a loss of 33 seats. This also meant that his party would be excluded from floor negotiations with other party delegations, since only parties that earned more than 20 seats could participate, under existing parliamentary rules. (Maybe he should have stayed in the merger with Kim Dae Jung). Not surprisingly, the PPD received the worst results, only earning 3.7% of the popular vote and two seats, including one under PR. This barely

passed the Korean New Party (KNP), another new party that gained one seat in the election. The remaining seats were earned by independents.

The turnout of the election was only 57.2%, a reflection of voter alienation and disillusionment with politicians and broken promises. Like the U.S., voter turnout was particularly low among younger voters. Turnout was also low in Seoul and the urban areas relative to the rural areas. This did not sway from the pattern in South Korea of "the more urbanized a district, the lower the voter turnout," (Kim, H.N. 2000: 907).

Regionalism also continued to play a strong role in the Honam and Youngnam regions. Though Kim had campaigned to reduce regional antagonism, he did the opposite once in office and granted important posts to individuals within his region of Honam. His party won 25 of 29 seats with 66.8% of the votes. This favoritism made Kim very unpopular in the Youngnam region and the GNP practically swept with 64 out 65 seats and earned 62.5% of the votes. Thus, the practice of voters voting according to their regions of origin still overshadows voting along lines of ideology, party platforms and issues (to be discussed further in Part IV).

The 2000 parliamentary election demonstrated that Korean politics still differs considerably from its Western counterparts. The election and the months before that demonstrated that the leaders were still engaging in the tactic of trying to change the electoral system to benefit them. The leadership also relied on using the government to induce opposition politicians into

joining the ruling party. The leadership was thus, averse to accepting the uncertainty that comes with democratic elections and resorted to tactics common to authoritarian leaders of the past to control the outcomes.

In addition, the practice of parties merging, splitting and sprouting up was also witnessed. Though these tactics are not common in Western democratic nations, they are still a means of survival for weak political parties in South Korea, which are essentially still run and based around personalities.

Finally, regionalism is still a factor that demonstrates South Korea's strong grip on traditional methods of voting and political activity. South Korean voters have not changed what drives their voting decisions and base them strictly on traditional ties instead of issues, platforms and ideology.

More Electoral Reform (1988- current)

The strength of traditional ties has stifled South Korea's political development. In particular, regionalism has been a destructive factor that is not present in Taiwan. One of the reasons why regionalism has made such an impact has been due to the lack of local autonomy (to be discussed in Part IV). This lack of local autonomy also explains why South Korea's political development differed from Taiwan's. Taiwan had local autonomy at an early stage in its political development, while South Korea was stripped of this opportunity once Park Chung Hee had come to power. Local autonomy had not been granted until the late 1980's and the process was a slow and

ongoing one that had not reached the level enjoyed by the Taiwanese. In Taiwan, local elections were an important aspect of its democratic development. It enabled them to become accustomed with democratic practices and helped develop grassroots organizations. It enabled politicians who were not a part of the ruling party, to experience holding office in some capacity and to be acclimated with elections and campaigns. It helped citizens become more aware of the democratic process, and though many of these positions were minor, and did not reach the national level until a much later stage, these local elections were important to the Taiwanese public and local politicians.

South Korea had been promised local autonomy by the Chun regime and a half-hearted effort was placed into gradually implementing local autonomy. A more monumental piece of legislation was passed in March of 1994 with the Local Autonomy Act (Oh 1999). It stipulated that the aim was to not only strive for democracy but to achieve a balanced development of local areas. It essentially extended local elections to more areas, cities, provinces and wards. It also extended the number of positions that were elected versus appointed. Moreover, it also gave these local governments more power vis-à-vis the central government, altering the tendency of a centralized government that overshadowed local assemblies and grassroots organizations. It signified an effort on the part of the central government to

allow political groups at all levels to flourish and diminish the government's strong grip on society.

Also in 1994, significant efforts were made to contribute to the development of democratic politics by making sure that elections were held and run more fairly. An extensive law was passed to prevent election malpractice that contained more than 270 articles on March 16. In most Western democracies, ensuring fair elections, is almost a given and thus, they do not necessitate the passing of such an all-embracing reform package. However, for South Korea, it had not reached that stage yet in its democratic development and the passing of the reform package illustrated its commitment to progress.

The law, titled, "The Election for Public Office and Election Malpractice Prevention Act," repealed the Presidential Election Act, the National Assembly Members Election Act, the Local Council Members Election Act and the Election for Heads of Local governments Act (Oh 1999). It stipulated that elections in South Korea must be free and that there must be safeguards to ensuring this. These safeguards included reporting on the details and results of public opinion polls and limiting campaign spending, in terms of both how much was spent and how the money could be used. Massive rallies were now banned in favor of using public facilities. In addition, all campaign workers had to be volunteers and could not be paid for their services.

It was widely known that campaign spending in South Korean elections was outrageously high. Thus, it was naïve to assume that these severe limits would be followed. However, there was a key aspect of the new election law that would have an impact on democracy, most specifically, eradicating the built in advantages to the ruling party. The decision to amend this law, in a manner that clearly did not benefit the number of seats that it'd receive in the National Assembly, possibly was an effort for the ruling party to improve its standing among the public. Nevertheless, regardless of its motivations, the end result was very beneficial to the competitiveness of the party system.

Under the old election laws the parliamentary seats for the national constituency were awarded bonus seats. A set amount of seats was reserved for the party that won the most seats, which was often more than it deserved, and a lesser number of seats reserved for the party that came in second. Thus, there were a set amount of seats given, no matter what percentage of seats each party had won in the national constituency seats. The only thing that mattered was whether or not the party placed in first or second. The law gave a huge advantage to the ruling party, because it only needed to win just enough more than the largest opposition party to be greatly advantaged by this bonus rule.

Under the new law, the so called proportional seats were now allotted on the basis of the total number of votes each party won, and there wasn't a set number of seats automatically given to the party that won a plurality. This

avored smaller parties who were thwarted by the previous rule. They only received a smaller percentage of bonus seats, which was based on the percentage of seats that they had won in the national constituency election. This made elections more competitive and represented the public's will to improve the electoral process.

More laws regarding campaign spending were passed that, and though with good intentions, did not make much of an impact on Korean politics. The Political Fund Law was another effort to improve things by providing subsidies from the state to help pay for elections. It also raised the amount of what individuals could contribute from 100 million won (250,000\$) to 150 million won (375,000\$), under the prerequisite that all funds and contributions be reported (Oh 1999). Though attempts were made to clean up the system, to appease the public, most politicians found ways to get around them.

Chapter 16

Democratic Korea: Campaigns, Corruption and Scandal

South Korean campaigns are managed and financed much differently than in Western democracies and are often knee-deep in corruption and scandals. The electoral laws and political institutions have unfairly served the interests of the ruling party in the past. Unfortunately, there are still some aspects of the institutions that need to be reformed. This was illustrated during the 1992 Presidential election. It came as no surprise that Kim Young Sam was able to win the Presidential election in 1992. He was well known and was still considered fairly popular. He had also made a shrewd move for political power with a 1990 merger. However, because he was now the ruling party candidate, he was advantaged by other factors that can be viewed as weaknesses to the electoral laws and institutions.

One of the biggest weaknesses of Korean electoral laws has been their inability to regulate campaigns more effectively. Korean elections are very expensive. The 1992 National Assembly, local and Presidential elections cost South Korean government three billion dollars or 16% of its annual budget at that time. The electoral laws stipulate that the average expenditure per electoral district not exceed 20 million won (50,000\$). These regulations set forth by the Regulating Agency for Elections are some of the strictest in the world. Legal sources of funding include membership dues paid for by party members, candidate support group contributions, sungu gwali

wiwonhoi subsidies, government support and funds raised by political parties.

Accepting political donations from other sources is deemed illegal.

Nevertheless, because these laws are so rigid, they are continuously ignored.

The ruling party, in particular, has room to maneuver and intervene during the elections. The ruling party has ignored the rules and spent as much as was needed to win the election. The ruling party has benefited from a number of sources (Chon 2000: 72-77). First, the president has helped his party benefit from the close relationships with big business. These corporations gave money in the form of membership fees in proportion to their revenues. They knew that these membership fees would help target specific legislation aimed at improving the regulations on businesses.

Second, the ruling party had offered the most bonus seats under PR and was able to sell off those seats to the highest bidder. A nomination for candidacy in the national constituency could cost a candidate more than one for a local election district because the national constituency candidates were expected to pay the party for these coveted seats. Candidates who were given the bonus seats would spend more money to ensure a higher ranking on the list. The higher they were ranked, the better chance they had of ensuring a seat in the National Assembly. Because the ruling party had more seats that it could dole out (due to the peculiarities of the electoral laws), it also had more money that it could use to finance its campaigns.

Third, the ruling party has much more carrots to throw out to rich and influential individuals and can dole out favors in exchange for high positions within the party or government, or other favors. There were many close personal friends of the party that campaigned for the party in exchange for benefits.

Fourth, political contributions were often given to ministers within the government, which in turn, could be used to donate to campaigns. These contributions were aimed at influencing specific reforms.

The ruling party later benefited from its relationship with local government leaders. When local elections were introduced during the Kim Young Sam regime, Kim's party made local officials cooperate with the government in the election campaign. The extent to which local governments could assist candidates, even at the presidential level is illustrated by the following example. In the 1992 presidential election, both Kims conflicted over the timing of an election for the large district representatives. This all boiled down to who would win the right to appoint the heads of the Ku that would provide support to a candidate in the upcoming presidential election. Under a new electoral law, district representatives were given the power to appoint the heads of local governments. Thus, the timing of the large district representative election would have a big impact on the organizational support for either party and this support had an impact on the ability to campaign.

There were other sources for the ruling party to gain more support to mobilize for campaigns. During the Kim Young Sam regime, like those before him, he used the bureaucracy to help him campaign and bring money into the party as well. He established channels of government bureaucracy to apply political pressure on voters to elect ruling party candidates. The bureaucracy not only pressured voters, but it was also used to mobilize informal groups. It helped with the recruitment of local leaders for their election campaigns by exploiting all of their connections with influential individuals and groups in their communities (Chon 2000: 73). The bureaucracy, during the Kim regime, played a larger role in passing legislation and made many influential contacts. It could recruit powerful individuals several months before the election to help with the campaign.

The bureaucracy also assisted with electoral organization support. It could help mobilize many civic organizations that were funded by the government. The government used these organizations to build informal networks, particularly in the rural areas. This was easiest to accomplish in these areas, because friendships are strong and individuals have close ties to the community. The bureaucracy built off these networks to improve organizational support for the ruling party.

There was no legal limit on the number of individuals that could be mobilized as party members. Each member was expected to recruit three or more other people to participate in the campaigns. The Electoral Committee

of the ruling party had the funds to pay these recruits' wages and expenses. This was all accomplished under the pretext that it was educating new party members for committee work.

The electoral committee organization and the government administration organization overlapped much more than should be the case in a democratic government. The government used both of these organizations to gather intelligence and information about voters and strong bases of support. Some of these small electoral committees worked in conjunction with the government to become informed on voter choice and favored certain candidates within the districts. This enabled the ruling party to accurately predict election results. The KCIA also assisted this process, by analyzing and summarizing in detail the electoral forecasts before the elections. This enabled the party to know who to pay off to get the last minute votes (Chon 2000: 75).

The bureaucracy could also be used to deter campaign contributions to the opposition parties. Political contributions from large corporations to the opposition parties were discouraged. Why did businesses ignore these warnings? The bureaucracy made sure that this didn't happen by threatening to audit them. Any business that was too closely affiliated with an opposition party was likely to be audited, an effective deterrent since tax evasion for big businesses was a means of survival with South Korea's high corporate tax

rates. Auditing conveys government disapproval of these firms and was used as a means of controlling the opposition's chances for campaign funding.

The bulk of funding for opposition parties had to come from their own sources, which was not easy. There were only a couple ways that this could be accomplished. First, there was the rare occasion that an opposition assembly member served on a special National Assembly Election Committee. This meant that this individual made important decisions and could get kickbacks from big businesses.

The second manner in which opposition parties gained political support illustrates the difficulty that the South Korean regime will have in implementing primaries. Primaries make the candidates accountable to the public. With the current system, candidates are still accountable to the party and rely on the party for their positions within the party. Nominations for the National Assembly had to be bought. This was a crucial source of funding. Party leaders, in turn, were individuals with large financial resources.

The two Kims were not exempt from this process. Their method for raising money was not revealed to the public. At the time, there was no incentive to reveal where the money came from. This all changed after a hotly contested election ended with sour grapes. Two followers of one of Kim Dae Jung's New People's Party, Cho Chan Hyung and Lee Dong Bae were competing for a nomination for the National Assembly and both donated large sums of money. When Cho realized that he was not going to get the

nomination, he blackmailed Kim and forced him to nominate him. Kim Dae Jung was not the only one committed to this method of gaining financial resources. Kim Young Sam was no angel either.

After Kim Young Sam was elected he relied on private organization called sajojic, which consisted of groups of individuals who supposedly shared the same interests as Kiim (although these interests weren't based on partisanship, but were based on personal connections). Sajojic helped Kim raise a lot of money (Chon 2000: 75). It donated and used the same amount of political funds as the official organization in Kim's election campaign used. All of these informal organizations lacked continuity. Their structure was completely dependent on who was in power at the time. They would disappear after Kim's tenure was up.

Unfortunately for Kim, however, his legacy would be forever tarnished by the corruption scandals that followed involving him and his son. It was determined that political fund donations to political parties had been given by chaebols (big businesses), through Sungo-Gwali. His regime was also rocked by the Suso scandals, which were real estate project irregularities.

Thus, despite the many advantages to his regime, as stated above, he was not so popular once he came to power. This lack of support was demonstrated during the 1995 local elections that took place on June 27. These elections provided an embarrassing defeat for Kim Young Sam's party, now named the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). The party did not want to

hold the elections, but was forced to do so, only because it knew it had no choice. Roh had made promises about local autonomy back in 1991 and Kim Young Sam had a moral obligation to decentralize. The elections, to be held, would elect 6 mayors of metropolitans, nine provincial governors, 230 heads of smaller administrative units and over 5000 council members. The party was correct to have reservations about the election. The DLP only captured 5 of the 15 major seats for the mayor and governor positions (Hong 1993).

The major opposition party, the Democratic Party (Kim Dae Jung was the de facto leader) and Kim Jong Pil's newly merged United Liberal Democrats (ULD) did well. Nevertheless, the results of the elections demonstrated the strength of regionalism, as the strength of each party was divided along ties to the origin of each of the three Kims. Thus, although local autonomy was supposedly promoted, "the elections reinforced the political rivalry based on regionalism," (Yoon 1996: 513).

Corruption and economic problems had tainted the end of Kim Young Sam's regime. Though he was the first civilian president that had been fairly elected in forty years, his election did not signal that the democratization process had been consolidated. The electoral laws were still in need of reform. One of the main issues on the agenda concerned the election campaign laws.

The Hanbo scandal illustrated why the need for new laws was so necessary. This scandal, which involved the Hanbo Iron and Steel

conglomerate, alleged that Hanbo's patriarch, Chung Tai Soo was bribing Kim and his son, Kim Hyun Chul for campaign contributions and the younger Kim received kickbacks in exchange for government contracts. After the Hanbo incident, which ended in the arrest of Kim and his son in 1997, new laws needed to be enforced to strictly regulate the elections and the direct chaebol contributions to the leading party.

According to Chon, there were many changes that had been made to equalize the advantages. First, there was a more equitable distribution of political funds between the leading and opposition parties. There was also more use of television debates. This was now the single most important factor in the popularity of a candidate and reduced the amount of campaign funds needed to buy labor to attend campaign rallies. The establishment of local government elections eliminated the medium through which the leading party used the government bureaucracy to its advantage. Before, the ruling party was the only one with total access to local government resources. Now, the opposition also had local government officials on its side and was able to compete against the leading party (2000: 77-78).

Despite this, little could be done about eliminating all of the ruling party's advantages. The ruling party could still use to its advantage its close ties to the IRS to threaten those who supported the opposition.

One of the more pressing problems that has yet to disappear has been the excessive spending on campaigns. This characteristic of Korean

elections will not go away easily despite promises from Kim Dae Jung. Even after the second fair direct presidential election, Korean politics is still plagued by corruption. Much of this corruption stems from excessive campaign spending.

It will not go away with electoral reform. What should be done about this? Both electoral reform and a change in attitudes are necessary for curbing corruption. The Korea Herald stated on June 28th 1999 that "candidates must learn to spend less, voters, should cease requesting financial favors," (Kim, K.H. 1999). Politicians spend their entire fortune on campaigns. Candidates in parliamentary elections need large amounts of money to induce people to campaign rallies, to operate the many chapter organizations and to buy votes. These candidates spend large amounts of money on lavish events and maintain large central and district organizations.

Kim Dae Jung's ruling party collected almost 94 billion won but less than 10% of that money came from membership fees. This is much lower than the average of 50% contributed by major political parties in other Western advanced countries. Thus, it's no secret that corruption characterizes Korean politics as well as inefficiency and though the public sometimes benefits from this relationship, criticism has mounted.

Given this disapproval, DJ Kim has sought to rectify the situation, or at least his image, but freeing up the Korean political system of corruption and excessive campaign spending will be a very, very difficult task.

Analytic Summary

In the previous chapters I described the “bubble-up” process (as contrasted to previous chapters’ depiction of Taiwan’s “trickle-down” process) of South Korea’s democratization. I have shown that democratization in South Korea is a result of a combination of internal and external factors as well.

The most important internal factor of this “bubble-up” process was the lack of regime legitimacy, due to the absence of any type of institutionalized and well-organized political party, such as the KMT. Instead, politics revolved around personalities and their quest for power. Political parties appeared and disappeared with these personalities. Therefore, political parties never were institutionalized, long-standing, legitimate organizations. In addition, elections between political parties were manipulated, or in some cases fixed, to favor the ruling party. Thus, the sources of the legitimacy crisis in the South Korean case were due to both an inadequate basis for legitimacy and excessive and un-institutionalized competition.

This excessive and un-institutionalized competition was nothing new to Korean politics. After the Korean War, a multitude of political groups sprouted up, all vying for political power. Though these contests for legitimacy and power were fierce, they never helped foster a stable democracy. Instead, the excessive competition made the regime more unstable and chaotic. This helps to better explain why it took South Korea so much longer than Taiwan to settle on rules and regulations about how its democracy would function.

Moreover, two forces, (one internal and the other, external) pushed South Korea leadership to a point of no return. The internal force is both the opposition and the public (the student population), as mentioned above. Both of these groups grew stronger as South Korea changed economically, socially and culturally, as it was continuously exposed to more democratic ideals and practices. The external force is the influence that the U.S. exerted on both the government and the opposition in South Korea. This was similar to how Taiwan was influenced, (although the U.S. exerted more serious pressure in the late 1980's, around the time that Roh Tae Woo was elected, as mentioned in previous chapters).

My study shows that unlike Taiwan, South Korea's democratization was not smooth and linear. Its legitimacy crisis and democratization process took several steps backwards, at times. Unlike the Taiwanese case, where the leaders gradually democratized in order to increase their legitimacy, in South Korea, the leaders could not rely on a strong institution such as the KMT to gradually disperse power. Instead, political leaders responded to their legitimacy crisis by increasing their power and manipulating the rules even more in their favor. As a result, the citizens, in particular the students, and the opposition became more and more frustrated as they were forced to live in an oppressive society, where few democratic concessions were offered. It wasn't until the leadership in South Korea, had no choice but to

respond to this "bubbling" frustration that democratic reforms were finally implemented.

In addition, my study demonstrates the important role that elections played in South Korea's democratization. Though many of the elections held in South Korea were manipulated to advantage the ruling party, political parties, (unlike Taiwan) were allowed to form and compete. Thus, South Korean leadership could not prevent political groups from forming and gaining the experience of holding elections. Though the rules and regulations for elections were changed multiple times and were never settled upon, the citizens and the opposition were accustomed to some sort of electoral process as a means of selecting their leadership.

The previous chapters on South Korea thus demonstrate the following mechanism of the bubble up theory of democratization: formalization of election ----► mass mobilization ---► interruption of democratic institutionalization ---► rise of praetorianism ---► legitimacy crisis ---► full democratization.

In sum, while both countries installed elections, Taiwanese elections were installed to appease and co-opt the native Taiwanese politicians and political parties were strictly prohibited from forming. In South Korea, the U.N., an external force, installed elections as a foundation for democracy. Unfortunately, little attention was placed on implementing rules that would lead to a stable party system. Instead, electoral engineering opened up

opportunities for all organized groups to compete. This excessive mobilization resulted in an atmosphere of instability, which the military seized upon. The military and personal leaders continued to interrupt any type of democratic progress. Thus, South Korea suffered from a legitimacy crisis, often expressed in student activism and a relentless (though at times, ineffective) opposition.

This differed from the Taiwanese case because democratic progress was continuous and democratic reforms were enacted from above in response to a more effective opposition and increasing external pressures. Taiwanese leaders gradually adapted to their changing economic and social environment by increasing the scope of representation as well as other democratic reforms. Though the Taiwanese opposition pushed the leadership in Taiwan to reform, important changes had already been made to the system and reforms were incremental. Unlike South Korean leaders, Taiwanese leaders continuously tried to alleviate the legitimacy crisis by responding with democratic reforms. In contrast, in South Korea, leaders responded with more oppression and manipulation, inciting more frustration, dissatisfaction and protest from the opposition groups. Nevertheless, when the legitimacy crisis reached a boiling point, this incessant protest helped to finally drive South Korea to democratize. As the previous chapter described however (and as will be analyzed in Part IV), South Korea's version of

democracy is still much different than the liberal democracies exemplified by the West.

Part IV.

Examining Representation Literature:

What are the Implications for South Korea and Taiwan?

Chapter 17

Theories on Representation

Previous theories on representation have focused on Western industrialized democracies. This literature is rich with studies that look at how representation occurs, by what pathway it occurs and to what degree. Other studies examine the effects of electoral laws and whether or not it can affect the number of viable parties. Scholars have also looked at whether or not electoral laws can have an effect on how competitive elections are and the relationship between voters and legislators. Finally, there have been numerous theories that have observed the saliency of issues, the strength of ideology and the strength of party loyalty. Though scholarly work on representation have varied in the conclusions drawn, the one thing that all of these studies share in common, is that countries such as South Korea and Taiwan have not been included in the comparisons.

In light of South Korea and Taiwan's recent and impressive democratization efforts, it is timely to examine how representation occurs in these countries and to analyze whether or not they can be compared with their Western counterparts. Thus far, few attempts have been made to

include these studies in comparisons. Before, exploring whether or not these studies can be compared with Western nations, it is important to look at the previous studies of electoral systems, pathways of representation and the salience of political issues and ideology.

Electoral Systems Literature

The studies of electoral systems/laws have primarily focused on Western democracies and used these countries as cases in which to generate hypotheses. Most significantly, Duverger articulated in 1954 that institutions have an impact and can help predict outcomes. In his book, he formulated what came to be known as *Duverger's Law* and *Duverger's Hypothesis* (1954). *Duverger's Law* and *Hypothesis* essentially claimed that institutions do have important effects, namely on the number of parties in a political system. Duverger claimed that the electoral system a country employs accentuates the tendency for a two-party system or a multi-party system.

Duverger's Law predicted that in countries that utilized single-member district/plurality (SMD), a two-party system would emerge. He argued that there is a mechanical effect that forces parties to coalesce into permanent coalitions before the elections because they know that they have to win a plurality in order to gain seats in office. The logic behind the law is that votes are dispersed across single-member districts. Hence, this makes it very

difficult to win a seat in office, if one's support base is dispersed across the country. Thus, it serves candidates' best interests to join parties that have the best chance of winning.

The psychological effect states that the laws will also affect voters. He claimed that voters will not waste their votes on a candidate/party that has no chance of winning. Thus, Duverger took into account that voters assess the probable actions of others and will vote for the larger party even if another smaller party is closer to them, ideologically speaking. Voters do this simply because they prefer the former outcome over the possibility of a party winning who is farther away from them on the left to right ideological continuum.

His hypothesis predicted that countries that employed proportional representation would tend to have a multi-party system. His logic was that there were more incentives for parties to form and compete in elections without having to coalesce into permanent coalitions before the elections. In order to gain some type of stability and control over policy, parties would only form coalitions before the elections, but they would not be permanent. Voters, in turn would also not be affected by the competitiveness of the institutions. They would feel free to vote for whichever political party they wanted and would not be constrained by the notion that they didn't want to waste their vote for a candidate/party that had no chance of winning a plurality.

Duverger also made predictions about two-stage elections such as those that occur in France. In this instance he predicted that multi-party systems would form that were tempered by alliances. The logic behind this is that the candidate/ party only needs to come in 2nd, 3rd or even 4th to have a chance if a single candidate/party does not get a majority of the vote. The two-stage election allows for a minimum number of seats that a party must receive to be considered for the second stage. This makes it harder for small parties because they have to pass this threshold in the elections. Thus, the level of party fragmentation is smaller than it normally would be for electoral systems that are more purely proportional. Duverger, then claimed that coalitions will form after the first stage election, granted no party was able to win a majority, but not before. Why, given that there is a threshold, don't parties coalesce to ensure electoral victories? Duverger claimed that there is no motivation to transform these coalitions into permanent parties because smaller parties can form temporary coalitions with a large party to win, (because in the second stage one party must win to have the majority).

France made this change during the Fourth Republic and witnessed a change in the level of fragmentation. During the Third Republic, when it used proportional representation, it was much too divided. It had too many parties that were making the government inefficient and unstable. The change of the electoral laws resulted in less fragmentation and a party system that is much more workable. This evidence proved the importance of electoral laws and

the impact that they can have on party systems and party proliferation. This work was also significant because it spawned a number of works that empirically tested his theory, (which will later be discussed).

Though Duverger's theory was met with strong reactions from both supporters and critics, his work served as a springboard for other scholars. Thus, most of the literature has focused on the effects of the electoral laws after they have been chosen. However, there are few theories that discuss the selection of electoral systems. Lipset and Rokkan however, focused not on the effects of the law and hypothesis but on what *affected* which electoral system was chosen. They argued that the selection of the electoral laws was affected by the cleavages present at the onset of modernization, development and state building. They examined countries in Europe and argued that the reason that proportional representation was adopted in so many of these countries was due to a "convergence of pressures from below and above," (1967: 157). They claimed that the rising working class wanted to gain access to the legislatures and the established groups were threatened by this and demanded that PR be implemented in order to protect their interests. Thus, after universal suffrage was implemented, those in power decided to choose proportional representation as the best means to protect their positions.

Lipset and Rokkan also claimed that PR was implemented in Europe to create political stability. They pointed to the various groups and cleavages

that were present at the time and argued that in order to accommodate all of these groups fairly, an electoral system needed to be implemented that had a lower threshold and could enable many different groups to feel represented. Rokkan claimed that "it was no accident that the earliest moves toward proportional representation came in the ethnically most heterogeneous European countries. In linguistically and religiously divided societies majority elections could clearly threaten the continued existence of the political system. The introduction of some element of minority representation came to be seen as an essential step in the strategy of territorial consolidation", (1967: 157). Thus, in more homogeneous polities, plurality rule can be used and still remain stable, since its harsh effects do not hinder minority representation.

In sum, Lipset and Rokkan argued that the electoral system will not encourage new parties to form rather it's based on the number of cleavages present, such as cleavages between labor and owner. This contrasted directly with *Duverger's Law and Hypothesis* written in 1954 that institutions do have important effects, namely on the number of parties in a political system. Lipset and Rokkan claimed that he misunderstood the causal direction. Others such as John Grumm (1957) agreed with this assessment and claimed that the cleavages already present in society affected which electoral system a country employed, not the other way around. Grumm claimed that SMD was not as polarizing as predicted by Duverger. He

concluded that the party system preceded the electoral system and that PR is adopted when a multi-party system is already present.

This questioning of the causal direction regarding electoral systems led to a few more theories that like Lipset and Rokkan, focused on the reasons behind why certain electoral systems and laws are chosen. Quintal in 1970 (From Riker 1986), attempted to develop a theory using an economist model of costs and benefits, or in other words a rational choice framework. He suggested that it was possible to predict what electoral system would be chosen simply by analyzing the systematic effects of legislative costs in the form of seats to votes ratio and the contingent costs such as decision making costs and costs in voter affect.

Rokkan investigated the factors that account for the employment of different electoral systems again in 1970. He examined the two main reasons why countries adopt PR, such as minority protection and the extension of suffrage. He claimed that established parties provided universal suffrage as a concession to the working class parties but had to adopt PR regardless, to protect their own legislative positions against the new contingency of voters who would vote for Socialist parties. Thus, PR was adopted in response to the needs of the country and also in response to the number of cleavages present. This conflicted with Duverger's arguments that electoral systems affect politics.

Riker, however, argued that there were many strengths to *Duverger's Law* and believed that it was more beneficial to make some modifications to the theory rather than discard the theory entirely (1986). First, he claimed that it was noteworthy because it was grounded in a rational choice framework. Second, he claimed that the mechanical effect of the law was of particular importance because it provided an explanation for why countries that used single-member districts were more likely to have two parties.

He argued that the key, however, was to look at the role of party donors. As he saw it, party donors were unlikely to donate money to parties that were incapable of winning. He also agreed with Duverger's argument that politicians would be unlikely to join parties that had no chance of getting them elected. Because the livelihood of the actors involved is based on getting into office, this goal overshadows some of the concerns for belonging to parties that exactly fits their view on every issue.

Riker applied another modification to the theory. He claimed that most of the democratic countries provide empirical support for Duverger. Nevertheless, there are exceptions that can also be included. Though India uses SMD as well, it has a multi-party system. Riker claimed that this example does not disprove the law, but is an example of where a large party, the Congress party is the *Condorcet* winner, occupying the center of the ideological left to right continuum. This allows no room for other parties to coalesce against the Congress Party enabling the Congress Party to

continually win elections, (until recently). Other parties, thus, are unable to coalesce if a large party is always the Condorcet winner.

Rae also added other important modifications to Duverger's theory (1967, 1971). Rae tested a number democracies with elections as the unit of analysis. He pointed to the case of Canada, which could be regarded as an exception to the Law because it uses plurality but has had three parties for quite some time now. Rae claimed that though Canada uses plurality it should not be considered an exception to the Law. He claimed, as the Law would predict, that Canada has two main strong parties. The only reason why there continues to be a third party is due to a strong local minority in the province of Quebec. Because there is a concentration of minority votes in Quebec, a third party is able to sustain itself. To prove this, Rae looked at thirty elections of those countries using plurality. Of the seven elections where a third party received over ten percent of the votes, all occurred in Canada.

Rae's main concern was how electoral laws affected competition between political parties. He focused primarily on "proximal" effects, namely how votes are translated into seats. He pointed to three phases in how votes translate into seats, balloting, districting and the electoral formula and identified a variable for each of these. Balloting referred to the ballot structure and whether or not it was ordinal or categorical. Districting referred to district magnitude in order to distinguish the number of seats in a district.

Rae was the first to stress the importance of district magnitude and demonstrated with his data analysis that district magnitude is more important than the electoral formula in effecting proportionality. He claimed that "the decisive point in PR is the size (magnitude) of the constituencies: the larger the constituency, that is the greater the number of members which it elects, the more closely will the result approximate proportionality," (1971: 45).

Regarding the electoral formula, he demonstrated how different electoral formulas provide different "bonuses" to the parties with the most votes. In particular, the notion of "bonus seats" is important in the cases of both South Korea and Taiwan. Both countries benefited from electoral systems that provided extra bonus seats to the ruling party in efforts to control the outcomes. For South Korea, during Park's and Chun's rule (and to a lesser extent during Roh's and Kim Young Sam's rule-until this was finally reformed in 1994), bonus seats were automatically given to the party that won the most votes, which granted it more seats than should have been allotted, to ensure that the ruling party always had a majority to work with. In this case, there were a number of seats that were reserved for certain parties, depending on how the parties did in the nationally contested seats. Bonus seats were also given to the party that placed second, to make it appear as though there was a two-party system. However, the formula did not favor the second placed party nearly as much as it benefited the ruling party.

In Taiwan, bonuses are still awarded to the ruling party in the form of occupational seats that are saved for the party who won the most votes. Given that senior representatives held many of the seats, during Taiwan's transition, for many years, these additional seats guaranteed that the KMT always had a majority to work with. It lessens the pressure on the ruling party to dominate elections. Instead, the party can simply dominate the legislative organs without having to obtain the same amount of votes. In essence, bonus seats make it more difficult for opposition parties to compete effectively. Though Rae's studies did not include Taiwan and South Korea, he noted some of these less obvious aspects of electoral systems. He also added more empirical conclusions to *Duverger's Law* and supported the arguments that institutions have important effects on a party's ability to compete.

However, not all aspects of *Duverger's Law* were supported and praised. The weaker aspect of *Duverger's Law*, according to Riker, was his use of the psychological effect. He claimed that it becomes more difficult to measure the strategic voter and that the theory should concentrate more on the actors involved in trying to get elected. Other scholars also contested the psychological element to the Law. Though Riker may not have emphasized it, other rational choice theorists claim that strategic voting occurs. Nevertheless, this notion has been widely challenged.

W. Phillips Shively (1970) claimed that strategic voting only has a trivial impact, at best, on electoral outcomes. Abelsom questioned this assumption on the basis that it is wrong to assume that all voters vote because they think that their votes count (From Riker 1986). He contended that voters vote expressively, not strategically. Meehl (1977) claimed that the notion of strategic voting is incorrect because the motivation to vote is moral. He argued that it's impossible to waste a vote if one is voting for his or her preference. He explored the process and motivation behind what actually gets the voter to the polls. Fiorina added that voters vote out of guilt, and if this is the case, are not necessarily motivated to vote strategically. Thus, there are many different views on what motivates voters and there is little agreement whether or not Duverger's notion of the strategic voter holds up, especially outside the United States and Western Europe (From Riker 1986).

In particular, Meehl disagreed with Duverger's claim that all actors are motivated by "rationality" and thus behave "strategically". According to Meehl, voters are driven to the polls out of moral obligation to vote with their gut, and not for whom they strategically think that they should vote for. This explains the voting behavior of those who voted for Ralph Nader in the 2000 US Presidential election. Though Gore was clearly the more likely winner, many liberals voted for Nader regardless of the possibility that they were taking away votes from Gore, when Nader did not have a chance of reaching the 30% threshold. Thus, Meehl's consideration on the "moral vote" cannot be

disregarded. In addition, understanding why people vote is not conclusive. This makes it more difficult to apply the psychological effect of *Duverger's Law* to other countries, especially since what is regarded as "rational" is context specific. This can explain why voting behavior in both South Korea and Taiwan may be dictated by different factors (From Riker 1986).

Nevertheless, none of the aforementioned critiques of the psychological effect deterred the publication of more studies that focused on institutional factors. Taagepera and Shugart argued in 1989 that it is also necessary to look at district magnitude (1989). They drew from Rae's study but avoided some of the methodological problems associated with Rae's study regarding his formula for operationalizing district magnitude. In addition to that, they presented a number of different issues regarding the effects of the electoral laws. They introduced an operational way to measure the number of parties in a system. They also investigated the interconnection between political parties and the number of political issues. Their primary contribution was their assertion that magnitude is the decisive factor and plays an important role in determining the number of viable parties that compete in a system.

Taagepera and Shugart make some important contributions that should have had important consequences for countries such as Taiwan whose districts are large in magnitude, and for South Korea, who used to use two-member districts. Both, however, are cases of where the laws of district

magnitude did not apply in the same manner. South Korea employed a larger district magnitude to gain more legitimacy in urban areas rather than to create more party fragmentation, and thus, better representation. In Taiwan, the KMT used the large districts to its advantage in ways that skewed theoretical predictions. Both countries were able to manipulate the laws in ways that worked to their advantage, and thus, the larger district magnitudes were not employed so that the system was more representative to the public, but so that the system better served the interests of the ruling parties.

Cox also studied electoral systems and illustrated all of the important aspects of them (1997). He included first, the laws and rules that regulate how parties make nominations. This varies from party to party and country to country. Primaries, in particular are not widely used, but have important effects on party discipline and the overall organization of the party.

Second, Cox pointed to how votes are counted. This encompasses many different aspects and has various implications. Some countries have mandatory voting which raises voter turn out. Some countries have the same registration procedures and this can lead to a larger voter turn out as well. Some countries stuff the ballots and do not count votes fairly. Finally, some countries weigh some voters votes more heavily than others do, such as giving more weight to votes by party cadres than to normal citizens.

Third, Cox pointed to the district structure of the polity. This includes whether or not the districts are divided along a geographic area where a

strong minority or religious groups exists. This also includes whether or not the districts are multi-member or single-member, implications that were brought up by Taagepera and Shugart in 1989.

Finally, Cox mentioned that the question of how votes are translated into seats is extremely important, and this aspect is the most distinguishing factor. How seats are allocated includes whether or not the system uses plurality, PR, two stages with plurality, D'Hondt or a mixed system. The consequences of how votes are allocated are the main subjects of Duverger's study and the basis for his mechanical effect.

The categorization set forth by Cox highlights many important aspects of electoral systems that help explain some of the outcomes in Taiwanese and South Korean politics. The use of primaries is of particular importance because so few countries outside the US use them. It helps explain why parties in the U.S. are so candidate driven compared to their Western European counterparts who are confined to towing the party line and concentrating on party platforms.

It was a sign in Taiwanese politics, in particular, that the highly centralized KMT was democratizing when candidate nominations were made accountable to the public. This was a drastic change from the days of Chiang Kai-shek when all party decisions were made in a hierarchical manner. Primaries were installed not only to be more democratic but to also help parties choose the candidates that have the best chance of gaining voter

support. South Korea's ruling party, in an effort to appear more democratic also tried to install a modified primary system. Not surprisingly, primaries haven't been adhered to, too closely in either country. Given that too much power to the public still alarms political leaders, some of the results have been overruled. Primaries also make parties less cohesive and thus, have created more divisions in both countries.

Cox also highlights the importance of how districts are divided. This is relevant in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan as well as Japan (until the reforms of 1994). The practice of gerrymandering districts is most relevant in Taiwan and Japan, where the Taiwanese system originated. The overrepresentation of the rural areas created obstacles for opposition politicians. In both Taiwan and Japan, the rural areas have typically been more loyal to the ruling party and though they are not as well populated, they allotted more representatives per person than the urban districts, which typically are more supportive of the opposition. The KMT has benefited from not reapportioning the districts despite the disproportionate population growths in the urban areas.

District divisions were also a source of interest for Park Chung Hee, the President of South Korea from 1961-1979. During his infamous Yushin Constitution, he changed the districts from single to two-member districts in order to ensure that he gained seats in the urban areas. Thus, though he did not gerrymander the districts to benefit from his loyal following in the rural

areas, he did orchestrate the district size in a way that would guarantee him seats from a segment of the population that he deemed vital to strengthening his legitimacy. The district size was often an area of contention among politicians and was changed many times in South Korean history. It was a major area of contention even in 1999 as well. The constant structuring and manipulation of the districts demonstrates how important that aspect of the electoral system was to ensuring a political majority for the ruling party.

Lijphart in 1994 also looked at the political consequences of electoral laws in democracies from 1945-1990 (1994). He aimed to analyze the operation and political consequences of electoral systems, especially the degree of proportionality of their translation of votes into seats and their effects on party systems. He looked at seventy electoral systems of 27 democracies to make his conclusions.

He claimed that the biggest explanatory factor was a combination of the district magnitude and the electoral thresholds. He also categorized the various dimensions of electoral systems, including the electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral threshold and assembly size.

As he saw it, the electoral formula could be categorized into three types. The first type was the majoritarian formula that includes plurality, two-ballot system and the alternative vote. The second type was the proportional representation formula that includes true PR and single transferable vote.

The third type is the semi-proportional and includes both cumulative and limited vote.

Besides district magnitude, he also mentioned the importance of the electoral threshold. He claimed that this encompasses the minimum level of support that a party needs to gain representation. If the electoral law provides such a threshold, it is usually applied at the national level. As he saw it, high thresholds tend to limit proportionality and opportunities for smaller parties to win seats.

The last dimension, assembly size includes the total number of seats in the legislature. Rae also called attention to this but did not enter it into his analysis. Lijphart added that assembly size could have a strong influence on proportionality and on the degree of multi-partism.

Lijphart mentioned other electoral variables that he deemed important. First, he pointed to the ballot structure. This is one of Rae's three basic dimensions of the electoral system. The ballot structure can either be categorical if the voter can give his or her vote to one party only, which is the case in most electoral systems, or ordinal if the voter can divided his or her vote among two or more parties.

Second, he pointed to mal-apportionment. In the case of countries that use plurality with single member districts, mal-apportionment means that districts have substantially unequal voting populations. In those countries that

have multi-member districts, it often takes the form of rural or regional over-representation.

Third, Lijphart drew on Shugart's claim that presidential systems can have an important effect on legislative elections if the presidential elections use plurality and if the legislative elections are held at the same time. Large parties have an advantage because in presidential elections, smaller parties usually won't have a chance of getting their candidates elected. This advantage, thus, carries over to the legislative election. In sum, Lijphart argued that presidential systems discourage multi-partism.

Fourth, Lijphart pointed to apparentement. He claimed that this pertains to PR systems in which voters choose among different party lists. In several of these systems, parties are allowed formally to link or connect their lists, which means that their combined vote total will be used in the initial allocation of seats. Thus, it's a set of inter-party connected lists.

His main conclusion was that majoritarian systems make it harder for smaller parties to gain representation than other types of systems, unless (like Rae noted) the smaller parties are geographically concentrated.

In conclusion, the various theories set forth has made the electoral systems literature rich with information on the effects of institutions in Western countries, but the literature needs to be expanded to include how electoral laws work in other countries.

Chapter 18

Empirical Work in Other Countries-

Does *Duverger's Law* and *Hypothesis* predict behavior in other countries?

How many viable parties compete in the elections?

This section deals directly with questions explored by scholars of electoral systems regarding whether or not it is the institutions or the social cleavages present during the onset of democratization and industrialization that affect the number of viable parties. This section examines the validity of *Duverger's Law* and *hypothesis* as well as the arguments set forth by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). A viable party is defined as a party that is able to receive at least ten percent of the vote and has competed in more than ten elections.

It is predicted that a two-party system would form when a country employs single-member district/plurality. As mentioned above, this is otherwise known as *Duverger's Law* and has been used to provide explanations behind the two-party systems of the United States and previously, Great Britain. The hypothesis predicts that multiple parties will compete in countries that use *proportional representation* or a form of it, due the institutional incentives that don't punish smaller parties or their supporters.

The final aspect of the hypothesis concerns countries that use a two-stage election where one party must win a majority. In this case, it is

predicted that a multi-party system will form, that is tempered by alliances. The logic is that during the first stage, while parties are competing, there is no incentive to coalesce into a permanent coalition until they can assess how they did in the first stage of the election. After that, the top parties that make it to the second stage will form temporary coalitions that allow them to compete effectively in the second stage of the election. These coalitions will not be permanent but simply serve as a means to win the second part of the contest. This type of system has been used in France.

France used to use proportional representation (PR) and is often pointed to as proof that institutions can have a significant impact on electoral outcomes. In this case, France used PR up until the Fourth Republic where a two-stage system was introduced to avoid the instability that came with having over twenty parties competing in elections. In order to rectify this problem, new electoral laws were set in place. The results reinforced theories that promoted the importance of institutions.

Great Britain had a two-party system for many years where the Conservative and the Labor Party competed year in and year out. Things changed however, with the formation of the Liberal-Democratic Party, an organization that appears to be less conservative than the Conservative Party and less liberal than the Labor Party. Duverger defended his *Law* and claimed that the third party is hardly significant. In an election where it received 20% of the votes, because of the mechanical effects of the law, this

only translated to 6% of the seats. This result impacted the results of the next election, when the Liberal-Democrats in subsequent elections garnered fewer votes.

Duverger claimed that the British case does not in any way disprove the *Law*. Instead, he blames this irregularity on the inability of the other two parties to be representative to the voters in the middle of the left to right ideological spectrum. He claimed that the Liberal-Democrats emerged to fill a void left by the other two parties. More importantly, because the mechanical effects of the *Law* are so severe for third parties, the Liberal-Democrats are considered insignificant because they never pose much of a threat to either party.

Germany uses a mixed system, as do most countries in the world. They use a combination of single-member districts with PR. This was a response to the destabilizing experience of using solely PR, which Hermans argued led to tremendous instability and had disastrous results during the Weimar republic (From Taagepera and Shugart 1989). A mixed method should lead to more party fragmentation than a pure SMD system. The results of the elections show that Germany has between four and five viable parties competing in elections during the past 15 years. It is particularly interesting that the Green Party in Germany is a viable party, one of the newer political cleavages. In contrast, the Green Party in the U.S. is mechanically and possibly psychologically hindered by the electoral rules.

Though both countries have these cleavages present, the Green Party is more successful in Germany than the U.S. This is telling of the impact of the electoral rules. The emergence of some of these new cleavages in this case, disproves Lipset and Rokkan's thesis that most political parties are the result of social cleavages that were present during the early stages of state building.

The United States is the case that provides the strongest support for the Law. The U.S. has had a two-party system for many years and even with the recent attempts of the Green party and the Reform party, no third party has emerged that has seriously competed with the other two parties. Though there are individuals in the country who might hold beliefs that are more congruent with the Reform or Green Party, most voters still stick with the party that they believe will have the best chance of winning. In addition, most politicians, no matter how liberal or conservative, have not defected to the other parties yet.

In Lijphart's book Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, which tested *Duverger's Law* more thoroughly, it is concluded that SMD does lead to less fragmentation while PR leads to more fragmentation (1984). In general, SMD systems are hard on smaller parties and even if they do compete, they rarely are able to garner enough votes to be considered viable. Most countries in Europe use some form of PR or mixed system that allows for fragmentation to accommodate the many different views in the political arena.

Examining Theories of Electoral Systems and the Number of Viable Parties

Testing the theories of electoral systems in Taiwan and South Korea

The previous authors mentioned have produced important studies, but empirical testing of their theories and modifications made to the theories were primarily based in Europe and the United States. The cases tested were industrialized stable democracies that were not struggling with legitimacy issues, overactive militaries, authoritarian leaders and political cultures that exhibited low levels of trust towards institutions. It was also assumed that voters were fully socialized in a modern civic culture.

In *Duverger's Law* and *hypothesis* there was an expectation of the countries' examined that the electoral laws were stable and adhered to in a similar manner. In Lipset and Rokkan's theory, there was an expectation that the social cleavages that had been present during the early stages of state building, were enduring and had already been transferred into political cleavages for many, many years. Neither theory took in to account or examined countries whose electoral laws are orchestrated and designed by a ruling party/leader who intended to suppress the opposition. This changes many of the outcomes and needs to be further explored.

Because of this, none of these studies have focused on some of the newly democratized countries of East Asia. This area has been for the most

part, neglected by scholars of electoral systems. Grofman and Lee's book titled Elections in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1999, departed from this trend and looked at electoral systems in Asia. Given the recent democratization efforts, the volume argued that it came out in a timely fashion.

The book argued that changes from one type of election system to another, can have significant and lasting direct consequences for party proliferation, which is supported by Riker, Duverger, Taagepera and Shugart, Rae and Cox. They also argued that electoral rules that appear to be the same would have different consequences when one considers district size and thresholds. Third, changes in election system can't be "understood as operating in a vacuum," (1999: 2). Other aspects such as political culture and other existing political institutions affect the effects of these types of changes. They also argued that changes to electoral systems may "give rise to equilibrium forces that moderate the consequences of the changes as voters, candidates and parties adapt their behavior to the new institutional environment in ways that compensate for the changes, so as to partially restore significant elements of the status quo ante," (pg. 2).

Nevertheless, the book focused most of its attention on the use of SNTV and granted, does provide important insights regarding the effects of SNTV. However, because SNTV serves as the primary framework, the book missed opportunities to examine other aspects of these countries' electoral systems. It did not delve deeply enough into the origins of the laws and thus

largely neglects an examination of the cultural and political context. It also neglected to discuss how changes made to the laws impacted the degree of democratization. The effects of single member district, changes made to how candidates are nominated, how votes are counted and changes made to the size of the legislatures, changes made to district size are also not explored in depth.

Few theories have made predictions about SNTV because it is so rarely used, with the exceptions of Spain, in some cases, Japan before 1994 and South Korea from 1972-1988. Taiwan is the only country that uses SNTV at the national scale, which makes comparison with other systems difficult. SNTV has been more thoroughly examined in Japan. Reed (1990) made insights regarding the effects of SNTV in Japan (From Grofman and Lee, 1999).

What predictions have been made about SNTV? In Japan, SNTV had been used for over forty years with very favorable results for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It dominated politics in Japan and was able to win election after election. Most scholars attributed this phenomenon to the electoral laws that claimed that its dominance was due to the crooked structure of the districts that gave bloated representation to the rural areas. This set-up helped the LDP because it had guaranteed support in the rural areas and these areas were given more representation. On the other hand, the populations of the urban areas had grown tremendously, but no

reapportionment had occurred to accommodate this. This gave the urban areas less representation, which suited the LDP best since it was not always the first choice of voters in these areas.

The large multi-member district system was used until 1994 when it became clear that the laws were detrimental to the system and were not conducive to effective governance. The laws aggravated factionalism and forced parties to over-spend on every election to accommodate the many coordination problems. The LDP was not immune to self-destruction. The divisive factions that had been fostered by the laws became too divisive after the LDP broke down and for the first time, it did not have a majority in the Diet.

Though many of his predictions can be applied to Taiwan, "SNTV works somewhat differently when embedded in different regime types. Whereas Japan exemplified SNTV under democracy, Taiwan illustrates SNTV first under authoritarianism (1945-1975), also under the gradual transition from authoritarianism (1975-1990), and finally under the more rapid transition to democracy (1990-1996).

Thus, given all of the literature on electoral systems, what can be said about Taiwan and South Korea? Taiwan does demonstrate that district magnitude has an impact on the number of parties, as pointed out by Rae and later confirmed by Taagepera and Shugart. Taiwan has two dominant parties, but other parties and independent politicians continually compete in

elections. This is due to the increased district magnitude of their districts. However, though both Rae and Taagepera and Shugart predicted that district magnitude will lead to increased proportionality, they don't elaborate on how one party could dominate and possibly be advantaged by the system. The dominance of the KMT would not have been predicted. There were other factors to be examined that explain why the KMT was able to dominate for so long.

Thus, the history, political context and political culture become important in the Taiwanese case to illustrate why the KMT was able to rule for so long. The KMT controlled the laws and never allowed other political parties to exist until the late 1980's. The party had no cohesive opposition to deal with for many years and could build a super-party that was strong enough to handle and take advantage of the SNTV system. Similar to Japan, one party was able to rule for an extraordinary period of time because the laws also benefited parties that are well-organized, well-funded, well networked, are willing to buy votes and whose districts are gerrymandered in their favor. Thus, in this context, it's not just smaller parties that are advantaged by the district magnitude, but also parties that fit the criteria mentioned above.

In South Korea's case, it does use a modified form of SMD, which is used by many other Western countries. However, can *Duverger's Law* be applied to South Korea? Given that South Korea, still does not have a two-

party, system, the answer is no. South Korea should not be disregarded, however, because it does not fit the theory. As mentioned above, unlike in the Western Countries tested for *Duverger's Law*, the elites in South Korea created special institutions for selfish political reasons. This has affected the way that voters respond to the system, even after it has finally been modified to be as fair and democratic as possible. Voters are still affected by the numerous changes that have been made to the electoral system, their history with authoritarian rule and the strength of traditional norms that have been exacerbated by self-interested political leaders. Therefore, it is unlikely that voters will respond to electoral laws in the same manner as other Western countries, which have different histories and different political cultures.

In sum, as of yet, the theories that have been tested with some success on Western countries cannot yet be applied to South Korea and Taiwan without some serious modifications. In general, it is better to take them on a case-by-case basis. Though *Duverger's Law* and *hypothesis* have had success in predicting the tendency for party fragmentation or lack thereof in Western countries, in South Korea and Taiwan, both the mechanical and psychological effects are negated by the behavior of the politicians and voters and their political cultures and contexts. Politicians can afford to not form permanent coalitions with other parties because voters, and according to the law, behave "irrationally". They are motivated by other factors such as

regionalism, personalism, vote-buying and patron-client ties, to be more thoroughly examined later.

Examining Theories on the Pathways of Representation

Miller and Stokes significant study in 1963 examined not only whether or not representation is occurring, but they also examined by what pathway representation occurs (1963). They looked at U.S. Congressional roll call votes to determine this and also asked questions to constituents regarding three issues. They examined beliefs on civil rights, social welfare policies and foreign policy issues. They concluded that representation occurs by two different pathways, proposing two different models. The first model was the *delegate* model, which assumed that the legislator follows the views of his or her constituency closely, in order to better represent their beliefs. The *trustee* model assumed that the legislator is better informed and better able to keep up with all of the current issues affecting his or her constituents, and should make decisions on behalf of the voters. Thus, it was hypothesized that there were two types of relationships that legislators had with their constituents. They were either closely following their constituents or clearly communicating their views to the constituents and voting according to these views.

Miller and Stokes concluded that representation is occurring, but takes a *trustee* path with social welfare issues and a *delegate* path with civil rights issues. (It was unclear what pathway was taking place regarding foreign

policy issues). For the most part, the study spawned other theories and much criticism regarding their methods and findings.

Page and Shapiro (1992) claimed that the theory ignored important demographic variables and looked at the wrong variables. They also claimed that methodologically, there were problems with the surveys. They only had 13 interviews per district, asked different questions to the legislators as to the constituents and asked yes or no questions, which lead to biases. There was also the problem of the scope of the study. It was argued that they ignored that representation occurs both dyadically and collectively. Later studies attempted to account for these methodological problems.

Dalton claimed that representation occurs much differently in the U.S. compared to Europe (1988). As he saw it, representation occurs both dyadically and collectively in Europe, but in different ways. In Europe, dyadic representation is not how well the legislator represents the constituents in his district, but how well each particular party represents their party supporters.

In light of this, he argued that the *Responsible Party Model* better explains representation in Europe. In this model, elections are highly competitive and parties are very distinct from one another. In addition, parties were assumed to be highly centralized, to vote in a united bloc and make their platforms clear to the public. In turn, the voters were well informed regarding where the parties stood, and voted based on their knowledge of the parties' platforms. Parties would stick to their platforms after the election, and voters

could either punish or reward the party(s) in power based on their performance.

He chose to look at both party and national level effects to explain this. Of party level effects, he argued that centralized parties are more likely to have strong party discipline, which would counteract the method of looking at roll call votes. The parties in Europe are so highly centralized and thus, vote in a united bloc because they are not accountable to the voters in primaries, as opposed to the United States. As he saw it, this affected the way legislators in the respective parties' voted. Therefore, it made no sense to look at roll call votes, since all legislators within the same party would vote the same.

Dalton also claimed that the ideology of the party had an impact. Parties that were more extreme from an ideological standpoint would exhibit higher levels of representation. On the other hand, more centrist parties had lower levels of dyadic representation.

Finally, whether or not the party(s) are mass or catch-all parties also impacts representation. Mass parties have large memberships and a clear party platform, such as the Communist party in China. Catch-all parties are vehicles for winning elections, don't necessarily have clear platforms and adapt to do what is needed to win votes, such as the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan.

Of the national level effects, Dalton mentioned the role of the electoral system (which he fails to explain the impact of), which can impact how representation occurs. Since the U.S. holds primaries, this impacts the freedom given to representatives to go with their own views or closely follow their constituents rather than follow the party. However, because European countries do not make use of primaries, their parties are highly centralized and stick to their platforms. There are also more parties to choose from which better enables the voter to vote for a party that can closely match their beliefs.

According to Dalton, this makes the *Responsible Party Model* a more adequate example of how representation occurs in Europe. The relationship between the voter is not with a particular legislator but with a particular party. The voter is represented because he or she is well informed on the platforms of the various parties and there are multiples parties available to best represent their views (with some exceptions in Austria and England).

How does representation occur in South Korea and Taiwan? In both of these countries, representation is not through and by parties (as Giovanni Sartori claimed, 1976), but through individual legislators who are heavily networked and involved with the voters in patron client relationships. These ties are not based on similar beliefs on important issues, but are based on patronage doled out by the particular legislator. In South Korea, the role of regionalism also affects these relationships.

In Taiwan, representation does not follow any of the models discussed by Dalton or Miller and Stokes. It does not follow the *Responsible Party Model* because representation does not occur by and through parties. Parties are not cohesive. They are groups composed of individuals with their own power bases, who are not always accountable to the party. Why is this the case? Parties in Taiwan are fragmented due to the electoral laws, the cultural practice of vote buying and the factionalist nature of Taiwanese politics. (The nature of political parties in Taiwan to be more thoroughly discussed in the section "Taiwanese Political Parties")

As described in the previous chapters, the electoral system fragments political parties and creates a very competitive environment for candidates even within the same political party. These candidates must differentiate themselves from other candidates within their own party, and thus emphasize candidate characteristics and rely on vote buying and pork barrel legislation to gain votes. Thus, representation does not occur through parties, because they are not unified organizations with clear platforms that all of the individual legislators are forced to stick to. Representation occurs through individual legislators.

However, this pathway of representation is not in line with the pathways set forth by Miller and Stokes either. The *trustee* and *delegate* models are established under the premise that issues are important to both legislators and the constituents. In Taiwan, issues do not play as pivotal a

role in the legislator to constituent relationship (with the possible exception of the Taiwanese independence issue). This absence of issues in politics alters the model that representation occurs through in Taiwan. Instead, it occurs through a *patron-client* model. Though issues have become more important, they are still overshadowed by the importance of money and pork barrel politics.

Because individuals are still voting for politicians based on what they can provide them, either through buying their votes or doling out patronage, representation in Taiwan does not follow the aforementioned pathways set forth by either Miller and Stokes or Dalton. Legislators are representative to their constituents simply because they are providing them with money, gifts or some other type of patronage. Since the ideology of the two main political parties is largely the same, (with the exception of the highly contentious independence issue) the process of appealing to voters is not through issues but through patronage. Thus, in Taiwan, representation still occurs through a *patron-client model*.

In South Korea, the models also do not apply. Representation does not occur through parties, but also occurs through individual legislators, because parties have never had any meaning in South Korean politics. Parties have not been enduring institutions that have developed loyal followings. (The nature of Korean political parties to be discussed in the section on Korean Political Parties) Thus, representation does not follow the

responsible party model either. Personal characteristics, vote-buying (although to a much lesser extent than in Taiwan), region of origin, and pork-barrel legislation have eclipsed the importance of issues and ideology as well.

Though there are some ideological differences between the heads of the political parties in South Korea (given that Kim Dae Jung claims to more ideologically to the left than his opponents), for the most part, regionalism drives voting behavior. In this setting, voters vote based on what candidate hails from their region of origin. There are many cultural reasons for this, which draws back on the importance of kinship and family ties. However, a more practical reason for this is that politicians dole out the most patronage to their region of origin. This is still the case with current president Kim Dae Jung. He attacked his predecessors for the practice of favoring particular regions, yet has committed the same deed himself.

Thus, again, issues and ideology are not as important. Like in Taiwan, political parties are not that distinct and personal characteristics of politicians overshadow most important political issues. Representation follows the *patron-client model* where legislators represent their constituents, appealing to voters primarily through patronage. All of these particularities that distinguish the South Korean and Taiwanese systems from their Western counterparts will be discussed in further detail later.

Examining Theories on the Saliency of Political Issues and Ideology

Studies have also focused much attention on the whether or not parties and voters emphasize specific political issues or are more ideologically driven. Dalton (1988) delineated that American parties focus more on political issues while European parties are more ideological in nature. European parties also tend to be more liberal on a left to right continuum than their American counterparts. The important thing is not whether parties are ideological or concentrate on certain issues, but whether or not the parties in a particular system are offering different views to best represent the vast electorate. Ian Budge claimed that political parties in the U.S. are not only distinct but are also responsive to the public in highly competitive elections (1983). Parties in Europe are also ideologically distinct, and as argued by Dalton, the public is able to distinguish between the different parties.

Thus, political issues and ideology are important and parties are better identified and distinguished by their platforms than other factors. This is not the case in South Korea and Taiwan. The parties are not that different from an ideological stance in Taiwan. Though there are key issues that may differentiate the major two parties in Taiwan, their stances on many different issues are relatively the same. During the democratization process, the different stances on the pace and extent of democratic reform, distinguished the two parties. However, in light of the many reforms that have taken place,

it is not always easy for the voters to differentiate between the two parties based on their platforms. Voters' decisions are motivated by other factors.

In South Korea, this is also the case. Voters can't easily differentiate between the parties that compete. Before the democratic forms had been enacted, the ruling party simply competed against a very unorganized opposition that often competed against one another, in order to be regarded as the most "pure opposition party". Thus, the cleavages present for both countries during the development process were simply government vs. anti-government. The democratization process left the opposition with little to espouse and it became much more difficult to distinguish the various parties along lines of policy. Why is this the case? How do voters differentiate between parties? What influences their voting behavior, if it is not based on policy?

Parties are not easily distinguishable because there has been a lack of political cleavages in both parties. Factions divide up politicians, but in most cases, these divisions are more personal in nature and not based on policy. When voters go to the polls, in turn, their decisions are not based on policy as well, but based on personal and in South Korea's case, regional ties. Politicians are well known, but their platforms are not. The questions asked in the previous paragraph are answered in the next section.

Chapter 19

Key Aspects of Taiwanese and South Korean Politics

Political Culture of the Elite and Electorate

The level of institutionalization of political parties, as well as other democratic institutions and organizations are overshadowed by cultural traits in both South Korea and Taiwan. The most important traits to be focused upon are: 1) the low levels of trust, 2) the cultural fear of political uncertainty and disorder, 3) the hierarchical interpersonal relationships, 4) the authoritarian and patriarchal culture, 5) the importance of honor and face, 6) the importance of groups over individuals, 7) the emphasis of harmony, conformity and uniformity and finally, 8) an overall inconsistent commitment to democracy.

Both countries exhibit similar cultural traits and have Confucian traditions. Though I will not delve into the role of Confucianism, it is important to note that aspects of the Confucian tradition are often interpreted to form the basis of their cultures and shape important cultural traits. However, Confucianism, as a school of thought, will not be examined because much of the Confucian tradition has been reinterpreted and distorted to best serve the interests of the leaders in both societies.

In South Korea, in particular, one of the cultural traits that alters the way in which its party system functions is the lack of trust between people

and their leaders. This is a result of South Koreans' emphasis on networks and in-groups. Relationships with individuals who are outside the group are in general, characterized by distrust. Thus, there is little trust between those of different clans and regions, etc. It is therefore, difficult for organizations to extend beyond regions that are able to resonate with the public and be trusted.

This lack of trust is particularly evident between the people and their leaders. The reasons for the lack of trust is due to deep rooted skepticism towards people who are outside of one's own community or social group and the unrealistically high expectations people place on their leaders. (This is ironic given, that many individuals have respect for Park, despite the fact that he clearly operated in an authoritarian manner.) In the in-group environment, individuals are very trusting of one another. This is especially true among family members. If the leader is from the same group as the individuals than trust is also higher, and there is a strong faith in the benevolence of the leaders. This loyalty is demonstrated by the support given to presidents who hailed from the same region as the individuals. These individuals who descend from the same region are more likely to perceive the leader's performance and abilities as favorable compared to individuals who are from other parts of the country (Helgesen 1998: 100).

There is also a lack of trust, in both countries, of institutions. Both countries' leaders have had difficulty dealing with uncertainty. These leaders

have demonstrated little faith in institutionalized certainty. In the context of both China's and Korea's history, because of their turbulent histories, political uncertainty may be equated with disorder (Yao 1992: 238). In the Chinese case Yao wrote that "Chinese culture is a controlling culture, not a democratic, not a free, not an equal one. Chiang Kai-shek said it was an ethical system, but ethical is not equal. Enforced conformity and strict maintenance of public order has been justified over the years by a perversion of Confucian values," (Yao 1992: 238).

The emphasis on order has weakened the reliance on institutions that might undermine leaders' goals. Patron-client relationships have flourished due to weak institutions and a cultural aversion to relying on them. It has allowed these types of relationships between legislators and their constituents, rather than relying on interest group politics and lobbying. The weakness of institutions have allowed representatives to dole out immediate benefits to their clients rather than waiting for indirect benefits as an outcome of interest group articulation and legislation. Leaders in both countries are accustomed to relying on these types of relationships with the public and the public is accustomed to the immediate rewards. With patron-client politics (to be discussed in further detail, later) there is no adherence to laws, rules and regulations. Instead, patron-client politics allows corruption to foster and undermines the chances for democracy to take root.

In general, democracy breeds competition and uncertainty. In the eyes of Korean and Chinese, uncertainty is enhanced by open and formal discussions and political debate. Richard Solomon (1971) emphasized how the fear of uncertainty and disorder, known as luan causes political leaders to view their adversaries with contempt, creating bitter factions and making it difficult for leaders to take criticism.

The relationships in both South Korean and Taiwanese societies can be characterized as hierarchical. The importance of these vertical relationships has persisted in both societies. In Korea there was little that was democratic during the Choson dynasty, according to Oh, who wrote that loyalty "governed the relationships between the ruler and the monarch's subjects," (1999: 12). The hierarchical nature of the system tacitly allows leaders to make authoritarian and arbitrary decisions, particularly if these actions are justified in the name of preserving peace and order.

The hierarchical nature of society has also encouraged patron-client relationships where leaders continue to give goods and rewards in order to maintain the hierarchical structure of support. The leaders developed strategies to keep their subordinates dependent on them, rather than working with them.

Thus, leaders still manipulate the interchange of goods and other things of material value and interest. This weakens the strength of institutions because in order to deliver these goods, the role of institutions either takes a

different form or is discarded altogether in favor of relying on informal networks. Modern versions of political institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties are often disguised for informal networks, which thwart formal structures of organized rule and authority.

In addition, the patriarchal nature of both South Korean and Taiwanese societies plays an important role in politics as well. It stems from agrarian traditions and the core of that is respecting your elders. Family ties in both countries are central elements of their lives. Leaders are depicted as patriarchal figures and the state is an extreme extension of one's family. They look to their leaders for key decisions and are obedient to them. Helgesen claimed that there is a psychological dependency found in leadership styles that demonstrate paternalistic modes of authority (1998). Unfortunately for the development of a democratic culture, these traditions have been developed in a distorted fashion to justify authoritarianism and oppressive leadership. This explains the paradox of strong leaders with obedient assistants who may be secretly alienated, but are unable to overthrow the established leadership.

The culture also places a high priority on concepts of face and honor. This gives rise to situations where the consequences of avoiding a loss of face are very significant. Thus, leaders are willing to do whatever it takes to avoid a loss of face and this goal takes precedence over following the rules. In a community with such a high emphasis on face and honor, it is common

that informal regulations are more commonly used than arbitration through the legal system. This practice of resolving problems informally, in a discreet manner, rather than relying on democratic institutions is perpetuated due to the importance of these concepts of face and honor.

The importance of individual rights is one of the hallmarks of Western societies. In Eastern communities, such as in South Korea and Taiwan, the rights are not based on the individual and more emphasis is placed on the group. Western concepts of individual liberty and human rights undermine the overall solidarity of the group, which are foundations of South Korean and Taiwanese societies.

In general the individual's concept of self is dependent on his or her position within the group and on the group's support for this position. The possibility of a loss of position within that group causes emotional stress because it threatens the individual's identity.

This all conditions individuals to suppress their more aggressive emotions in order to be part of a group and to project harmony and consensus. Harmony and consensus are important building blocks to creating a peaceful social order and political stability. Thus, it is not only the political leaders that are concerned with maintaining order, harmony and consensus, but the public as well. Discussions of different beliefs and values are viewed as threats to this maintenance of harmony. Helgesen wrote that suppressed hostility towards superiors is a major cause of emotional stress

among Korean men (1998: 114). Thus, one result of this is that harmony is valued over ideological variety. There are fewer political choices available to voters and an absence of political cleavages. There are not as many issues that differentiate the various political parties. The choices offered to the public are essentially the same.

Both the lack of individuality and the emphasis on harmony encourage authoritarian exercise of power. There is no tradition of deciding important issues through deliberation or debate. The public has depended on authoritarian guidance for decades and has great difficulty with the process of peaceful conflict resolution. They are not accustomed to civilized public disagreements. Distinguishing the difference between criticism and scolding is problematic. In addition, inquiry into the truth or falsifying a proposition has not been successful. Overall, all of these practices that are common in democracies are viewed as threatening to the social order, and political stability.

Another important consequence of this is that a loyal opposition has not developed in the same way as in Western democracies. A loyal opposition was an alien concept in Korea and Taiwan, until recently. This is due to both societies' aversion to conflict. This makes the process of holding elections in the modern democratic era, appear more like an all-out battles with chaos and confusion. According to Manwoo Lee, "a western style election runs counter to traditional concepts of interpersonal decency. A

person who publicly touts his own virtues, while denigrating others is judged to be thoroughly depraved and vicious. When elections are held, they degenerate into unregulated fights," (1990: 12).

Finally, overall there is an inconsistent commitment to democracy and Western values of individualism and pluralism. In Taiwan this ambivalence is due to decades of military threats and ideological challenges from the Communist regime on the mainland. These challenges have made it more difficult to embrace the individualism that accompanies democracy and Western ideals. The need for order and stability was more important. In addition, the economic legacy of capitalism has had a slow effect on Taiwanese culture. Cultural change is a much slower process than economic development.

Korean political culture still lacks a commitment among its leaders to liberal democracy and all that it entails. Many leaders still show no respect for the rule of law as scandals have rocked the regimes of Roh, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. Laws are still perceived to be only for those who are powerless and unfortunate. Politics is a high stakes game where there are big losses and big rewards. In addition, among leaders, the authoritarian past has not been eradicated in any way. It still persists in beliefs, values and attitudes of the leaders, and even the voters. Not enough time has passed for them to reject the cultural norms of the previous undemocratic regimes.

Though many Koreans are diffusely attached to the ideals of democracy, it is difficult to erase the residue of authoritarian rule.

Vote Buying and Corruption

Though the practice of vote buying might seem like a rare if unique occurrence in the United States and other Western industrialized nations, it is a common practice in Taiwan in South Korea. Vote buying has not occurred as much in South Korea due to some changes to the electoral rules, which makes this process less effective, but it is still an issue in Taiwanese politics. In recent Taiwanese elections, the process of vote buying has been a negative issue for the KMT, and in particular, the mainstream faction that was led by former President Lee. Vote buying and corruption has been so pervasive in the KMT that the new party that formed, known as the New Party, made it one of the most salient issues in its campaign. This distinguished it from the KMT, the party that it had initially been a part of.

Huntington claimed that the "purchase of votes is a form of corrupt behavior, partially bred by modernization, which creates new sources of power and wealth," (1968: 59-61). Though it is clearly a form of corruption it has been instilled in the culture as a normal process of garnering votes. The behavior reflects the political culture of Taiwan and South Korea and the character of their democratic institutions. The continuance of vote buying is

indicative that the electoral behavior found in advanced democracies has not taken root.

Vote buying or some form of gift giving has been endemic in Taiwan's elections for years. As stated earlier, this has had something to do with the electoral system and the competitive environment that it breeds. The electoral laws create an environment that is so competitive and volatile that candidates are forced to compete against other candidates from their own party and have very few outlets based on issues and substance with which to distinguish themselves from other candidates. They are forced to resort to pork barrel techniques and vote buying in order to not only mobilize voters and gain some sort of support base but also to coordinate the votes, as was discussed earlier.

Nevertheless, because the electoral laws have not been changed, the transformation of the political culture has yet to take place. To change the political culture is a much slower process than the reform of institutions. Though the political culture has evolved somewhat and has become more accustomed to democratic norms and practices, until the election standards are legally enhanced and enforced and the SNTV system is abolished, vote buying will remain an entrenched cultural norm, (Moon, Brown and Robinson 1998: 573).

This practice started earlier when voters were bribed for their support. Money was quickly recognized as the key to win support. Voters did not

recognize candidates for any other reason other than what material rewards they would offer. Politicians were willing to buy votes early on and this usually came in the form of ten-dollar notes and occurred right before election time where candidates would traditionally call on relatives, friends and neighbors as well as other potential voters. When candidates came to call on voters it was a reminder of services rendered and favors given. The calls were rarely made to strangers but between people who shared a cordial relationship. In the smaller constituencies these practices were more effective. The process worked in the following manner. The politician would "turn to the zhuang jiao-vote brokers, who would in turn present gifts to their families, friends and acquaintances as reminders of obligation," (Brown, Moon Robinson 1998: 573).

Lerman illustrated how rampant the vote buying practices were. He claimed that it was reported "from each bank in Tainan County's sin-ying township, within the past three days the total of ten dollar bills that have been taken out in exchange for other denominations or that have been withdrawn from savings accounts has reached the five million dollar mark (125,000 U.S. dollars). By yesterday the ten dollar notes of several banks were equally exhausted," (1978: 112). This demonstrated the extent of bribery of vote buying.

Besides how obvious vote buying was to bank employees, it was also noticeable to anyone who visited the headquarters of any candidate. There

were stacks and stacks of ten-dollar NT bills in the headquarters of each candidate. It is interesting that candidates used the ten-dollar denomination in the vote buying process. The reason for this was because each vote at the time was bought for forty NT dollars and the next closest denomination was a 50. Because it would have been too embarrassing to ask for change, ten-dollar notes were used instead.

The cost of a vote wasn't always set at 40 NT dollars. At times it varied from 25 to 250 NT dollars. The cost of the vote depended on how important the office was and how hotly contested it was. There are actually two types of vote buying pointed out by Bosco (1992). He claimed that in the majority of cases, the money is merely a gift not to outright buy the vote of a voter but to secure the loyalty of an already established supporter. In this case, many candidates substitute money for soap, towels, china or watches. When money is given as a gift, it is given in the form of loose bills along with a flyer or small advertisement for the candidate. Bosco wrote that the money is sometimes referred to as hongbao (or red envelope). Most of the votes in the rural areas are bought in this manner. Most rural voters do not see this as a corrupt maneuver, but rather see it as an attempt to forge a relationship between the candidate and the voter.

Thus, elections, especially in the rural areas, were contests between two candidates who could be undifferentiated regarding how they stood on policy. The decisive factor in the competition was who could dispense the

most patronage. Though, these gifts of soap and pens would never buy someone's vote in Western democracies, gifts would never be distributed to someone whose mind had already been made up in Taiwan. Receiving money or gifts was to clarify and reinforce these already established loyalties. Most of these voters would have voted for a particular candidate, even if he hadn't tried to buy his vote. In this instance, however, the money is considered a gift, and it is culturally rude to not accept it. The gift giving of this type strengthens networks that had previously been built.

The second type of vote buying is less obscured by cultural norms. This occurs when a candidate spends much more per vote and goes to areas where he normally wouldn't be supported. This type of vote buying is much more expensive. To buy votes in areas that are far from a candidates' established support base can cost a candidate 200\$ NT more a vote. Sometimes last minute votes are bought for as much as 1000\$ NT per vote (40 U.S.\$) such as in the case of the Wandan township executive election in 1986. The candidate spent \$3,800,00 NT (150,000 U.S.\$) of his personal money in the last day along of the election, when it appeared to be too close to call.

Besides being much more costly, the second type of vote buying is done much more discreetly, often at night so that it is not in public written record, such as is customary with wedding gifts. Regardless of when or how the votes are bought, when the costs are added, the amounts spent in

campaigns are staggering. Factions in 1990 spent about 10,000,000 \$ NT (370,000 U.S.\$) for the township executive race. Candidates for County Assembly representative spent about 4-5,000,000 (148,000-180,000 U.S.\$). These representatives then sold their own vote receiving up to 500,000 \$NT (18,500 U.S.\$) for their vote for County Assembly speaker (Bosco 1992: 171).

Thus, vote buying makes it very costly for candidates who are trying to win supporters. Many times there was no way that they could pay to buy votes on their own. They usually had to rely on aid from faction leaders in the form of loans. More often, however, small businesses sought out local officials to arrange favorable treatment and contracts in exchange for votes and financial support. The power struggle within the KMT fueled this process and spurred on new contending blocs to bring help in from the outside. It also fostered anxiety to secure a strong base of financial support.

Though not all businessmen were corrupt, if the businesses didn't seek out the government officials, the government and party officials went looking for local opportunities to make deals for themselves. It became common practice to sell products or services to the government at artificially high prices and then split the difference of the benefits with officials arranging the deals. This explains how long-term financial rewards were guaranteed. If the first deal would be lucrative enough, more deals would follow with additional contracts, trips overseas and other deals involving money for continued agreements. How was this type of behavior justified? Hood (1997:

74-75) pointed to the Chinese tradition of doing favors through personal networks and contacts. He claimed that these traditions justified the practice in the minds of some business owners.

How else do politicians pay for these money-eating campaigns? Are there any other opportunities for politicians to "earn" back their investments? The answer is yes. There are several ways in which politicians can maintain these expensive elections and still end up on top. Besides the close connections with business and business deals as was mentioned above, politicians have preferential treatment and access to loans. They can take advantage of construction contracts and earn broker's commissions. They can also profit personally, by speculating in land involved in urban planning or operating underground dance halls or casinos. Thus, having money doesn't merely buy respect but it helps bring in more moneymaking opportunities.

Why would politicians rely on vote buying? Aren't there any voters who actually care about the issues and whose votes' could not be swayed, no matter how much money was thrown in their direction? Yes, there are some voters who hold onto their convictions and would not be swayed by money. However, and especially in the rural areas, the practice of vote buying is so common that money is much more readily recognized than the issues a candidate stands for.

In addition, in the past, before elections were held at the national level, there were ways in which the candidates could make sure that the votes that

they purchased are serving them well. To ensure this, candidates must rely on factions and vote-buying agents to help with the time-consuming coordination process involved in buying votes. Each agent purchases only 25 to 30 votes and instructs people he buys these votes from to mark their ballots in a distinctive fashion so that when the ballots are publicly counted he can determine who failed to honor their agreement. The agents are also present at the polling places throughout, serving as watchdogs paying close attention to how everyone is voting and who shows up and who doesn't. This helps a candidate make sure that an opposition candidate has not paid a voter for their identification card (without it, it is impossible to vote) from people known to have sold their votes to certain candidates he or she is trying to keep from getting elected. In addition, careful records are kept in each faction of whose votes were bought and how much was paid for them (Dickson 1996).

Vote buying was obviously very prominent early on when there was almost nothing to distinguish candidates from one another besides personal traits and there were not meaningful elections at the national level, where buying votes may not have as big an impact. However, according to Moon, Brown and Robinson, vote buying is still rampant, depending on what's at stake and how effective the buying of votes can be. The practice of sending out little red envelopes at night and visiting constituents and potential voters is still a common method of mobilizing the vote. Moon, et al. add that vote

buying does not just exist in the rural areas, but also in the cities where new and sophisticated vote buying methods are used, such as holding lavish entertainment and banquets (1998).

What is more problematic is that vote buying has many violent side effects. Some of the closer contests invite strenuous efforts to affect the results and this leads to the use of gangs. In 1994, the police reported that more than 200 candidates requested protection after receiving threats. They recorded five instances of gunfire at headquarters or homes of candidates, 17 injuries and one death.

Vote buying is a cultural phenomenon that has been reinforced by the electoral laws. Vote buying is a series of resource exchanges taking place within an ongoing supportive exchange dyad where obligation is implicit. It relegates the importance of political issues and helps perpetuate the need for factions and patron-client relationships.

Corruption, bribes, often ensconced under the guise of gift giving, characterize politics in both Taiwan and South Korea. In South Korea, corruption is particularly tarnishing to the democratization process. Leaders who were once touted for their greatness in forwarding the democratization process such as Roh and Kim Young Sam were not immune to falling prey to corrupt dealings. Though in some respects many were stunned by these transgressions, given South Korea's history, it's really not that surprising.

The supposedly democratic ways during the late 1980's and 1990's should have been free of these types of irregularities. However, both Kim and Roh left a legacy of disgrace after it was ascertained that they had been involved in huge scandals.

Factionalism and Patron-Client Relationships

Factions are nothing new to Asian politics. Though they were looked upon with disdain in Taiwan and were outright despised in South Korea, they are a common element to how politics function in both countries. In Taiwan, they were considered both necessary and problematic in that they could be too divisive and lead to self-destruction. Nevertheless, the regime made sure that it was strong enough to keep all of the factions in check and found that it could exercise better control with their existence, counterbalancing one another and serving several important functions for the government.

In South Korea, the public's view of factions was that of complete contempt. They regarded factions as responsible for the collapse of the Yi dynasty, making it more susceptible to conquest and takeover. The negative view of factions was extended to how Koreans viewed political parties. They perceived political parties to be nothing more than divisive political factions, which were not good for the country. This had an impact on the initial view of political parties and their lack of institutionalization. Despite this distrust of factions, they served an important purpose in both countries. In addition,

they are concepts that help to better understand how politics function in both South Korea and Taiwan.

There are several cultural sources of factions in Taiwan. The concept of guanxi, a term that denotes ties, connections, and patron-client relationship and networks helps to better explain the source of factions (Bosco 1992). Rather than conceptualizing themselves as free individuals, Taiwanese think of themselves as connected to others in a web of social relations. These webs are comprised of many social connections, with the most obvious type being connections of family. However, bonds and connections can form between friends, neighbors, classmates and co-workers. A good politician or businessman often keeps up a number of these connections to sustain power and organize deals.

Factions are defined as non-corporate groups that are based on patron-client relationships. A person is considered to be a member of a faction if he trades favors with other faction members. Thus, there is no ceremony to indicate this membership. Factions, are thus, very vague. There are many different types of transactions that can occur and many different ways in which members can join factions.

Factions monopolize the access to political power and economic interests through patron-client relationships. It is through these relationships, that the established elite is able to mobilize lower status individuals in traditional societies. The dyadic ties within factions are cemented on the

basis of a supportive exchange between the patron and the client. In the political arena the patron is usually a superior figure who commands or has access to resources that can be given out to its clients in exchange for their political support. The client is somewhat empowered by the institution of elections because it is given an important resource, the ability to vote.

In true electoral competition, the faction resembles a "political machine, which buys electoral support with particularistic rewards distributed through a leader to the follower in a network of clientelistic ties," (Nathan 1993: 430).

The faction, in the political sense, is distributing goods to ensure that whomever it is supporting maintains his or her power. The main goal is to help politicians sustain or attain power. They do this by several ways. First, factions assist in campaign financing. Second, they help candidates communicate where they stand on certain issues or what they plan to dole out. Third, they help create a distinct reputation. Fourth, they help a candidate build his personal networks. Fifth, they help mobilize voters to the polls. Finally, (and this is important when SNTV was used in South Korea and is still used in Taiwan) they help coordinate the vote.

The last function has been particularly important in Taiwan. In Taiwan, coordination problems demand that political parties have some sort of organization that ensures that votes are distributed properly. In Taiwan, the communication and coordination between candidates of the same political party is important. It is rare, if ever, that KMT legislators from the same

electoral district were also from the same faction. The KMT used factions to distinguish the candidates from one another, which was important to ensuring that one candidate didn't take too many of the votes away from other candidates.

The KMT controls the economic and political resources and doled them out to factions in favor of their support and ability to perform the above functions. This relationship with the factions helped it consolidate its power when it arrived to the island initially. Thus, the KMT instituted a corporate arrangement to strengthen its domination.

Factions in Taiwan were also important to securing ties to reliable voter bases such as residential compounds and military bases, (which was essential to candidates who didn't have their own war-chests). In Japan, factions had huge ties to big business and were instrumental to raising funds and attaining resources. Both countries relied on factions to coordinate votes and distinguish candidates within the same party from one another because both countries have extensively used the SNTV system.

Nevertheless, factions in Japan differed from those in Taiwan in two regards. First, factions in Japan were much more divisive and cohesive than the factions in Taiwan. Cheng and Chou (2000: 61-63) claimed that the factions in Taiwan were soft factions because they had overlapping memberships. Unlike Japan where members were limited to one faction only, there were many members who held multiple memberships to a number of

factions. This is due to the various procedures done by secret ballot. By keeping voting procedures secret, there was no way to monitor the loyalty of faction members, which allowed individuals to overlap their allegiances. This kept the factions from becoming as divisive as they are in Japan.

Nevertheless, having factions with multiple memberships impedes a faction's ability to act collectively because it leads to information leaks and undermines its overall cohesion.

Second, factions in Japan reached the national level much sooner than the factions in Taiwan did. In Japan, local factions are connected to national ones. Factionalism in Taiwan, for many years, was confined to the local administrative units at the municipal, county, township and village levels. Chiang Kai-shek blamed the KMT's failure on the Mainland on the excessive factionalism. Thus, he ensured that factions stayed at the local level in Taiwan, so that they would never pose a threat to his rule. He also ensured that no one faction became too powerful, by playing factions off one another and never giving out too many resources to any one faction. Chiang Kai-shek needed factions as a way to balance out all of the contending forces on the island and as a means to co-opt the local elite. In no time, factions were deeply entrenched in various localities.

Factions in Taiwan served similar purposes to their counterparts in Japan. The dominant parties, the KMT and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), used factions respectively, to build personal networks. In Japan these

networks were known as koenkais and were used to prevent ones' support base from being eroded by others. They were also used to raise money and form important networks. Factions also both played a role in weakening ideology. "Once local forces penetrated the state apparatus, Taiwan, like Japan, became a paradise for factional politics weakening the ideology of the KMT brought from the mainland," (Cheng, M. 1996: 177). For both countries, loyalties to factions started to overshadow the importance of any ideology. *Factional loyalties replaced loyalties to particular issues and ideological stances.*

Why was this the case? For an extended period of time in Taiwan, there was no alternative ideology to the KMT. Thus, the electorate is not ignorant or irrational, but only was given the choice of voting for KMT candidate A vs. KMT candidate B. Hence, the electorate came to judge candidates not on the issues that they promoted but more on how capable the candidate appeared and other candidate characteristics. In addition, "voters in the rural areas where social networks are more stable and longstanding, vote according to faction because it suits them," (Bosco 1992: 161). Factions dispense patronage and help voters distinguish candidates from one another so that they can choose between similar candidates running in their voting district. For politicians, the faction is instrumental to ensuring electoral victories because the social network between the candidate and the voter is

stronger. Factions coordinate the votes, buy votes, distribute votes and help candidates deal with the complexity of the SNTV electoral system.

The function and behavior of factions has changed somewhat with the arrival of national elections. Before, factions were prohibited from reaching the national level, but now have extended to this arena. The KMT has lost control over the local factions, which are now becoming more powerful, linking with national politicians and affecting national policy.

"Through a cultural pattern of tapping into guanxi connections made factions possible, it would be a mistake to view factions as merely the product of traditional culture, an immature electorate, or irrational clannishness. Factions are part of the structure of society, the channels through which political favors and resources flow," (Bosco 1992: 178).

Factions in South Korea are also part of the structure of society, though the population has a love-hate relationship with them. When the Japanese colonized Korea, one of the factors to blame for this take-over was the presence of divisive factions that were unable to cooperate to surmount their aggressive captor. Factions were a life and death struggle, at the time. Factional struggles intensified and were less based on merits and almost entirely based on personal differences. Factions are thus, viewed as divisive and undesirable. However, that does not mean that they don't continue to persist in South Korea.

Personalism

The strength of personalism in Korea and Taiwan is based on both cultural and institutional factors. Both Taiwan and South Korea have had a history of powerful leaders whose charisma and/or power has completely overshadowed other aspects of the political system. Leaders are depicted as patriarchal figures. This stems from a political culture that gives a blind obedience to elders and superiors, and where relationships are characterized as hierarchical.

Because the institutions other than the executive branch have been weak, the other institutions and aspects of democratic governments have never had the opportunity to exercise any muscle. These institutions include the legislative bodies, political parties and other aspects such as interest groups. In both countries the legislative bodies were much weaker than the executives. This left the public more attentive and conscious of political leaders than institutions. In addition, political parties have been generally weak. Though one could hardly regard the KMT as weak party, it was weak regarding its ability to form bonds with the public based on policy (as were South Korean parties). The ties formed with the public were based on patronage, regional ties (in the case of South Korea) and personal ties. These networks that formed overshadowed issues and ideology, as well as the effectiveness of rules and institutions. Interest groups were also never given a space to flourish. The authoritarian leadership in both nations had

outlawed any organization that might thwart the power of the leader and ruling party, which has hampered interest groups (Helgesen 1998).

In South Korea, one of the problems hindering political development was the insistence of both the opposition leaders and leaders of the ruling party to emphasize their own personal characteristics in campaigns above issues and policy platforms. They seek to distinguish themselves based on their personal characteristics and their personal relationships with the voters. This has been especially damaging to the opposition movement. The opposition has been unable to cooperate because of personal differences that could not be overcome. Instead of coalescing and emphasizing policy, they have let their egos get in the way. Their powerful personalities and loyal followings based on this have given them the leverage to not adhere to institutions. This has disrupted the democratization process. Nevertheless, opposition leaders were willing to adhere to personalism, in the name of increasing their personal chances for more power and prestige.

The ruling party leadership has also exacerbated the propensity for excessive personalism. Park integrated Korean elites into an elaborate network around him. As a super-patrimonial leader, they were linked to him based on his personal leadership. He could attract them with various forms of rewards. Thus, because the powers of the president were so excessive, the president had the means to give out rewards to keep a loyal following based on other reasons besides their commitment to his political vision.

The lopsided power of personalities made institutions impotent. The electoral laws have been changed so many times, and thus, parties and voters' ties to these parties have not been strong. This has created an unstable political environment where political parties dissolved and reappeared. As a result, the only connections retained by the voters are the ties to powerful leaders who garner their attention. This pattern persists as political parties continue to disappear and reappear under new names (Kim, H. W. 1992).

Taiwan has also been plagued by powerful personalities. This is due, in part, to the peculiarities in the electoral system and the way in which the political culture responds to it. The electoral system is highly divisive. With the semi-introduction of primaries, the system is complete with as many mechanisms as possible to divide up political parties into loose conglomerates of individual leaders. The opposition had no choice in the matter, given that it was intentionally divided by the ruling KMT into factions and was prohibited from forming a cohesive organization.

The emphasis on specific leaders and their personal connections, and amounts of patronage that they could dole out was also reinforced by the use of multi-member districts (MMD). The use of MMD is highly divisive since politicians are forced to compete against other politicians within their own party. In order to distinguish themselves from one another, they must rely on other mechanisms besides the policy of the party (whatever that may be).

They had to distinguish themselves to voters based on personal characteristics, networks and so forth.

This is perpetuated by the implementation of primaries, which gives individual politicians more leverage to concentrate on personal characteristics above policy. The parties in Taiwan are not easily distinguishable. Politicians within the same party are even less so. This means that emphasis on personal characteristics helps distinguish politicians from one another in the primaries as well.

Personalism has hindered political development and continues to characterize politics in both countries. Personality matters in politics and implies more than that. In South Korea, personification and regionalism are sometimes seen as two aspects of the same matter. This is because personality implies other forms of close and lifelong binding relationships. According to Helgesen, the outcome of personalism in politics is regionalism, to be discussed in the next section, (1998).

Regionalism

The phenomenon of regionalism is more unique to South Korea than Taiwan. It was one of the most stubborn aspects of South Korean politics that impedes it from developing a stable two-party system. It is defined as negatively charged emotions toward particular regions or individuals from those regions. Lee and Cho wrote that it is an emotional state and that it often

brings destructive behavior when a catalyst is given. It can even trigger political violence, as seen in the riots that took place during the Kwangju massacre in 1980, (1993: 23). Thus, it has had a destructive effect on post war development in Korea. Regional preferences are prominent in the behavior of both politicians and voters and it alters the way individuals in the system respond to their institutional constraints.

Regionalism can be traced to a variety of factors. Culturally, the origin of birth or the destination where one's family is from was very important and continues to be important today. Helgesen wrote that a descendant of Taegu, for example, would always belong to that place, regardless of whether he or she was actually born somewhere else (1998). In Korea, according to Lee and Cho, it is not the birthplace that is asked but the native place of origin of one's family. A person, thus, may be called a native son of a specific region, but be born somewhere else. Lee wrote that these "psychological ties to specific regions operate as fundamental catalysts to maintain and strengthen regional conflicts," (Lee, Cho 1993: 24).

Korea's past was characterized by conflicting relationships between the southeast and the southwest. These conflicts were a legacy of the "Three Kingdom" period when Korea was divided up into three areas ruled by different leaders. During this period, personal bonds were identified as highly important and people congregated into different clans. Clans were confined to blood relatives and over time, developed to include people of the same

village, and school. Nevertheless, the important consequence of this was that Koreans formed tight knit groups with one another, and these relationships were based on both family ties and ties to those who lived or descended from the same general area. Relationships were characterized with high levels of trust of those from the same region, and low levels of trust of those who were outsiders. Regional bonds became very significant.

These traditional ties and bonds were strengthened after the colonial period. Many Koreans regressed to the traditional behavior learned before Japan's takeover. They held on tightly to the traditional behavioral patterns as a means of survival and preserving their heritage. Because the Japanese had tried to eradicate their culture completely, it's no wonder that they responded in such a manner. Some of these traditional behavioral patterns were not necessarily conducive to democracy. Regionalism was one of the features of the traditional culture that has been more detrimental.

More recently, politicians, particularly during the Park era, exacerbated these regional ties through lopsided treatment of the different regions. This unfair distribution of development and investment tapped into the animosity between the various regions and heightened regional sentiments. Park heavily favored and developed his native area, Kyongsang. Seoul and the Pusan areas were also well developed. The Cholla regions, however, were neglected. Thus, under the Park regime, there was a geographically skewed pattern of economic development. There were regional disparities in industry,

income and infrastructure, which sharpened the variance in regional attitudes. Individuals were aware of different regional attributes such as how one spoke. Different accents and behaviors were negatively stereotyped. This was clearly due to the biased infiltration of government funding. The underdeveloped areas grew more frustrated with this unfair treatment and were easily mobilized along regional lines.

Another problem is that the central government always had too much power. The lack of local autonomy increased frustrations in these areas and made the Cholla regions, for example, completely dependent on the government. The government, however, would neglect some regions in favor of others. The ruling leaders and parties used regionalism to continue this centralized domination. The implementation of local autonomy would have allowed all of the regions the chance to appropriate funds for themselves and allocate the funds in ways that were not so unbalanced. Because of the lack of interregional cooperation, however, no region sought its own political autonomy to transform the highly centralized system of government into a decentralized one. This could only be achieved by forming a strong interregional cooperative network. As of yet, it is important to note that not enough time has passed for local autonomy to make a positive impact reducing regionalism.

Regionalism is the most important factor influencing voting decisions. Because of this, it also influences how politicians respond to the institutional

constraints placed upon them. Knowing that they will receive support from voters from their region encourages politicians to run on their own and in new parties. Voters, in turn, prioritize regional bonds above policy, issues and ideology.

This trend has been particularly noticeable in presidential elections. Because Park was from Kyongsang, his support primarily came from this region. In turn, Kim Dae Jung is from a small town in the Cholla region and has sustained overwhelming levels of support from this region. In the contentious 1971 presidential election, Kim Dae Jung received 68% of the vote from his native region while Park received 71% of the vote from his native region.

This would not be the last time that these regional preferences were notable. One of the more frustrating events that demonstrated the crippling effects of regionalism occurred during the 1987 presidential race. If the opposition forces, namely, Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil could have cooperated and combined, they could have easily won the first fair and direct presidential race. Though Roh was handpicked by Chun to be the successor, his announcement of a direct presidential election gave the opposition an excellent chance of finally coming to power, ending years of being shut out by the government party. In addition, given the mood of the nation, which seemed to demand change, and the unpopularity of the Chun regime, Roh should not have had a chance without resorting to cheating.

Due to personal animosities and each leader's support from their respective regions, Roh wouldn't have to (Cotton 1993: 170-176).

Roh did not need to come up with a brilliant campaign strategy. Instead, the failure of the Kims to agree on a single opposition presidential candidate helped Roh win. During the election campaign, all four candidates exploited regionalism by emphasizing their own regional attachments or degrading the regional attachments of the other candidates, (Cotton 1993: 176).

Roh received support from 66.4% of his native region of northern Yongham. Kim Dae Jung received a whopping 83.5% of support from Northern Cholla and 90.3% of support from Southern Cholla. Kim Young Sam received 51.3% of support from Yongham. In the 13th National Assembly election in April of 1988, the pattern of regional voting continued. Kim Young Sam's party did well in his native region, as did Kim Dae Jung's party (Cotton 1993).

This continued during the 1992 National Assembly election. The newly formed Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), which was a merger between Roh and Kim Young Sam, did best in Pusan, Kim's native region, Taegu and Northern Kyongsang. The DLP, however, did poorly in the Cholla regions, where the DP under Kim Dae Jung performed well (Cotton 1993).

In the 14th presidential election, Kim Young Sam received 70% of the vote from the Yongham region while only receiving 8.7% of the vote from

those in the Honam region, which includes the Cholla areas. Kim Dae Jung received 88% of the vote from the Honam region and almost no support from the Yongham region. They would have good reason not to support him. When he finally was elected president in 1997, he behaved no differently from his predecessors. He continued the practice of recruiting individuals, playing favorites from his native region and doling out more patronage to those areas as well (Bedeski 1994).

Regionalism is the most critical socio-political cleavage in Korea. It has many negative effects on democratic consolidation. First, it prevents political competition based on differences in policy. It also precludes the rational debates from taking place in a democracy. Second, it creates a divided national society. The divisions are vertical and this suppresses all other important sources of political cleavages. Third, it hinders any interregional cooperation, which is important to prevailing over centralized rule. In essence, it kept all local areas unable to triumph over centralism (Helgesen 1998).

Regional ties hinder the development of a two-party system. South Korea utilizes the same electoral system and also has a presidential system like the U.S., which both Duverger and Lijphart (1994) argued would lead to a two-party system. Nevertheless, a stable two-party system has not been established yet. One could argue that the strength of these regional ties works similar to the existence of an ethnic geographic concentration of voters,

as in Quebec. Regional ties are still stronger indicators of how people vote than other factors. Because of this, politicians can play on these attachments to avoid having to coalesce with other parties, cooperate and compromise.

Absence of Political Cleavages

Lipset and Rokkan argued that the political parties that we see today are the result of cleavages that were present during the timing of democratization (1967). As they saw it, these cleavages are enduring and help understand how past divisions present in society influence countries' current party systems. In Taiwan and South Korea, political cleavages are not so obvious. One first might point to the lack of heterogeneity in the electorate of both countries. However, there are many other societies that are homogeneous and still have electorates that are divided by particular political cleavages. In Taiwan and South Korea, much of the political development was stunted by the lack of political freedom that anyone who was not in agreement with the ruling party/leader enjoyed. This arrested their political development and deterred the proliferation of new ideas that could contest the dominant regime.

Besides the institutional constraints on political parties, new cleavages haven't clearly developed because the primary issue that those outside the ruling party/leader championed was the issue of democratization. New parties didn't form solely to promote different economic plans or different

welfare plans. The primary concern of those outside the ruling party was democratization. This was the main issue that consumed leaders of the DPP in Taiwan, and the politicians that were a part of opposition parties in South Korea. Opposition parties/politicians weren't identified by voters in terms of where they stood on a left to right ideological spectrum or differentiated by the salient issues made known to the public. Instead, parties/politicians who were not in the ruling party were identified as simply "the opposition".

In Taiwan the word "opposition" is what politicians outside the party, ("tang-wai") were identified as. In South Korea, there was a competition among those who were competing outside the party, concerning which party was the purest opposition party (Lee, S. 1999: 62). This has been an extended dispute between the opposition parties. This is due to the divisiveness of Korean society, requiring voters to take either a pro or anti-government stances. The result is that there is no room for compromising politicians. This type of behavior does not get much support from the voters. According to H.W. Kim, under authoritarian regimes, voters tend to prefer either the ruling party or genuine opposition parties, but not moderate and compromise-seeking politicians. Thus, the battle is to be the purest opposition party or politician, and what that means as far as issues are concerned is disregarded (1992).

The lack of cleavages can also be attributed to the relative equal distribution of wealth and low levels of crime. Though the situation may

gradually be changing, in both South Korea and Taiwan, both societies started out with an absence of any middle class (although this was not as prominent in Taiwan) and both countries experienced rapid economic growth. Overall, a large chunk of the population benefited from this growth (though to different degrees). Compared to other developing nations, there is an equal distribution of wealth and a large middle class. There are also not such obvious discrepancies between rich and poor.

Finally, the lack of political cleavages can be attributed to the political culture and specific cultural traits that emphasize conformity and stability. These traits are prioritized over discord and uncertainty. Since both South Korea's and Taiwan's electorates are aware of the security threats posed by their neighbors to the north, this provides a focal point for consensus among the public. They are concerned with their security and their concern affects how the public responds to more radical ways of handling their foreign policy.

In addition, there is some consensus regarding the need for stability in order to achieve economic growth. Despite the hardships imposed by both Park and the Chiangs, many South Koreans and Taiwanese respectively believe that the rapid economic growth can be credited to their wisdom and good judgement. Both Park and the Chiangs have not been vilified in the history books as dictators. Instead, there is a large portion of both countries' populations that believe that their leadership was responsible for the

economic growth and prosperity. Thus, there is a consensus that there is no reason to support leaders that might change their quality of life.

In Taiwan's case, the presence of political cleavages is becoming more evident, but for now, the only serious divide regards the independence issue and how to deal with China and asserting its sovereignty. The opposition party/ politicians, in the past, had to rely on the democratic reform issues to increase their electoral support. Previously, the KMT won election after election while the opposition came together primarily to fight for democratizing the system. Even the name of the party, tang-wai (meaning outside the party) reflected that their only common bond was that the politicians didn't belong to the KMT and were in favor of democratic reforms.

Since much of the democratic reform issues have been resolved, confrontations regarding Taiwan's identity have moved to the forefront. This issue is divided along ethnic lines, with native Taiwanese being more in favor of Taiwanese independence than the ethnic Chinese. However, the issue is still very sensitive given the security threats from China. When the DPP pursued this issue more vigorously it was hurt at the polls. The overall mood of the public is not as radical as the DPP is on the independence issue. Public opinion polls indicated that stability was more important (Chang, C. 1996).

Besides the independence issue, money politics and social welfare are also nominally important. Given that the KMT has been accused of being

heavily involved in money politics, (which was one of the reasons why the New Party split) this issue has had some resonance with the public.

However, other than the independence issue, which is more hotly contested among politicians than the public at large, there are few political cleavages.

In addition, though the nature of Taiwanese society is changing, compared to many democracies, the income of the public is relatively well distributed. The constant threat of China possibly attacking and sending threatening overtures, also unifies the public.

In the Korean case, due to the lack of cleavages, which are supposed to distinguish political parties from one another, and the lack of salient issues communicated to the public, the occurrence of mergers has been quite common. Specific issues do not ideologically bind political parties in South Korea, as Downs had hypothesized (1957). This gives them the freedom to make severe changes to their agendas. Political parties in South Korea have not been given the chance to become well institutionalized. The electorate is not aware of how political parties stand on different issues. They identify more with different leaders and judge parties based on their leadership, their charisma, where they're from and the patronage that they may promise to dispense. Thus, there are no distinct cleavages in the traditional political sense, as discussed by Lipset and Rokkan that distinguish political parties and force them to retain some ideological consistency or remain true to certain issues (1967).

Because of the lack of cleavages and the particularistic motivations behind most voting decisions, mergers in South Korea have occurred more frequently than other countries. These mergers weaken any party loyalty that was starting to form and blur the already ambiguous programs of political parties.

Mergers and Name Changes

Effects of Constant Changes to the Electoral System

The January 1990 merger of Kim Young Sam, Roh Tae Woo and Kim Jong Pil changed the party system into a two-party system with the DLP competing against Kim Dae Jung's PPD. Though this may have boded well for stable democracy, Kim Dae Jung labeled it a coup d'etat. It was reminiscent of mergers that took place in Japan and was not welcomed with open arms by the public. Surprisingly, these political parties could make this coalition because they differed very little in ideology or platforms. Their motivations were purely based on their own personal political aspirations and personal rivalries. This move demonstrated the weakness of both political parties in South Korea and the weakness of party loyalty of the voters.

Mergers are rare in countries with presidential systems. They are more common in parliamentary democracies where parties need to merge and form coalitions after elections in order to guarantee a vote of confidence. Mergers have risen in South Korea because the political leaders involved

were trying to manage their uncertainties concerning their electoral outcomes and wanted to try to control the outcomes. It can be understood as a traditional pattern of changing alliances due to the power aspirations of the leaders. It demonstrates the lack of commitment to political issues and ideology that separates political parties from each other in democratic Western countries.

It also demonstrates the power of other cultural characteristics such as regionalism and in particular, personalism. M. Lee wrote that "Korean politics is dominated by a few powerful political personalities and the Korean political system periodically adjusts to the needs of these powerful figures. In the case of Korea, its political institutions, particularly its political parties, lack the institutional autonomy and complexity to shape its leaders," (1990: 235).

This pattern is true of both opposition parties and ruling parties. Both leaders have exhibited similar styles that have been impediments to democracy. They both tend to follow the line of personal leadership rather than to work on forming a set of platforms and policies for a political party. The political party, in itself, is only formed in response to the need for a political leader to acquire power. The parties are easily subject to manipulation and are virtually powerless organizations. These organizations were designed to meet political leaders needs, not the other way around.

What, then caused the numerous mergers that appeared right after liberation from Japan? During the initial stage of democratization, there were

a large number of political parties that appeared. Merging was thus, quite common and accepted as normal to the political process. Immediately after liberation, the U.S. military had strict policy guidelines to promote political development that encouraged the merging of political organizations. Some of the first policy guidelines issued by Hodge in August of 1945, stated that consulting would only occur with organized political groups. Soon after that, political parties and groups multiplied.

Nevertheless, instead of these groups sticking together and forming cohesive and enduring organizations, the parties were forced to fight for their survival in a highly uncertain and volatile environment. Political parties had little experience with the democratic process in South Korea. They regressed into traditional modes of operating: personalism. Opposition parties also couldn't rely on the bureaucracy for support, nor could they rely on the legal institutions to deter government corruption and electoral irregularities. They had to respond to the ever-changing rules and the ever-changing ways that powerful leaders had instituted.

There were several instances of mergers during Rhee's regime, as he alienated and co-opted different parties left and right. When Rhee refused to follow the laws and committed numerous election irregularities, opposition parties were forced to fight for their survival by merging, which led to the creation of the Democratic Party in 1955. Mergers shouldn't be uncommon

during the early stages of development, however, in the South Korean case, these mergers never formed into permanent coalitions.

Changes made to the electoral laws also caused political organizations to divide and fragment. For example, after the military coup of May 16, 1961 all political party activities were banned until the end of 1962. The next day the National Assembly was also dissolved. Finally, on December 31, 1962, Park issued the legal and institutional basis for political parties, which made it more difficult for them to form and compete.

These early mergers are just the beginning. South Korean politics has seen the appearance and dissolution of multiple mergers later on. In most cases the mergers occurred on the opposition's side in response to the uncertainties and constraints of its environment.

The 1990 merger was not the first big merger that occurred during the Roh regime (Kim, H.W. 1992). The opposition parties were constantly talking about merging among parties to provide a united front against the government. After the 1988 National Assembly election, the RDP and the PPD looked as though they were going to merge on March 5, 1989. Nevertheless, the merger agreement was interrupted by violence that halted the talks. There were more than 200 student activists and PPD members demonstrating at the hotel where the merger was to occur.

Though that merger never came to fruition, a merger between Roh, Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil did. Kim Young Sam would be in charge

since he was touted as Roh's successor. This was thought to be a shrewd maneuver on Kim Young Sam's part, just to cement his bid for the presidency, while abandoning his role as an opposition to the ruling party.

This merger shocked many of the voters who didn't expect the opposition to abandon its cause so quickly. It also illustrated the absence of party loyalty (to be analyzed more in depth later). While name recognition should be an important factor helping political parties campaign, Kim Dae Jung saw no problem with not only changing the name of the PPD to the New Democratic Party, but soon after, merged with other smaller opposition parties to form the new Democratic Constitutional Party. All of this name changing should be confusing to the South Korean voters, but at this point, given the laundry list of name changes, this type of behavior is not considered abnormal.

Party mergers have been a pattern in Korean politics. The mergers that occurred in 1990's do not bode well for democratic consolidation. They are illustrative of the traditional mentality of political leaders and their abrupt dealings such as withdrawing from competition during a stalemate, with no other justifications. Mergers are thus, an option of political survival in a competitive, uncertain and volatile environment, (Kim, H. W 1992: 235).

The Nature of Political Parties in Taiwan and South Korea

Korean Political Parties

By now we see a dramatic contrast in Western and Eastern political parties. What is the role of political parties in Western industrialized democracies? According to Sartori, representation is to occur by and through political parties (1976). Parties are vehicles of representation. Dalton claimed that they are to be accountable to the public. He illustrated the role of political parties in Europe. As he saw it, representation in European countries occurs through the *Responsible Party Model*. Parties are supposed to be highly ideological and distinct from one another. Voters in these countries are well aware of the parties' platforms and how parties are distinguished from one another. After the election, parties are to stick to these platforms. Parties are highly centralized and vote in a united block, adhering to party lines so that the voter knows what he or she is getting when a vote is placed. In addition, elections should be highly competitive. This all means that there is a healthy contesting of different viewpoints that can be contested in fair, consistent and well-regulated elections. Voters, thus, are represented because they can choose to punish or reward parties based on their performance.

In the U.S., representation occurs in a different manner, though one could argue, no less meaningful. Parties are not as united and are

decentralized. Important issues of the day are emphasized more than ideology. Miller and Stokes claimed that representation occurs by different pathways in the U.S. (1963). In the *delegate* model, voters' views and sentiments are listened to. Each individual legislator has the leverage to vote against party platforms and can therefore, follow his constituents' views more closely to better represent them. In the *trustee* model, voters vote for representatives who are considered more informed on the issues of the day. Voters trust the judgement of representatives who are better equipped to make decisions on voters' behalf. Voters can look forward to new elections to punish or reward representatives who have not done this successfully.

In either case, representation occurs and parties, whether centralized or decentralized function for the purpose of embodying what the voters want or would want if they had the chance to inform themselves. Parties are not supposed to be solely vehicles for gaining new members and mobilizing voters to the polls. They are long standing and stable institutions that only change their platforms to adapt to the gradual changes to the political and social environment. They are, for the most part, distinct. Even though American parties have been criticized for being too similar, Budge countered that this is not the case (1983). He claimed that parties in the U.S. are very distinct and respond to dynamic shifts in the electorate.

Many scholars have indicated that parties should educate citizens to their political responsibilities, engage in conflict management, structure the

vote, maximize votes, organize the public will and represent the connecting link between the government and public opinion. South Korean political parties have mainly concentrated on maximizing and structuring the vote.

Political parties in South Korea have not evolved to this point. They function very differently and are more recognized by the personalities that lead them. From the beginning, they have been indistinguishable from a policy stance. Their effectiveness has been undermined by how narrow their ideological perspectives are. In Europe, there are various political parties that compete in elections that can be easily distinguished by their ideological stances. In South Korea, the early political parties at the onset of independence were all conservative in ideology. During the Park and Chun regime, the only difference between political parties was how they stood regarding the government. The ruling party supported the government and was nothing more than an organization to keep its leader afloat. The other parties opposed the government and competed more against each other to determine which opposition party was the purest. Issues, rather than the desire to democratize were rarely made salient to the public.

Instead of focusing on political issues or a particular political ideology, representation has occurred through patron-client relationships, a *patron-client* model. Patronage is doled out to voters, particularly in the rural areas in return for their political support. To go even further, votes are simply bought or paid for with pork-barrel legislation or gifts. In addition, parties are

distinguished by the personalities within the party. Personal characteristics are important factors that hinge on voters' decisions at the polls. Of these characteristics, the region of origin where a candidate is from is one of the most deciding factors. Thus, voters are linked to individuals, not parties. These linkages do not involve issues, but are based on patronage and networks, connections, friendships and common ties of origin.

The main function of Korean political parties is vote maximization. They are organized in ways to ensure that the leaders involved in the parties have the best chance of winning seats in office. They have internal organizations set up around the country for the sole purpose of mobilizing voters and gaining new party members. They spend millions of millions of dollars of party funds on campaigning. When parties during the Park and Chun regime made their lists of which individuals would be on the list of representatives to receive bonus seats, the criteria for making it on the list was completely based on money. This money then went to help the parties' maintain or gain power.

Political parties in Western democratized countries deal with uncertainty with every election. At times, there are major voter shifts in the electorate. There are voter realignments, economic crises, international conflicts that change the environment that a political party has to deal with. Political parties must deal with uncertainty year in and year out and have the

institutional strength to adapt to these changes without crumbling. In South Korea, during times of uncertainty parties opt for other solutions.

According to H. W. Kim (1992) there have been three common ways of coping with the uncertainty of electoral outcomes. First, parties have resorted to name change (which is basically disappearing and then reappearing), mergers and amending the electoral laws. Name change is not unique in Korea. According to Kim, there are significant cultural reasons for this. He claimed that last names of Koreans have important implications and meaning. Politicians understand that changing the name of a political party is symbolic of a new beginning. Park changed the name of the ruling party, as did Chun when he came to power. Kim Dae Jung has changed the name of his party so many times one could lose count. The same can be said for Kim Young Sam. The ironic thing about the process of name changing is that the individuals and the policies within the party are exactly the same, but voters apparently respond to the new name, and the process of deciding the new name is one that is seriously negotiated.

Another common coping mechanism for opposition parties and ruling parties alike is merging. This is a more common practice of big companies and firms that are competitive and motivated by selfishness. This is supposed to only occur in parliamentary democracies in order to provide a stable government and attain a vote of confidence from the legislature. This is not supposed to be a common event in presidential democracies. Yet, it is

in South Korea. This illustrates how little political parties care about ideology. Because they are indistinguishable, they are more easily able to let bygones be bygones and merge in the name of attaining more power. Though merging is not always warmly received by the public, these mergers can help ambitious politicians attain the positions of power that they covet.

Finally, the party in power can resort to the common method of changing the electoral laws. Though this happens rarely in Western democracies, this has been a common occurrence in South Korea. The electoral system must reduce the uncertainty quotient for the ruling party so that it can continue to hold elections and appear both democratic and legitimate in the eyes of the public (and the U.S.). Every political system has used an electoral system that favored the ruling party.

In sum, why have parties been so weak in South Korea? In addition, why is there such low party loyalty? There are various reasons for this. First, this is caused by how randomly new parties have been established. Second, constant name changes suggest the party's lack of an independent identity. Third, this is due to how frequently the electoral laws have been changed. Fourth, powerful personalities and their authoritarian styles of leadership overshadow party strength. Fifth, parties have failed to develop due to the low consciousness of the masses. Sixth, regionalism overshadows issue-voter behavior, weakening the connection from voter to representative based on a platform. Finally, the lopsided power given to the bureaucracy and other

organizations such as the military and the KCIA have hampered parties (1998).

Whether or not South Korean political parties can transform themselves into more enduring institutions remains to be seen. However, if personalism, regionalism and politicians' selfish behavior continues to be the trend, the strength of political parties will be overshadowed.

Taiwanese Political Parties

Unlike South Korean political parties, which have been extremely weak and merely used as vehicles to serve ambitious politicians' political interests, political parties in Taiwan have been somewhat more enduring. This of course, is clouded by the fact that political parties, with the exception of the KMT were banned from forming until the late 1980's. Regardless of that, the KMT has endured for over 50 years, an achievement that no party in South Korea has accomplished.

The role of the political party was somewhat different for Taiwanese leaders than the role that political parties have played for South Korean leaders. For Rhee, the political party was nothing more than an organization that could help him attain power. He had no interest in political parties until it became apparent that he needed to ally with one for his survival. He took control of the party and undermined any party member that got in his way. His sole purpose was to stay in power as long as possible and used only

party members that could help him achieve this goal. The party had no purpose otherwise, in his view.

For Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT served a more important purpose. He wanted to build it into an effective all-encompassing organization that would serve a variety of interests. He wanted to eventually take over Mainland China. In order to build up the party, he relied on support from local politicians and co-opted them into the party. He structured and built the party into an efficient machine, which besides helping him win elections, would rebuild the economy and create political stability.

When the R.O.C. fled to Taiwan, the country had a better foundation with which to work off of than South Korea. Korea had been war-torn, divided and destroyed. The economy was in the shambles and it had to deal with the aftermath of a civil war where the country had been polarized politically along two contrasting visions. The environment was one of chaos despite U.S. efforts to install some type of democratic government. The U.S. was not prepared to deal with the Korean situation. The main political force left was a conservative grouping of politicians. There were few differences regarding ideology and the only things to distinguish Korean politicians appeared to be personal characteristics. Their willingness to appeal to the public on these terms exacerbated this condition. Issues would be swept to the side in favor of personal infighting and tapping into traditional behavioral patterns of the public. None of this helped a competitive party system flourish.

In Taiwan, there was only one party. This party did not compete against any other parties, only individual politicians. Thus, the KMT never had to deal with political chaos. It didn't have to resort to the coping mechanisms chosen by Korean political parties. The precedent was set that political parties are enduring organizations, and didn't have the penchant to disappear and reappear at the drop of a hat.

Though the electoral laws are extremely divisive to political parties, it was able to stay together due to its internal organizational structure and highly centralized nature. In addition, Chiang had set up the party in such a way that many groups relied on him, and thus, he was the glue to the various factions, that could possibly cause divisions. It can be argued that both Chiangs had more personal support from their party members' than Rhee, Park, or Chun.

Also Chiang Kai-shek, made the party part of the nation's ideology. It was integral to taking over the Mainland. It was important to the R.O.C.'s survival and was almost interchangeable with the R.O.C. The KMT had lasting power and its leaders were committed to integrating the party into the daily lives of the citizens. Even, as the opposition politicians gained momentum, many Taiwanese chose to integrate themselves into the party, because it was viewed (and still is viewed) as a stepping-stone to success.

As stated before, however, parties are supposed to educate citizens to their political responsibilities, engage in conflict management, structure the

vote, maximize votes, organize the public will and represent the connecting link between the government and public opinion. Like South Korea, Taiwanese political parties have been more active in maximizing and structuring votes. The tang-wai and the DPP, to a lesser extent, however, have attempted to educate the public and connect the government to public opinion. The DPP was the first party to pursue using primaries to gauge the public's preferences. The DPP has also attempted to get the citizens more involved in the political process, which has been a hallmark of its agenda.

This does not negate the fact, however, that the KMT has been in control, not the DPP (until recently). The KMT has been in the position of power and has had more contact with the public than the DPP. Its initial aim was concentrated on structuring and maximizing the vote. It engaged in conflict management only so that its factions would not split off. The link that it had provided for the public was more through doling out patronage, than trying to listen and connect with the public on political issues. It has gradually tried to reach out more to the public so that its policies would come closer to mirroring the public's needs, but this has gone hand in hand with the democratization process.

Though the KMT has been very strong in the past, things are changing somewhat. The KMT, as an institution itself, has changed and an authoritarian hand no longer rules the KMT. The KMT is not as cohesive an organization as it once was. It no longer has a leader with enough power

within the party to control it and keep it together in the same manner as had been done in the past. More severely, during the Lee era, the KMT had been riddled with factions that were very divisive. This manifested in the formation of the New Party, splitting off from the KMT. The DPP is not immune to factions either and has struggled to agree on important issues due to factional squabbles.

These parties are all more enduring than political parties in South Korea, however. Nevertheless, it's important to mention that personalism has threatened to disrupt party unity in Taiwan as well (as it did in the case of James Soong running as an independent in the 2000 presidential election). In addition, Taiwan has had a history of independents running for office. This all weakens political parties to some extent. However, in the long run, in Taiwan, politicians believe that it is easier to attain power by working through and with political parties that are enduring institutions rather than running on their own. This deters them from engaging in the destructive cycles that political parties go through in South Korea.

Party Loyalty (or lack there of)

H. W. Kim hypothesized that one of the significant consequences to all of the many changes to the electoral systems, constant mergers, name changes and splits in South Korea has been low party loyalty (1992). Party loyalty reflects a voter's psychological closeness and attitude towards a

specific political party. Dalton has hypothesized that party loyalty is often used by voters as a short cut to learning about the many issues of the day, and affects their voting decisions, (1988). Adams and Merril, in studies of Norwegian and French elections hypothesized that issues such as party loyalty affect how the voter evaluates political parties (forthcoming). It has also been noted that party loyalty has been a strong factor influencing voting behavior in the U.S. with a staunch divide between the Republican and Democratic Parties.

Budge claimed that the parties in the U.S. are not only distinct, but also parties' supporters know where they stand (1983). Individuals in the U.S. have been loyal to parties for years, with party platforms signifying the basis by which parties are evaluated. In South Korea, this connection does not exist. Party loyalty is virtually non-existent.

Voter loyalty rests with individuals. This has worked unfavorably for the opposition. In 1985, the strength of individual candidates worked to the ruling parties' favor. Opposition parties received scattered support because individual opposition candidates had random support throughout the country, dividing the votes. Instead of banding together along a set of policy issues, and building a loyal following along these issues, opposition politicians built local support for themselves and relied on this support in elections.

Party loyalty has also been affected by the constant changes to the electoral system. This has led to a constant realignment of votes and support

as more votes are distributed to the ruling party in order to serve its needs. There is an absence of continuity. The constant changes to the electoral system affects the way that parties behave. They are now forced to compete in an environment and by rules that are constantly changing. This leaves little time to accustom themselves to the rules of the game and to figure out how to compete. They must adapt, and in this fight for survival they resort to tactics, mentioned above, that kill the chances for a loyal following based on institutions with a given platform.

The constant mergers, splits and name changes in Korea make it very difficult for voters to develop any loyalty. They are forced to simply follow certain names or charismatic individuals for any continuity. H. W. Kim claimed that the lack of predictability in party behavior goes hand in hand with a lack of predictability in voting behavior (1993). He claimed that this is voter volatility. Voters become volatile when they are manipulated by the politicians or influenced more so by traditional interests than partisan ones.

Regionalism becomes the only factor that can be predicted in election after election. Though there is no way to prove what new party may form or when a party will split, the one constant is that voters will follow a candidate from their native region and make their decisions based on this.

Conclusion-

As stated in the introduction, scholarly work on democratization is quite thorough. Many different factors have been hypothesized as integral to the transition to democracy, such as the role of a united elite, class relations, the military, culture and economic development, to name of a few. The bulk of the work on Taiwan and South Korea has focused on economic factors. This study has traced the democratization process of South Korea and Taiwan and specifically, has examined the role of elections and electoral systems.

Why are elections and electoral systems/laws important? Elections are an integral part of the democratic process. They help the citizens choose their leaders, who will guide them and make the decisions which will impact their lives. The credibility of the electoral process is contingent upon having regular, competitive, fair, and if need be, frequent elections. The legitimacy of this process is dependent upon how the electoral laws work and which ones have been implemented. Cultural and historical factors help point to how and why these laws were implemented. In addition, cultural factors also help explain how these laws function and why they function the way they do. This interaction between the electoral laws and culture helps explain political outcomes and how the political system functions as a whole.

In Taiwan and South Korea, these cultural factors interacted with the electoral laws with unique results. They bring different meanings to the laws

and have different effects on the laws. These cultural effects have important implications for why these laws are selected, changed or sustained.

In addition to the effects of the interaction between the laws and the cultural setting, this study explores the history in order to better understand why these laws were chosen in the first place. Why were the laws changed? Why were the laws sustained? What factors influenced their original implementation? This study answers these questions in order to better understand how the political systems function in these countries and the degree of democracy.

Both countries had indications that liberalization was occurring in that they held elections in some form or level since the early 1950's. But liberalization was not accompanied with democratization, which is indicated by how competitive elections are, the direct election of key offices, such as the president, and alteration in power. Thus, the changes to the electoral laws were a reflection of the overall progress of democratic reform. The reluctance and slow progress to reform, and changes in the electoral laws represented the state's/political leaders' overall reluctance to democratize, despite the knowledge that it needed to be done.

In addition, in examining the transitions in South Korea and Taiwan, the study finds that their paths to democracy were quite different. In the case of Taiwan, the leadership was reluctant to democratize because it believed that it was in a catch-22 situation. Though liberalization and democratization

might have been necessary to protect the legitimacy of KMT rule, it would also bring that legitimacy into risk. Given the historical background of the KMT's rule in Taiwan, its legitimacy was always in question from the beginning. This question of legitimacy was partially rectified by economic development and "taiwanization" of the party, but as these forces developed on their own, more pressures were brought on the KMT to democratize. Thus, the changes came from the top and trickled down.

In the case of South Korea, the public, through the process of voting in elections had become more accustomed with democratic practices and was determined to have more involvement in setting the rules. The leadership, on the other hand, had no intention of democratizing and was more concerned with consolidating power, under the justification that total order was necessary for security reasons. South Korean leaders, most specifically Park and Chun, believed that they could attain legitimacy by maintaining order in South Korea and developing the country economically. Nevertheless, the pressure from the opposition members, the public, students and, to a lesser extent, the U.S., forced South Korea to completely overhaul the electoral laws in a way that could ensure competitive, fair, and democratic elections. The leaders in South Korea had little choice when they chose to democratize. If they did not respond, the results could have been disastrous. Thus, it was a bubble-up process.

The liberalization process is ongoing, but by witnessing the most recent elections in both countries, the prognosis looks very positive. This study has demonstrated that both South Korea and Taiwan differ from Western democratic countries regarding representation, issue saliency, and the nature of political parties. Moreover, this study argues that representation does not occur through the various models hypothesized by scholars who have focused on Western democratic countries, but through a *patron-client* model. The nature of political parties and the importance of issue saliency also differ from political parties in Western countries as well. Thus, utilizing previous models and hypotheses to explain political behavior in Taiwan and South Korea is still premature.

The key factor for South Korea is the presence of regionalism and personalism. Hopefully, with the implementation of local autonomy, the former will slowly wane in importance during elections. For Taiwan, the electoral process would be greatly improved with an overhaul to the electoral system, which currently encourages vote buying and other election irregularities. Though these changes may not come any time soon, they would make a positive impact on the democratization process.

Both of these countries have gone through tremendous transformations that are equally as impressive as their economic achievements. Though many of the aspects of South Korean and Taiwanese politics differ from Western democratic countries, more research will be

**needed to examine representation, issue saliency and political party behavior
in the future.**

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